Elisa Koppelman v. Board of Assessors of the City of Amesbury (October 2, 2012)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPELLATE TAX BOARD

ELISA KOPPELMAN                 v.         BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF   THE CITY OF AMESBURY
Docket No. F314355	  Promulgated:
	  October 2, 2012


This is an appeal under the formal procedure, pursuant to G.L. c. 58A, § 7 and G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65, from the refusal of the Board of Assessors of the City of Amesbury (the "appellee" or the "assessors") to abate taxes on condominium unit number four, which is located at 206 Main Street in Amesbury (the "subject unit") and is owned by and assessed to Elisa Koppelman (the "appellant") under G.L. c. 59, §§ 11 and 38, for fiscal year 2011.
Commissioner Mulhern heard this appeal.  Chairman Hammond and Commissioners Scharaffa, Rose, and Chmielinski joined him in the revised decision for the appellant.  The revised decision is promulgated simultaneously herewith.  
These findings of fact and report are made pursuant to a request by the appellee under G.L. c. 58A, § 13 and 831 CMR 1.32.

Elisa Koppelman and Nicholas Cracknell, pro se, for the appellant.
Mary T. Marino, Chief Assessor, for the appellee.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT
	The essential facts in this appeal are not in dispute.  The parties do contest, however, the effects and extent of certain affordable housing restrictions and concomitant mortgage-interest benefits on the fair cash value of the subject unit.  The appellant asserts that the assessed value attributed to the subject unit is excessive because it does not account for the negative impact on value caused by the affordable housing restrictions.  The assessors maintain that the subject unit's assessed value is appropriate because the restrictions do not specifically establish a maximum sale price.  
At the hearing of this appeal, both the appellant and her spouse, Nicholas Cracknell, testified and introduced seven exhibits.  The exhibits include: (1) a chart entitled - "an affordable housing unit"; (2) a chart entitled - "determining fair market value for an affordable housing unit"; (3) a letter from the Department of Revenue ("DOR"), Division of Local Services; (4) a DOR publication; (5) a comparison of "restricted fair market rate value and assessed value"; (6) 70% Annual Median Family Income ("AMI") purchase price limits; and (7) 80% AMI purchase price limits.  
Mary Marino, Amesbury's Chief Assessor, testified for the assessors.  The assessors introduced into evidence: (1) the requisite jurisdictional documents; (2) the subject unit's property record card; (3) a letter dated January 12, 2012, addressed to Ms. Marino, from the Director of Amesbury's Housing Rehabilitation Program; and (4) a chart depicting a "total assessed value savings of $171,360" over a twenty-year period assuming the "[initial] value of the [subject unit's] deed restriction" equates with the $22,400 principal amount of the appellant's no-interest loan (the "subject loan") and then decreases by 5% each year.  This chart also contains an "example home loan" which shows a hypothetical interest savings of $13,079 for the subject loan amortized over its twenty-year loan term at five-percent simple interest.   Copies of the Rent Regulatory Agreement and the Affordable Housing Restriction instrument with the registry recording stamp affixed were included in the attachments to the Application for Abatement and Petition, which are part of the jurisdictional documents.     
Based on this record, the Appellate Tax Board (the "Board") made the following findings of fact.
	On January 1, 2010, the valuation and assessment date for fiscal year 2011, the fiscal year at issue in this appeal, the appellant was the assessed owner of the subject unit.  For assessing purposes, the subject unit is identified on map 65 as unit 30B.  The subject unit is part of a four-unit condominium-conversion project that includes two parcels and two buildings and was completed in 2006.
For fiscal year 2011, the assessors valued the subject unit at $227,300 and assessed a tax thereon, at the rate of $18.46 per thousand, in the amount of $4,195.96.  Amesbury's Treasurer/Collector mailed the fiscal year 2011 real estate tax bills on December 31, 2010.  The appellant timely paid the tax without incurring interest. 	
In accordance with G.L. c. 59, § 59, the appellant timely filed an Application for Abatement on February 1, 2011.  In her application, the appellant sought an abatement claiming that the subject unit was overvalued because the assessors had valued it as a market-rate unit instead of as an affordable-housing unit. On April 14, 2011, the assessors denied the appellant's request for abatement, and on July 14, 2011, the appellant seasonably appealed the denial to the Board.  On this basis, the Board found and ruled that it had jurisdiction over this appeal.
The three-story subject unit contains 1,397 square feet of living space along with a total of five rooms, including two bedrooms, as well as one full bathroom and one half bathroom.  According to the subject unit's property record card, the kitchen is "above standard," and the bathrooms are "modern."  The floors are either hardwood or ceramic tile.  The subject unit is heated by a forced-hot-air system fueled by gas and is cooled by a central air-conditioning system.  For amenities, the subject unit has a 380-square-foot garage, two additional parking spaces, a deck, and access to and use of a large fenced-in yard.
When the appellant purchased the subject unit in 2006 for $130,000, it consisted of approximately 800 square feet of living space that included only one bedroom.  In 2007, the appellant obtained no-interest financing, in the principal amount of $22,400, through the Amesbury Housing Rehabilitation Program and converted the subject unit into a two-bedroom apartment by finishing the attic.  As a condition for the favorable financing, the appellant executed with Amesbury a Rent Regulatory Agreement and an Affordable Housing Restriction instrument.  The Rent Regulatory Agreement requires an income-eligible renter and restricts the initial "maximum allowable rent" after a $180.00 utility allowance to $1,028.00 per month with highly regulated and limited rent increases.  While the Affordable Housing Restriction instrument does not contain an actual monetary limit on the sale price of the subject unit during the restricted period or a right-of-first-refusal constraint, it nonetheless provides that "the [subject unit] shall be marketed as Affordable Housing for purchase exclusively by Families . . . whose annual incomes are eighty percent (80%) or less of the median income for the Area ("Low Income Families") based on family size as determined by HUD."  These restrictions and limitations as well as others contained in the Affordable Housing Restriction instrument are duly recorded deed restrictions that run with the subject unit, thereby binding the appellant and any subsequent purchasers until March 20, 2027 regardless of whether the financing through Amesbury is prepaid.  
The January 17, 2012 letter from the Director of the Amesbury Housing Rehabilitation Program to Ms. Marino contains the Director's understanding of the gist of the Affordable Housing Restriction instrument.  Her letter provides, in pertinent part, that: 
The Affordable Housing Restriction insures that a property receiving housing rehabilitation assistance will be retained as affordable rental housing for occupancy by low and very low-income families by restricting the amount of rent charged for the rental unit, and the income of the tenants who will rent the unit.  The Affordability Restriction encumbers the property and not the property owner, and continues in force for its stated term regardless of repayment of the Housing Program Assistance Loan.  

The letter, however, goes on to provide that:

The recorded Affordable Housing Restriction does not require the property to be sold as an affordable Housing Ownership Unit, however, the affordable rental restriction would continue at point of property transfer until the stated term has been satisfied.  There is no established maximum sales price restriction set by the DHCD.

As explained in greater detail, infra, the Board found that this latter interpretation, which forms the basis of the assessors' assertion that the subject unit could be sold at a market-based value without regard to any affordable housing restrictions, is a distinction without a practical difference from restrictions which literally contain a maximum-sale-price provision.  Moreover, the Board found that the Director's interpretation was faulty.  Furthermore, because the Director of Amesbury's Rehabilitation Program did not appear and testify at the hearing of this appeal and was therefore not available for cross-examination by the appellant or for questioning by the Board and because the provisions of the Affordable Housing Restriction instrument which the Director interpreted in her letter were part of the record before the Board, the Board gave no weight to the Director's interpretations.  
The Board found that the Rent Regulatory Agreement not only limits the initial maximum allowable rent to $1,028.00 with highly regulated and limited rental increases but it also requires the subject unit to be rented to "tenants holding Section 8 Existing Housing Certificates, Chapter 707 Certificates, or other recognized housing voucher certificate[s]."   These rent limitations or restrictions run "for a period of twenty years" - until March 20, 2027.  
The Affordable Housing Restriction instrument specifically states that "[it] regulat[es] and restrict[s] the use, occupancy and transfer of the [subject unit]; and that "the [subject unit] shall be used as the location for an affordable housing unit" and "shall be marketed as Affordable Housing for purchase exclusively by [income-eligible] Families."  Furthermore, the covenants, restrictions and limitations in the Affordable Housing Restriction instrument "shall be and are covenants that run with the [subject unit]" and "shall bind [the appellant] and [her] successors and assigns [until March 20, 2027]."  This instrument is recorded at the appropriate registry of deeds.  On this basis, the Board found that the plain language in the provisions contained in the Rent Regulatory Agreement and Affordable Housing Restriction instrument serve to limit the universe of both potential renters and buyers of the subject unit, for the remaining term of the subject loan regardless of prepayment, to those who are income-eligible.    
The Board further found that, even if it adopted the Director of Amesbury's Housing Rehabilitation Program's more limited interpretations of the provisions of the Affordable Housing Restriction instrument -- those interpretations being that the subject unit does not have to be sold as an affordable housing unit and does not have a maximum sales price -- they would not change the effect of the Board's finding here.  The Board concluded that because of the rent restrictions alone there are essentially only two classes of potential buyers for the subject unit: (1) a buyer/landlord who would only pay an amount that was largely financially consistent with the subject unit's long-term restricted earning capacity and (2) a buyer/occupant who would have to be an income-eligible occupant.  Therefore, assuming, arguendo, that the Affordable Housing Restriction instrument only limits the rent but not the sale price, the Board still found that, under the circumstances here, the effect of the long-term limited rental income alone served to similarly limit the sale price for the fiscal year at issue.
Moreover, the Board found that the appellant's evidence amply demonstrated, by using Massachusetts Department of Housing and Community Development Purchase Price Limits Schedules coupled with reasonable assumptions regarding mortgage-interest and tax rates, a mortgage term, certain expenses, and target household size, that the indicated maximum sales price for the subject unit as of the relevant valuation and assessment date was approximately $180,000.  The assessors did not directly contest this methodology.  The following tables essentially reproduce the appellant's exhibit 7 -- the "80% AMI - 3 Person Household" schedule.
Purchase Price Limits
Housing Costs:
Maximum Sales Price	$180,000	
Down Payment (5%)	$9,000	
Mortgage	$171,000	
Interest Rate	4.50%	
Amortization	30 years	
Monthly P&I Payments	$866.43	
Tax Rate	$17.77	
Monthly Property Tax	$267	
Hazard Insurance	$60	
PMI	$111	
Condo/HOA fees (if applicable)	$150	
Monthly Housing Cost	$1,454	
Necessary Income	$58,165	

Household Income:

Number of Bedrooms	2	
Sample Household Size	3	
80% AMI/"Low-Income" Limit	$58,000	
Target Housing Cost (80% AMI)	$1,450	
10% Window	$50,750	
Target Housing Cost (70%) AMI	$1,269	

The Board found, however, that this indicated maximum sales price, while relevant, underestimated the subject unit's fair cash value for the fiscal year at issue because it ignored certain benefits accruing to the appellant, such as mortgage-interest savings, and those benefits accruing to any owner, such as the steadily declining term of the restrictions.  In making this finding, the Board recognized, however, that while the mortgage-interest savings might well be intangible in nature,  their inclusion in the valuation determination was necessary to provide a more complete financial picture of the affordable-housing property.  Accordingly, and as explained more fully in the Opinion below, the Board determined that $185,000 more accurately reflected the fair cash value of the subject unit for assessment purposes for the fiscal year at issue after taking into consideration not only the restrictions and limitations but also the benefits associated with the subject loan, the Rent Regulatory Agreement, and the Affordable Housing Restriction instrument.  
The Board, therefore, reduced the assessment by $42,300, decided this appeal for the appellant, and granted a tax abatement in the amount of $780.86.

OPINION
		The assessors are required to assess real estate at its fair cash value.  G.L. c. 59, § 38.  Fair cash value is defined as the price on which a willing seller and a willing buyer will agree if both of them are fully informed and under no compulsion.  Boston Gas Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 334 Mass. 549, 566 (1956).  "The 'fair cash value' standard established by G.L. c. 59, § 38 cannot be varied by public officers or by agreement of the parties, but must be adhered to rigidly."  Hampton Associates v. Assessors of Northhampton, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 1998-770, 787 (citing Carr v. Assessors of Springfield, 339 Mass. 89, 91 (1959) and Waltham Watch and Clock Co., 272 Mass. 396, 412 (1930)), aff'd, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 110 (2001).  In determining the fair cash value of a property, the purposes for which it is adapted are relevant considerations.  Boston Gas Co., 334 Mass. at 566.  
While neither the General Court, in the form of legislation, nor the Department of Revenue, in the form of regulations or other official pronouncements, have addressed how to value real estate encumbered with deed, lease, or other contractual restrictions for assessment purposes, the case law has provided some guidance in this regard.  Essentially, restrictions affecting the use of the property should be considered when valuing real estate for assessment purposes.  See, e.g., Lodge v. Swampscott, 216 Mass. 260, 263 (1913)(holding that a deed restriction prohibiting building any structure on the land reduced its fair cash value); Parkinson v. Assessors of Medfield, 398 Mass. 112, 115-16 (1986)(holding that the effect of a conservation restriction must be taken into account in determining the fair cash value of property); Mashpee Wampanoag Indian Tribal Council, Inc. v. Assessors of Mashpee, 379 Mass. 420, 422 (1980)(holding that "the existence of restrictions on the use of property may reduce its value below that which would be appropriate in the absence of such restrictions.").  Conversely, private contracts affecting the income or return that a particular owner may derive from real estate should not be considered.  See, e.g., Donovan v. Haverhill, 247 Mass. 69, 72 (1923)(holding that a long-term, disadvantageous lease does not constitute an encumbrance that diminishes the property's value for tax-assessment purposes); Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 397 Mass. 447, 450 (1986)(holding that property should be valued as though it were not "encumbered by an uneconomic lease").  Cf. Sisk v. Assessors of Essex, 426 Mass. 651, 654-55 (1998)(holding that "a proper valuation of the taxpayers' real property requires the assessors to consider the value of the entire estate unencumbered by [town-imposed restrictions] in the lease").    
An exception to this latter rule -- the exception being that governmental policies or actions that regulate the return a property can produce and also promote an important public interest must be taken into account in valuing real estate.  See, e.g., Assessors of Weymouth v. Tammy Brook Co., 368 Mass. 810 (1975)(rescript opinion)(holding that in valuing real estate for assessment purposes, it was appropriate to consider Federal restrictions on the income that could be realized from a project); Community Development Co. of Gardner v. Assessors of Gardner, 377 Mass. 351, 356 (1979)(holding that the rent restrictions placed by federal regulations on the rent the company could receive from the housing project had to be taken into account in valuing the property).   Accordingly, this Board has ruled in several relatively recent appeals that when determining fair cash value, the unique status of governmentally regulated affordable-housing units, and the restrictions and benefits attendant thereto, must be considered.  See Hampton Associates, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 1998-790 ("Thus, Massachusetts considers contributions of rental subsidies, accelerated depreciation and special financing as well as restrictions imposed on properties as affecting the overall values of such properties.").  See also Trueheart v. Assessors of Montague, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 1999-158, 170 (ruling that "deed restrictions must be considered in arriving at the fair cash value of the subject properties" because "[a] willing, informed buyer . . . is presumed to know that . . . he or she will be limited to a maximum resale price based on the discount rate applicable to the property"). 
The Board found in this appeal that the provisions contained in the Rent Regulatory Agreement and the Affordable Housing Restriction instrument serve to limit the universe of potential renters and buyers of the subject unit to those who are income-eligible.  The Board also found and ruled that the appellant's voluntary participation in the government-sponsored affordable housing program is not controlling here.  See generally Hampton Associates, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 1998-770; cf. Parkinson, 398 Mass. 112 (holding that the effect of a voluntary conservation restriction must be taken into account in determining the fair cash value of property).  As a result, the Board further found that by using Massachusetts Department of Housing and Community Development Purchase Price Limits Schedules coupled with reasonable assumptions regarding mortgage-interest and tax rates, the mortgage term, certain expenses, and target household size, an indicated maximum sales price for the subject unit as of the relevant valuation and assessment date was approximately $180,000.  The Board additionally found, however, that this indicated price, while relevant, underestimated the subject unit's fair cash value for the fiscal year at issue because it ignored certain benefits accruing to the appellant, such as mortgage-interest savings, and those benefits accruing to any owner, such as the steadily declining term of the restrictions.  In making this finding, the Board recognized that while the mortgage-interest savings might well be intangible in nature, their inclusion in the valuation determination was necessary to provide a more complete financial picture of the affordable-housing property.  The Board therefore ruled that the fair-cash-value determination for the subject property for the fiscal year at issue must account for all of these factors. See Hampton Associates, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 1998-791 (finding and ruling that special favorable financing as well as restrictions imposed on properties affect their overall value).  The "unique status" of affordable housing property should not be overlooked when determining its fair cash value for assessment purposes.  Community Development Co., 377 Mass. at 354.    
		In an appeal before this Board, a taxpayer "'may present persuasive evidence of overvaluation either by exposing flaws or errors in the assessors' method of valuation, or by introducing affirmative evidence of value which undermines the assessors' valuation.'"  General Electric Co. v. Assessors of Lynn, 393 Mass. 591, 598 (1984) (quoting Donlon v. Assessors of Holliston, 389 Mass. 848, 855 (1983)).  Here, the appellant did both.  She not only demonstrated that the assessors failed to account for applicable affordable housing limitations and restrictions in the subject unit's assessed value for the fiscal year at issue, but she also provided the Board with a reasonable mechanism, under the circumstances, for appropriately valuing the subject unit.   
		Generally, real estate valuation experts, the Massachusetts courts, and this Board rely upon three approaches to determine the fair cash value of property: income capitalization, sales comparison, and cost.  Correia v. New Bedford Redevelopment Authority, 375 Mass. 360, 362 (1978).  "A proper valuation depends on a consideration of the myriad factors that should influence a seller and buyer in reaching a fair price."  Montaup Electric Co. v. Assessors of Whitman, 390 Mass. 847, 849-50 (1984).  All the factors that contribute to a property's fair cash value must be considered, no matter whether they increase or diminish the value.  See Massachusetts General Hospital v. Belmont, 233 Mass. 190, 208 (1919); Lodge, 216 Mass. at 263.  When valuing property with unusual characteristics or subject to special circumstances, variations of the three usual valuation methods or even other valuation techniques are often useful in determining the fair cash value of the property.  See, e.g., Boston Edison Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 402 Mass. 1, 17 (1988)(using a "unit cost per kilowatt hour method[] of valuation" as a check); Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Assessors of Agawam, 428 Mass. 261, 263 (1998)("Assessors also may use the unit principal to value property of a utility."); Woburn Services, Inc. v. Assessors of Woburn, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 1996-565, 574 (modifying the traditional income-capitalization methodology to appropriately account for contamination and stigma); see also Wayland Business Center Holdings, Inc. v. Assessors of Wayland, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2005-557, 595-97.  
In past analogous appeals, the Board has used modified income-capitalization approaches to ascertain the value of the property at issue.  See, e.g., Hampton Associates, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 1998-789-91; Cummins Towers Co. v. Assessors of Boston, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 1984-291, 305, 308-09; cf. Woburn Services, Inc., Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 1996-574-75.    However, given the record here, the Board adopted and then adapted the methodology proposed by the appellant, which was based on Massachusetts Department of Housing and Community Development affordable housing criteria and several reasonable assumptions.  The Board found that this approach was a realistic methodology to use to value the subject unit for the fiscal year at issue under the circumstances.  The Board found that the universe of potential buyers was limited by the affordable-housing restrictions and that this methodology accounted for those restrictions.   The Board found, however, that the value derived from this methodology, while relevant, underestimated the subject unit's fair cash value for the fiscal year at issue because it ignored certain benefits accruing to the appellant, such as mortgage-interest savings and those benefits accruing to any owner, such as the steadily declining term of the restrictions.  Accordingly, the Board determined that $185,000 more accurately reflected the fair cash value of the subject unit for assessment purposes for the fiscal year at issue after taking into consideration not only the restrictions and limitations but also the benefits associated with the subject loan, the Rent Regulatory Agreement, and the Affordable Housing Restriction instrument. 
The burden of proof is upon the appellant to make out its right as a matter of law to an abatement of the tax.  Schlaiker v. Assessors of Great Barrington, 365 Mass. 243, 245 (1974).  The appellant must show that the assessed valuation of her property was improper  See Foxboro Associates v. Assessors of Foxborough, 385 Mass. 679, 691 (1982).  The assessment is presumed valid until the taxpayer sustains his burden of proving otherwise.  Schlaiker, 365 Mass. at 245.  
In reaching its opinion of fair cash value, the Board was not required to believe the testimony of any particular witness or to adopt any particular method of valuation suggested.  Rather, the Board can accept those portions of the evidence that the Board determined had more convincing weight.  Foxboro Associates, 385 Mass. at 683; New Boston Garden Corp. v. Assessors of Boston, 383 Mass. 456, 473 (1981); Assessors of Lynnfield v. New England Oyster House, Inc., 363 Mass. 696, 701-702 (1972).  "The credibility of witnesses, the weight of evidence, the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are matters for the [B]oard."  Cummington School of the Arts, Inc. v. Assessors of Cummington, 373 Mass. 597, 605 (1977).
The Board need not specify the exact manner in which it arrived at its valuation.  Jordan Marsh v. Assessors of Malden, 359 Mass. 196, (1971).  The fair cash value of property cannot be proven with "mathematical certainty and must ultimately rest in the realm of opinion, estimate and judgment."  Assessors of Quincy v. Boston Consol. Gas Co., 309 Mass 60, 72 (1941).  An opinion of value "should be rounded to reflect the degree of precision . . . associate[d] with [it]."  Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate (13th ed. 2008) 564.  "[I]f the final value estimate is a six-digit number, the figure will likely be rounded to the nearest thousand or ten thousand dollars."  Id.      
The Board applied these principles in reaching its determination that the appellant met her burden of proving that the assessors overvalued the subject unit for the fiscal year at issue.  After determining that the fair cash value of the subject unit was $185,000, the Board reduced the assessment by $42,300 and granted the appellant a tax abatement in the amount of $780.86.

In concluding, the Board suggests that affordable-housing valuation might be better suited to a legislative analysis and response rather than a case-by-case determination by this Board.  As the Supreme Judicial Court observed in Community Development Co., 377 Mass. at 354-55: "The great dilemma in assessing [affordable housing] projects is that the 'value' of these projects is inherently ambiguous." (Citation omitted). 

The revised decision is promulgated simultaneously with this Findings of Fact and Report.
 
							 THE APPELLATE TAX BOARD

						  By: _________________________________
							 Thomas W. Hammond., Jr., Chairman
A true copy,


Attest: __________________________
			 Clerk of the Board

 "HUD" is an acronym for United States Department of Housing and Urban Development.   
 DHCD is apparently an acronym for Massachusetts Department of Housing and Community Development.
 See Trinidad v. Assessors of Attleboro, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2012-900, 907 ("the Presiding Commissioner did not give the letter any weight because [the author] did not appear at the hearing of this appeal and was not available for voir dire or cross-examination . . . or for questioning by the Presiding Commissioner")(and the cases cited therein).
 According to Appraisal Institute, The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal 148 (4th ed. 2002), "intangible property" is defined as "[n]onphysical assets, including but not limited to franchises, trademarks, patents, copyrights, goodwill, equities, mineral rights, securities, and contracts, as distinguished from physical assets such as facilities and equipment."  "Intangible value" is defined as [a] value that cannot be imputed to any part of the physical property, e.g., the excess value attributable to a favorable lease or mortgage, the value attributable to goodwill." 
 The majority of other jurisdictions that have examined similar issues appear to agree with the Board in this regard.  See, e.g., Cottonwood Affordable Hous. v. Yavapai Cnty., 205 Ariz. 427, 430 (Ariz. Tax Ct. 2003)(finding that because long-term restrictions imposed upon rental property by federal regulations have a significant impact on the value of the property, a valuation that fails to take the deed restrictions into account will not result in a determination of fair market value for that property); Deerfield 95 Investor Assoc. v. Town of E. Lyme, No. CV96-0538367, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1747 (Sup. Ct. of Conn, New London, May 26, 1999)(finding that low-income housing tax credits do have an effect on real estate value and should be considered in the determination of the value of the subject property); Pine Pointe Hous., L.P. v. Lowndes Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 254 GA. App. 197, 198-99 (2002)(holding that taxing authorities are required to consider low-income housing restrictions); Brandon Bay, Ltd. P'ship v. Payette Cnty., 142 Idaho 681, 684 (2006)(concluding that when assessing low-income housing, it would be inequitable to assess the property based upon full market-rental value);  Greenfield Vill. Apartments, L.P. v. Ada Cnty., 130 Idaho 207, 210-11 (1997)(holding that property valuation should consider the restricted use of the property as low-income and rent-restricted); Kankakee Cnty. Bd. of Review v. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 131 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (1989)(holding that when valuing a government subsidized apartment building, the taxing authority must weigh both the positive and negative elements and adjust the actual income figure to accurately reflect the property's true earning capacity); Rainbow Apartments v. Ill. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 326 Ill. App. 3d 1105, 1109 (2001)(holding that the Property Tax Appeal Board appropriately considered low-income housing tax credits when determining the fair cash value of property); Vill. Hous. Partners II, L.P. v. Wayne Twp. Assessor, Cause No. 49T10-0208-TA-103, 2005 Ind. Tax LEXIS 92 (Ind. Tax Ct. December 22, 2005)(concluding that low-income housing rental restrictions may cause economic obsolescence); Pedcor Invs. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 715 N.E.2d 432, 436-37 (Ind. T.C. 1999)(concluding that deed restrictions may constitute economic obsolescence depending on the effect of the tax incentives); In re Ottawa House. Assn., 27 Kan. App. 2d 1008, 1011 (2000)(holding that taxing authority should have considered the effects of low-income housing contract when it valued the property for ad valorem tax purposes); Glenridge Dev. v. City of Augusta, 662 A.2d 928, 931 (Me. 1995)(concluding that the taxing authority should consider the effect of HUD regulations restricting selling, raising or lowering rents, or making improvements or major repairs without HUD's approval, among other restrictions governing the housing complex); Huron Ridge LP v. Ypsilanti Twp., 275 Mich. App. 23, 32 (2007)(holding that property tax appraisal methods may take into account the value of benefits accruing to owners of properties regulated under federal subsidized housing programs); Meadowlanes v. Holland, 437 Mich. 473, 495 (1991)(holding that interest subsidy payments made by the government in return for the rent restrictions affect the selling price of the property and should have been considered in the property's valuation); Rebelwood Ltd. v. Hinds Cnty., 544 So. 2d 1356, 1364-65 (Miss. 1989)(holding that because the benefits of participating in a federal low-income housing program affect the value of the property in the open market, they must sensibly be considered in assessing the value); Kalispell Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, Cause No. ADV 96-747, 1997 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 118 (Mont. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. July 22, 1997)(concluding that consideration of low-income housing use restrictions when determining market value would be consistent with Montana precedent); Steele v. Town of Allenstown, 124 N.H. 487, 491-92 (1984)(holding that federally subsidized housing should be valued as such and not as non-subsidized housing); Penns Grove Garden Ltd. v. Penns Grove Borough, 18 N.J. Tax 253, 263-65 (1999)(concluding that governmental contract rent and actual management fee should be used in determining valuation); Bayridge Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Dep't of Revenue, 321 Or. 21, 31-32 (1995)(concluding that participation in a federal low-income housing tax-credit program is a governmental restriction as to use and must be considered in valuing property); In re Appeal of Johnstown Assocs., 494 Pa. 433, 439 (1981)(finding that rent and sale restrictions are factors unique to subsidized property and clearly relevant to the question of value); Church St. Assocs. v. Cnty. of Clinton, 959 A.2d 490, 494 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008)(holding that sale restrictions and rent restrictions, in the context of federally subsidized low-income apartment buildings, were factors for which taxing authorities must account when appraising property); Parkside Townhomes Assocs. v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 711 A.2d 607, 611 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998)(holding that the fair market value of property is a function of the economic reality which includes the effects of tax credits for low-income housing); Town Square Ltd. P'ship v. Clay Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 2005 SD 99, ¶22(concluding that both the restrictive rents and the tax credits had to be considered when assessing property operating under federal low-income housing tax credit program); Spring Hill, L.P. v. Tenn. State Bd. of Equalization, No. M2001-02683-COA-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 952 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003)(holding that valuation of low-income housing should consider both restricted rents and tax credits); Cascade Court Ltd. P'ship v. Noble, 105 Wash. App. 563, 570 (2001)(holding that the assessor should have taken into account the restricted rents of a low-income housing development); Metro. Holding Co. v. Bd. of Review of Milwaukee, 173 Wis. 2d 626, 634 (1993)(holding that property assessment for low-income housing should be based on actual rents and expenses).  But see, New Walnut Square Ltd. P'Ship v. La. Tax Comm'n, 626 So. 2d 430, 432 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1993)(concluding that assessor did not have to consider separately the existence of a rent ceiling and a limit on distributions from income); Maryville Props., L.P. v. Nelson, 83 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002)(holding that low-income housing tax credits should not be considered in real estate tax appraisals); In re Appeal of Greens of Pine Glen Ltd. P'Ship, 356 N.C. 642, 651 (2003)(finding that because the federal low-income tax housing credit program's restrictions were freely entered contractual covenants, not governmental regulations, the taxpayer was not allowed to artificially alter the value of its property below fair market value); Alliance Towers, Ltd. v. Stark Cnty. Bd. of Revision, 37 Ohio St. 3d 16, 24 (1988)(holding that the artificial effects of government housing assistance programs are not indicative of real estate value); Piedmont Plaza Invs. v. Dep't of Revenue, 331 Or. 585, 592-93 (2001)(finding that assessed values are best calculated without making adjustment for the federal interest subsidy).
 
 At least twenty-two other states have attempted to address, statutorily, the affordable-housing-valuation conundrum including: Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Montana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.

ATB 2012-950