Harris v. American Commercial Barge Line

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

GELISHIA N. HARRIS

VERSUS

AMERICAN COMMERCIAL
BARGE LINE

*

*

*
CIVIL ACTION

NO. 24-2935 DIV. (2)

MAG. JUDGE CURRAULT
ORDER AND REASONS

Defendant American Commercial Barge Line’s Motion to Compel is pending before me in
this matter. ECF No. 27. The motion was scheduled for submission on Wednesday, May 13,
2026. As of this date, Plaintiff Gelishia Harris has not filed an Opposition Memorandum, and the
deadline for same expired on Tuesday, May 5, 2026. See E.D. La. L.R. 7.5.
Having considered the record, the written submissions of counsel, the lack of Opposition
Memorandum, the applicable law, and finding that the motion has merit for the most part, the
Court GRANTS the motion to compel.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Gelishia Harris filed this employment discrimination suit alleging that she was
harassed, discriminated against and retaliated against based on her race. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff
seeks damages for emotional distress. Id. at 7.
Defendant American Commercial Barge Line issued written discovery seeking, among
other things, evidence supporting Plaintiff’s claim for emotional distress/mental anguish damages,
including medical records. See, e.g., ECF No. 27-2 at 9 (RFP Nos. 4, 8). Plaintiff’s responses
included one medical report/After Visit Summary indicating prior and subsequent appointments.
ECF No. 27-4; see also ECF No. 27-5 (deposition excerpt). After discussing a Medical Records
Authorization for Release of Records to enable Defendant to obtain complete records for a 10-year
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time period and revising same, Plaintiff refused to sign same. ECF No. 27 at 2-3; No, 27-9 at 2
(draft authorization for release).
II. APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS
Although the Court generally has the authority to grant a motion as unopposed, it is not
required to do so.
1

A. Scope of Discovery
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes parties to
obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's
claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the
parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.
2

Information need not be admissible into evidence to be discoverable.
3
Rather, information merely
needs to be proportional and relevant to any claim or defense.
4

The threshold for relevance at the discovery stage is lower than the threshold for relevance
of admissible evidence at the trial stage.
5
At the discovery stage, relevance includes “any matter
that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or
may be in the case.”
6
Discovery should be allowed unless the party opposing discovery establishes
that the information sought “can have no possible bearing on the claim or defense of the party
seeking discovery.”
7
If relevance is in doubt, a court should allow discovery.
8
Facts that are not

1
Edward H. Bohlin Co., Inc. v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 356 (5th Cir. 1993).
2
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Rangel v. Gonzalez Mascorro, 274 F.R.D. 585, 590 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (citations omitted).
6
Id. (brackets and citations omitted).
7
Dotson v. Edmonson, No. 16-15371, 2017 WL 11535244, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 21, 2017) (Morgan, J.) (citing Merrill
v. Waffle House, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 467, 470 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (Ramirez, M.J.)).
8
E.E.O.C. v. Simply Storage Mgmt., L.L.C., 270 F.R.D. 430, 433 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (quoting Truswal Sys. Corp. v.
Hydro–Air Eng’g, Inc., 813 F.2d 1207, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
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considered in determining the ultimate issues may be eliminated in due course of the proceeding.
9

While the discovery rules are accorded broad and liberal treatment to achieve their purpose of
adequately informing litigants in civil trials,
10
discovery does have “ultimate and necessary
boundaries.”
11
Ultimately, determining the proper scope of discovery falls within the broad
discretion of the trial court.
12

B. Rule 34 Requests for Production and Written Authorizations
Rule 34 authorizes a party to request another party to produce documents or items within
that party’s possession, custody or control. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1). The party served with written
discovery must fully answer each request to the full extent that it is not objectionable and
affirmatively explain what portion of a document request is objectionable and why, affirmatively
explain what portion of the request is not objectionable and the subject of the answer or response,
and affirmatively explain whether any responsive information or documents have been withheld.
13

The ambit of “control” under Rule 34(a)(1) extends to a party’s records held by a non-
party, because by either granting or withholding her consent, a party may determine who shall
have access to them.
14
Indeed, as courts within the Fifth Circuit have recognized, Rule 34, along

9
Rangel, 274 F.R.D. at 590 n.5 (quoting In re Gateway Eng’rs, Inc., No. 09-209, 2009 WL 3296625, at *2 (W.D. Pa.
Oct. 9, 2009)).
10
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) (citations omitted).
11
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507
(1947)).
12
Stewart v. Winter, 669 F.2d 328, 331 (5th Cir. 1982) (“And, as in all discovery matters, the district court has broad
discretion in limiting the scope of discovery.” (citation omitted)); Brown v. DFS Servs., L.L.C., 434 F. App’x 347,
351-52 (5th Cir. 2011).
13
Lopez v. Don Herring Ltd., 327 F.R.D. 567, 580 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (citation omitted).
14
See Smith v. Md. Cas. Co., 42 F.R.D. 587, 589 (E.D. La. 1967) (Rubin, J.) (“Rule 34 permits the Court to require a
party to produce any document under his control. Obviously, the plaintiff is in control of these records [held by
hospitals], because, by either granting or withholding her consent, she may determine who shall have access to them.
Therefore, she is ordered to produce them or to execute an authorization for the defendant to examine them.”); see
also EEOC v. L-3 Commc’ns Integrated Sys., LP, No. 17-538, 2018 WL 3548870, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 24, 2018)
(“[W]ritten authorizations for release may be compelled under Rule 34 because they compel parties to disclose
documents that are within their control.” (citing Mir. v. L-3 Commc’ns Integrated Sys. L.P., 319 F.R.D. 220, 227 (N.D.
Tex. 2016))).
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with Rule 37, empowers federal courts to compel parties to sign written authorizations consenting
to the production of various documents.
15

C. Relevance of Medical Records
Courts have routinely held that, by putting one’s medical condition at issue, a plaintiff
waives any privilege to her medical records which she may otherwise have been entitled based on
her privacy interest.
16
And when a plaintiff seeks emotional distress damages, her mental
conditions are put at issue,
17
making medical records relating to same relevant and discoverable.
18

Basic fairness requires the other party be allowed “to explore the truth of the [party’s] allegations

15
See Smith, 42 F.R.D. at 589; Allen v. Indian Harbor Marine, Inc., No. 96-3135, 1997 WL 666210, at *1–2 (E.D.
La. Oct. 24, 1997); Lischka v. Tidewater Servs., Inc., No. 96-296, 1997 WL 27066, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 22, 1997)
(Vance, J.) (citing McKnight v. Blanchard, 667 F.2d 477, 481-82 (5th Cir. 1982) (strongly suggesting that when a
party puts his or her physical condition at issue that a court can, upon proper motion, order him or her to sign a medical
authorization); Phillips v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 633 F.2d 1165, 1167-68 (5th Cir. Unit B Jan. 1981) (finding that district
court could sanction party who failed to comply with discovery order compelling written tax authorizations)); DeGruy-
Hampton v. Ochsner Clinic Found., No. 20-2417, 2021 WL 2514681, at *9 (E.D. La. June 18, 2021); Hunters Run
Gun Club, LLC v. Baker, No. 17-176, 2019 WL 507479, *6–8 (M.D. La. Feb. 7, 2019); Broussard v. Callon Petroleum
Co., No. 04-2264, 2005 WL 8178118, at *1 (W.D. La. Oct. 28, 2005); Mir, 319 F.R.D. at 226–28 (ordering party to
sign authorization for release of social security records); see also Zamora v. GC Servs., LP, No. 15-048, 2016 WL
8853096, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2016) (recognizing that the majority of courts to consider the issue have concluded
that a party may be compelled to execute an authorization for release of records).
16
Stogner v. Sturdivant, No. 10-125, 2011 WL 4435254, at *5 (M.D. La. Sept. 22, 2011) (citing cases); Tanner v. BD
LaPlace, LLC, No. 17-5141, 2018 WL 3528023, at *2 (E.D. La. July 3, 2018) (Feldman, J.) (citations omitted)
(recognizing that privilege may be waived when a party places his medical condition at issue).
17
See Hardy v. Scandinavian Airlines Sys., No. 21-1591, 2025 WL 416106, at *9 (E.D. La. Feb. 6, 2025) (finding
plaintiff put her mental status at issue by seeking emotional distress damages and thus she waived any privilege she
would otherwise be entitled to by her privacy interest in her medical records, including any mental health records);
Taylor v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. 18-234, 2019 WL 13207593, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 24, 2019) (“[T]his Court has
held that ‘[b]y asserting a claim for emotional distress and mental anguish, [Plaintiff has] placed in issue any mental
or physical conditions [of Plaintiff] which could have led to the claimed damages.’” (first brackets added) (quoting
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hathcock, No. 11-738, 2012 WL 12883641, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 14, 2012) (quoting
Williams v. NPC Int’l, Inc., 224 F.R.D. 612, 613 (N.D. Miss. 2004)))); Frazier v. Luther, No. 24-262, 2025 WL
2856531, at *4 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 8, 2025) (requiring Plaintiff to execute authorizations that include and exclude
psychotherapy notes because “Plaintiff has undoubtedly placed his mental health at issue by virtue of his negligent
infliction of emotional distress claims” and the court was “unable, based on the briefing, to itself separate from
Plaintiff’s physical condition” from her “extensive past mental health treatment”).
18
Merrill, 227 F.R.D. at 473 (“Utilizing th[e] broad construction of relevance in Rule 26(b)(1), several courts have
found that medical records are relevant to claims of mental anguish in discrimination case.” (citing Fitzgerald v.
Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 634 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (finding that medical records involving mental health, including physical
conditions tied to mental health, were relevant under the broad definition of relevance in Rule 26(b)(1))); Bacharach
v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc., No. 14-962, 2015 WL 1843007, at *7 (E.D. La. Apr. 22, 2015) (granting request for
production of “all of the Plaintiff’s medical records, charts, progress reports, prognoses or other similar documents
regarding any damages for which she seeks to recover in this case” because Plaintiff “is seeking emotional distress
damages”).
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that he/she suffered . . . emotional distress as a result of the [other party’s] conduct and to determine
whether the [party] suffered any pre-existing . . . emotional distress” that may be the (or an) actual
cause of the distress.
19

Although Plaintiff’s medical records are relevant, that does not mean that every medical
record of any nature for an excessive time period are relevant and proportional to the needs of the
case. Consistent with the obligation to ensure that discovery is within the scope permitted by Rule
26(b)(1), the authorization must include appropriate temporal limitations. Courts often impose a
time limitation
20
to ensure disclosures are proportional to the needs of the case.
21

In this case, the requested records fall within January 1, 2015 - December 8, 2025. ECF
No. 27-9 at 2. Given that Plaintiff began working for Defendant in 2017 and stopped in 2024,
22

this time period is reasonable.
23

III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,

19
Stogner, 2011 WL 4435254, at *5 (citing Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (noting that,
once a plaintiff has elected to seek such damages, she cannot fairly prevent discovery into evidence relating to that
element of her claims because the defendants must be free to test the truth of the plaintiff’s contention that her mental
issues arise because of the defendants’ conduct)).
20
See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, No. 19-10023, 2020 WL 6204310, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 5, 2020) (limiting temporal
scope of blank medical authorization); Garza v. AAA Cooper Transp., No. 20-1, 2021 WL 3777739, at *5 (S.D. Tex.
May 18, 2021) (requiring plaintiff to sign authorization to release medical records, but limiting the time period of the
authorization because defendant’s request was overbroad); EEOC v. L-3 Commc’ns Integrated Sys., LP, No. 17-538,
2018 WL 3548870, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 24, 2018) (limiting authorization for release of medical records to date that
employee began working for defendant).
21
Tijerina v. Guerra, No. 19-285, 2020 WL 1663181, at *9-10 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 1, 2020) (denying medical records
request that was unlimited in time based on Rule 26(b)(1) proportionality factors where movant did not establish why
the requested 5-year period would be insufficient); Gray-Standberry v. Ashley Distrib. Servs., Ltd., No. 20-0638, 2021
WL 2792984, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2021) (finding request for 27 years’ of medical records, including pediatric
records, not proportional); Stogner, 2011 WL 4435254, at *6 (limiting medical records request to 10 years after finding
request for 23 years’ worth of records excessive); Cummins v. Lollar, No. 12-560, 2015 WL 12731746, at *2 (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 5, 2015) (citation omitted) (request for 50 years’ of medical records dating to birth is excessive).
22
ECF No. 1 at 1.
23
See, e.g., L- 3 Commc’ns Integrated Sys., 2018 WL 3548870, at *3 (limiting authorization for release of medical
records to date that employee began working for defendant),
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IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant American Commercial Barge Line’s Motion to
Compel (ECF No. 27) is GRANTED. This Order reserves to Defendant the right to seek recovery
of fees and costs in incurred in filing the motion in accordance with Rule 37(a)(5) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure by filing an appropriate motion for same, with supporting documentation,
by June 16, 2026.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within 21 days, Plaintiff Gelishia Harris must execute
and deliver the medical authorization requested by Defendant.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this ____ day of May, 2026.

___________________________________
DONNA PHILLIPS CURRAULT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

13th
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