Slover et al v. Corpus

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POSTED ON WEBSITE
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRESNO DIVISION

In re

AMY ANNE CORPUS,

Debtor.
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Case No. 25-10088-B-7

LESLIE SLOVER, an individual;
LILY ORTIZ, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

v.

AMY CORPUS, an individual, dba
KALOS SPECIALIZED SERVICES, a
California corporation; and
DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

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Adv. Proc. No. 25-01017-B

Docket Control #FW-3

MEMORANDUM RULING ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION
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Two former employees of debtor’s business seek to have their
claims for alleged sexual harassment and personal injury they
suffered while working determined to be non-dischargeable under
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) for willful and malicious injury.
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The following are the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law under
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. made applicable to adversary proceedings by Fed. R. Banky.
Proc. 7052. Any finding of fact that is deemed a conclusion of law is adopted
as such. Any conclusion of law deemed a finding of fact is adopted as such.
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Throughout this Memorandum references to a section will be to the United
States Bankruptcy Code. References to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
will be “Civ. Rule.” References to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
shall be “Rule.”
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Debtor owned and operated a business providing care to
developmentally disabled adults. One of debtor’s clients caused
the alleged injuries.
Debtor asks for summary judgment urging that debtor neither
caused the injuries, was substantially certain co-plaintiffs
would be injured or acted with malice as a matter of law.
Finding disputed issues of material facts, the court DENIES
the motion for summary judgment.

FACTS
1. Parties.
A. Defendant Amy Corpus dba Kalos Specialized Services
(“Corpus” or “Kalos”)
Kalos is a vendor with the California Department
Developmental Services (“DDS”) providing services to individuals
with developmental disabilities. In California, persons with
developmental disabilities and their families have a right to
receive services and support. DDS provides three primary
services: Supportive Living Services Programs (“SLS”), an
Independent Living Program (“ILP”), and a Community Integration
Program (“CIP”). Kalos provides services to those individuals
not suited to live in group homes. Specifically, Kalos provided
support services to clients with behavior issues that manifested
in addition to underlying mental retardation.
The clients Kalos served exhibited many adverse behaviors
including fabrication; psycho-social disorders; aggression;
depression; eloping syndrome; schizophrenia; paranoia;
ritualistic behavior patterns; boundary disorders; sexual
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preoccupation; property destruction; and other behavioral
disorders.
Kalos had a managerial hierarchy. Caretakers for Kalos’
clients would report to managers if there were inappropriate
behaviors or a particular client’s protocol needed to be altered
to address any particular anti-social behavior. There were
multiple supervisory layers between Corpus and direct care staff
including program directors, supervisors, and managers.
Kalos’ written anti-harassment policy required all
supervisors to report any harassment immediately and directly to
Amy Corpus. This allowed the company to investigate and try to
resolve the claim internally. Corpus expected to be made aware
“immediately” of physical aggression toward staff and expected an
incident report and a phone call.
Caring for the Kalos clients involves domestic duties but
one of the primary directives was to help the clients control
behaviors that could cause them or others harm. That includes
helping the clients to manage impulses, minimizing and
redirecting negative behaviors, teaching coping skills, and
keeping the clients safe.
B. Client X
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Client X is a middle aged, un-conserved male. He is
mentally retarded and generally operates at the level of an eight
year old child. But since he is un-conserved, Client X retains
full legal rights and autonomy to make his own decisions despite
his intellectual disability and behavioral disorders. Client X
has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder; depression; paranoia;

3
This reference to “Client X” is intentionally vague to protect his identity.
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diabetes; severe hearing loss; speech impairment to the extent he
is considered mute; generalized seizure disorder; and other
comorbidities. Client X communicates using American sign
language.
Client X needs substantive assistance to meet his needs, and
constant interdictions to challenge his behavioral disorders. He
requires twenty-four hour supervision and thoughtful monitoring
of his activities and behaviors based upon professional
evaluation of staff of DDS. 24/7 staffing is required.
He has multiple “triggers” that upset him. For example, if
people wrote down things without showing him what was being
written, Client X would believe that people are reporting “bad
things” about him. Seeing someone texting on their phone or
viewing on their phone was very upsetting to him and triggered
paranoia. Since he was deaf, he could not tolerate people
speaking on their phones.
If he felt he was being ignored, Client X would be
frustrated and exhibit antisocial behavior. He was also known to
masturbate in his own home. Since he was required to be
constantly supervised, Client X was unable to have complete
privacy. He would not latch the bedroom or bathroom door to
avoid triggering his feeling of paranoia.
Client X has been a client of Kalos since 201l.
C. Co-Plaintiff Lilly Ortiz
Ortiz is a former employee of Kalos who started working in
June 2021. She was assigned to work with Client X. Within the
first month or two, Ortiz informed her supervisors that she was
uncomfortable with Client X’s behavioral proclivities while she
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worked with him and that he would resist her closing the bedroom
door when he was engaged. Ortiz experienced Client X walking
around the apartment totally nude numerous times. She said she
complained to her supervisors and asked that it stop or that she
be transferred. Ortiz claims that after the manager spoke with
Ms. Corpus, they informed Ortiz that according to Ms. Corpus
there was nothing they could do unless Client X was physically
violent.
Ortiz continued to express her disgust, offense, and unsafe
feelings to her immediate supervisor on at least five separate
occasions and was told that the supervisor would bring it up to
Corpus again.
Between January 2022 and March 2022 Ortiz reported to her
supervisor several instances of physical violence by Client X
toward her including physically kicking her out of Client X’s
apartment and physically pushing her out of his way. After
confirming that they had spoken to Corpus, the managers
reportedly told Ortiz there was nothing they could do.
Between October 2022 and April 2023, at the manager’s
suggestion, Ortiz called Kalos’ emergency “on call line” about
Client X’s behavior ten different times reporting an additional
incident of physical violence and/or perceived sexual harassment.
On half of those occasions, no one answered the phone. On the
other half she spoke to a person who said they would document it
so Corpus could address the situation. Ortiz also wrote written
complaints which documented instances where Client X would make
her feel unsafe while masturbating during nearly her entire shift
in her presence or putting hands on her violently.
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On May 1, 2023, Ortiz reported that Client X exposed himself
to Ortiz, masturbated in front of Ortiz, touched her breast, and
wiped semen on her.
Corpus claims that at no point before May 1, 2023, did Ortiz
ever communicate any of the information about Client X to her and
there was never a complaint of a sexual assault or sexual
harassment of any kind to anyone at Kalos regarding Client X.
When the events complained of on May 1, 2023, were reported by
Ortiz to her supervisor, the supervisor informed Corpus the next
day. Ortiz requested reassignment following her shift on May 1,
2023, which was granted the next day on May 2, 2023. After that
Ortiz was never assigned to work with Client X again.
Ortiz claims that Kalos then substantially reduced her
hours.
Ms. Corpus claims that Ms. Ortiz’s own explanation for not
working after May 1, 2023, is that she was pregnant. Corpus
claims that she personally offered her job back when she was able
to return from maternity leave. Any prior instances involving
Ortiz, according to Corpus, were handled by Ortiz’s supervisors
at Kalos. Corpus claims to have no actual knowledge of any of
the situations giving rise to Ms. Ortiz’s allegations until May
2, 2023.
D. Co-plaintiff Leslie Slover
Leslie Slover is a former employee of Kalos. During one of
her first days working for Kalos with Client X she heard him
making moaning sounds in his bedroom. She learned from a
supervisor at the time that he was masturbating and she was told
to “just try to ignore it.” Slover experienced Client X walking
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around his apartment with just his underwear on. She became
unsettled, nervous, afraid and bothered by it. In April of 2021,
she complained to her supervisor about the offensive and
perceived harassing behavior. The supervisor said that he would
meet with Corpus. After talking with Corpus, the supervisor
reportedly told Slover to “tell Client X that we need to close
the door.”
Slover also reports an occasion where her supervisor
witnessed Client X’s violence when Client X chased Slover out of
the apartment in a rage. She and her supervisor got in a car and
locked the doors until Client X calmed down and went back in the
house. Slover was told to call Kalos emergency on call phone
line if she did not feel safe. The “on call” line operators told
Slover that they would make note of the complaint and advise the
owner.
Approximately July 13, 2023, Client X physically attacked
Slover during her shift. Client X allegedly lunged at Slover
opening his palms to try to strangle her while she was sitting in
a chair. She ran for the door to escape. As she was leaving,
Client X violently shoved her out the door. Client X took her
purse and violently threw it out the door scattering belongings
everywhere. The police were called.
After calling the police, Slover notified her supervisor who
also told another supervisor to arrive on the scene. The police
arrived and took Slover’s statement. After giving her statement,
she left her shift.
A few days later, Slover’s leg and arm were still hurting
and her cheek was bruised from the attack. She went to the
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emergency room. Slover advised her supervisor that she was not
going to work with Client X again. She was told on numerous
occasions thereafter that Kalos did not have another client for
her.
Corpus claims that Slover and Ortiz (who both deny) were
both trained on how to deal with sexual harassment. Corpus
claims (which Slover and Ortiz deny) that they knew full well the
conditions presented by working with Client X and the protocols
for addressing them and had been trained on how to handle his
care. As with Ortiz, Corpus claims that she was unaware of any
of Ms. Slover’s complaints about her assignment with Client X.
Corpus claims that following her reassignment, Slover failed to
show up to work with her reassigned client. After several no
shows, she eventually spoke to her supervisor in August 2023 and
acknowledged that Kalos could assume she was voluntarily
terminating her employment.

E. Managers
There were two primary managers at Kalos for Ortiz and
Slover. Tracy Heath was an immediate supervisor with the title
“house lead.” Ms. Heath reported to manager Mike Farmer. Mike
Farmer reported to either Corpus or program director Esther
Rivera.

2. Procedural Status
Co-plaintiffs filed a complaint against Corpus alleging non-
dischargeability under § 523(a)(6). Defendant Kalos filed a
motion to dismiss for insufficiency of service of process,
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failure to join a necessary party, and failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Civ. Rule 12(b)(4)(5)(6) (Fed.
Rule Banky. Proc. 7012). Defendant also moved to strike
references to the name of “Client X.” The court denied the
motions to dismiss under Civ. Rules 12(b)(4) and (5). The court
also denied the motion to dismiss as to as to the claims of Lilly
Ortiz. The court granted the motion to dismiss as to the claims
of Leslie Slover with leave to amend. The motion to strike was
denied and the court directed the clerk to seal the original
complaint.
After filing the first amended complaint, defendant Kalos
responded with this motion for judgment on the pleadings. Civ.
Rule 12(c). However, Defendant presented a declaration of Amy
Corpus in support of the motion which involved matters outside
the pleadings. The court did not exclude the matters but under
Civ. Rule 12(d), the court gave the parties a reasonable
opportunity to present all the material pertinent to the motion
as the court treated the motion as one for summary judgment. The
parties entered into a joint order regarding discovery pertinent
to this motion. Some of that discovery has been submitted both
in support and opposition to the motion.

JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction of this adversary proceeding and
motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) and by reference to this court
by the United States District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 157(a).
This court may hear and finally determine this matter under 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I).
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DISCUSSION
1. Summary Judgment Standards
Summary Judgment should be granted when there are no genuine
issues of material fact and when the movant is entitled to
prevail as a matter of law. Civ. Rule 56 (made applicable in
adversary proceedings by Rule 7056); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). As to materiality, the substantive
law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over
facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law would properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that
there be no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 247-48
(emphasis in original).
There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient
evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a
verdict for that party. Id at 249. The court engages in a
threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a
trial – whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual
issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact
because they may be reasonably resolved in favor of either party.
Id. at 250.
The court “does not weigh the evidence or determine the
truth of the matter but only determines whether there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Balint v. Carson City Nev., 180 F.3d
1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999). “Reasonable doubts as to the
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existence of a material factual issue are resolved against the
moving parties and inferences are drawn in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party.” Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc.,
198 F.3d 1130, 1334 (9th Cir. 2000). However, the court is
required to do so only in circumstances where a fact specifically
averred by the moving party is contradicted by specific evidence
submitted in opposition to the motion. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife
Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).
Conjecture, surmise, or “metaphysical doubt” by the non-
movant of the movant’s assertions will not defeat a summary
judgment. See, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586. The non-movant’s evidence must be probative.
Gertsch v. Johnson & Johnson, Fin. Corp. (In re Gertsch), 237
B.R. 160, 165 (B.A.P. 9th Cir., 1999). “Even in cases where
elusive concepts such as motive or intent are at issue, summary
judgment may be appropriate if the non-moving party rests merely
upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences and
unsupported speculation”. Id. at 165.

2. Application of § 523(a)(6)
Section 523(a)(6) excepts the debt of an “individual debtor”
from any debt for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to
another entity or to the property of another entity. 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(6). The Supreme Court in Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S.
57, 61 (1998) held the word “willful” in [523](a)(6) modifies the
word “injury,” indicating that non-dischargeability takes a
deliberate or intentional injury not merely a deliberate or
intentional act that leads to injury. Negligent or reckless acts
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do not suffice to establish that resulting injury is willful and
malicious. Id. at 64; citing Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293
U.S. 328, 332 (1934).
Under Geiger, it must be shown not only that the debtor
acted willfully but also that the debtor inflicted the injury
willfully and maliciously rather than recklessly or negligently.
Petralia v. Jercich (In re Jercich), 228 F.3d 1202, 1207 (non-
payment of wages under the circumstances of that case constituted
willful and malicious tortious conduct).
In her motion, Corpus stresses that the injury suffered by
the co-plaintiffs must have been “by the debtor.” It is
undisputed that the actual injurious conduct by Client X was the
immediate cause of the injuries to the co-plaintiffs. From that
premise, Corpus concludes that there is no evidence in opposition
to the motion for summary judgment to show that the debtor
committed any act or omission that amounted to a willful or
malicious injury.
Also, Corpus argues that the co-plaintiffs and other
employees were trained in the care needed for Client X and
similar clients. Thus, some of the behavioral proclivities of
Client X are part of the job and known to the co-plaintiffs. The
co-plaintiffs vehemently deny this. At the hearing on the
motion, counsel for Kalos noted this position would not be
pursued.
Co-plaintiffs counter that though it may be true that Corpus
did not perform the injurious acts, either Corpus herself or co-
plaintiffs’ managers and supervisors were aware of various
incidents involving Client X before the occurrences in May and
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July of 2023 that resulted in co-plaintiffs reassignment to other
clients. Co-plaintiffs therefore urge a theory imputing to
Corpus knowledge of prior incidents involving co-plaintiffs. Co-
plaintiffs continue to urge that the significant delay between
their managers reporting these incidents to Corpus and any action
being taken amounted to harassment and in Corpus’ case were
willful and malicious actions or inactions.
Defendant counters that by urging that the co-plaintiffs
factual theories may fit a claim under the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act (Cal.Gov’nt Code § 12940(j)(1)).
However, even if Corpus’ actions or inactions were proscribed
under California law, there is insufficient proof of any willful
or malicious action or inaction.
As will be seen, though the issue is close, there does
appear to be disputed issues of material fact for both the
“willful” and “malicious” prongs of § 523(a)(6) which preclude
granting the motion for summary judgment.

a. Disputed Issues of Fact as to Willfulness.
In the Ninth Circuit, the willful injury requirement of
§ 523(a)(6) is met when it is shown either that the debtor had an
subjective motive to inflict the injury or that the debtor
believed that injury was substantially certain to occur as a
result of her conduct. Jercich, 238 F.3d at 1208. A debtor is
charged with the knowledge of the natural consequences of her
actions. Ormsby v. First American Title Co. of Nev., 591 F.3d
1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2010). In addition to what a debtor may
admit to knowing, the bankruptcy court may consider
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circumstantial evidence that tends to establish what the debtor
must have actually known when taking the injury provoking action.
Carillo v. Su (In re Su), 290 F.3d 1140, 1146. But “sloppy
business practices” do not equate to a willful injury. Palm
Finance Corp. v. Eberts (In re Eberts), 607 Fed. Appx. 683, 689
(9th Cir. 2015) citing Ormsby, 591 F.3d at 1206.
Since it is undisputed that Corpus did not have a subjective
motive to inflict the alleged injuries on co-plaintiffs, if there
is a disputed issue of fact, it is on the question of whether
Corpus was substantially certain injury was going to incur to
either Ortiz or Slover as a result of her action or inaction.
On this subject, there is widely diverging evidence. Corpus
contends that given the number of her employees and the
limitations of the types of “reports” she usually received, she
did not learn of Ms. Ortiz’s complaints until May 2, 2023. Ms.
Corpus immediately removed Ms. Ortiz from Client X’s care
responsibilities.
Countering that, the plaintiffs presented evidence that they
communicated through the supervisory chain established at Kalos
and that based upon the policies in effect at the time, both Ms.
Ortiz’s and Ms. Slover’s supervisors were duty bound to report to
Ms. Corpus.
In Ms. Ortiz’s case on at least five separate occasions, she
testified that Farmer told her words to the effect that he was
going to continue to bring up Ms. Ortiz’s concerns to Ms. Corpus.
Mr. Farmer also testified in his deposition that he did not have
any reason to believe he failed to tell Ms. Corpus about any
harassment or other incidents. Further, Farmer met with Corpus
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at least twice per year regarding annual/quarterly reports about
Client X and those reports were expected to include behaviors
such as physical aggression and masturbation.
As to Ms. Slover, it is clear that at least as of May 2023,
Ms. Corpus was aware that Client X had behavioral tendencies that
could be perceived by staff as harassment or dangerous. Slover
worked with Client X “for years.” Ms. Slover’s declaration
stated that as early as April 2021, Farmer told her that he had
talked to Amy Corpus and reported to Corpus’ response to Slover.
Ms. Slover also testified in declaration that she called Kalos’
emergency on call line approximately ten or more times and each
time was told the complaint would be noted for the owner.
Corpus herself testified knowing of four to five incidents
of Client X “physically touching someone” between 2020 and 2025.
This evidence at least raises a disputed material factual
issue as to Corpus’ knowledge of Client X’s behavioral
tendencies. This leads to a disputed material factual question
as to whether she was “substantially certain” that injury would
occur as a result of the assignment of co-plaintiffs to Client
X.
4

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4
Defendant has repeatedly argued that the alleged reporting by Farmer of
Client X’s behavioral incidents to Corpus and Farmer relaying Corpus’ alleged
response are hearsay or double hearsay. First, testimony that Farmer stated
he spoke with Corpus is not hearsay under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D) as Farmer
is an undisputed agent of Amy Corpus. Second, Farmer reporting Corpus’
response is also not hearsay because Corpus’ is a party under Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(2)(A). Even if Corpus’ statements are hearsay – they are not – they
would be allowed under Fed. R. Evid. 803(3). The “weight” of the evidence may
be insubstantial. But that is not an appropriate analysis on this motion.
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b. There are Disputed Issues of Material Fact as to
Malice.
In the Ninth Circuit, a malicious injury involves (1) a
wrongful act, (2) done intentionally, (3) which necessarily
causes injury, and (4) is done without just cause or excuse.
Jercich, 238 F.3d at 1209 quoting In re Bammer, 131 F.3d 788, 791
(9th Cir. 1997) (En Banc). The first issue is whether Corpus’
alleged acts were wrongful. Under Cal.Gov’nt Code § 12940(j)(1)
it is an unlawful employment practice:
For an employer....to harass an employee....an
employer may also be responsible for the acts of
non-employees with respect to harassment of
employees, ...if the employer or its agents or
supervisors knows or should have known of the
conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate
corrective action. In reviewing cases involving the
acts of non-employees, the extent of the employer’s
control and any other legal responsibility that the
employer may have with respect to the conduct of
those non-employees shall be considered. An entity
shall take all reasonable steps to prevent
harassment from occurring.

Simply establishing a claim will not pass muster under
§ 523(a)(6). The court quotes that section only to show that if
facts supporting such a claim were present, it may be a wrongful
act under California law. That does not make that act malicious
without substantial additional evidence.
5

Assessing whether an employer has taken reasonable steps to
either prevent or remedy harassing conduct does not equate to a
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5
See also Cal.Gov’nt Code § 12940(k). In Trujillo v. North County Transit
District, 63 Cal.App 4th 280, 286 (1998) Court of Appeal noted that provisions
of Cal.gov’nt Code § 12940 establish a legal duty of care toward plaintiffs, a
breach of a duty (a negligent act or omission), legal causation and damages.
However, that does not reach the proof required under § 523(a)(6).
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willful and malicious act. Indeed, reckless or negligent conduct
may be incorporated in a liability determination under California
law. However, that does not mean for bankruptcy purposes, a debt
should not be discharged.
There are genuine issues of material fact as to whether
Corpus acted intentionally. Plaintiffs’ factual theory depends
in large part on imputing actions or inactions of supervisors
directly to Corpus. However, for purposes of § 523(a)(6) imputed
or vicarious liability is not appropriate for non-
dischargeability purposes in the Ninth Circuit. Del Rosario v.
Rosario (In Rosario), 668 B.R. 618, 629 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2025).
This reinforces that § 523(a)(6) requires willful and malicious
acts by the debtor not the debtor’s agents.
Disputed material issues of fact exist since Ms. Corpus
admitted that she never investigated any of Client X’s conduct
until after she received the summons and complaint from
plaintiffs’ attorneys in this adversary proceeding.
Corpus counters that after Corpus received Ms. Ortiz’s May
2, 2023, complaint she conducted a conversation with Farmer and
immediately directed Ortiz’s reassignment and implemented
protocol restricting Client X’s activities. Further, § 523(a)(6)
requires a subjective intent on behalf of the debtor to injure.
A formal investigation does not equate to intentional malicious
conduct without substantially more evidence.
There are also disputed issues of fact as to whether any
conduct or omission of Corpus, if proven, necessarily caused
injury to the co-plaintiffs. For example, defendants contend
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that Corpus did not personally supervise direct care staff
including the plaintiffs. Rather, Kalos utilized multiple
supervisory layers including program directors, supervisors, and
managers.
In response, plaintiffs maintain that in deposition, Corpus
testified that all formal incident reports were emailed directly
to her and she admitted she expected to be made aware immediately
of physical aggression toward staff and expected an incident
report and a phone call. Further, there were at least semi-
annual meetings between Farmer and Corpus which included a
discussion of Client X’s behavior proclivities.
Plaintiffs argue that Ms. Corpus admitted in her deposition
that she heard about four or five incidences of Client X
physically touching someone between 2020 and 2025.
Defendants counter that though true, those facts do not
establish that Corpus subjectively believed serious sexual injury
or other injury to plaintiffs was a substantially certain result
from any operational decisions Corpus may have made. Corpus
reminds that Client X is a seriously developmentally disabled
individual prone to behavioral proclivities that may include
unwanted touching. However, that does not mean that assignment
of employees to Client X’s care would necessarily cause injury.
As there are numerous material issues of fact, there is no
need to discuss whether Corpus had any just cause or excuse since
there are numerous material undisputed facts preventing a summary
judgment concerning both willfulness and malice.
///
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CONCLUSION
Though the issue is close, there are too many factual
disputes present for the court to find that summary judgment in
favor of the defendant is appropriate. Material disputed issues
concerning defendant’s knowledge, intent, and awareness as it
relates to both co-plaintiffs are numerous. So, for the forgoing
reasons defendant’s motion for summary judgement shall be denied.
A conforming order will issue.

Dated: By the Court

René Lastreto II, Judge
United States Bankruptcy Court

Jul 17, 2026
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Instructions to Clerk of Court
Service List - Not Part of Order/Judgment

The Clerk of Court is instructed to send the Order/Judgment or
other court generated document transmitted herewith to the
parties below. The Clerk of Court will send the Order via the
BNC or, if checked , via the U.S. mail.

Jeffrey Hogue
Hogue & Belong
3555 Fifth Ave., Ste 300
San Diego, CA 92103

Peter A. Sauer
7650 N. Palm Ave., Ste 101
Fresno, CA 93711
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