Shaunda Sanders, et al v. Elmington Property Management, LLC, et al

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-12729
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________

SHAUNDA SANDERS,
MAURICE SANDERS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus

ELMINGTON PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, LLC,
101 DAVENPORT DRIVE HOLDINGS, LLC,
SOUTHEAST MULTI-FAMILY PARTNERS, LLC,
DAVID DESHONG,
Defendants-Appellees,

SHIELD SECURITY SOLUTIONS, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.

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2 Opinion of the Court 25-12729
____________________
Appeal f rom the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-03985-SDG
____________________

Before J
ORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and KIDD, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Shaunda Sanders fell while walking up the staircase to her
apartment, sustaining injuries. Sanders and her spouse, Maurice
Sanders (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), then filed this premises-liability
action for negligence and wantonness, asserting a failure to main-
tain the stairs in a safe condition and to remedy known dangerous
or defective conditions. After Plaintiffs presented their case at trial,
the district court granted judgment as a matter of law to two of the
four remaining Defendants, finding that they did not owe Sanders
a duty of care. A jury found against Plaintiffs on their claims against
the final two Defendants. Plaintiffs now appeal the grant of judg-
ment as a matter of law. After careful review, however, we con-
clude that any error was harmless in light of the adverse jury ver-
dict. So we affirm the judgment.
I.
As relevant here, Plaintiffs sued four parties with manage-
ment or ownership interests in the apartment, which was located
at 210 Davenport Dr., Nashville, Tennessee.
1
Davenport Drive

1
A fifth Defendant, Shield Security Solutions LLC, was dismissed without
prejudice from the action in November 2024.
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25-12729 Opinion of the Court 3
Holdings, LLC (“101 Davenport”), was the registered owner of the
apartment complex. Elmington Property Management managed
the property. Southeast Multi-Family Partners I, LLC, owned 101
Davenport. And David Deshong was Southeast’s managing mem-
ber and the owner of 11 percent of the company.
The case proceeded to trial, and Plaintiffs presented their
case. As relevant here, Deshong testified that as managing mem-
ber, he oversaw Southeast’s real-estate portfolio, which included
the apartment complex where Plaintiffs lived. Elmington managed
the property for Southeast, which deferred to Elmington to handle
issues of premises safety and day-to-day management. Deshong
acknowledged that Southeast had duties to tenants because “we
have leases to follow.”
In February 2020, before Sanders’s fall, Elmington notified
Deshong that one of the concrete steps on the staircase to Plaintiffs’
apartment was loose or wobbly. A contractor inspected the stair-
case and recommended replacing the bottom five steps. Elmington
sought approval for the repairs from Southeast. Deshong ap-
proved the work on behalf of Southeast, and the steps were re-
placed. Elmington’s regional manager for the apartment complex
testified in more detail about Elmington’s knowledge of the condi-
tion of the stairs and the circumstances of the inspection and repairs
in February 2020.
Sanders’s fall occurred several months later in October 2020.
The parties agreed in the district court that Sanders fell at the
twelfth step up from the bottom of the staircase.
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4 Opinion of the Court 25-12729
Before the case was submitted to the jury, the district court
granted judgment as a matter of law to Deshong and Southeast.
The court reasoned that these Defendants did not owe Sanders a
duty of care because Deshong was acting in a representative capac-
ity and there was no evidence to pierce 101 Davenport’s corporate
veil and impose liability on Southeast.
During closing arguments, defense counsel stressed that De-
fendants had hired a contractor to inspect and fix the stairs upon
being notified that there was a problem in February 2020, and that
they otherwise lacked notice of any problem with the step where
Sanders fell. Counsel did not attempt to draw any distinction be-
tween Defendants with respect to their knowledge of the condition
of the stairs. Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that it was negligent not to
replace the entire staircase when Defendants learned in February
2020 that at least some of the stairs were unsafe.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of 101 Davenport and
Elmington, finding that Plaintiffs failed to prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that either Defendant was at fault for Sand-
ers’s injuries. The district court entered judgment on the verdict
against Plaintiffs. This timely appeal followed.
II.
Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in granting judg-
ment as a matter of law to Deshong and Southeast. They assert
that sufficient trial evidence proved that Deshong and Southeast
were property owners who “had control over the staircase and its
safety” and therefore owed a duty of care to Sanders.
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25-12729 Opinion of the Court 5
Defendants respond that Deshong and Southeast were
properly dismissed, but that, even if the court erred, any error was
harmless because it had no effect on the adverse verdict, and Plain-
tiffs’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs
have not replied.
III.
We review de novo a district court’s order granting judg-
ment as a matter of law. Tooltrend, Inc. v. CMT Utensili, SRL, 198
F.3d 802, 805 (11th Cir. 1999). “We examine the evidence in a light
most favorable to the non-moving party and affirm if there is no
legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for
the non-moving party on that issue.” Buland v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd.,
992 F.3d 1143, 1148 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61 instructs that courts
“must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party’s
substantial rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. “Although the test for harm-
less error varies somewhat with the context, generally it connotes
error that has little or no impact on the affected party’s substantive
rights.” Thomas v. Whitworth, 136 F.3d 756, 760 (11th Cir. 1998); see
Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., Inc., 513 F.3d 1261, 1276 (11th Cir.
2008) (“We will not reverse if an error of the district court is harm-
less, and the standard for harmless error is whether the complain-
ing party’s substantive rights were affected.”).
In Perrine v. Fredericks, 786 F.2d 1068, 1070 (11th Cir. 1986),
for example, we held that it was harmless error to grant judgment
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6 Opinion of the Court 25-12729
as a matter of law to certain defendants before trial, since the ap-
pellants still “had the opportunity to fully advance their conten-
tion” to the jury, and they identified “no additional evidence . . .
which they did not have an opportunity to present.” Id.
Here, we need not resolve whether the district court erred
in granting judgment as a matter of law to Deshong and Southeast
after Plaintiffs presented their case.
2
Even assuming Plaintiffs are
correct that the district court erred by dismissing these Defendants,
any error was harmless under the circumstances. See Thomas, 136
F.3d at 760. At trial, Plaintiffs “had the opportunity to fully ad-
vance” their case to the jury, which found against them. Perrine,
786 F.2d at 1070. And they point to “no additional evidence . . .
which they did not have an opportunity to present.” Id.
Nor do Plaintiffs provide any reason to suggest that the jury
would have imposed liability had Deshong and Southeast re-
mained in the case. Indeed, Deshong’s and Southeast’s liability was
based on the same evidence and theories as the liability of 101 Dav-
enport and Elmington. The parties’ arguments to the jury at trial
did not distinguish between Defendants with respect to their
knowledge or conduct. And the jury found that 101 Davenport and
Elmington were not at fault for Sanders’s injury. So we see little
possibility that the jury would have distinguished between Defend-

2
Although we see little grounds to impose personal liability on Deshong for
acting on behalf of 101 Davenport and Southeast, the question of whether
Southeast should have been dismissed is much closer.
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25-12729 Opinion of the Court 7
ants in assessing fault, and Plaintiffs do not suggest otherwise. Ac-
cordingly, we cannot say that Plaintiffs were harmed by the re-
moval of Defendants Deshong and Southeast from the jury’s con-
sideration. See Thomas, 136 F.3d at 760; Perrine, 786 F.2d at 1070.
For these reasons, to the extent the district court erred in
granting partial judgment as a matter of law, we conclude that any
error was harmless because it had “little or no impact on the af-
fected party’s substantive rights.” Thomas, 136 F.3d at 760; see Per-
rine, 786 F.2d at 1070; Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. We therefore affirm the
district court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.

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