USA v. Seabrease

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF ALASKA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff,

v.

AUGUST FREDERICK SEABREASE

Defendant.

3:25-cr-00060-ACP

ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
[Dkt. 90]

Defendant August Frederick Seabrease has moved for a judgment of acquittal
pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, reasserting his argument that the
evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). (Dkt. 90) The
Government opposes Seabrease’s request. (Dkt. 94) For the reasons stated herein,
Seabrease’s motion is DENIED.
Pursuant to Rule 29, the Court assesses the evidence to determine whether it is
sufficient to sustain a conviction. If the Court finds the evidence is insufficient to sustain a
conviction, it “may set aside the verdict and enter an acquittal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(2).
The Supreme Court has established a two-step inquiry for courts considering a
challenge to a conviction based on sufficiency of the evidence. Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307 (1979). First, a reviewing court must consider the evidence presented at trial in
the light most favorable to the prosecution. Id. at 319. Second, after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the reviewing court must determine whether
this evidence, so viewed, is adequate to allow “any rational trier of fact [to find] the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Put
another way, a court must affirm a conviction if “viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found [the defendant]
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the crimes charged.” United States v.
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Mann, 389 F.3d 869, 878 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Corral-Gastelum, 240
F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2001)).
“It is not the district court’s function to determine witness credibility when ruling
on a Rule 29 motion.” United States v. Alarcon-Simi, 300 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2002).
The Ninth Circuit has explained that when “ruling on a Rule 29(c) motion, a district court
must bear in mind that ‘it is the exclusive function of the jury to determine the credibility
of witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, and draw reasonable inferences from proven
facts.’ ” See United States v. Rojas, 554 F.2d 938, 943 (9th Cir.1977) (quoting United States
v. Nelson, 419 F.2d 1237, 1242 (9th Cir. 1969)). Therefore, in a case involving factual
disputes and credibility determinations, courts “must presume . . . that the trier of fact
resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.”
United States v. H.B., 695 F.3d 931, 935 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326).
Here, Seabrease argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove
that he intended to persuade, induce, entice or coerce a minor to engage in sexual activity
with him. (Dkt. 90 at 3) Seabrease appears to concede there may have been “an
arrangement to meet for sex,” but argues that the evidence did not establish “persuasion,
inducement, enticement and coercion” on Seabrease’s part. (Dkt. 90 at 6)
But Seabrease’s argument can only succeed if the evidence is viewed in the light
most favorable to him, which turns the standard upside down. Viewing the evidence in a
light most favorable to the prosecution, as courts must when reviewing motions of this
nature, the record was clearly sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Seabrease guilty
of the charged offense.
The Government presented extensive documentary evidence and witness testimony.
For example, the Government introduced text and audio messages resulting from a lengthy
exchange between Seabrease and someone he thought was a minor. (Gov. Trial Ex. 1, 3, 6,
admitted at Dkt. 80) When the communications became overtly sexual, Seabrease eagerly
continued. (Id.) And Seabrease does not dispute that he intended to engage in sexual
activity with a minor. (Dkt. 90 at 3) At best, this evidence presents an “evidentiary conflict”
to be resolved by the jury. See Rojas, 554 F.2d at 943. And even if the facts of this case
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differ from other cases the Ninth Circuit has upheld under the same statute, that does not
render them inadequate—different cases have different facts. See United States v. Goetzke,
494 F.3d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 2009).
The evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that Seabrease attempted to
persuade, induce, entice, and coerce a 13-year-old to engage in criminal sexual activity and
took substantial steps toward that result. As such, Seabrease’s motion for a judgment of
acquittal is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED August 10, 2026, at Anchorage, Alaska.
/s/ Aaron Christian Peterson
Aaron Christian Peterson
United States District Judge

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