2026 CA ADMIN - NON-CONFIDENTIAL OPINION - 003 — NOT TO BE PUBLISHED - OPINION AFFIRMING

RENDERED: OCTOBER 16, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2026-CA-0104-ME
W.M.A., JR. APPELLANT
v.
APPEAL FROM LOGAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOE W. HENDRICKS, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 25-AD-00025
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND
FAMILY SERVICES; C.L.C.; AND
H.G.A., A MINOR CHILD APPELLEES
AND
NO. 2026-CA-0105-ME
C.L.C. APPELLANT
v.
APPEAL FROM LOGAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOE W. HENDRICKS, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 25-AD-00025
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND
FAMILY SERVICES; H.G.A., A
MINOR CHILD; AND W.M.A., JR. APPELLEES

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OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CETRULO, A. JONES, AND L. JONES, JUDGES.
JONES, A., JUDGE: On December 18, 2025, the Logan Circuit Court (“circuit
court”) entered an order terminating both parents’ parental rights to minor child
H.G.A. (“Child”).
Thereafter, acting with the assistance of his court-appointed counsel,
W.M.A. (“Father”) filed a direct appeal as a matter of right with this Court, Appeal
No. 2026-CA-0104-ME. Father’s appeal has been fully briefed on the merits.
C.L.C.’s (“Mother”) counsel filed a separate notice of appeal on her
behalf, Appeal No. 2026-CA-0105-ME. However, instead of filing an appellant’s
brief on the merits, as Father’s counsel did, Mother’s counsel filed an Anders1 brief
and a motion to withdraw.2 Thereafter, this Court advised Mother of her right to
continue her appeal pro se and provided her with additional time to file a brief of
1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
2 In A.C. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 362 S.W.3d 361 (Ky. App. 2012), this Court
adopted the procedures identified in Anders to appeals from orders terminating parental rights
when counsel has concluded that the appeal is frivolous. A.C., 362 S.W.3d at 371. Counsel is
required to “conduct[] a thorough, good-faith review of the record.” Id. “[O]nce counsel has
reached the conclusion that the appeal is wholly frivolous, counsel ‘should so advise the court
and request permission to withdraw.’” Id. (quoting Anders, 386 U.S. at 744). “An Anders brief
supplements a motion to withdraw filed after counsel has conscientiously reviewed the record
and found the appeal to be frivolous.” C.R.G. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., 297 S.W.3d
914, 915 (Ky. App. 2009)

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her own choosing. Mother did not file a supplemental brief or take any other
action in relation to her appeal. The Cabinet filed a separate appellee brief in
response to Mother’s appeal.
Both appeals, Nos. 2026-CA-0104-ME and 2026-CA-0105-ME, are
ripe for review on the merits and have been submitted to this panel for decision.
Although docketed separately, the appeals share a common nucleus of operative
facts. Accordingly, in the interest of judicial economy, we elect to address both
appeals in a single Opinion.
Having reviewed the record and being otherwise sufficiently advised,
we affirm the Logan Circuit Court’s order terminating Mother’s and Father’s
parental rights.
I. BACKGROUND
Child was born to Mother and Father (collectively, “Parents”) in
August 2024. Within days of Child’s birth, the Cabinet for Health and Family
Services (“Cabinet”) received reports concerning Parents’ ability to provide
appropriate care for Child and the condition of their home.
The Cabinet conducted its first home visit on August 30, 2024.
Cabinet workers found the home extremely dirty and cluttered and observed
roaches crawling on Child’s infant swing. The Cabinet instituted a safety plan
addressing, among other things, supervision, safe sleep, appropriate feeding, pest

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control, medical appointments, and participation in services. The Cabinet also
referred Parents to the HANDS program, a state-funded program that provides
parenting education before and after the birth of a child.
The Cabinet conducted another home visit on September 20, 2024.
Many of the same environmental concerns persisted, and Cabinet workers
observed weapons in the home. The Cabinet provided Parents with cleaning
supplies and instituted another safety plan addressing pest control, safe sleep,
safety hazards in the home, and cooperation with HANDS, First Steps, and the
Cabinet.
When the Cabinet returned on November 21, 2024, the home was
again filthy and contained animal feces and urine. The Cabinet instituted a third
safety plan and began providing homemaker services. Through those services, a
worker assisted Parents with hygiene and cleanliness issues and provided cleaning
schedules, routines, recipes, and other household-management assistance.
On November 27, 2024, the Cabinet received another report alleging
that the home was unlivable due to animal urine, trash, black mold, bed bugs, and
roaches and that Child had not been bathed in approximately one month. On
November 29, 2024, Parents were arrested for endangering the welfare of a minor
based on the condition of the home. The uniform citation described a dead animal
hanging in a doorway, a strong odor of urine, cockroaches and other live insects,

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dirt and spiderwebs, multiple pets, broken plumbing, and filthy kitchen and
bedroom areas. Live bugs were also observed inside the refrigerator. Mother
reported that she bathed Child in a wash basin, but the responding officer observed
that the basin was covered in dust and grime and appeared not to have been used
recently. The citation further indicated that Father did not appear to appreciate the
condition of the home or the risk it presented to Child. The Cabinet obtained
emergency custody of Child at that time, and Child has remained in its custody
since.
On January 23, 2025, Parents stipulated that Child was abused or
neglected and waived a separate disposition hearing. The circuit court ordered
Parents to undergo psychological evaluations at the Cabinet’s expense. Parents
were also subject to substantially similar case plans requiring them to maintain safe
and stable housing; maintain a clean home free of pests, clutter, and safety hazards;
obtain stable income; participate in mental-health treatment and parenting classes;
comply with court orders; and maintain contact with the Cabinet.
Parents completed parenting classes and participated in some mental-
health treatment through telehealth but did not complete all requirements of their
case plans. In late February 2025, Parents moved to Oklahoma. Shortly before the
move, Parents met with the Cabinet and were warned that relocating out of state
could impede their ability to complete their case plans. Nevertheless, Parents

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relocated to Oklahoma, where they moved into a trailer located on a friend’s
property. Parents explained that they moved to Oklahoma to be near fictive kin
and obtain more affordable housing.
The condition of Parents’ Oklahoma residence soon became an
additional concern. As part of an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children
(“ICPC”) investigation, an Oklahoma social worker inspected the residence and
denied it as a potential placement for Child. The social worker described the home
as unlivable and documented its condition with photographs that were admitted
into evidence. Parents kept five dogs and one cat at the residence. Among other
things, the social worker observed openings in the walls, windows, and doors
through which animals could enter; a strong odor of animal urine; an unstable
porch; exposed trailer underpinning; and a boarded window in the room intended
for Child. Parents also reported problems with roaches and other insects.
After receiving the Oklahoma evaluation, the Cabinet provided
Parents with a list of necessary repairs. At the time of the termination hearing,
however, the residence remained unsuitable for Child. Portions of the flooring
remained exposed to the subfloor, the window in the room intended for Child
remained boarded, electrical outlets remained uncovered, and concerns involving
animals and insects persisted.

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Parents also failed to complete the court-ordered psychological
evaluations. Megan Allen (“Allen”), the Cabinet’s ongoing social worker, testified
that she contacted the Oklahoma Department of Human Services, Parents’
therapist, and multiple providers in an effort to locate a provider who could
perform the evaluations. The providers she contacted either did not perform the
evaluations or did not have an appropriate provider available. One agency was
willing to perform an assessment but required payment in advance and would not
bill the Cabinet directly. Parents could not afford the upfront cost. Allen offered to
arrange evaluations in Kentucky, but Parents did not return to Kentucky to
complete them.
Allen also testified regarding concerns about Parents’ ability to
provide basic care for Child. During in-person visitation, Parents sought assistance
from Cabinet workers with basic childcare tasks, including soothing, feeding, and
changing Child. Allen further testified that Parents’ Oklahoma therapist had
expressed concerns regarding their understanding of basic parenting concepts.
According to Allen, her own interactions with Parents gave rise to similar
concerns.
Parents generally participated in weekly video visitation with Child,
although Allen testified that they failed to appear, without notice, for
approximately every third visit. At the time of the termination hearing, neither

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parent had stable employment. Father received Social Security benefits and
occasionally performed yard work, while Mother had previously worked at a
warehouse but was unemployed at the time of the hearing. Allen testified that
there were no additional services the Cabinet could offer Parents.
Father testified that he was willing to undergo a psychological
evaluation but could not afford either the upfront cost of an Oklahoma evaluation
or the expense of traveling to Kentucky for one. He explained that Parents moved
to Oklahoma because living in Kentucky had become too expensive, they had been
evicted from their Kentucky residence, and they had friends in Oklahoma.
Father disputed some of the Cabinet’s characterization of the
Oklahoma residence but acknowledged problems with the trailer, including drafts,
damaged flooring, and a recurring roach infestation. He testified that Parents had
purchased a window for the room intended for Child but were waiting for their
landlord to install it. Father further testified that he had investigated other
necessary repairs but lacked sufficient financial resources to complete them.
Father testified that he received approximately $1,359 per month from
Social Security and SNAP benefits. He paid between $300 and $500 per month in
rent and approximately $300 per month to a rent-to-own furniture store. He
testified that little income remained after paying utilities and other expenses.
Parents also purchased two fifty-pound bags of dog food every other month for

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their five dogs and one cat. Father identified his ADHD as his greatest impediment
to employment and testified that he was attempting to obtain disability benefits.
He acknowledged that several businesses within driving distance of the residence
were hiring and that employment resources were available in the area.
Mother testified that she likewise was willing to undergo a
psychological evaluation. She stated that Parents were using bug bombs and sticky
traps to address the insect problems in their home. Mother was unemployed at the
time of the hearing and testified that poor internet service at their rural residence
accounted for some of Parents’ missed virtual visits with Child.
Allen testified that Child was doing well in his adoptive foster
placement, which was the only home Child had known, and opined that
termination was in Child’s best interests.
On September 18, 2025, the Cabinet obtained a waiver of reasonable
efforts. The following day, September 19, 2025, the Cabinet filed its petition to
terminate Parents’ parental rights. The circuit court conducted the termination
hearing on November 14, 2025, at which Allen, Father, and Mother testified. On
December 18, 2025, the circuit court entered its order terminating Mother’s and
Father’s parental rights. These appeals followed.

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
KRS3 625.090 sets forth the requirements that must be satisfied before
a Kentucky court may involuntarily terminate a parent’s rights to his or her child.
First, as relevant to these appeals, the circuit court must determine that the child is
an abused or neglected child or that the child was previously adjudged to be an
abused or neglected child by a court of competent jurisdiction. KRS
625.090(1)(a)1.-2. Second, a petition seeking termination must have been filed by
the Cabinet pursuant to KRS 620.180 or KRS 625.050. KRS 625.090(1)(b)1.
Third, the circuit court must find that termination is in the child’s best interests.
KRS 625.090(1)(c). Finally, the circuit court must find by clear and convincing
evidence the existence of at least one of the grounds enumerated in KRS
625.090(2). Even when these requirements are satisfied, the circuit court may, in
its discretion, decline to terminate parental rights if the parent establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that the child will not continue to be an abused or
neglected child if returned to the parent. KRS 625.090(5).
Following the termination hearing, the circuit court must enter
findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting its decision. KRS 625.090(6).
“Broad discretion is afforded to trial courts to determine whether parental rights
should be terminated, and our review is limited to a clearly erroneous standard.”
3 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

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Cabinet for Health and Family Services v. H.L.O., 621 S.W.3d 452, 462 (Ky.
2021). Factual findings supported by substantial evidence are not clearly
erroneous. R.M. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 620 S.W.3d 32, 37
(Ky. 2021). “Substantial evidence is that which is sufficient to induce conviction
in the mind of a reasonable person.” Id.
When the circuit court’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence, we review de novo whether those findings support its legal conclusions.
H.L.O., 621 S.W.3d at 462. If the circuit court’s factual findings are not clearly
erroneous and its legal conclusions are correct, our review is limited to determining
whether the circuit court abused its discretion in applying the law to the facts. Id.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Father’s Appeal No. 2026-CA-0104-ME
As an initial matter, the circuit court relied on Parents’ prior
stipulation in the underlying dependency, neglect, or abuse (“DNA”) proceeding
that Child was abused or neglected due to the deplorable conditions of their home,
and it also made an independent finding as part of the termination proceeding that
Child was abused or neglected as defined in KRS 600.020(1). Father has not
challenged this finding.
The circuit court further determined that the Cabinet proved by clear
and convincing evidence two independent statutory grounds for termination under

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KRS 625.090(2): subsections (e) and (g). Specifically, the circuit court found that,
for a period of not less than six months, Parents had continuously or repeatedly
failed or refused to provide, or had been substantially incapable of providing,
essential parental care and protection for Child and that there was no reasonable
expectation of improvement considering Child’s age. KRS 625.090(2)(e). The
circuit court separately found that, for reasons other than poverty alone, Parents
had continuously or repeatedly failed to provide, or were incapable of providing,
essential food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or education reasonably necessary
for Child’s well-being and that there was no reasonable expectation of significant
improvement in their conduct in the immediately foreseeable future. KRS
625.090(2)(g). The circuit court concluded that each ground was independently
established by clear and convincing evidence.
On appeal, Father’s arguments center primarily on the circuit court’s
findings under KRS 625.090(2) and its consideration of the factors enumerated in
KRS 625.090(3). Father maintains that termination of his parental rights was
impermissibly predicated on his poverty and inability to pay for services required
by his case plan, particularly the court-ordered psychological evaluation.
Relatedly, he argues that the Cabinet failed to make reasonable efforts toward
reunification because it found neither a means to pay an Oklahoma provider to
perform the evaluation nor provided nor arranged transportation for Father to

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return to Kentucky for an evaluation at the Cabinet’s expense. Finally, Father
asserts that the circuit court improperly based termination on his purported lack of
mental capacity despite the absence of a diagnosis by a qualified mental-health
professional.
We address these related arguments together. Having carefully
reviewed the circuit court’s findings and the evidence presented at the termination
hearing, we are not persuaded that the circuit court terminated Father’s parental
rights because of his poverty or upon an unsupported finding that he suffered from
a mental disability. Nor are we persuaded that the difficulties surrounding
completion of the psychological evaluation establish that the Cabinet failed to
make reasonable efforts toward reunification.
Certainly, poverty alone cannot support termination under KRS
625.090(2)(g). Indeed, the General Assembly expressly limited that ground to a
parent who, “for reasons other than poverty alone,” has continuously or repeatedly
failed to provide, or is incapable of providing, the necessities reasonably necessary
for the child’s well-being. Father’s limited financial resources were undisputed
and undoubtedly presented obstacles to his completion of some aspects of the case
plan. Most notably, the record indicates that financial considerations impeded
Parents’ ability to obtain the psychological evaluations in Oklahoma and to make
some of the structural repairs to their Oklahoma residence.

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The circuit court’s findings, however, were not based on poverty
alone. The conditions resulting in Child’s removal extended well beyond Parents’
inability to afford adequate housing or costly repairs. Before Child’s removal, the
Cabinet repeatedly encountered animal feces and urine, insect infestations, and
pervasive unsanitary conditions in the Kentucky home. The Cabinet provided
Parents with cleaning supplies, instituted three safety plans, and provided
homemaker services specifically designed to assist Parents with cleaning, hygiene,
and household routines. Nevertheless, these conditions persisted. At the time of
removal, the home contained animal feces, cockroaches, broken plumbing, and live
insects in the refrigerator. The evidence also included concerns unrelated to
Parents’ financial means, including that Child had not been bathed for
approximately one month and that Parents required assistance during visitation
with basic childcare tasks such as feeding, changing, and soothing Child.
Nor did the environmental concerns resolve when Parents relocated to
Oklahoma in search of more affordable housing. The ICPC evaluation determined
that the Oklahoma residence was unsuitable for Child, and many of the concerns
present in Kentucky persisted there, including insects, animal urine, and generally
unsafe living conditions. At the time of the termination hearing, Parents continued
to keep five dogs and one cat in the residence. Father testified that they purchased
two fifty-pound bags of dog food every other month. The circuit court did not fault

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Parents merely for owning pets. Rather, it considered their continued maintenance
of numerous animals, while animal waste and the condition of the residence
remained impediments to reunification, as one circumstance bearing upon the
adjustments Parents had made to permit Child’s safe return.
Thus, while some deficiencies identified by the Cabinet were
undoubtedly exacerbated by Parents’ financial circumstances, substantial evidence
supported the circuit court’s determination that poverty did not alone account for
Parents’ continuing inability to provide Child with essential care, protection, and a
safe home. KRS 625.090(2)(e)-(g). A lack of financial resources does not prevent
a parent from allowing an animal outside to relieve itself or from cleaning animal
waste when an accident occurs inside the home. Nor does poverty explain the
failure to maintain basic cleanliness after the Cabinet provided cleaning supplies
and homemaker services specifically designed to assist Parents with hygiene,
cleaning schedules, and household routines. Likewise, Parents’ financial
circumstances do not explain the evidence that Child had not been bathed for
approximately one month or that Parents required assistance during visitation with
basic childcare tasks such as feeding, changing, and soothing Child.
We likewise discern no error in the circuit court’s determination that
the Cabinet made reasonable efforts toward reunification. The psychological
evaluations were ordered on January 23, 2025, at the Cabinet’s expense, while

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Parents still resided in Kentucky. Approximately one month later, Parents
voluntarily relocated to Oklahoma. Before doing so, they met with Cabinet
personnel and were specifically advised that an interstate move could impede their
ability to complete their case plans. Parents nevertheless elected to relocate
without having completed the evaluations and without having first secured
employment in Oklahoma.
Even though Parents moved to Oklahoma against the Cabinet’s
advice, the Cabinet continued its efforts to assist them. Social Worker Allen
contacted the Oklahoma Department of Human Services, Parents’ therapist, and
multiple providers to locate someone who could perform the evaluations.
Although one Oklahoma provider was willing to conduct an assessment, that
provider required advance payment and would not bill the Cabinet directly. When
that arrangement proved unworkable, Allen offered to arrange the evaluations in
Kentucky, but Parents did not return to Kentucky to complete them.
Father argues that the Cabinet should have found some means to pay
the Oklahoma provider or, alternatively, should have paid for or arranged his
transportation to Kentucky. The statutory requirement, however, is one of
reasonable efforts. It does not require the Cabinet to eliminate every financial or
logistical impediment encountered by a parent in completing a case plan. This is
particularly so where, as here, the psychological evaluation was available to Father

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in Kentucky at the Cabinet’s expense before he voluntarily moved approximately
nine hours away after being warned that the move could interfere with his ability to
complete his case plan. Under these circumstances we are confident the Cabinet
complied with its obligation to provide reasonable reunification services.
Moreover, on September 18, 2025, the district court entered a finding
relieving the Cabinet of its obligation to continue reasonable efforts toward
reunification. The circuit court nevertheless considered the services rendered both
before and after Parents’ relocation and expressly found that the Cabinet had
“rendered or attempted to render all reasonable services” that might reasonably
have been expected to reunify the family and that no additional services were
likely to permit Child’s return within a reasonable period. Substantial evidence
supports that finding. Notably, despite repeated counseling and services directed
toward proper hygiene and maintenance of the home, Parents’ Oklahoma residence
continued to contain animal feces and urine. The persistence of these same basic
sanitation concerns after Parents relocated to Oklahoma demonstrates their failure
to make meaningful and lasting adjustments even in areas that required little or no
financial expenditure. Given Parents’ inability to remedy these basic conditions
despite repeated intervention by the Cabinet, the circuit court could reasonably
conclude that additional services were unlikely to bring about the more substantial
and lasting parental adjustments necessary for Child to safely return to their care.

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Finally, we are unpersuaded by Father’s assertion that the circuit court
improperly diagnosed him with a mental disability and then relied on that
diagnosis to terminate his parental rights. KRS 625.090(3)(a) directs a court, in
determining the child’s best interests and the existence of a ground for termination,
to consider a parent’s mental illness or intellectual disability when properly
established by a qualified mental-health professional. Here, no such diagnosis was
made.
We recognize that, elsewhere in its findings, the circuit court stated
that Parents’ inability to meet Child’s material needs was “doubtless due more to
significant mental illness/limitations than any other single factor.” Standing alone,
that language could be read as suggesting a conclusion concerning Parents’ mental
condition that the evidentiary record did not permit the circuit court to make.
However, when the circuit court specifically addressed KRS 625.090(3)(a), it made
clear that it was not making such a finding. The court observed that, based on
Parents’ presentation during their testimony, mental disability appeared likely to be
a factor but expressly stated that Parents’ failure to complete the court-ordered
psychological evaluations “hampers this Court’s ability to make a specific
determination regarding this factor.”
Read as a whole, therefore, the circuit court’s order does not contain
an affirmative finding that Father suffered from a qualifying mental illness or

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intellectual disability under KRS 625.090(3)(a). Rather, the circuit court suspected
that cognitive or mental limitations might contribute to Parents’ difficulties but
recognized that, without the ordered evaluations, it lacked the professional
diagnosis necessary to make a specific finding under that subsection. Thus, we are
satisfied that the circuit court did not predicate its best-interest determination on a
definitive diagnosis of mental illness or intellectual disability. As the fact finder,
the circuit court was entitled to observe Parents’ demeanor and consider those
observations in assessing the weight and credibility of their testimony. That the
circuit court could not translate those observations into a clinical diagnosis does
not mean it was required to disregard what it personally observed during Parents’
testimony.
The circuit court considered the totality of the evidence and found by
clear and convincing evidence that Father had been substantially incapable of
providing essential parental care and protection for Child with no reasonable
expectation of improvement, KRS 625.090(2)(e), and that, for reasons other than
poverty alone, he had continuously or repeatedly failed to provide, or was
incapable of providing, the necessities reasonably required for Child’s well-being
with no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the immediately
foreseeable future, KRS 625.090(2)(g). Those findings are supported by
substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous. Likewise, substantial evidence

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supports the circuit court’s determination that the Cabinet made reasonable efforts
toward reunification and that termination was in Child’s best interests.
Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s decision to
terminate Father’s parental rights.
B. Mother’s Appeal No. 2026-CA-0105-ME
As noted, Mother’s counsel filed an Anders brief. Accordingly, this
Court has an independent duty to review the record for prejudicial error. A.C., 362
S.W.3d at 370. This review is akin to palpable-error review and requires us to
ascertain whether any error affected Mother’s substantial rights. Id.
We have independently reviewed the entire record and have identified
no error affecting Mother’s substantial rights. For many of the same reasons
discussed in connection with Father’s appeal, substantial evidence supports the
circuit court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights. During the first few
months of his life, Child was subjected to unsafe and profoundly unsanitary living
conditions, resulting in an adjudication that he was abused or neglected. Following
Child’s removal, the Cabinet provided Mother with numerous services and
resources designed to address the conditions that led to his removal, including
safety planning, parenting education, homemaker services, cleaning supplies,
mental-health services, and supervised visitation.

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Despite these interventions, Mother failed to make sufficient and
lasting adjustments to permit Child’s safe return to her care. Most significantly, the
same fundamental sanitation concerns that existed in Kentucky persisted after
Parents relocated to Oklahoma. The Oklahoma residence remained unsuitable for
Child, and Mother had not demonstrated an ability to maintain a safe and sanitary
home for him. These deficiencies were not attributable to poverty alone. Basic
measures such as cleaning animal waste from the home and maintaining minimally
sanitary living conditions required little or no financial expenditure, particularly
where the Cabinet had provided Parents with instruction and assistance directed
specifically toward those concerns.
Considering the conditions that led to Child’s removal, the persistence
of substantially similar conditions despite the services provided, Mother’s failure
to make sufficient adjustments to permit Child’s safe return, and Child’s progress
in his foster placement, substantial evidence supports the circuit court’s findings
under KRS 625.090. The record likewise supports its determination that
termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Child’s best interests and that no
additional services were likely to bring about the lasting parental adjustment
necessary for reunification within a reasonable period of time. Accordingly, our
independent review reveals no error affecting Mother’s substantial rights, and we
affirm the termination of her parental rights.

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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the Logan Circuit
Court terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT W.M.A.,
JR.:
Logan Sorrell Fugate
Russellville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT C.L.C.:
Darin Higgs
Oak Grove, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
COMMONWEALTH OF
KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR
HEALTH AND FAMILY
SERVICES:
Leslie M. Laupp
Covington, Kentucky

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