Antoine Clark v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-563

ANTOINE CLARK

vs.

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Antoine Clark, filed a single count

negligence complaint against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts

on March 20, 2017, alleging that on March 28, 2014, his neck was

injured while he was a passenger in a vehicle operated by a

Commonwealth employee that collided with a metal door (the March

2014 accident).1 In April 2022, the Commonwealth moved for

summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff could not prove

that his injuries were caused or exacerbated by the 2014

1The accident occurred when the plaintiff was incarcerated
and was being transported in a Department of Corrections vehicle
to a correctional facility. Vehicles enter the facility through
a pair of steel double doors known as a "vehicle trap." The
vehicle the plaintiff was being driven in slowly collided with
the inner door of the vehicle trap. Neither the vehicle nor the
door was damaged.
accident without expert testimony, and, therefore, his complaint

must be dismissed. In October 2022, a judge of the Superior

Court allowed the Commonwealth's motion for summary judgment,

and, in October 2023, the same judge denied the plaintiff's

motion for reconsideration. The plaintiff now appeals, arguing

that the trial judge erred by (1) allowing the Commonwealth's

motion for summary judgment because a genuine dispute of

material fact existed as to what caused the plaintiff's

injuries, and (2) denying the plaintiff's motion for

reconsideration despite the purported existence of newly

discovered evidence. We affirm.

Discussion. "We review a grant of summary judgment de novo

to determine 'whether, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, all material facts have been

established and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.'" Juliano v. Simpson, 461 Mass. 527, 529-530

(2012), quoting Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass.

117, 120 (1991). In doing so, we must rely on the same summary

judgment record that was before the motion judge. See Meyer v.

Veolia Energy N. Am., 482 Mass. 208, 211 (2019).

"Expert testimony is necessary where proof of medical

causation lies outside the ken of lay jurors." Pitts v. Wingate

at Brighton, Inc., 82 Mass. App. Ct. 285, 289 (2012). And,

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expert testimony is a particular necessity when faced with

"highly technical medical issues, such as injury causation and

enhancement of injury to the spine." See Lally v. Volkswagen

Aktiengesellschaft, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 317, 324-325 (1998), and

cases cited therein. "Proof of exacerbation or aggravation of

injuries is more likely to require expert testimony." Bailey v.

Cataldo Ambulance Serv., Inc., 64 Mass. App. Ct. 228, 233

(2005). Furthermore, an expert's opinion on causation must be

based on more than mere possibility or conjecture. See Goffredo

v. Mercedes-Benz Truck Co., 402 Mass. 97, 102-103 (1988).

"However, where a determination of causation lies within general

human knowledge and experience, expert testimony is not

required." Pitts, 82 Mass. App. Ct. at 289 (citation and

quotation omitted).

Here, it is undisputed that the plaintiff has an extensive

history of neck and back pain dating back to 2002 when he sought

treatment for pain from a bullet lodged in his back. Then, in

2011, the plaintiff was diagnosed with, inter alia, "multilevel

spondylosis with multiple levels of disc bulging." In fact, the

plaintiff had undergone treatment, physical therapy, and steroid

injections for neck and back pain well before the March 2014

accident and underwent his first spinal fusion surgery in

November 2011. Since the 2014 accident, the plaintiff has been

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involved in two additional motor vehicle accidents, one in

September 2014, and another in January 2017, from which he

sought medical attention for neck and back pain. He has also

undergone two additional spinal fusion surgeries, one in

November 2014 and his third in December 2016. Throughout, the

plaintiff has continued to report his chronic neck pain to his

medical providers up until the filing of this case in 2017.

The plaintiff contends that a single medical record dated

November 30, 2015, namely a neurosurgery progress note from the

plaintiff's treating neurosurgeon, Dr. Massengale, was

sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether the March 2014 accident caused or exacerbated his neck

pain. In the progress note, Dr. Massengale wrote:

"I explained [to the plaintiff] that I find the best
primary diagnosis for [the plaintiff's] neck pain and
persistent cervical radiculopathy pain to be
pseudoarthrosis and failed fusion in the cervical
spine. I explained that the automobile accidents [the
March and October 2014 accidents] in which he [the
plaintiff] was involved, because they exacerbated his
pain, must be considered [to be] a contributor to his
present pain condition but they did not cause the
pseudoarthrosis."

Notwithstanding the plaintiff's contention, we agree with

the judge below that, given the plaintiff's extensive medical

history of neck and back injuries, this entry alone cannot

suffice to establish by more than a mere possibility that the

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March 2014 accident caused or aggravated the plaintiff's

condition. See Goffredo, 402 Mass at 102-103; see also Bailey,

64 Mass. App. Ct. at 233. Rather, on this record, expert

medical testimony is required to establish such a causal link.2

See Lally, 45 Mass. App. Ct. at 325. Although a treating

physician may sometimes offer an expert opinion, see Sacco v.

Roupenian, 409 Mass. 25, 29-30 (1990), the plaintiff does not

argue that Dr. Massengale qualified as an expert here.

We also agree with the motion judge that the second note

that the plaintiff provided from Dr. Massengale in support of

his motion for reconsideration did not constitute "newly

discovered evidence." See Audubon Hill S. Condominium Ass'n v.

Community Ass'n Underwriters of Am., Inc., 82 Mass. App. Ct.

461, 470 (2012). As noted by the judge, the second note, dated

February 3, 2023, failed to provide any "meaningful further

information regarding how the injuries allegedly sustained in

the accident at issue are physically different from the

multitude of other accidents and incidents in which the

plaintiff also sustained injuries." Furthermore, in the second

note, Dr. Massengale uses the phrases "I explained," "I have

indicated in the past," and "I reiterated," in reference to how

2 For these same reasons, the plaintiff's own sworn
statements in his answers to interrogatories are insufficient to
establish a causal link.

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the March 2014 accident contributed to the plaintiff's injuries.

Therefore, because the second note, by its own terms, did not

bring any new information to bear on the issue of causation, it

does not qualify as newly discovered evidence.

Judgment affirmed.

Order denying motion for
reconsideration affirmed.

By the Court (Desmond,
Sacks & Brennan, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: June 9, 2025.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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