HOPE Prison Ministries v. City of Fort Worth, Texas

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION

HOPE PRISON MINISTRIES,

Plaintiff,

v.

No. 4:26-cv-00369-P
CITY OF FORT WORTH, TEXAS

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant City of Fort Worth’s (“the City”) Rule
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 12), Plaintiff Hope
Prison Ministry’s (“Plaintiff”) Response (ECF No. 16), and the City’s
Reply (ECF No. 17). Having considered the filings, the applicable law,
and the record, the Court will GRANT the City’s Motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a faith-driven organization that operates transitional
housing and Christ-centered rehabilitation to formerly incarcerated
individuals, including sex offenders. See ECF No. 10 at 1. Plaintiff sues
the City based on its recent enactment of Ordinance § 23-23 (“the
Ordinance”). Plaintiff brings an as-applied constitutional challenge to
the Ordinance, alleging five causes of action and seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief.
The Ordinance makes it unlawful for a sex offender registered for an
offense involving a minor victim to establish temporary or permanent
residence within 2,000 feet of any premises where children commonly
gather. ECF No. 12 at 31. The Ordinance also makes it unlawful to lease
or rent any real property with the knowledge that it will be used as a
permanent or temporary residence by any person prohibited from
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establishing residence due to the place or structure or any other
conveyance being located within 2,000 feet of premises where children
commonly gather. ECF No. 12 at 31. The City alleges it adopted the
Ordinance to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. ECF
No. 12 at 7. The Fort Worth City Council found that protecting children
from sexual abuse and predatory behavior is a legitimate and compelling
governmental interest. ECF No. 12 at 7.
The City has not issued citations or pursued any action against
Plaintiff. ECF No. 12 at 7–8. Rather, Plaintiff sues based on the threat
of enforcement. ECF No. 16 at 5. The City contends that it is entitled to
dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims because Plaintiff lacks standing to
challenge the Ordinance under federal and state law, and Plaintiff fails
to plead sufficient facts to state a plausible claim. ECF No. 12 at 8.
Plaintiff alleges the Ordinance violates (1) the Fair Housing Act
(“FHA”); (2) the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment under 42
U.S.C. § 1983; (3) the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4) the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), and (5) the Texas Religious
Freedom and Restoration Act (“TRFRA”). ECF No. 10 at 2, 19, 24.
LEGAL STANDARD
A suit should be dismissed if the complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). The complaint fails
to state a claim if there is no set of facts consistent with the allegations
in the complaint under which relief could be granted. Hishon v. King &
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). Accordingly, dismissal is proper under
Rule 12(b)(6) unless the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible in its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The complaint must
allege more than mere “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
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“[C]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual
conclusions will not suffice” to save a complaint from dismissal.
Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir.
1993). The Court is not bound to accept legal conclusions as true, and
only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion
to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.
ANALYSIS
Again, Plaintiff alleges the Ordinance violates the following: (1) FHA
(2) Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; (3) Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4 ) RLUIPA and (5) TRFRA. Plaintiff challenges
the validity of the Ordinance as applied because it “effectively bars
[Plaintiff] from carrying out its core religious mission,” while also
rendering housing unavailable to its residents. ECF No. 10 at 2.
The Court finds that all five claims should be dismissed for failure to
state a claim.
1
The Court addresses each claim in turn.
A. Plaintiff Fails to State a Plausible Claim for Relief
Under the Fair Housing Act.

The FHA provides a private right of action for discriminatory
housing practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613; Lincoln v. Case, 340 F.3d 283,
289 (5th Cir. 2003). Before any liability can arise under the FHA, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that they qualify as an aggrieved person. An
“aggrieved person” is “any person who” either “claims to have been
injured by a discriminatory housing practice” or believes that such an
injury “is about to occur.” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i); Bank of Am. Corp. v. City
of Miami, Fla., 581 U.S 189, 197 (2017). “Discriminatory housing
practice” means an act that is unlawful under Section 3604, 3605, 3606,
or 3617 of the FHA. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(f). Under § 3604, it is unlawful to
make unavailable or deny a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of
a handicap of: that buyer or renter, a person intending to reside in that

1
Because the Court finds dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6), it
declines to engage in a 12(b)(1) analysis.
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dwelling after it is made available, or any person associated with the
buyer or renter. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1).
Here, the FHA does not apply because Plaintiff is not an aggrieved
person who has been injured by a discriminatory practice. While
Plaintiff may house individuals with a disability apart from them being
a child sex offender, Plaintiff fails to identify any provision in the
Ordinance that discriminates against persons on the basis of a
qualifying disability. The Ordinance only applies to child sex offenders.
Being a child sex offender is not a disability. Because the Ordinance only
affects those who are child sex offenders, Plaintiff is not an aggrieved
person under the applicable statute. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a
claim under the FHA.
Additionally, Plaintiff failed to plead any facts demonstrating that
persons with disabilities are disproportionately impacted by the
Ordinance. “[A] disparate-impact claim that relies on a statistical
disparity must fail if the plaintiff cannot point to a defendant’s policy or
policies causing that disparity.” Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v.
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 542 (2015). A plaintiff
cannot make out a prima facie case of disparate impact if plaintiff fails
to allege facts or produce statistical data at the pleading stage
demonstrating such a causal connection. Id. at 543. Here, Plaintiff has
only alleged that individuals with disabilities rely on group and
transitional housing. See ECF No. 10 at 13–14. This is insufficient,
especially given that the Ordinance does not prohibit group or
transitional housing for persons with disabilities, but only prohibits
housing for a child sex offenders near children. See ECF No. 12 at 31.
Thus, Plaintiff fails to establish facts demonstrating a causal connection
between the Ordinance and a disparate impact on disabled individuals.
Even if Plaintiff properly claimed that the Ordinance
disproportionally impacts persons with disabilities, under the FHA
governmental entities must not be prevented from achieving legitimate
objectives, such as the health and safety of its citizens. Texas Dep't of
Hous. & Cmty. Affs., 576 U.S. at 544; see also ECF No. 12 at 29.
“Government policies are not contrary to the disparate impact
requirement, unless they are ‘artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
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barriers.”’ Id. at 543. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts establishing that
the Ordinance is artificial, arbitrary, or an unnecessary barrier, nor can
Plaintiff point to any provision in the Ordinance that allegedly causes
any disparity based on a disability.
Thus, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that the individuals
it houses are discriminated against due to their disability or disparately
impacted by the Ordinance. Accordingly, the Court must dismiss this
claim.
B. Plaintiff Fails to State a Plausible Free Exercise
Claim.
The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause provides that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free
Exercise Clause applies to the States and their subdivisions through the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303
(1940). The Free Exercise Clause affords protection to religious beliefs
and, to a limited extent, religious conduct. Emp. Div., Dept. of Hum. Res.
of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877–78 (1990). Conduct, however,
“remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.” Cantwell,
310 U.S. at 304. As the Cantwell court explained, “[e]ven the exercise of
religion may be at some slight inconvenience in order that the state may
protect its citizens from injury.” Id. at 306.
To successfully establish a free exercise claim, plaintiff’s allegations
must demonstrate that a government entity has burdened his sincere
religious practice pursuant to a policy that is not “neutral” or “generally
applicable.” Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507, 525 (2022).
A burden upon a religious practice exists, where a state either
“conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a
religious faith” or “denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated
by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent
to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of
Indiana Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717–18 (1981). “The government
does not impermissibly regulate religious belief, however, when it
promulgates a neutral, generally applicable law or rule that happens to
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result in an incidental burden on the free exercise of a particular
religious practice or belief.” Cornerstone Christian Sch. v. Univ.
Interscholastic League, 563 F.3d 127, 135 (5th Cir. 2009). “Religious
practices that threaten the public’s health, safety, or general welfare
cannot be tolerated as protected religious belief.” Pleasant Glade
Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex. 2008) (citation
omitted).
Here, Plaintiff fails to plead any facts showing that the Ordinance is
not “neutral” or “generally applicable.” Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 525. The
Ordinance prohibits child sex offenders from residing within 2,000 feet
of locations where children are usually present. See ECF No. 12 at 30–
31. A plain reading of the Ordinance shows the restriction is not aimed
at any religious practice—it is aimed at protecting children from the
risks associated with having child sex offenders near areas where
children gather. This neither facially discriminates against adherents of
any particular faiths nor targets any religious conduct. Moreover, the
Ordinance is generally applicable because it does not restrict housing
based on any religious or secular conditions. The Ordinance applies
universally to residences under the Ordinance’s jurisdiction. Thus, all
conduct—secular and religious—is limited equally, without
consideration of any religious commitments or individual exceptions.
Laws that are neutral and generally applicable are subject only to
rational basis review. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 (“Our conclusion that
generally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of
burdening a particular religious practice need not be justified by a
compelling governmental interest is the only approach compatible with
these precedents.”). Therefore, the Ordinance need only be rationally
related to a legitimate government interest to survive constitutional
scrutiny.
Under rational basis review, the Ordinance is “accorded a strong
presumption of validity” and “must be upheld if there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis” for it.
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1993). Plaintiff bears the burden of
showing that there is no conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the Ordinance. Plaintiff fails to do so. Protecting
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children from the potential sexual abuse and predatory behavior of child
sex offenders is a legitimate and compelling interest. ECF No. 12 at 7.
Further, other courts have found that sex offender registry
restrictions that serve to protect children are rationally related to a
legitimate governmental interest. See, e.g., Duarte v. City of Lewisville,
136 F. Supp. 3d 752, 786 (E.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 858 F.3d 348 (5th Cir.
2017) (holding a city’s ordinance prohibiting registered sex offenders
from residing within 1,500 feet of “where children commonly gather”
rationally advanced the government’s interest in protecting children);
Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 714–15 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding legislature
had a legitimate interest in protecting children and Iowa’s statute
rationally advanced this interest by prohibiting sex offenders from living
within 2000 feet of a school or child care facility). Plaintiff has failed to
plausibly plead facts that there is no conceivable rational basis for
implementation of the Ordinance.
Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for relief under the Free
Exercise Clause. As such, the Court must dismiss this claim.
C. Plaintiff Fails to State a Plausible Claim for Relief
Based on a Violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits the government from
“deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Equal protection is implicated
only if the challenged government action “classifies or distinguishes
between two or more relevant groups.” Rolf v. City of San Antonio, 77
F.3d 823, 828 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492
(5th Cir. 1993)). Thus, to establish an equal protection claim, Plaintiff
must first show that similarly situated persons of two or more
classifications were treated differently. Gallegos-Hernandez v. United
States, 688 F.3d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 2012). Once that element is
established, the Court determines the appropriate level of scrutiny. Id.
Strict scrutiny is appropriate only where a government classification
“implicates a suspect class or fundamental right.” Id. “Otherwise,
rational-basis review applies and this court need only determine
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whether the classification is rationally related to a legitimate
government interest.” Id.
The Court is skeptical Plaintiff even meets the first prong of this
analysis. However, even assuming Plaintiff did establish that similarly
situated people were treated differently, sex offenders are not a suspect
class under the Equal Protection Clause. See Stauffer v. Gearhart, 741
F.3d 574, 587 (5th Cir. 2014) (“A classification that categorizes inmates
based on the type of criminal offenses for which they have been convicted
does not implicate a suspect class.”). Therefore, rational-basis review
applies.
As already determined by the Court in the Free Exercise Clause
claim analysis, the Ordinance is valid under rational-basis review. See
supra Section B. As a result, Plaintiff fails to plausibly state a claim
under the Equal Protection Clause. Therefore, the Court must dismiss
this claim.
D. Plaintiff Fails to State a Plausible Claim Under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act.
Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim under RLUIPA. Specifically,
Plaintiff fails to allege facts that establish a plausible claim for the
Ordinance being classified as a land use regulation under RLUIPA.
Under RLUIPA, a “land use regulation” means a zoning or
landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits or restricts
a claimant’s use or development of land (including a structure affixed to
land), if the claimant has an ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude,
or other property interest in the regulated land or a contract or option
to acquire such an interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5; see A.A. ex rel.
Betenbaugh v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 611 F.3d 248, 259 (5th Cir.
2010) (explaining that RLUIPA’s “scope is limited to laws and
regulations that govern (1) land use and (2) institutions such as prisons
that receive federal funds”).
Here, the Ordinance does not fall within RLUIPA’s definition of “land
use regulation.” While it might incidentally affect land use, the
Ordinance is person-based. The Ordinance contains no reference to the
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City’s zoning or landmarking authority. See ECF No. 12 at 29–33. Other
courts have refused to consider similar ordinances or laws as land use
regulations under the RLUIPA definition. See Whitaker v. Perdue, No.
4:06-CV-0140-CC, 2007 WL 10025445, at *14 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 30,
2007), reconsidered in part, No. 4:06-CV-0140-CC, 2008 WL 11627774
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2008); Merced v. City of Euless, No. 4:06-CV-891-A,
2008 WL 182220, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2008) (McBryde, J.).
In Merced, Judge John McBryde dismissed Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim
for similar reasons. Merced, 2008 WL 182220, at *2. There, Plaintiff was
an ordained member of the Santeria religion, of which blood sacrifice
was an essential element. Id. at *1. A Euless ordinance made it
“unlawful to slaughter or to maintain any property for the purpose of
slaughtering any animal in the city.” Id. Judge McBryde explained that
“[i]f defendant’s ordinance regulating the activity of slaughtering
animals were construed as a land use regulation under RLUIPA, then
any ordinance that regulates a person’s activities, as all activities are in
some way conducted on land, would potentially be subject to RLUIPA.”
Id. at *2.
Here, like in Merced, Plaintiff contends the Ordinance is a land use
regulation because it governs where individuals may reside and
prohibits certain uses of property. ECF No. 10 at 24. Plaintiff is
incorrect. The fact that Plaintiff wants to use its land to house child sex
offenders for religious reasons does not transform the Ordinance into a
land use regulation. See Merced, 2008 WL 182220, at *2; ECF No. 10 at
24.
In conclusion, Plaintiff fails to plead a plausible claim for relief under
RLUIPA. Accordingly, the Court dismisses this claim.
E. The Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental
Jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Texas Religious
Freedom and Restoration Act C laim.
The Court is exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the TRFRA
state law claim. As the Court is dismissing all of Plaintiff’s federal
claims, all claims over which the Court had original jurisdiction have
been dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) gives courts broad discretion to
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decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in this specific situation.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Price v. Jefferson Cnty., 470 F. Supp. 2d 665, 694
(E.D. Tex. 2006) ( “When federal law claims that serve as the basis for
subject matter jurisdiction are dismissed and only state law claims
grounded on supplemental jurisdiction remain, a district court has
broad discretion to dismiss the state law claims.”). Therefore, the Court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s TRFRA
claim.
The Court finds that all of Plaintiff’s federal claims fail to state a
plausible claim for relief and declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s TRFRA claim.
Because Plaintiff’s claims fail on 12(b)(6) grounds, the Court declines
to conduct 12(b)(1) analysis.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss.
Accordingly, the case is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
2

SO ORDERED on this 14th day of August 2026.

2
If a court determines that dismissal of a claim is appropriate, it should be
with prejudice if amending the claim would be futile or “the plaintiff has
alleged his best case.” Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir.
1999); see Schiller v. Physicians Res. Group, Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 566 (5th
Cir.2003). Plaintiff has already amended its complaint once. ECF No. 10 at 1.
The Court concludes Plaintiff has alleged its best case.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
REGINALEA KEMP,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 4:23-cv-00841-P
REGIONSBANKET AL.,
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to File
Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 18. Having considered the Motion
and applicable docket entries, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
SO ORDERED on this 18th day of September 2023.
______________________________________________
Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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