STATE OF LOUISIANA vs. versus DAVID JEANJACQUES

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STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
DAVID JEANJACQUES
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NO. 2026-K-0648
COURT OF APPEAL
FOURTH CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
SCJ JENKINS, J., DISSENTS AND ASSIGNS REASONS
I dissent and would deny the State’s writ application as L.C.Cr.P. art.
780(B)(2), as amended, was not in effect at the time Defendant filed his motion to
waive jury trial.
The majority properly references the three types of law—substantive,
interpretative, and procedural—as explained in State v. Washington, 2002-2196, p.
3 (La. 9/13/02), 830 So.2d 288, 290. The majority then finds La.C.Cr.P. art.
780(B)(2) is a procedural law and opines:
Defendant’s vested right is the statutory right to waive trial by jury,
which was not disturbed by the amendment now requiring the
procedural step of reallotment of the case to another division. As this
Court pronounced in Doe v. Jesuit High School of New Orleans,
‘[o]ur jurisprudence is well-settled that ‘no one has any vested right in
any given mode or procedure.” 21-0284, pp. 7-8 (La. App. 4 Cir.
11/10/21), 331 So.3d 426, 432 (citations omitted).
However, whether the statute is a procedural law is not dispositive of this matter.
Pursuant to the facts as outlined in Washington and Doe v. Jesuit High School of
New Orleans, supra, the statute must be in effect at the time a party files for relief
as a prerequisite to determining whether a statute applies retroactively or
prospectively.
In Washington, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to recuse on
July 23, 1999, and ordered random reallotment to another judge. 2002-2196, p. 1,

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830 So.2d at 289. The reallotment conflicted with La. C.Cr.P. art. 676(B), which
at the time required the judge ad hoc who tried the recusal motion to continue to
act as judge ad hoc for the trial of the case. Id. Thereafter, on April 9, 2002, the
defendant filed a motion to correct the reallotment and have the case returned to
the judge who initially presided over the trial, citing Code of Criminal Procedure
article 676(B). Id. The trial judge to whom the case had been reallotted granted the
motion. Id. The State sought supervisory review, noting that La. C.Cr.P. art.
676(B), as amended by Acts 2001, No. 417, Section 2, which went into effect on
August 1, 2001, now required a case to be reassigned to another judge after a
motion for recusal is granted. The Washington Court determined the trial court
erred in granting the defendant’s motion to correct allotment, noting that “by the
time defendant filed his motion to recuse the randomly allotted trial judge, . . .,
article 676 had been amended . . .;” and inasmuch as the law was procedural, it
could be applied retroactively. 2002-2196, p. 3, 830 So.2d at 290.
In Doe v. Jesuit High School of New Orleans, the appellant filed suit in
November 2019 against the defendants arising out of sexual abuse claims that
dated back to 1978. 2021-0284, p. 2, 331 So.3d at 428-29. The defendants filed
exceptions of prematurity, alleging the appellant had failed to comply with the
provisions of La. R.S. 9:2800.9. Id., 2021-0284, p. 1, 331 So.3d at 428. The issue
on review was whether La. R.S. 9:2800.9 was substantive or procedural. Id., 2021-
0284, p. 4, 331 So.3d at 429. This Court found the procedural requirements of La.
R.S. 9:2888.9 (B)-(D) applied to the appellant’s petition at the time of its filing,
and found the trial court properly granted the exception of prematurity and
dismissed the appellant’s petition. Id., 2021-0284, p. 1, 331 So.3d at 428.
I also note the State relies, in part, on Alvarez v. Touro Infirmary, 2015-0606
(La. App. 4 Cir. 3/19/16), 187 So.3d 592, to bolster its argument that as La. C.Cr.P.
art. 780(B)(2) is allegedly procedural, “it flows naturally then that the applicable

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statute is the version in effect at the time the motion was actually heard.” The
State’s reliance on Alvarez to support this argument is misplaced.
In Alvarez, the issue before this Court was the propriety of the trial court’s
grant of summary judgment. In rendering its decision, the Court noted “[f]or
purposes of this opinion, we refer to the statute as amended in 2014, which version
was in effect at the time JCT’s motion was tried and decided.” Id., p. 3, 187 So.3d
at 593 n.3. Nonetheless, the Alvarez facts establish the defendant—JCT—filed its
motion for summary judgment on November 15, 2014, after the 2014 amendment
had gone into effect on August 1, 2014. Accordingly, based on the date of filing,
the amended statute was in effect at the time the summary judgment motion was
tried.
In the present matter, it is not disputed that Defendant filed his motion to
waive jury trial on June 16, 2026, and complied with the statutory requirement of
La. C.Cr.P. art. 780(B) to seek a waiver in advance of forty-five days of the trial
date, which in this instance, was August 10, 2026. I find no requirement within the
Louisiana constitution or any of the statutory provisions which conditions this right
to the date the merits of the motion to waive jury trial is heard or decided. There
also is no requirement for a defendant to seek relief based on a non-existent law at
the time of filing.
In accordance with Washington and Doe v. Jesuit High School,
determinations as to whether a statute is procedural or substantive for purposes of
determining retroactive or prospective application require an initial inquiry as to
whether the statute was in effect at the time the party filed for the relief requested.
Hence, the issue of the statute’s procedural application in this case is of no
consequence as the statute was not in effect at the time Defendant filed his motion
to waive jury trial. The statute’s random re-allotment provisions did not apply; and

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thus, the trial court had authority to consider the merits of Defendant’s motion to
waive jury trial based on the existing law at the time of filing.
Based on the foregoing reasons, I dissent. I would affirm the trial court’s
judgment and deny the State’s writ application.

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