ORDER AND REASONS: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that CRSC's motion 11 is DENIED. Signed by Judge Nannette Jolivette Brown on 8/14/2026. (amj)•T.J. Sutton Enterprises, LLC v. CRSC, LLC
ORDER AND REASONS: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that CRSC's motion 11 is DENIED. Signed by Judge Nannette Jolivette Brown on 8/14/2026. (amj)District Court Laed14.08.2026
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
TJ SUTTON ENTERPRISES, LLC CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO.: 25-232
CRSC, LLC SECTION: “G”
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant CRSC, LLC’s
1
(“CRSC”) Motion to Dismiss.
2
In the
motion, CRSC argues that this case should be dismissed because it is duplicative of a previously
filed case pending before this Court.
3
CRSC requests that this case be dismissed, or alternatively,
administratively stayed pending resolution of the previously-filed case. Plaintiff TJ Sutton (“TJ
Sutton”) opposes the motion. Considering the motion, the memoranda in support and in opposition,
the record, and the applicable law the Court denies the motion.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
TJ Sutton and CRSC entered into a “Receipt, Release, Settlement and Indemnity
Agreement with Reservation of Rights” (“Settlement Agreement”), which was signed by the
parties on August 29, 2023 and August 30, 2023, respectively.
4
The Settlement Agreement
1
Formerly known as “Citadel Recovery Services, LLC”
2
Rec. Doc. 11.
3
Citadel Recovery Services, LLC v. T.J. Sutton Enterprises, LLC, Case No. 22-cv-914.
4
Rec. Doc. 1 at 2.
Case 2:25-cv-00232-NJB-KWR Document 19 Filed 08/14/26 Page 1 of 11
2
concerned three cases pending in the U.S. Virgin Islands, which were collectively referred to as
the “Cotto Matters.”
5
Section II(1) of the Settlement Agreement provided:
Upon execution of this Agreement, Citadel will file a motion in The Interpleader
Suit to release the $500,000.00 interpleader bond provided by Travelers and to
release $833,504.33 payable immediately to Sutton. Sutton and Travelers agree to
join in this motion and not oppose the release of the $500,000.00 bond provided by
Travelers or the release of $833,504.33 to Sutton.
6
The Complaint identifies the interpleader action as Citadel Recovery Services, LLC v. T.J.
Sutton Enterprises, LLC, Case No. 22-cv-914.
7
Section II(2) of the Settlement Agreement
provided, “Citadel agrees to pay Sutton an additional sum of $266,495.67 within the earlier of (a)
the funds being received by Citadel from AECOM, (b) one-year from the date this Agreement is
executed, or (c) dismissal of the pending claims of Jerry Baptiste.”
8
According to the Complaint, despite one year passing, CRSC has refused to pay TJ Sutton
the sum of $266,495.67.
9
Section II(3) of the Settlement Agreement provided:
Within 30 days of the execution of this Agreement, Citadel will file a motion with
the Court to release $271,188.88 of the Interpled Funds into the Trust Account of
its counsel, Robert J. Ellis (“The Trust Funds”). Travelers and Sutton agree to join
in this motion and not oppose the release of $271,188.88 to the Trust Account of
Robert J. Ellis.
10
5
Id. at 4, n.1. The “Cotto Matters” were defined in the Settlement Agreement as the following three lawsuits:
Cotto, et al v. Citadel Recovery Services, LC, et al., No. 3:21-cv-00016; Cotto, et al v. Gerald Tolliver, et al., No. ST-
2002-cv-00073; and Gov. of the Virgin Islands ex rel. Cotto, et al. v. Gerald Toliver, et al., No. ST-2002-cv-00081.
6
Id. at 2.
7
Id. at 3.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
Case 2:25-cv-00232-NJB-KWR Document 19 Filed 08/14/26 Page 2 of 11
3
CRSC filed the contemplated motion, which was joined by TJ Sutton, and this Court denied
the motion.
11
Section II(4) of the Settlement Agreement provided:
The Trust Funds shall first be used to resolve the Cotto Matters on behalf of Citadel
and Sutton. Citadel understands and accepts that any additional sums needed to
resolve the Cotto Matters shall be provided by Citadel, not Sutton. To that end,
Citadel agrees to indemnify Sutton from any liability above The Trust Funds in the
Cotto Matters.
12
The Complaint states that the Cotto matters reached a preliminary settlement in February
2024.
13
According to the Complaint, CRSC is responsible for the indemnification of TJ Sutton
with respect to the Cotto matters and the preliminary settlement reached in February 2024.
14
According to the Complaint, the responsibility of CRSC to resolve the Cotto matters and indemnify
TJ Sutton of any amounts above the Trust Funds was independent of the release of any funds from
the registry of the Court.
15
The Complaint states that CRSC has refused to indemnify TJ Sutton in
relation to the Cotto matters.
16
B. Procedural Background
1. Prior Litigation
On April 6, 2022, Citadel filed a Interpleader Complaint in this Court against Morgado
Rentals, Inc., Smart Freight Funding, LLC, TJ Sutton Enterprises, LLC, and Travelers Casualty
and Surety Company.
17
Citadel placed the total sum of $1,751,430.53 into the registry of the Court,
11
Id.
12
Id. at 4.
13
Id. at 5.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 4.
16
Id.
17
Id.
Case 2:25-cv-00232-NJB-KWR Document 19 Filed 08/14/26 Page 3 of 11
4
inclusive of: (1) funds received by Citadel from AECOM totaling $833,504.33; (2) cash deposit
from Citadel of $417,926.20; and (3) bond provided by Travelers in the amount of $500,000.
18
On
June 19, 2023, Jerry Baptiste (“Baptiste”) filed a Motion to Intervene alleging rights to the
interpled funds.
19
Baptiste disclosed to the Court that the amount needed to protect his claim was
$307,000.
20
On October 17, 2023, TJ Sutton and Citadel filed an unopposed Motion for
Interpleader Disbursement following a settlement agreement between TJ Sutton, Citadel, and
Travelers,
21
which was granted by the Court. The amount of $833,504.33 payable to TJ Sutton
was disbursed, and the $500,000 bond was released to Travelers Casualty and Surety Company.
22
On June 5, 2025, a settlement conference was held before the Magistrate Judge, wherein a
partial settlement was reached as to Baptiste.
23
On July 18, 2025, Toliver and TJ Sutton filed a
Joint Stipulation.
24
On August 13, 2025, Citadel filed a motion for disbursement of interpled
funds.
25
On September 8, 2025, Toliver filed an Ex Parte Motion for Disbursement of Funds,
requesting partial disbursement in the amount of $67,500 pursuant to the joint stipulation.
26
On
September 15, 2025, the Court granted Toliver’s motion.
27
18
Citadel Recovery Services, LLC v. T.J. Sutton Enterprises, LLC, Case No. 22-cv-914, Rec. Doc. 7; Rec.
Doc. 39; Rec. Doc. 42.
19
Citadel Recovery Services, LLC v. T.J. Sutton Enterprises, LLC, Case No. 22-cv-914, Rec. Doc. 52.
20
Citadel Recovery Services, LLC v. T.J. Sutton Enterprises, LLC, Case No. 22-cv-914, Rec. Doc. 85-1 at 2.
21
Citadel Recovery Services, LLC v. T.J. Sutton Enterprises, LLC, Case No. 22-cv-914, Rec. Doc. 85.
22
Citadel Recovery Services, LLC v. T.J. Sutton Enterprises, LLC, Case No. 22-cv-914, Rec. Doc. 89.
23
Citadel Recovery Services, LLC v. T.J. Sutton Enterprises, LLC, Case No. 22-cv-914, Rec. Doc. 142.
24
Citadel Recovery Services, LLC v. T.J. Sutton Enterprises, LLC, Case No. 22-cv-914, Rec. Doc. 156.
25
Citadel Recovery Services, LLC v. T.J. Sutton Enterprises, LLC, Case No. 22-cv-914, Rec. Doc. 160.
26
Citadel Recovery Services, LLC v. T.J. Sutton Enterprises, LLC, Case No. 22-cv-914, Rec. Doc. 165.
27
Citadel Recovery Services, LLC v. T.J. Sutton Enterprises, LLC, Case No. 22-cv-914, Rec. Doc. 66.
Case 2:25-cv-00232-NJB-KWR Document 19 Filed 08/14/26 Page 4 of 11
5
On January 14, 2026, the Magistrate Judge held a settlement conference.
28
On March 6,
2026, the Magistrate Judge entered a Report and Recommendation, recommending that the parties
file a joint motion for disbursement of $130,000.
29
On June 29, 2026, Citadel and TJ Sutton filed
a Joint Motion to Disburse Funds from the Registry.
30
On August 3, 2026, the Court granted the
motion.
31
2. Current Litigation
On February 3, 2025, TJ Sutton filed a Complaint in this Court, asserting causes of action
for: (1) Breach of Contract related to the August 2023 Settlement Agreement; (2) Breach of
Contract related to a preliminary settlement in February 2024; (3) Breach of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing; (4) Declaratory Judgment; and (5) Breach of Contract in Bad Faith.
32
On October 23,
2025, CRSC filed the instant Motion to Dismiss.
33
On January 27, 2026, TJ Sutton filed an
opposition to the motion.
34
II. Parties’ Arguments
A. CRSC’s Arguments in Support of the Motion
In the motion, CRSC argues that this action is the second lawsuit filed between the same
parties over the same underlying contract dispute.
35
CRSC explains that federal law bars
28
Citadel Recovery Services, LLC v. T.J. Sutton Enterprises, LLC, Case No. 22-cv-914, Rec. Doc. 169.
29
Citadel Recovery Services, LLC v. T.J. Sutton Enterprises, LLC, Case No. 22-cv-914, Rec. Doc. 170.
30
Citadel Recovery Services, LLC v. T.J. Sutton Enterprises, LLC, Case No. 22-cv-914, Rec. Doc. 172.
31
Citadel Recovery Services, LLC v. T.J. Sutton Enterprises, LLC, Case No. 22-cv-914, Rec. Doc. 173.
32
Rec. Doc. 1.
33
Rec. Doc. 11.
34
Rec. Doc. 18.
35
Rec. Doc. 11-1 at 1.
Case 2:25-cv-00232-NJB-KWR Document 19 Filed 08/14/26 Page 5 of 11
6
duplicative suits that arise from the same nucleus of operative facts, and dismissal is warranted to
prevent piecemeal litigation and inconsistent rulings.
36
CRSC contends that this case does not
present a new controversy.
37
CRSC argues that the parties in the instant litigation are identical to the previously-filed
case.
38
CRSC avers that the two cases are grounded in the same operative facts and seeks to resolve
the same controversy.
39
CRSC contends that both actions seek to determine the obligations arising
from the same agreement.
40
CRSC asserts that, consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s claim-splitting
jurisprudence, this later-filed case should be dismissed, or stayed until resolution of the previously-
filed action.
41
B. TJ Sutton’s Argument in Opposition to the Motion
In opposition, TJ Sutton explains that CRSC has refused to pay TJ Sutton the sum of
$266,495.67, as previously agreed upon by the parties.
42
According to TJ Sutton, the responsibility
to indemnify TJ Sutton for the amount of $266,495.67 was independent of the release of any funds
from the registry in the previously-filed matter.
43
TJ Sutton contends that the instant matter was
filed for enforcement of the settlement agreement, breach of contract, and declaratory judgment
that CRSC is required to indemnify TJ Sutton with respect to the preliminary settlement reached
36
Id.
37
Id. at 3.
38
Id. at 4.
39
Id. at 5.
40
Id. at 6.
41
Id.
42
Rec. Doc. 18 at 4.
43
Id.
Case 2:25-cv-00232-NJB-KWR Document 19 Filed 08/14/26 Page 6 of 11
7
in February 2024.
44
III. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that an action may be dismissed for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
45
A motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim is “viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.”
46
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’”
47
“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.”
48
A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff has pleaded facts that allow
the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”
49
On a motion to dismiss, asserted claims are liberally construed in favor of the claimant,
and all facts pleaded are taken as true.
50
However, although required to accept all “well-pleaded
facts” as true, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions as true.
51
“While legal conclusions
can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”
52
Similarly, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
44
Id.
45
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
46
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982).
47
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
48
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
49
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
50
Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993); see also
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322–23 (2007).
51
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.
52
Id. at 679.
Case 2:25-cv-00232-NJB-KWR Document 19 Filed 08/14/26 Page 7 of 11
8
statements” will not suffice.
53
The complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it
must offer more than mere labels, legal conclusions, or formulaic recitations of the elements of a
cause of action.
54
That is, the complaint must offer more than an “unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
55
From the face of the complaint, there must be enough
factual matter to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence as to each
element of the asserted claims.
56
If factual allegations are insufficient to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level, or if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that there is an “insuperable”
bar to relief, the claim must be dismissed.
57
IV. Analysis
CRSC moves to dismiss this action under the theory of “claim-splitting,” arguing that this
case is duplicative of a previously filed case pending before this Court. In opposition, TJ Sutton
argues that the responsibility of CRSC to resolve the Cotto matters and to indemnify TJ Sutton
was independent of the release of any funds from the registry of the Court in the previously filed
matter.
“Claim-splitting occurs when a single ‘cause of action’ is split by advancing one part in an
initial suit and another part in a later suit.”
58
Adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Super Van Inc. v. City
53
Id. at 678.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 2009).
57
Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328 n.9 (5th Cir. 2007); Moore v. Metro. Hum. Serv. Dist., No. 09-6470,
2010 WL 1462224, at * 2 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 2010) (Vance, J.) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007)).
58
FDIC v. Nelson, 19 F.3d 15, 1994 WL 93409, at *2 n.5 (5th Cir. Mar. 15, 1994) (per curiam) (unpublished
table decision).
Case 2:25-cv-00232-NJB-KWR Document 19 Filed 08/14/26 Page 8 of 11
9
of San Antonio,
59
the rule against claim splitting:
prohibits a plaintiff from prosecuting its case piecemeal and requires that all claims
arising out of a single wrong be presented in one action. In a claim splitting case,
the second suit will be barred if the claim involves the same parties and arises out
of the same transaction or series of transactions as the first claim.
60
“A main purpose behind the rule . . . is to protect the defendant from being harassed by repetitive
actions based on the same claim.”
61
“In dealing with simultaneous actions on related theories, courts at times express principles
of ‘claim splitting’ that are similar to claim preclusion, but that do not require a prior judgment.”
62
“A dismissal on this [claim-splitting] ground has been viewed as a matter of docket management,
reviewed for abuse of discretion, even in decisions that with some exaggeration describe the theory
‘as an aspect of res judicata.’”
63
Because the prohibition against claim splitting rests on res judicata principles, courts rely
on res judicata’s four-part test: (1) the parties in the current action are the same or “in privity with
the parties in the prior action”; (2) “the court that rendered the prior judgment” was a “court of
competent jurisdiction”; (3) the prior action “terminated with a final judgment on the merits”; and
(4) the “same claim or cause of action” is “involved in both suits.”
64
This test is modified when the prior suit is pending because, by definition, no final
59
92 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 1996).
60
Sensormatic Sec. Corp. v. Sensormatic Elecs. Corp., 273 Fed. App’x. 256, 265 (4th Cir. 2008) (citations
and internal quotations omitted); Nelson, 1994 WL 93409, at *2 n.5 (holding that Fifth Circuit applies the “same
transaction” test to determine whether a single claim has been split).
61
Super Van Inc., 92 F.3d at 371.
62
18 Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4406, at 30 (Supp.2008); see, e.g.,
Sensormatic, 273 Fed. Appx. at 265 (affirming dismissal based on claim-splitting even where there was no final
judgment in earlier action).
63
18 Wright, et al., supra, § 4406, at 30.
64
Gulf Island-IV, Inc. v. Blue Streak-Gulf Is Ops, 24 F.3d 743, 746 (5th Cir. 1994).
Case 2:25-cv-00232-NJB-KWR Document 19 Filed 08/14/26 Page 9 of 11
10
judgment from the prior suit exists.
65
Accordingly, in the context of claim splitting when an earlier
suit is pending, the relevant res judicata factors are (1) whether the parties are the same or in
privity and (4) whether “the same claim or cause of action” is “involved in both suits.”
66
In determining whether two suits present the same claim or cause of action, courts apply
the transactional test from the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24.
67
“[T]he critical issue is
whether the two actions were based on the ‘same nucleus of operative facts,’” and courts “look to
the factual predicate of the claims asserted, not the legal theories upon which the plaintiff relies.”
68
Under the transactional test, courts assess whether the factual predicate of both suits is “related in
time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their
treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding or usage.”
69
Courts have recognized that claim splitting does not bar claims that could not have been
asserted at the time the first action was commenced.
70
The principal test recognized by the Fifth
Circuit is whether the primary right and duty or wrong are the same in each action: “Is the same
right infringed by the same wrong? Would a different judgment obtained in the second action
impair rights under the first judgment? Would the same evidence sustain both judgments?”
71
65
See Oliney v. Gardner, 771 F.2d 856, 859 (5th Cir. 1985); 18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller &
Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4406 (3d ed.).
66
Gulf Island-IV, 24 F.3d at 746; Oliney, 771 F.2d at 859.
67
Petro-Hunt, LLC v. United States, 365 F.3d 385, 395–96 (5th Cir. 2004).
68
Eubanks v. FDIC, 977 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
69
Petro-Hunt, 365 F.3d at 396 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(2) (1982)).
70
Estate of Hunt v. U. S., 309 F.2d 146, 148 (5th Cir. 1962); see also Commercial Box & Lumber Co., Inc.
v. Uniroyal, Inc., 623 F.2d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 1980).
71
Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 516 F.2d 103, 109 (5th Cir. 1975).
Case 2:25-cv-00232-NJB-KWR Document 19 Filed 08/14/26 Page 10 of 11
11
The claims asserted in the instant action are predicated on the August 2023 Settlement
Agreement, which was entered after Civil Action No. 22-cv-914 was filed on April 6, 2022.
Because the underlying agreement did not exist when the earlier action commenced, TJ Sutton
could not have asserted causes of action arising from the Settlement Agreement in the previously
filed case. Although the requested relief may overlap in part with issues from the earlier action,
the present claims arise from contractual obligations that arose only after the first suit was initiated.
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has instructed that the relevant inquiry is whether the two
actions involve the same primary right and the same alleged wrong.
72
The Fifth Circuit has further
held that claim splitting does not bar claims that could not have been asserted at the time the first
action was commenced.
73
While both actions stem from the underlying Virgin Islands project, the
instant action seeks to enforce separate contractual obligations created by a Settlement Agreement
executed after the commencement of the earlier litigation. Consequently, the rights asserted and
duties allegedly breached in this action were not actionable when Civil Action No. 22-cv-914
commenced. Because Plaintiff could not have litigated these claims in the earlier action, the Court
concludes that the rule against claim splitting does not require dismissal here.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that CRSC’s motion
74
is DENIED.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this _____ day of August, 2026.
____________________________________
NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
72
Id.
73
Estate of Hunt, 309 F.2d at 148; see also Commercial Box & Lumber Co, 623 F.2d at 374.
74
Rec. Doc. 11.
14th
Case 2:25-cv-00232-NJB-KWR Document 19 Filed 08/14/26 Page 11 of 11
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