JEFFREY NEWSOME ET. AL. V. TERRY WILLIAMS ET. AL. — NOT TO BE PUBLISHED - OPINION AFFIRMING

RENDERED: OCTOBER 9, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2025-CA-1387-MR JEFFREY NEWSOME; BRENDA NEWSOME; KENNETH REED; RETHA NEWSOME; ROBERT NEWSOME; AND SUSAN REED APPELLANTS v. APPEAL FROM MORGAN CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE REBECCA K. PHILLIPS, JUDGE ACTION NO. 20-CI-00171 TERRY WILLIAMS AND VICKI WILLIAMS APPELLEES OPINION AFFIRMING ** ** ** ** ** BEFORE: ACREE, EASTON, AND KAREM, JUDGES. KAREM, JUDGE: Appellants Jeffrey Newsome, Retha Newsome, Robert Newsome, Brenda Newsome, Kenneth Reed, and Susan Reed (collectively, the “Appellants”) appeal from the Morgan Circuit Court’s order after a bench trial

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-2- finding the doctrine of champerty to be inapplicable to the Appellants’ property dispute with Appellees Terry and Vicki Williams (collectively, the “Williamses”). Finding no error, we affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The Appellants owned real property located in Morgan County, Kentucky. The Williamses owned adjoining real property. On November 24, 2020, the Appellants filed a complaint alleging that a dispute had arisen as to the location of the boundaries between the parties’ properties and requesting that the circuit court “establish the boundary line and declare its location.” The complaint further alleged that the Williamses had expressed a desire to remove logs from the property claimed by the Appellants, and the Appellants requested that the Williamses be temporarily and permanently enjoined from encroaching upon such property. Finally, the complaint requested that if the Williamses encroached on the property claimed by the Appellants or logged thereon, that the circuit court grant the Appellants compensatory damages. Thereafter, the Williamses filed an answer denying the complaint’s allegations and a counterclaim for a declaration of rights with respect to the applicable boundary lines and an action to quiet title. Specifically, the Williamses alleged in their counterclaim that the Appellants had “attempted to expand the boundaries of their property.”

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-3- The circuit court held a bench trial at which it heard from seven (7) witnesses and received numerous exhibits. In a detailed order, the circuit court concluded that the Williamses’ deed was not void as champertous and that the Williamses’ title was superior to the Appellants’ claim. Finally, the circuit court established the boundary according to the plat of a licensed professional land surveyor. This appeal followed. We will discuss further facts as they become relevant. ANALYSIS 1. Standard of Review When reviewing a judgment after a bench trial, the reviewing court will only set aside findings of fact if they are clearly erroneous, with “due regard” being given to the circuit court’s “opportunity . . . to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 52.01. We review the circuit court’s conclusion of law de novo. Hoskins v. Beatty, 343 S.W.3d 639, 641 (Ky. App. 2011). The interpretation of a statute such as Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 372.070 is purely a question of law subject to de novo review. Spencer County Preservation, Inc. v. Beacon Hill, LLC, 214 S.W.3d 327, 329 (Ky. App. 2007).

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-4- 2. Discussion The Appellants argue that the doctrine of champerty is applicable in this case. The champerty statute, KRS 372.070, states in pertinent part: (1) Any sale or conveyance, including those made under execution, of any land, or the pretended right or title thereto, of which any other person has adverse possession at the time of the sale or conveyance, is void; but this section does not render void any devise of land in adverse possession. Moreover, a panel of this Court described the evidence required to succeed on a champerty claim as follows: There are several criteria which must be met in order to establish adverse possession under the champerty statute. The nature and elements of adverse possession are that it must be: actual possession; open and notorious possession; exclusive possession; hostile possession, and it must exist at the time of the conveyance claimed to be champertous. However, [u]nder this statute . . . possession . . . need not be for any specific length of time. To render the conveyance champertous, and therefore void, it is sufficient if the adverse character of the possession is such as would ripen into a fee simple title under the limitation adverse possession rule had it continued uninterruptedly for the period prescribed. Henninger v. Brewster, 357 S.W.3d 920, 925–26 (Ky. App. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In this case, it is undisputed that the Appellants have never lived on the property at issue or developed the property in any meaningful way. As the

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-5- circuit court stated, “[n]o evidence was presented of any homes, barns, garages, or other permanent structures constructed on the disputed property.” Moreover, “[n]o evidence was presented of fencing of the disputed property.” Finally, no testimony was presented as to the exact location of any deer stands or deer blinds, or when such structures may have been erected. The evidence of record indicated that the Appellants primarily used the land for deer hunting and four-wheeling. However, for the champerty statute to apply, the property in question must be in the adverse possession of another at the time of the sale or conveyance. KRS 372.070(1). Under Kentucky law, recreational use does not amount to “actual” possession for adverse possession purposes. Moore v. Stills, 307 S.W.3d 71, 80 (Ky. 2010), as corrected (Apr. 7, 2010). Moreover, “the mere incidental use of another’s property will not give rise to an adverse possession.” Id. at 81. The property at issue in this case was used for recreational activities, and the construction of and use of a deer stand or deer blinds did not change the nature of such recreational use. Therefore, the evidence does not establish adverse possession due to the recreational nature of the property’s use. Moreover, the adverse possessor must have actual, physical possession that is open, notorious, hostile, and continuous for the entire statutory period. Henninger, 357 S.W.3d at 925–26. In this case, possession was not

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-6- continuous, as the Appellants had never resided in Morgan County, Kentucky. Moreover, as previously discussed, the Appellants provided no evidence that they had built any type of structure on the disputed area. Therefore, the Appellants did not sufficiently prove that they adversely possessed the property in any way. Nor was the Appellants’ timbering sufficient conduct to establish adverse possession. For champerty purposes, the conduct must be viewed as of the time of the conveyance. KRS 372.070. The record does not establish that timbering was occurring in the area at the time of the conveyance. Sporadic logging activity is insufficient to establish title by adverse possession. Noland v. Wise, 259 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Ky. 1953) (citations omitted). Indeed, “occasional entries for the purpose of cutting timber are not sufficient to constitute adverse possession.” Griffith Lumber Co. v. Kirk, 14 S.W.2d 1075, 1076 (Ky. 1929) (citations omitted). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Morgan Circuit Court’s order. ALL CONCUR.

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-7- BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS: James P. Pruitt, Jr. Pikeville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEES: Leah N. Hawkins Mt. Sterling, Kentucky

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