Deltech Monomers OpCo, LLC

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

IN RE:

DELTECH MONOMERS OPCO, LLC CASE NO. 26-10182
PUTATIVE DEBTOR CHAPTER 7

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On March 5, 2026, Tankworx & Construction Services, LLC, Picou Group Contractors,
LLC, Momentum Constructors, LLC, and Iberville Insulations, LLC (collectively, “Petitioning
Creditors”) filed an Involuntary Petition for Relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code
against Deltech Monomers Opco, LLC (“Deltech”). Deltech Monomers Opco (assignment for
the benefit of creditors), LLC (“Assignee”) filed a Motion for Abstention and Dismissal of
Involuntary Petition Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 305.
1
On April 29, 2026, the court held a
preliminary hearing limited to the threshold issue of whether a canceled Delaware limited
liability company is eligible to be an involuntary debtor in a bankruptcy case. After hearing
argument of counsel, the matter was taken under advisement. On May 1, 2026, the court entered
an order
2
dismissing the Involuntary Petition due to its limited finding, explained thoroughly in
the Memorandum Opinion
3
entered the same date (“Original Opinion”), that Deltech was not
eligible to be a debtor. The case was closed on May 4, 2026.
On May 15, 2026, the Petitioning Creditors filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment
pursuant to F.R.B.P. 9023
4
(“Motion to Amend”) that is currently before the court. The

1
P-45.

2
P-92.

3
P-91.

4
P-99.

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Assignee filed an Objection,
5
and the Petitioning Creditors filed a Reply.
6
The Petitioning
Creditors also filed a Motion to Reopen
7
the case on May 18, 2026, and the court entered an
order
8
reopening the case on May 19, 2026. The court held a hearing on the Motion to Amend
on June 15, 2026. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court took the matter under advisement
and now renders its ruling.
I. F.R.C.P. 9023
F.R.C.P 9023(b) provides that a “motion for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment
must be filed within 14 days after the judgment is entered.” The Motion to Amend was filed
timely. F.R.C.P 9023(a) provides that F.R.C.P. 59 is applicable. The Petitioning Creditors
specifically seek relief pursuant to F.R.C.P 59(e).
9
In Matter of Life Partners Holdings, Inc.,
10

the Fifth Circuit found that “[a] motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) must
clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or must present newly discovered evidence
and cannot be used to raise arguments which could, and should, have been made before the
judgment issued.”
11
The Fifth Circuit in Templet v. HydroChem Inc.
12
made clear that Rule 59(e)
“is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments.”
13
As another

5
P-108.

6
P-110.

7
P-101.

8
P-104.

9
P-99, p. 1.

10
Matter of Life Partners Holdings, Inc., 926 F.3d 103 (5th Cir. 2019).

11
Life Partners, 936 F.3d at 128 (quoting Schiller v. Physicians Res. Grp. Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 2003);
Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 863–64 (5th Cir. 2003)).

12
Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473 (5th Cir. 2004).
13
Id. at 479 (citing Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir.1990)).

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court put it more recently, “Rule 59(e) motions cannot be used as a vehicle for re-litigating old
issues, presenting the case under new theories, obtaining a rehearing on the merits, or taking a
‘second bite at the apple.’”
14
Within that framework, the court now addresses all the issues
raised by the Motion to Amend.
II. Petitioning Creditors’ Reasons for Reconsideration

A. Typographical Error

The Petitioning Creditors first contend that the court overlooked a key case due,
ironically enough, to a typographical error in their objection to dismissal. The Petitioning
Creditors’ cited “800 Cooper Fin., LLC v. Liu, 2019 WL 578725, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 10, 2019).”
In its Original Opinion, the court noted in footnote 32 that it could not find that case cited by the
Petitioning Creditors but believed they were referring to “800 Cooper Finance, LLC v. Liu, 2022
WL 855647 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 2022).” The court’s Original Opinion noted:
In 800 Cooper Finance, LLC v. Liu, [n. 32] a New Jersey federal district court applied
Delaware law to nullify a certificate of cancellation and allow other causes of action to go
forward against a canceled company. This decision may provide a useful roadmap for
nullifying a Delaware certificate of cancellation, but it does not afford a bankruptcy court
the power to move down that road without first having an eligible debtor to legitimize the
involuntary bankruptcy.
15

The Petitioning Creditors contend that the case they meant to cite was a related case, now
correctly cited as “800 Cooper Fin., LLC v Liu, 2019 WL 5078725 (D.N.J. Oct. 10, 2019).”
Both of these cases discuss the same certificate of cancellation by 800 Cooper Finance, LLC in
January 2017. They both support the contention that a federal district court can proceed against a

14
Keaton v. Director, TDCJ-CID, No. 4:22CV329, 2025 WL 2625571, *1 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 11, 2025) (quoting Chi v.
United States, No. 4:12CR155(1), 2022 WL 17347781, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2022); Sequa Corp v. GBJ Corp.,
156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1998)).

15
P-91, p. 11.

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company who has filed a Delaware certificate of cancellation to first nullify that certificate and
then address other causes of action. However, as this court already pointed out in the Original
Opinion, this “does not afford a bankruptcy court the power to move down that road without first
having an eligible debtor to legitimize the involuntary bankruptcy.”
16
Therefore, although the
court did not have the intended citation, the court still addressed, through a related case, the exact
same proposition that the Petitioning Creditors are making now. Therefore, there is no error of
law. Even considering the correct citation, reconsideration is not warranted.
Indeed, the Petitioning Creditors blur the distinct differences between whether a lawsuit
can be brought to nullify a Delaware company’s cancelation in federal district court and/or
bankruptcy court outside of Delaware (clearly it can be) with the only issue in play now, that is a
Delaware company’s eligibility to be an involuntary debtor in bankruptcy. The distinction is
illustrated nicely by section 303(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that “[a]n
involuntary case may be commenced only under chapter 7 or 11 of this title, and only against a
person, except a farmer, family farmer, or a corporation that is not a moneyed, business, or
commercial corporation.” So, for example, although a farmer can be sued in federal district
court under diversity or federal question jurisdiction, section 303(a) makes clear that a farmer is
not eligible to be a debtor in an involuntary bankruptcy case.
17

In In re McCloy,
18
an involuntary petition was filed against a farmer. He consented to
entry of the order for relief. Later, he filed an objection to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy

16
Id.

17
The Petitioning Creditors also cited W & Z, LLC v. Virginia Fam. Restaurants, LLC, No. CV 6:20-3012-KFM,
2023 WL 3646537 (D.S.C. Apr. 5, 2023), for the proposition that a federal district court outside of Delaware can
nullify a Delaware certificate of cancellation. Once again, that is not the issue before this court.

18
In re McCloy, 296 F.3d 370 (5th Cir. 2002).

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court on the grounds that he was not eligible to be an involuntary debtor pursuant to section
303(a). The Fifth Circuit held, “an individual's status as a farmer does not go to the jurisdiction
of the bankruptcy court over an involuntary bankruptcy petition, but instead is an affirmative
defense that may be waived.”
19

Unlike the putative involuntary debtor in McCloy, the Assignee asserted the affirmative
defense that Deltech is not eligible to be a debtor.
20
The court ruled in the Assignee’s favor,
finding that “Deltech is not currently a legal entity and therefore is not a person eligible to be a
chapter 7 debtor.”
21
Even though Deltech could certainly be sued in a federal district court to
nullify the cancelation, it is not eligible to be an involuntary debtor. In summary, the court’s
view is not changed by consideration of the case not originally presented due to typographical
error.
B. New Cases Cited by Petitioning Creditors
The Petitioning Creditors cited the recent Fifth Circuit opinion in Matter of EP Energy
E&P Co., L.P.
22
for its holding that
As numerous cases have recognized, a bankruptcy court’s determinative authority
encompasses underlying matters, governed by state law, that necessarily would be
resolved in the process of adjudicating core matters over which the bankruptcy
court has federal statutory and constitutional subject-matter jurisdiction.
23

19
Id. at 375.

20
The court ruled in the Original Opinion that the Assignee had standing to seek dismissal according to the General
Assignment executed by Deltech. P-91, pp. 5-6.

21
P-91, p. 9.

22
Matter of EP Energy E&P Co., L.P., 169 F.4th 609 (5th Cir. 2026).

23
Id. at 622 (citations omitted).

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EP Energy did not involve the issue that is before this court. In EP Energy, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the bankruptcy court’s ruling that the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over
administrative expense claims encompassed the underlying state law claims that had to be
resolved in the process. The Fifth Circuit’s ruling does not stand for the rather incredible
proposition that this court can ignore the Assignee’s well-founded affirmative defense, that
Deltech is ineligible to be an involuntary debtor, to proceed with a substantive hearing on
whether Deltech’s Certificate of Cancellation can be nullified by this court in order to create an
eligible debtor and a viable bankruptcy case.
The Petitioning Creditors also cited In re Two Wheels Props., LLC
24
and In re ABZ Ins.
Servs., Inc.
25
in support of their argument that this court has authority to decide whether to
nullify Deltech’s Certificate of Cancellation concurrently with its decision as to eligibility to be a
debtor. In both cases, the court applied Texas law to determine whether a voluntary debtor was
a ”person” eligible to be a debtor pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 109. In the case at bar, no party has
argued that this court lacks authority to determine whether Deltech is eligible to be a debtor or
that this court erred in applying state law in making that determination. Therefore, neither Two
Wheels nor ABZ advances the position of the Petitioning Creditors.
C. Arguments Re-Urged by Petitioning Creditors
The Petitioning Creditors argue that Deltech remains in existence under Delaware law
because it has not completed the winding up process. The Petitioning Creditors have already
made this argument, and the court rejected it. As stated earlier, a motion to alter or amend

24
In re Two Wheels Props., LLC., 625 B.R. 869 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2020).

25
In re ABZ Ins. Servs., Inc., 245 B.R. 255 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000).

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judgment should not be “used as a vehicle for re-litigating old issues, ... or taking a ‘second bite
at the apple.’”
26

In an abundance of caution, the court will address the case of Mohr v. MLB Sub I, LLC,
27

a case previously cited by the Petitioning Creditors for a different proposition
28
but now cited for
their contention that a limited liability company that filed a certificate of cancellation still exists
if it has not completed winding up its affairs. In Mohr, MLB Sub I, LLC (“MLB”) sought
confirmation of a judicial sale. Mohr filed a motion to dismiss alleging that MLB no longer
existed once it filed a certificate of cancellation with the Delaware Secretary of State. The court
cited Trusa v. Nepo
29
and held that Delaware law “permit[s] a certificate of cancellation only
‘upon the dissolution and winding up of the company.’ ... MLB has not completed the
prerequisite winding up process and thus remained in existence.”
30

The opinion in Mohr is not binding on this court. Absent a ruling from a binding court,
this court is much more persuaded by the rulings of Delaware courts as to Delaware law. This
court has found no binding case and no Delaware case holding that a company continues to exist
if it files a certificate of cancellation before completing winding up its affairs, even though the
certificate has not been nullified. While the court in Trusa did hold that “a certificate of

26
Keaton, 2025 WL 2625571, *1.

27
Mohr v. MLB Sub I, LLC, No. CV 16-00493 ACK-WRP, 2022 WL 596851 (D. Haw. Feb. 28, 2022).

28
In their objection to dismissal, the Petitioning Creditors cited Mohr for the proposition that a certificate of
cancellation could only be filed “upon the dissolution and winding up of the limited liability company.” P-81, n. 30
(quoting Mohr, 2022 WL 596851, at *3).

29
Trusa v. Nepo, No. CV 12071-VCMR, 2017 WL 1379594, at *7 (Del. Ch. Apr. 13, 2017).

30
Mohr, 2022 WL 596851, at *4 (quoting Trusa v. Nepo, No. CV 12071-VCMR, 2017 WL 1379594, at *7 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 13, 2017)).

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cancellation may only be filed ‘upon the dissolution and winding up of the company,’”
31
it did
not decide the issue of whether a company remains in existence if it files a certificate of
cancellation before completing winding up its affairs. In fact, in Trusa, the company at issue had
not even filed a certificate of cancellation.
This court cited in its Original Opinion the decision of the Court of Chancery of
Delaware in In re Reinz Wisconsin Gasket, LLC.
32
That court held that “[w] hen a certificate of
cancellation is filed for an entity, its ‘existence as [a] jural entit[y] cease[s].’ Its ‘legal existence
ends.’ A defunct entity ceases to be a ‘body corporate.’”
33
It follows that once Deltech filed its
certificate of cancellation, it ceased to exist as a “person” pursuant to Delaware law. As stated in
the Original Opinion, “absent a court ruling (somewhere) nullifying the Certificate, it remains
effective.”
34

The Petitioning Creditors also contend that the court should take a second look at In re
Opus East, LLC.
35
In this court’s Original Opinion, it found:
Opus East ... is distinguishable from the case at bar. In that case, the debtor filed
a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 7. The chapter 7 trustee then sought,
among other things, to revoke the certificate of dissolution of an entity against
whom the estate presumably had a valid preference action. The issue of whether
the debtor was a person eligible for bankruptcy relief was not before the court.
The court cited the requirements for dissolution pursuant to 6 Del. Code § 18-804
and then revoked the preference target’s certificate of dissolution, which of course
does not have the force and effect of resurrecting a canceled company.
36

31
Trusa, 2017 WL 1379594, at *7.

32
In re Reinz Wisconsin Gasket, LLC, No. CV 2022-0859-MTZ, 2023 WL 3300042 (Del. Ch. May 8, 2023).

33
Id. at *2 (footnotes omitted).

34
P-91, p. 9.

35
In re Opus East, LLC, 528 B.R. 30 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015).

36
P-91, p. 9.

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The Petitioning Creditors contend that the court in Opus East used the words “dissolution” and
“cancellation” interchangeably. In the facts of the case, the Opus East court states that “[b]efore
the court is ... revocation of a certificate of dissolution.”
37
Later in the case, the court states:
The Trustee asks the Court to revoke the certification of dissolution ... Under
Delaware law, an LLC that seeks to dissolve ... “[s]hall make such provision as
will be reasonably likely to be sufficient to provide compensation for claims ...
based on facts known to the limited liability company, are likely to arise or to
become known to the limited liability company within 10 years after the date
of dissolution.” Del.Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18–804(b)(3). Failure to comply with the
statutory requirements for winding up an LLC results in revocation or
nullification of the certificate of cancellation. See Metro Commc'n Corp., BVI v.
Advanced Mobilecomm Techs., Inc., 854 A.2d 121, 139–140 (Del.Ch.2004). “[I]f
the Court finds that an LLC's affairs were not wound up in compliance with the
Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, it may nullify the certificate of
cancellation, which effectively revives the LLC and allows claims to be brought
by and against it.” Matthew v. Laudamiel, No. 5957–VCN, 2012 WL 605589, at
*22, n. 148 (Del.Ch. Feb. 21, 2012). In this case, the Court has found that the
Trustee has a valid claim for a preference and fraudulent transfer against Core.
Therefore, the Court will grant the Trustee's request to revoke the dissolution
certificate of Core.
38

Whether Opus East conflated the Delaware concepts of dissolution and cancelation has no
bearing on this case. It did not involve eligibility of an involuntary debtor. Instead, the chapter 7
trustee in a properly invoked bankruptcy case sought to nullify the certificate of dissolution or
cancellation of a creditor against whom the estate had a preference action. A preference target is
never subject to the threshold issue of eligibility to be an involuntary debtor.
The Petitioning Creditors also urge the court to look again at the case of In re TPG Troy,
LLC.
39
As stated earlier, a motion to alter or amend judgment should not be “used as a vehicle

37
Opus East, 528 B.R. at 48 (emphasis added).

38
Id. at 105-106 (emphasis added).

39
In re TPG Troy, LLC, 492 B.R. 150 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013).

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for re-litigating old issues, ... or taking a ‘second bite at the apple.’”
40
As this court found in its
Original Opinion:
In TPG Troy, the court heard, all at one time, the issues of the putative debtor’s
eligibility, whether the putative debtor’s certificate of cancellation should be
nullified, and whether the involuntary petition should be dismissed on other
grounds. But that court dismissed the involuntary petition on other grounds and
did not reach the issue of whether the putative debtor was eligible to be a debtor
or whether the certificate of cancellation could be nullified by the bankruptcy
court.
41

The court in TPG Troy held that the involuntary cases filed against the two putative debtors must
be dismissed because 1) there was a bona fide dispute as to whether the petitioners held claims
against the putative debtors, and 2) abstention was warranted under section 305(a)(1). The
putative debtors also asserted as grounds for dismissal that they were ineligible to be debtors
pursuant to section 303(a) and that the petitioning creditors had not proven, as required by
section 303(h), that they were not paying debts as they came due or subject to a bona fide
dispute. The court found:
In order [to] dismiss these cases under section 303(h) or 303(a), the Court would
likely have to determine whether the Troy Entities are liable as alter egos for the
Issuer's debts and whether their dissolution was improper, both of which are
contested issues. Because the Court finds two other grounds upon which to
dismiss these cases, it is not necessary to delve into these fact-intensive
inquiries.
42

The Petitioning Creditors contend that this court should interpret the ruling by the court in TPG
Troy as indicating that it had the power to nullify the certificate of cancellation but chose not to
do so. That interpretation stretches the ruling to say the least. The court in TPG Troy only ruled

40
Keaton, 2025 WL 2625571, *1.

41
P-91, pp. 11-12.

42
TPG Troy, 492 B.R. at 161.

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that it was not necessary for it to decide whether the cases should be dismissed pursuant to
sections 303(a) or (h) because it would dismiss the cases on other grounds. It expressly resisted
the urge to provide dicta from a non-precedential opinion perhaps helpful to the Petitioning
Creditors’ cause here.
D. Deltech’s Good Standing in Louisiana
The Petitioning Creditors next contend that they have newly discovered evidence
showing that Deltech remains active and in good standing with the Louisiana Secretary of State.
They contend that Deltech was issued a certificate of authority to transact business in Louisiana
on July 14, 2021, and its last filing with the Louisiana Secretary of State was June 6, 2025. They
argue for the first time that regardless of its cancellation in Delaware, Deltech “still exists under
Louisiana law and may be a debtor in a bankruptcy the same as any other Louisiana entity.”
43

This evidence, even if relevant to the Motion to Amend, was obviously available at the
time of the hearing on dismissal. As the Fifth Circuit held in Life Partners, “[a] motion to alter
or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) ... cannot be used to raise arguments which could, and
should, have been made before the judgment issued.”
44
The Petitioning Creditors contend that
even though they had access to this public record at the time the court ruled on dismissal, the
court should nevertheless consider it. They cited In re Berg.
45
In Berg, the court allowed a trustee
to introduce, on reconsideration, a public record previously available because the trustee had
been misled by the opposing party. The Petitioning Creditors do not allege that the Assignee
misled them, but they contend, without any legal basis, that the Assignee should have informed

43
P-99, p. 10.

44
Life Partners, 936 F.3d at 128.

45
In re Berg, 383 B.R. 631 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2008).

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them that Deltech was in good standing in Louisiana. The ruling in Berg, even if binding on this
court (it is not), does not extend far enough to help the Petitioning Creditors.
Regardless, whether Deltech is in good standing in Louisiana is not grounds for alteration
or amendment of the order dismissing the case. Deltech was organized under Delaware law, and
its continued existence is governed by Delaware law. The Petitioning Creditors acknowledged
this in their objection to dismissal. They stated that Deltech “is a Delaware LLC, so Delaware
law controls its legal existence as a ‘person’ for bankruptcy purposes.”
46
Therefore,
reconsideration is not warranted as to this issue.
However, the court will address the new Fifth Circuit case cited by the Petitioning
Creditors – Alphonse v. Arch Bay Holdings, L.L.C.
47
In that case, Alphonse filed suit against
Arch Bay Holdings, L.L.C. (“Arch Bay”), the company he believed was responsible for
foreclosing on his home, pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Louisiana Unfair
Trade Practices Act. Arch Bay argued that Alphonse had sued the wrong defendant and that its
affiliate was the real party in interest. Alphonse argued that the two entities were not legally
distinct. The district court cited Louisiana’s conflict of laws statute, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
12:1342. It provides that “[t]he laws of the state or other jurisdiction under which a foreign
limited liability company is organized shall govern its organization, its internal affairs, and the
liability of its managers and members that arise solely out of their positions as managers and
members.” The district court then applied the law of the state of organization, Delaware, and
determined that the two entities were separate legal entities. Therefore, the court dismissed the
case. On appeal by Alphonse, the Fifth Circuit held:

46
P-81, p. 9.

47
Alphonse v. Arch Bay Holdings, L.L.C., 548 F. App'x 979 (5th Cir. 2013).

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[I]t is not clear that the liability of a limited liability company, or its “series,” to
third parties like Alphonse is internal rather than external. After all, “the law of
the state of incorporation normally determines issues relating to
the internal affairs of a corporation,” but “[d]ifferent conflicts principles apply ...
where the rights of third parties external to the corporation are at issue.”
48

The Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded for the district court “to consider the
external/internal affairs conflict-of-law question under Louisiana law.”
49
The opinion on remand
did not reach a resolution of this issue.
In the case at bar, the only decision being challenged by this Motion to Amend is whether
Deltech is a person eligible to be an involuntary debtor. The parties agreed at the outset that
Deltech was organized under Delaware law, and Delaware law governs its existence. This court
can think of nothing more uniquely internal than whether a company exists or not. Alphonse has
no bearing on this case.
III. Stay the Case
In the alternative, the Petitioning Creditors contend that if the court declines to reconsider
its Original Opinion, it should nevertheless stay the involuntary case while they pursue
nullification elsewhere. The involuntary petition has already been dismissed. The case was
reopened for the sole purpose of permitting the Motion to Amend to be considered. As such, the
case has neither been reinstated nor has an order for relief been granted. Stated another way,
there is nothing for this court to stay. Additionally, this is an argument that could have been urged
by the Petitioning Creditors before the court ruled in its Original Opinion. For all these reasons,
issuing a stay is denied.

48
Id. at 986 (quoting First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 621, 103
S.Ct. 2591, 77 L.Ed.2d 46 (1983) (citation omitted)).

49
Id. at 986.

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IV. Certification of Direct Appeal to the Fifth Circuit
The Petitioning Creditors finally contend that the court should certify a direct appeal to
the Fifth Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A). In response to this request, the Assignee
contends that dismissal of the case is not reviewable on appeal pursuant to section 305 of the
Bankruptcy Code. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A) provides:
(2)(A) The appropriate court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals
described in the first sentence of subsection (a) if the bankruptcy court, the district
court, or the bankruptcy appellate panel involved, acting on its own motion or on
the request of a party to the judgment, order, or decree described in such first
sentence, or all the appellants and appellees (if any) acting jointly, certify that—

(i) the judgment, order, or decree involves a question of law as to which
there is no controlling decision of the court of appeals for the circuit or of
the Supreme Court of the United States, or involves a matter of public
importance;

(ii) the judgment, order, or decree involves a question of law requiring
resolution of conflicting decisions; or

(iii) an immediate appeal from the judgment, order, or decree may
materially advance the progress of the case or proceeding in which the
appeal is taken; ...
50

In In re First River Energy, LLC,
51
the court held that “[i]f any of the four conditions precedent
are met, the bankruptcy court shall make the certification per § 158(d)(2)(B)(ii).”
52
The
procedure for requesting certification of a direct appeal to a circuit court is found in F.R.B.P.
8006. The court is concerned that the Petitioning Creditors, through this Motion to Amend, have
not presented its case for direct appeal through the meticulous requirements found in F.R.B.P.

50
28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A) (emphasis added).

51
In re First River Energy, LLC, No. 18-50085-CAG, 2019 WL 1782628 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2019).

52
Id. at *5 (emphasis in original) (citing In re Adkins, 517 B.R. 698, 699 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2014)).

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8006. Accordingly, the Petitioning Creditors may re-urge their request by separate motion filed
in compliance with F.R.B.P. 8006. Likewise, the Assignee may object to any such request on any
grounds, including appealability pursuant to section 305 of the Bankruptcy Code, when and if
such a motion is filed and noticed for hearing.
V. Conclusion
The request of the Petitioning Creditors to alter or amend the order dismissing the case is
denied, as are the alternative requests to stay the case or to certify direct appeal to the Fifth
Circuit. Denial of the request to certify direct appeal to the Fifth Circuit is without prejudice, as
is any objection to that relief raised by the Assignee, including appealability. The court will enter
a separate order in accordance with this Memorandum Opinion.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, June 17, 2026.

/s/ Michael A. Crawford
MICHAEL A. CRAWFORD
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
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