JAMES LYONS vs. ATTORNEY GENERAL & others.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-1059
JAMES LYONS
vs.
ATTORNEY GENERAL & others.1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff brought a complaint for injunctive and
declaratory relief, claiming that an amendment to Rule 85A of
the Rules of the House of Representatives (House Rule 85A)
"alter[ed] legislation recently adopted by the voters at the
ballot box, in derogation of the separation of powers and the
rights of the voters." A Superior Court judge dismissed the
complaint for lack of standing, and the plaintiff appeals. We
affirm.
Background. We recite the pertinent facts alleged in the
complaint. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local No.
1 Secretary of the Commonwealth, Clerk of the House of
Representatives, and Clerk of the Senate.

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129 Benefit Fund v. Tucci, 476 Mass. 553, 554 (2017).
Massachusetts voters passed ballot question 1, entitled "A Law
Expressly Authorizing The Auditor To Audit The Legislature," in
the 2024 election. As a result the State Auditor's enabling
statute, G. L. c. 11, § 12, was amended to give her authority to
audit "the general court."
Shortly after the election, the House of Representatives
amended House Rule 85A. As amended, House Rule 85A directs
House officials to request an audit from the State Auditor, who
is then permitted to select a neutral private firm to conduct
the audit.
The plaintiff, a former member of the Massachusetts
Legislature and former chairman of the Massachusetts Republican
Party, campaigned and voted for question 1. He raises two
claims in this action. Count 1, labeled a "Buckley claim" in
reference to Buckley v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 371 Mass.
195 (1976), appears to assert that House Rule 85A is
unconstitutional because it undermines the people's vote on
question 1. Count 2, labeled a "Paisner claim" in reference to
Paisner v. Attorney Gen., 390 Mass. 593 (1983), appears to
assert that House Rule 85A violates the separation of powers
because "[t]he topic of auditing the Legislature is not an
internal organizational matter of the house . . . ." As relief,
the plaintiff seeks "a declaration and injunction according the

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voter-adopted Question 1 primacy over [House Rule 85A]" and a
declaration that G. L. c. 11, § 12, "is constitutional, in the
face of the Legislature's assertions."
The Attorney General moved to dismiss the claims against
her pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754
(1974), arguing among other things that the plaintiff lacked
standing and that he failed to identify an actual controversy.
The judge allowed the motion and concluded that all of the
claims should be dismissed because the plaintiff did not have
standing to seek relief against any of the defendants. Final
judgment then entered dismissing the action in its entirety
without prejudice.
Discussion. Standing is properly challenged by way of a
motion to dismiss under rule 12 (b) (6). See Kenn v. Eascare,
LLC, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 643, 647 & n.6 (2024). To survive such
a motion, the complaint must allege facts that plausibly suggest
an entitlement to relief. See Cubberley v. Commerce Ins. Co.,
495 Mass. 289, 293 (2025). We review the judge's decision de
novo, accepting as true the facts alleged in the complaint and
drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See
id. at 292.
The plaintiff invokes multiple doctrines in support of his
assertion of standing, but none warrants overturning the
dismissal. First, the plaintiff does not have standing to

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pursue his claims under the public right doctrine, which allows
a citizen to bring an action "in the nature of mandamus to
compel the performance of a duty required by law." Tax Equity
Alliance for Mass. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 423 Mass. 708,
714 (1996). This doctrine applies only where a public officer
owes a "specific" duty directly to the public that the law
requires to be performed. Kaplan v. Bowker, 333 Mass. 455, 460
(1956). See Tax Equity Alliance for Mass., supra (doctrine
applies to "particular" duties required by law); Perella v.
Massachusetts Turnpike Auth., 55 Mass. App. Ct. 537, 540 (2002)
(doctrine limited to "clear and unequivocal duties").
Here, the plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that the
defendants owe any specific duty to the public for which he can
compel performance. Sears v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 327
Mass. 310 (1951), on which the plaintiff heavily relies, does
not cure this defect. In Sears the court held that the
plaintiffs had standing under the public right doctrine to
challenge a new law on the basis that it was not adopted within
the constitutional requirements for laws enacted by initiative.
See id. at 313, 315. But later in Tax Equity Alliance for
Mass., 423 Mass. at 715, the court made clear that Sears is
limited to constitutional challenges to "the procedure used to
adopt [a law]." Conversely, the public right doctrine does not

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apply to "substantive constitutional challenges," such as those
the plaintiff seeks to raise here. Id.
The other doctrines invoked by the plaintiff also afford
him no relief. The plaintiff does not have voter or proponent
standing because he has not plausibly alleged any electoral
harm, cf. Vigneault v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 354 Mass.
362, 364 (1968), or that he is one of the first ten signers of
an initiative petition seeking to protect the petition, cf.
Buckley, 371 Mass. at 197-198. He does not have taxpayer
standing, which applies only to claims to prevent the unlawful
expenditure of public funds. See Tax Equity Alliance for Mass.,
423 Mass. at 711-712. Cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106
(1968). Nor can he maintain his claims under what he calls
"disclosure standing" because he has not alleged that he
requested any information to which he is entitled but the
defendants failed to disclose. Cf. Federal Election Comm'n v.
Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 21 (1998); Public Citizen v. United States
Dep't. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989).
In addition, we agree with the defendants that dismissal
was appropriate for the separate reason that the complaint fails
to allege an actual controversy. An actual controversy exists
when there is a "real dispute" between the parties that if not
"adjusted . . . will almost immediately and inevitably lead to
litigation." Kligler v. Attorney Gen., 491 Mass. 38, 44 (2022),

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quoting Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders v. Attorney Gen.,
436 Mass. 132, 134-135 (2002). See Alliance, AFSCME/SEIU v.
Commonwealth, 425 Mass. 534, 536-37 (1997). The plaintiff's
abstract complaint about the constitutionality of House Rule 85A
does not come close to meeting this standard. See Gay & Lesbian
Advocates & Defenders, supra at 135-136.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Blake, C.J.,
Shin & Hodgens, JJ.2),
Clerk
Entered: October 9, 2026.
2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.