Hart v. Sunbelt Supply, L.L.C.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

GARY HART

CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS

NO. 25-1548
SUNBELT SUPPLY, L.L.C.

SECTION R (1)
ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is plaintiff Gary Hart’s motion for reconsideration of
the Court’s order partially granting defendant Sunbelt’s motion for summary
judgment.
1
For the following reasons, the Court denies plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration.
I. BACKGROUND
The undisputed facts are as follows. Gary Hart began working for
Sunbelt
2
in July 2017.
3
When Hart joined Sunbelt, he received base
compensation, a signing bonus, and incentive compensation.
4
The incentive
compensation was a return on invested capital plan tied to the branch sales
performance.
5
Hart’s offer letter includes language that “[Hart] must be

1
R. Doc. 47.
2
For simplicity, the Court refers to Hart’s employer as Sunbelt
throughout. Sunbelt Supply co. is a fictitious name used by FloWorks
USA L.P. R. Doc. 10.
3
R. Doc. 32-4 at 2.
4
Id.
5
Id.
Case 2:25-cv-01548-SSV-JVM Document 56 Filed 08/06/26 Page 1 of 10

2

actively employed on the date [incentive] payments are made to receive the
award. [Sunbelt] reserves the right to change, revise or terminate the
incentive plan at any time.”
6
As of January 2024, Hart had informed Scott
Jackson, the President of Sunbelt, that he intended to retire in January
2025.
7

From January 2024 until his retirement in January 2025 at the age of
67, Hart served as one of two Regional Directors for Sunbelt.
8
In that role,
Hart received a base salary and incentive-based variable compensation.
9
In
March 2024, Sunbelt modified the incentive compensation plan.
10
The
incentive compensation plan changed from the return on invested capital
plan to a sales contribution percentage plan.
11
The March 2024 incentive
compensation plan letter included language that Sunbelt could “change
revise, or terminate” the incentive-based compensation at any time and
“make changes to individual payouts as warranted.”
12
The incentive plan
contained language that the “employee’s eligibility to earn any future

6
R. Doc. 26-9 at 2.
7
R. Doc. 26-4 at 39.
8
R. Doc. 32-2 at 1.
9
R. Docs. 32-2; 32-3.
10
R. Doc. 26-10 at 2.
11
Id.
12
Id.
Case 2:25-cv-01548-SSV-JVM Document 56 Filed 08/06/26 Page 2 of 10

3

payment under any plan shall cease on the final day of employment, except
to the extent prohibited by applicable law.”
13

On November 1, 2024, Hart sent a formal, written notice of his intent
to retire on January 31, 2025.
14
Ten days later, on November 11, 2024,
Jackson informed Hart on a phone call that Hart’s incentive compensation
to be paid for October, November, and December 2024
15
would be $5,000
instead of the sales contribution percentage.
16
Hart emailed Jackson
following the phone call, clarifying the change in incentive contribution.
17

Jackson confirmed the change and noted that Hart would not be paid
incentive compensation for January because he would no longer be
employed with Sunbelt on the payout date in February 2025.
18
Hart
continued in his position as Regional Director until his retirement. Three
days before his retirement, he emailed Jackson, demanding full
compensation under the incentive-based plan for October, November, and

13
Id.
14
R. Doc. 32-4.
15
The Court throughout refers to payments “for October,” etc. The
payment “for October 2024” is the payment that would be made in
November 2024 based on October’s sales data in accordance with
Sunbelt’s payment policies.
16
R. Doc. 32-7 at 4.
17
R. Doc. 32-5 at 2.
18
R. Doc. 26-11 at 3.
Case 2:25-cv-01548-SSV-JVM Document 56 Filed 08/06/26 Page 3 of 10

4

December 2024, and January 2025, seeking $36,769.02 plus a commission
from January sales once known.
19
Jackson did not respond to that email.
On March 6, 2025, Hart filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC
for age discrimination. The EEOC issued a right to sue letter to Hart on June
26, 2025.
20
Hart then sued in this Court on July 29, 2025, asserting federal
question jurisdiction over his federal age discrimination claims.
21
In
addition, Hart brought claims under the Louisiana Employment
Discrimination Law (LEDL) and the Louisiana Wage Payment Act (LWPA),
asserting supplemental jurisdiction.
22

Sunbelt moved for summary judgment on each of Hart’s claims.
23
Hart
moved for partial summary judgment as to his Louisiana Wage Payment Act
claim.
24
The Court granted Sunbelt’s motion regarding Hart’s age
discrimination claims and dismissed the claims with prejudice.
25
As to
Hart’s LWPA claims, the Court granted Sunbelt’s motion and denied Hart’s
motion for summary judgment on the payments for October, November, and
December 2024, dismissing Hart’s claims for those months with prejudice.

19
R. Doc. 32-9 at 1.
20
R. Doc. 1 at 2.
21
R. Doc. 1.
22
Id.
23
R. Doc. 26.
24
R. Doc. 25.
25
R. Doc. 45 at 29.
Case 2:25-cv-01548-SSV-JVM Document 56 Filed 08/06/26 Page 4 of 10

5

The Court granted Hart’s motion and denied Sunbelt’s motion regarding the
payment for January 2025.
Before the Court is Hart’s opposed motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)
for reconsideration of the Court’s grant of summary judgment to Sunbelt on
the LWPA claim for the payment for October.
26
The Court considers the
motion below.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an
order that adjudicates fewer than all of the claims among the parties “may be
revised at any time” before the entry of a final judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(b). As Rule 54 recognizes, a district court “possesses the inherent
procedural power to reconsider, rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for
cause seen by it to be sufficient.” Melancon v. Texaco, 659 F.2d 551, 553
(5th Cir. 1981). Under Rule 54(b), a court “is free to reconsider and reverse
its decision for any reason it deems sufficient.” Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P.,
864 F.3d 326, 336 (5th Cir. 2017).
Rule 54(b) imposes a less stringent standard for reconsideration than
Rule 59(e). Id. at 336–37. Courts may reconsider and reverse their decisions

26
R. Doc. 47.
Case 2:25-cv-01548-SSV-JVM Document 56 Filed 08/06/26 Page 5 of 10

6

under Rule 54(b) “even in the absence of new evidence or an intervening
change in or clarification of the substantive law.” Id. at 336.
III. DISCUSSION
Here, plaintiff seeks reconsideration of this Court’s order granting
partial summary judgment to defendant. Plaintiff’s motion is limited to the
portion of the Court’s order granting summary judgment to defendant for
the October payment.
27
The parties agree that, because the Court’s July 8
Order did not resolve all of the claims between the parties, the Order is
interlocutory, and Rule 54(b) governs the motion for consideration.
28

In support of his motion for reconsideration, plaintiff asserts that the
October payment was already fully earned by the time of the November 11
modification.
29
Thus, Sunbelt’s retroactive modification caused plaintiff to
“forfeit” the October payment, violating La. R.S. 23:634.
30

La. R.S. 23:634 provides that employers may not require “employees
to sign contracts by which the employees shall forfeit their wages if
discharged,” or if they resign “before the contract is completed; but in all
such cases the employees shall be entitled to the wages actually earned up to

27
R. Doc. 47.
28
Id.; R. Doc. 52 at 3–4.
29
R. Doc. 47-1 at 2.
30
Id. at 5.
Case 2:25-cv-01548-SSV-JVM Document 56 Filed 08/06/26 Page 6 of 10

7

the time of their discharge or resignation.” La. R.S. 23:634. The Court
acknowledged in its July 8 Order that La. R.S. 23:634 “remains an express
legislative statement that [present-to-earn] clauses are unenforceable.”
31

Plaintiff argues that his October commission was “actually earned” by
the time of the November 11 modification because the October commission
was calculated based on his sales made during the month of October.
32

According to Plaintiff, his commission was “actually earned” on October 31,
2024, and any modification of the payment from that point forward
amounted to a forfeiture in violation of La. R.S. 23:634.
33

But the plain text of La. R.S. 23:631(E)(1) makes clear that whether
plaintiff’s commission was “actually earned” is not dispositive. Rather, the
statute provides a second prerequisite: commissions are due “only if, at the
time of separation, the compensation has been earned and not modified in
accordance with a written policy addressing the commission.” La. R.S.
23:631(E)(1) (emphasis added).
While plaintiff focuses on the first requirement of La. R.S.
23:631(E)(1), he has no response to the second. Even assuming that
plaintiff’s October commission was “actually earned” by the time of the

31
R. Doc. 45 at 28.
32
R. Doc. 52 at 11
33
R. Doc. 47-1 at 11.
Case 2:25-cv-01548-SSV-JVM Document 56 Filed 08/06/26 Page 7 of 10

8

November 11 modification, Sunbelt’s written policy addressed the October
commission. The March 2024 policy explicitly stated that Sunbelt could
“change, revise, or terminate” the incentive-based compensation at any time
and “make changes to individual payouts as warranted.”
34
So Sunbelt’s
November 11 modification of the October payment, even if retroactive, was
“in accordance with a written policy addressing the commission.” La. R.S.
23:631(E).
Plaintiff argues that the Court’s finding that “Sunbelt did not modify
the January payment in accordance with a lawful written policy” must mean
that the November 11 modification of the October payment was also
unlawful.
35
This confuses the Court’s reasoning. The Court held that the
modification of the January payment was not in accordance with a lawful
written policy because Sunbelt’s policy that an “employee’s eligibility to earn
any future payment under any plan shall cease on the final day of
employment” amounted to an illegal “present-to-earn” policy.
36
But the
modification of the October payment was not pursuant to Sunbelt’s “present-
to-earn” policy. Sunbelt modified the October payment under its policy that
it could “change, revise, or terminate” the incentive-based compensation at

34
R. Doc. 26-10 at 2.
35
R. Doc. 54 at 7–8 (emphasis in original).
36
R. Doc. 45 at 28–29.
Case 2:25-cv-01548-SSV-JVM Document 56 Filed 08/06/26 Page 8 of 10

9

any time and “make changes to individual payouts as warranted.”
37
The
Court’s ruling on the January payment does not affect this modification.
Plaintiff then asserts that reading La. R.S. 23:631(E) to allow the
November 11 modification of the October payment would “nullify [the]
statutory text” of La. R.S. 23:634.
38
For support, plaintiff relies on forfeiture
cases interpreting the LWPA before the enactment of La. R.S. 23:631(E).
39

But Plaintiff cites no case holding that the retroactive modification of a
commission payment is illegal under La. 23:634, nor is the Court aware of
one. Plaintiff also points to the legislative history behind La. R.S. 23:631(E),
but again, nowhere in this history does the legislature suggest that the
retroactive modification of a commission is illegal under La. R.S. 23:634.
While legislators discussed how commissions could not be withheld at
termination, plaintiff was not terminated on November 11. Rather, Sunbelt
modified plaintiff’s October commission on November 11 pursuant to its
written policy allowing such modifications.
Plaintiff’s reading of the LWPA also fails to account for La.
R.S. 23:631(E)(2) and (3). La. R.S. 23:631(E)(2) explicitly allows for policies
that retroactively affect the amounts of commissions based on future events.

37
R. Doc. 26-10 at 2.
38
R. Doc. 54 at 3.
39
R. Docs. 47-1 at 8–11; 54 at 6–8.
Case 2:25-cv-01548-SSV-JVM Document 56 Filed 08/06/26 Page 9 of 10

10
And La. R.S. 23:631(E)(3) provides that bonus amounts may be determined
by employers several months after the pay periods during which the
corresponding labor was performed. These provisions reflect that the
legislature did not view such action as amounting to illegal forfeiture under
La. R.S. 23:634.
In interpreting a statute, the Court must “start with the plain text, and
read all parts of the statute together to produce a harmonious whole.” Doe
v. KPMG, LLP, 398 F.3d 686, 688 (5th Cir. 2005). The plain text of La. R.S.
23:631(E) makes clear that a commission must be “earned and not modified
in accordance with a written policy” to be considered an amount then due.
La. R.S. 23:631(E) (emphasis added). Sunbelt modified the October
payment in accordance with the portion of its written policy that was not an
illegal present-to-earn provision. As such, the October payment was not an
amount due under La. R.S. 23:631(E).
IV.CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this ___ day of August, 2026.
_____________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
6th
Case 2:25-cv-01548-SSV-JVM Document 56 Filed 08/06/26 Page 10 of 10