In the Matter of Blomquist

In the Matter of Jefferson Blomquist, No. 1779, Sept. Term, 2024. Opinion by Arthur, J.

STATE PERSONNEL AND PENSIONS—EMPLOYEES’ PENSION
RETIREMENT SYSTEM

In general, Harford County employees must participate in the Employees’ Pension
Retirement System. These employees must contribute seven percent of their income to
the Employees’ Pension System, and the employer must make matching contributions on
the employee’s behalf. Officials that have been “elected or appointed for a fixed term”
may, however, opt out of participation in the Employees’ Pension System. Md. Code
(1993, 2024 Repl. Vol.), § 23-201(a)(3) of the State Personnel and Pensions Article.

In this case, the appellant is the Harford County Attorney. He argues that he, like the
Harford County Executive, should be allowed to opt out of participation in the
Employees’ Pension System.

Although the appellant is an appointed official, he is not elected or appointed for a “fixed
term.” In contrast to the Harford County Executive, who serves from a date certain to
another date certain four years later, the beginning and ending dates of the County’s
Attorney’s term are variable, not fixed. The County Attorney takes office at some point
after an appointment by the County Executive. If the Council does not confirm the
appointee, the term ends. The County Attorney serves at the pleasure of the County
Executive, so the County Executive can end the County Attorney’s term at any time for
any reason that is not independently unlawful. The County Attorney may remain in the
position for a period of time even after the County Executive’s term ends. And the next
County Executive may reappoint the County Attorney to continue to serve in the next
administration. In short, unlike an elected official, the County Attorney does not have a
“fixed term” and is therefore not able to opt out of the Employees’ Pension System.
Circuit Court for Harford County
Case No. C-12-CV-24-000287

REPORTED*

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 1779

September Term, 2024

______________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF JEFFERSON BLOMQUIST

______________________________________

Arthur,
Beachley,
Sharer, J. Frederick
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.
______________________________________

Opinion by Arthur, J.
______________________________________

Filed: January 29, 2026

Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal
Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State
Government Article) this document is authentic.

2026.01.29
14:15:10 -05'00'
Gregory Hilton, Clerk
As a general rule, employees of Harford County must participate in the

Employees’ Pension Retirement System. See Maryland Code (1993, 2024 Repl. Vol.), §

23-201(a)(3) of the State Personnel and Pensions Article (“SPP”); id. § 23-203; id. § 31-

102. Membership is, however, “optional” for an employee who is “an official, elected or

appointed for a fixed term[.]” Id. § 23-204(a)(1)(i).

In this case, the Harford County Attorney contends that he is “an official . . .

appointed for a fixed term” and thus that he need not participate in the Employees’

Pension System (“EPS”). The Maryland State Retirement Agency determined that the

County Attorney was not appointed for a fixed term. On judicial review, the Circuit

Court for Harford County affirmed the agency’s determination.

The County Attorney appealed. We too affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Robert G. Cassilly took office as the County Executive for Harford County on

December 5, 2022, and appointed Jefferson Blomquist as the Harford County Attorney

on that same day. Though Blomquist began serving as the County Attorney on the day of

his appointment, the Harford County Council did not confirm his appointment until

December 20, 2022.

Blomquist is in his late sixties. If he is required to participate in the EPS, his

interest will not vest until he has served for 10 years. See SPP § 29-303(b-1)(2)(ii).

Because of his age, and because the County Executive who appointed him can serve no
more than two, four-year terms, 1 Blomquist is unlikely to vest in the system.
0F

Nonetheless, if he is required to participate, he must contribute seven percent of his salary

to the system. See SPP § 23-212(d). 2 1F

Blomquist contended that—like the County Executive—he served for a fixed

term, so he did not enroll in EPS. Within a matter of months, however, the Executive

Director of the Maryland State Retirement Agency explained to Blomquist that he was

not eligible for optional membership because he is not an official serving a fixed term.

The Executive Director reasoned that “the County Attorney serves at the pleasure of the

County Executive and does not have any term of office fixed by statute or ordinance.”

Blomquist submitted a request for administrative review of that determination and

requested a hearing. In response to his request, the agency issued a proposed summary

decision, concluding again that the County Attorney does not serve for a fixed term. The

agency’s Board of Trustees adopted the proposed summary decision at a hearing on

March 19, 2024. Blomquist petitioned for judicial review.

On October 9, 2024, the Circuit Court for Harford County affirmed the Board’s

decision. The court reasoned that the County Attorney’s term is not fixed but is instead

“a moving target depending upon when the person is appointed[]” and confirmed. The

1
Harford County Charter § 304.
2
If, however, Blomquist leaves his employment with Harford County before he
vests in the EPS, the system must return his contributions, SPP § 29-303(j)(1),
presumably with compounded interest at the statutory rate of five percent per annum. See
SPP § 23-213(a).

2
court also reasoned that the County Attorney’s term is of “uncertain duration” because he

“serves at the discretion of the County Executive[.]”

Blomquist filed a timely notice of appeal. 3
2F

QUESTION PRESENTED

Blomquist presents one question for review: “Whether the County Attorney serves

for a fixed term[,] thereby entitling him to elect nonparticipation in the Employees’

Pension System[.]”

We answer that the County Attorney does not serve for a fixed term. The County

Attorney serves for a variable length of time depending on when the County Executive

makes the appointment, whether and when the County Council confirms the appointment,

whether or when the County Executive exercises his discretion to relieve the County

Attorney of his duties, and whether the County Attorney is reappointed by a new County

Executive and reconfirmed by the County Council.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing the final decision of an administrative agency, this Court “looks

through” the circuit court’s decision and “evaluates the decision of the agency.” People’s

Counsel for Baltimore Cty. v. Surina, 400 Md. 662, 681 (2007); see Bd. of Trs. for Fire &

Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Mitchell, 145 Md. App. 1, 8 (2002) (stating that “our role” in

reviewing an administrative decision “is precisely the same as that of the circuit court”)

3
Blomquist’s employer, Harford County, is required to make a matching
contribution to his pension. At oral argument, we were informed that Harford County has
agreed to make its contribution. Harford County is not a party to this case.

3
(internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, this Court reviews the decision of the

agency itself, and not the decision of the circuit court. Mitchell v. Maryland Motor

Vehicle Admin., 225 Md. App. 529, 543 (2015), aff’d, 450 Md. 282 (2016).

The agency’s decision is “‘presumed valid.’” Board of Physician Quality

Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 68 (1999) (quoting CBS Inc. v. Comptroller, 319 Md.

687, 698 (1990)). This Court’s review of the agency’s decision is “‘limited to

determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the

agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is

premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.’” Id. at 67-68 (quoting United Parcel

Serv., Inc. v. People’s Counsel for Balt. Cty., 336 Md. 569, 577 (1994)). “We review

purely legal decisions de novo.” Mayor & Council of Rockville v. Pumphrey, 218 Md.

App. 160, 194 (2014) (citing People’s Ins. Counsel Div. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins.

Co., 214 Md. App. 438, 449 (2013)).

“The phrase ‘errors of law’ encompasses a variety of legal challenges, including:

(1) the constitutionality of an agency’s decision; (2) whether the agency had jurisdiction

to consider the matter; (3) whether the agency correctly interpreted and applied

applicable case law; (4) and whether the agency correctly interpreted an applicable statute

or regulation.” Comptroller v. FC-Gen Ops. Investments LLC, 482 Md. 343, 360 (2022).

“Although we do not apply any agency deference when undertaking a review of the first

three types of legal challenges, we occasionally apply agency deference when reviewing

errors of law related to the fourth category.” Id.

4
DISCUSSION

Blomquist argues that he, as Harford County Attorney, is an “official . . .

appointed for a fixed term” and therefore that he is entitled to elect not to participate in

the EPS. We disagree.

The parties agree that Blomquist is an official. The parties further agree that if

Blomquist is not appointed for a fixed term, he must become a member of the EPS.

Therefore, the issue is whether the agency correctly concluded that Blomquist is not

appointed for a fixed term, within the meaning of that term in SPP section 23-204(a).

In interpreting a statute, “‘we begin with the normal, plain meaning of the

language of the statute.’” Elsberry v. Stanley Martin Cos., LLC, 482 Md. 159, 178-79

(2022) (quoting Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 275 (2010)); accord Abell

Foundation v. Baltimore Dev. Corp., 262 Md. App. 657, 694 (2024). “The meaning of

the ‘plain language’ is controlled by the context in which it appears.” Abell Foundation

v. Baltimore Dev. Corp., 262 Md. App. at 694. “‘If there is no ambiguity in the language,

either inherently or by reference to other relevant laws or circumstances, the inquiry as to

legislative intent ends.’” 75-80 Props., L.L.C. v. Rale, Inc., 470 Md. 598, 624 (2020)

(quoting Lillian C. Blentlinger, LLC v. Cleanwater Linganore, Inc., 456 Md. 272, 294

(2017)); accord Abell Foundation v. Baltimore Dev. Corp., 262 Md. App. at 694.

“‘In seeking to apply the plain[ ]meaning rule, it is proper [for a Maryland court]

to consult a dictionary or dictionaries for a term’s ordinary and popular meaning.’”

Minh-Vu Hoang v. Lowery, 469 Md. 95, 120 (2020) (quoting Ali v. CIT Tech. Fin. Servs.,

Inc., 416 Md. 249, 262 (2010)); accord Abell Foundation v. Baltimore Dev. Corp., 262

5
Md. App. at 694. “‘In choosing the dictionary or dictionaries from which to glean

assistance, we consult those editions (in addition to current editions) of dictionaries that

were extant at the time of the pertinent legislative enactments.’” Minh-Vu Hoang v.

Lowery, 469 Md. at 120 (quoting Ali v. CIT Tech. Fin. Servs., Inc., 416 Md. at 262);

accord Abell Foundation v. Baltimore Dev. Corp., 262 Md. App. at 694.

“Fixed,” according to Merriam Webster, means “not subject to change or

fluctuation[.]” Fixed, Merriam Webster, https://www.m-w.com/dictionary/fixed.

“Term,” according to Merriam Webster, means “a limited or definite extent of time[.]”

Term, Merriam Webster, https://www.m-w.com/dictionary/term.

A plain language reading of “fixed term” indicates that the County Attorney does

not serve for a fixed term. The County Attorney’s term length, start date, and end date

are all variable, not fixed.

The County Attorney is the head of the Department of Law, which is an executive

agency. Harford County Charter § 402. Section 313 of the Harford County Charter

governs the County Attorney’s appointment:

The County Executive shall appoint a single officer to head each agency of
the Executive Branch, as well as deputy directors of an agency, subject to
confirmation by the Council, as required by Section 223 of this Charter, and
such officer and deputies may be removed at the discretion of the County
Executive. Within six months after each election for County Executive, the
County Executive shall appoint for confirmation or reconfirmation, as the
case may be, all heads of each agency and deputy directors, of the
Executive Branch . . . subject to confirmation by the Council as required by
Section 223 of this Charter, and may remove the same in accordance with
this Charter or other applicable law.

6
Under section 313, the County Executive has six months after an election in which

to appoint the County Attorney: the County Executive need not appoint the County

Attorney on any fixed date within that six-month period. Thus, the beginning of the

Attorney’s term is variable, not fixed, in that it depends on when, during the six months

after the election, the County Executive makes the appointment.

Moreover, the appointment of the County Attorney is subject to confirmation by

the County Council. Harford County Charter § 313; id. § 223(a). The Council may

tacitly confirm the appointment by failing to act within 30 days of its submission by the

County Executive. Id. § 223(a). If, however, the Council rejects the appointment within

30 days of its submission, then the appointment is effectively nullified, and the County

Attorney’s term comes to an end. Id. Because the Charter envisions that the Council

may reject the appointment on some indefinite date as much as seven months after the

election, the end of the County Attorney’s term, like the beginning, is variable, not fixed.

The end of the term is also variable because the County Attorney “may be

removed at the discretion of the County Executive.” Harford County Charter § 313.

Blomquist himself agrees that “the County Attorney, like all Executive Branch agency

heads[,] serves at the pleasure of the County Executive.” “The operative phrase—‘serves

at the pleasure of’—is commonly understood to refer to employment at will.” Clough v.

Mayor & City Council of Hurlock, 445 Md. 364, 373 (2015). Thus, because the County

Attorney is an at-will employee, the County Executive may remove him at any time for

any reason (or at least for any reason that does not contravene a statutory limitation on

the employer’s discretion or a clear mandate of public policy). It follows that the County

7
Attorney does not have a fixed term, but one that varies as a function of the County

Executive’s discretionary decision to allow the County Attorney to remain in the

position.

Blomquist argues that the County Attorney’s term “mirrors that of the County

Executive[,]” who unquestionably does serve for a fixed term. He is incorrect. The

County Executive “serve[s] for a term beginning at noon on the first Monday in

December next following election, and ending at noon on the first Monday in December

in the fourth year thereafter.” Harford County Charter § 304. Although the current

County Executive happened to appoint Blomquist on the first Monday in December

following the election, the County Executive was not required to do so: he had six

months from the date of the election (or about another five months) in which to make the

appointment. In addition, as previously explained, the end date of Blomquist’s term was

and is variable rather than fixed, because the County Council had the option not to

confirm him and because the County Executive still has the discretion to dismiss him at

any time. And, as Blomquist acknowledges, section 313 of the County Charter envisions

that the County Attorney may remain in the post for up to six months after a new County

Executive takes office—so the County Attorney’s potential period of service is not

necessarily coterminous with that of the incumbent County Executive. In short, unlike

the County Executive, whose term has a specific and ascertainable beginning and end, the

Harford County Attorney does not have a fixed term.

Blomquist argues that the “outer limits” of his term are specified, because, he says,

the County Attorney cannot serve longer than four years and six months. Blomquist’s

8
argument does not address the more fundamental problems with his position—the County

Attorney does not take office on any specific date, the County Council can terminate the

appointment by refusing to confirm the County Attorney within 30 days after the

submission of the appointment, and the County Attorney serves at the pleasure of the

County Executive and thus can be relieved of his duties at any time. In any event,

Blomquist is incorrect in asserting that a County Attorney can serve no more than four

years and six months: the County Attorney may continue in office if the County

Executive is reelected, and the County Attorney may be reappointed by the next County

Executive, as has happened on at least one occasion. 4 3F

Blomquist argues that the agency’s interpretation of SPP section 23-204(a)(1)

impermissibly inserts language into the statute. In his view, the agency has interpreted

the phrase “official . . . appointed for a fixed term” to mean “official . . . appointed for a

fixed term that has a definitive start date and a definitive end date” or “appointed from a

date certain until a later date certain.” We disagree that the agency has inserted language

into the statute. The agency has simply interpreted the meaning of the words “fixed

term” to conclude, correctly in our judgment, that a “fixed term” does not mean a term

that has no definitive start date, no definitive end date, and no defined duration, and is

terminable at will.

4
Blomquist’s brief states that Robert McCord served as the County Attorney from
2004 to 2014, a period that would have spanned the terms of at least two County
Executives.

9
Blomquist attempts to minimize his status as an at-will employee by arguing that

“[a]ll public officials, whether elected or appointed, may be removed from office before

their fixed term expires.” He cites Article XV, section 2, of the Maryland Constitution,

which dictates that elected officials are removed from office as a matter of law if they are

convicted of certain crimes. Blomquist’s argument overlooks the fundamental distinction

between an at-will employee, who can be fired at any time for virtually any reason, and

an official whose fixed term is defeasible only upon the occurrence of some extraordinary

event, such as a criminal conviction.

Without citation to any authority, Blomquist asserts that “[t]he commonly

understood definition of the phrase ‘fixed term’ is a period of time with a determinable

beginning and ending.” We might agree, were the dates determinable in advance. Here,

however, they are not. The County Attorney takes office at some point after an

appointment by the County Executive and confirmation by the County Council, neither of

which must occur on any date certain. Furthermore, the County Attorney may leave

office on any number of different dates, including when the incumbent County Executive

relieves him of his duties, which he can do at any time, or when a new County Executive

appoints a new County Attorney. Again, the County Attorney is not “appointed . . . for a

fixed term.”

Blomquist cites the legislative history of the 2015 legislation that extended the

vesting period from five years to ten but allowed some local elected and appointed

officials to opt out. Quoting the 2014 Interim Report of the Joint Committee on

Pensions, Blomquist writes that if those local elected and appointed officials could not

10
opt out, they would “have to serve two and one-half terms before becoming eligible for

retirement”—i.e., before they would obtain a vested interest in a pension. Blomquist

stresses the Joint Committee’s concern that, unless those officials could opt out, the law

would impose a financial burden on the employers, which, unlike their employees, 5 do 4F

not receive a return of their matching contributions if the employee leaves before vesting.

Ordinarily, we need not consider legislative history if, as in this case, the text of

the statute in question is unambiguous. “Only if the words of the statute are ambiguous

need we seek the Legislature’s intent in the legislative history or other extraneous

sources.” Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 366 Md. 295, 302 (2001).

“[T]he resort to legislative history is a confirmatory process; it is not undertaken to

contradict the plain meaning of the statute.” Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v.

Chase, 360 Md. 121, 131 (2000).

But even if we considered the cited portions of legislative history, our conclusion

would not change. The Joint Report expresses solicitude for local governments, which

might have to make pension contributions that they will be unable to recover if an official

leaves office after less than 10 years (as many elected officials must). In this case,

however, the local government—Harford County—does not challenge the agency’s

conclusion that Blomquist was not “appointed for a fixed term” and that the County must

make unrefundable contributions on his behalf. See supra n.3. Blomquist cannot argue

5
SPP § 29-303(j)(1).

11
that the agency’s interpretation disadvantages his employer when his employer has

deigned not to make that argument.

Blomquist’s most compelling argument is that, because he is in his late sixties, and

because he was appointed by an elected official who can serve for only eight years, he is

virtually certain not to serve for 10 years and thus virtually certain never to vest in the

ERS—yet, he must lend seven percent of his income to the EPS for the duration of his

employment. Blomquist’s argument could be extended to encompass many other

qualified people who might be deterred from leaving the private sector for a temporary

stint in public service because they will have to take a seven percent pay cut (in addition

to the pay cut that they may take in moving temporarily to the public sector). The short

answer to this argument, compelling as it is, is that it is best directed to the General

Assembly. The County Attorney’s term does not become “fixed” merely because of the

unlikelihood that Blomquist will serve long enough to vest in the EPS.

In response to a question at oral argument, the agency identified many officials

who are “appointed for a fixed term” and, thus, are permitted not to participate in the

EPS. Those officials include: the appointed members of the Maryland Small Business

Development Financing Authority, who have five-year terms; 6 the appointed members of
5F

the Maryland Community Investment Corporation, who have four-year terms; 7 the 6F

6
Md. Code (2008, 2024 Repl. Vol.), § 5-506(b)(1) of the Economic Development
Article.

Md. Code (2008, 2024 Repl. Vol.), § 10-1105(f)(1) of the Economic
7

Development Article.

12
appointed members and the educator-member of the Juvenile Services Education Board,

who have four-year terms; 8 and the appointed members of the Maryland Transportation
7F

Authority, who have four-year terms. 9 Each of these appointees serves for a term of a
8F

specific duration that is fixed by statute; the County Attorney of Harford County does

not.

In summary, a term that may fluctuate depending on the appointment date, the

confirmation date, and the will of the present and possibly the future County Executive

cannot be considered a “fixed term.” Therefore, the County Attorney does not serve a

fixed term and may not opt out of the EPS.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR HARFORD COUNTY AFFIRMED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.

8
Md. Code (2008, 2024 Repl. Vol.), § 9-503(b)(2) of the Human Services Article
(educator-member); id. § 9-503(d)(1) (appointed members).
9
Md. Code (1977, 2020 Repl. Vol.), § 4-202(c)(1) of the Transportation Article.

13