2026 CA ADMIN - NON-CONFIDENTIAL OPINION - 003 — NOT TO BE PUBLISHED - OPINION AFFIRMING

RENDERED: OCTOBER 9, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2025-CA-1602-ME
M.D.B. APPELLANT
v.
APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID CURLIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 25-AD-00004
A.M.D.B., A MINOR CHILD; C.M.;
AND COMMONWEALTH OF
KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR
HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES APPELLEES
AND
NO. 2025-CA-1603-ME
M.D.B. APPELLANT
v.
APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID CURLIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 25-AD-00005
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND

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FAMILY SERVICES; D.P.; AND J.J.B.,
A MINOR CHILD APPELLEES
AND
NO. 2025-CA-1604-ME
M.D.B. APPELLANT
v.
APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID CURLIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 25-AD-00006
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND
FAMILY SERVICES; D.J.W.; AND
L.H.B.-W., A MINOR CHILD APPELLEES
AND
NO. 2025-CA-1605-ME
M.D.B. APPELLANT
v.
APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID CURLIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 25-AD-00007
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND

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FAMILY SERVICES; D.W.; AND
S.J.G.B., A MINOR CHILD APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, CALDWELL, AND EASTON, JUDGES.
EASTON, JUDGE: M.D.B. (Mother) appeals the orders of the Henderson Family
Court which terminated her parental rights to her four minor children (collectively,
Children). After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Cabinet for Health and Family Services (Cabinet) first became
involved with Mother and the Children in the fall of 2022, when a petition was
filed for educational neglect of the oldest two Children. The third Child was not
yet old enough to be enrolled in school, and the youngest Child had not yet been
born. The older two Children, L. (born in December 2014) and J. (born in
September 2016), had multiple unexcused absences and tardies.
In March 2023, L. and J. were found to be abused or neglected
children after the adjudication hearing. A disposition order was entered in April
2023. Mother completed her prevention plan in September 2023, and the Cabinet
moved to close the case. While the Cabinet closed their case, the family court left

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the court case open for further reviews. The family court did hold further review
hearings, in January 2024, February 2024, March 2024, May 2024, and July 2024.
In May 2024, the Cabinet filed a second Dependency, Neglect, or
Abuse (DNA) petition after Mother tested positive for several substances on a drug
screen. The Cabinet had previously requested Mother drug screen, because there
were occasions she appeared to be under the influence of substances, and Mother
refused to take those drug tests. Contemporaneously, an emergency custody order
was entered, granting temporary custody of all three older Children to the Cabinet.
On June 20, 2024, Mother gave birth to the youngest Child, A.
During her delivery, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine. The following
day, the Cabinet filed a third DNA petition, and emergency custody of A. was
granted to the Cabinet. A. was placed in a different foster home than that of her
three older siblings. In September 2024, an adjudication hearing was held, and
Mother stipulated to the facts in the third petition. Also on that date, Mother tested
positive for methamphetamine and marijuana.
On October 3, 2024, the family court held a disposition hearing.
Mother did not appear. The family court adopted the recommendations of the
Cabinet and set a future date for December 5, 2024, with a notation that if Mother
did not sign for her court date at that time, a bench warrant would be issued. It was

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noted at this court date that Mother had been having very little contact with the
Children.
Mother did appear for her review date on December 5. At this court
date, the family court found Mother had not made any progress on her case plan,
was inconsistent with visiting the Children, had not sought in-patient treatment as
directed, and continued to test positive on drug screens. At a review in late
January 2025, the family court found Mother was inconsistent with the Cabinet and
also that Mother had little to no contact with the Children. The Cabinet was
proceeding with changing their goal from reunification to adoption. On March 11,
2025, the Cabinet filed its petition for Termination of Parental Rights (TPR).
Mother was appointed counsel, and the TPR hearing was held on November 4,
2025. The testimony elicited at the TPR hearing will be discussed below as it
becomes relevant to our analysis.
The family court entered its Order terminating parental rights to all
four Children as to Mother and the Children’s respective fathers1 on December 1,
2025. Mother filed her Notice of Appeal on December 12, 2025.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a termination of parental rights case is the
1 All four Children had different biological fathers. None of them join in this appeal, and only
one appeared and participated in the underlying TPR action.

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clearly erroneous standard in CR2 52.01. The factual findings must be supported by
clear and convincing evidence. M.E.C. v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health and
Family Services, 254 S.W.3d 846, 850 (Ky. App. 2008). The findings of the trial
court should not be disturbed unless there exists no substantial evidence in the
record to support its findings. V.S. v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Human
Services, 706 S.W.2d 420, 424 (Ky. App. 1986). “The test for abuse of discretion
is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair or
unsupported by sound legal principles.” Woodard v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d
63, 67 (Ky. 2004).
ANALYSIS
KRS3 625.090 is the controlling statute regarding the involuntary
termination of parental rights. This statute allows parental rights to be
involuntarily terminated only upon findings, based on clear and convincing
evidence, that (1) the child has been found to be an abused or neglected child as
defined in KRS 600.020(1) by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) that the
Cabinet has filed a petition seeking the termination of parental rights pursuant to
KRS 620.180 or KRS 625.050; (3) that termination is in the child’s best interests;
and (4) at least one of the grounds set out in KRS 625.090(2)(a)-(k) is present.
2 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
3 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

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The first prong is that the child must have been found to be abused or
neglected. KRS 600.020(1) defines an “abused or neglected child” as “a child
whose health or welfare is harmed or threatened with harm” with a list of examples
provided. Mother does not dispute this finding. The family court had previously
found Mother responsible for abuse or neglect of all four Children in the previous
DNA actions; it further found the Cabinet had proven neglect or abuse in the TPR
action by clear and convincing evidence. The first prong is satisfied.
The court must find that at least one of the grounds outlined in KRS
625.090(2) is present. The family court in this action found these grounds applied:
(a) That the parent has abandoned the child for a period
of not less than ninety (90) days;
. . .
(e) That the parent, for a period of not less than six (6)
months, has continuously or repeatedly failed or
refused to provide or has been substantially incapable
of providing essential parental care and protection for
the child and that there is no reasonable expectation of
improvement in parental care and protection,
considering the age of the child;
. . .
(g) That the parent, for reasons other than poverty alone,
has continuously or repeatedly failed to provide or is
incapable of providing essential food, clothing,
shelter, medical care, or education reasonably
necessary and available for the child’s well-being and
that there is no reasonable expectation of significant
improvement in the parent’s conduct in the

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immediately foreseeable future, considering the age of
the child;
Mother disputes all three of these findings. The family court made
these specific findings of fact:
The mother first began working with the Cabinet in
November 2022 and was provided services to assist her
with issues surrounding educational neglect and stability
in the home. However, the mother began illegal drug use
and continued use for many months despite the Cabinet’s
intervention and offering services. The Court ordered the
mother to complete services that would address substance
misuse, housing, stability and her relationship with the
child but she did not take advantage and abandoned the
child for a period of greater than ninety (90) days while
also failing to maintain contact with the Cabinet. She
made little to no progress from May 2024 to April 2025
and essential tasks on her case plan are still not
addressed. The mother has had ample opportunity and
encouragement from the Cabinet and the Court to take
the necessary steps to regain custody of her child but as
of the date of the hearing she still had not completed her
case plan and established stability to care for the child.[4]
We will start with the analysis for subsection (e). Mother argues that
the family court failed to specify the six-month time frame in which it found she
failed to provide essential care and protection. She also argues there was no
evidence she was ordered or even requested to provide child support, or that she
had the means to do so. She also claims the family court’s finding of no
reasonable expectation of improvement is not supported by the evidence.
4 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, December 1, 2025.

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The family court clearly laid out that there was “little to no progress
from May 2024 to April 2025.” There is substantial evidence to support this
finding. It was in May 2024 that the older three Children went into foster care,
which is where they have remained since. The youngest Child was placed into the
Cabinet’s custody immediately after her birth in June 2024, and she has remained
in that same placement.
There was testimony that Mother was testing positive for illegal
substances, including methamphetamine, throughout that time period. Other times
Mother refused to test at all. The Cabinet worker testified that she case-planned
with Mother soon after removal of the Children from her custody, so Mother was
aware of the tasks she needed to complete. The Cabinet worker stated there were
multiple referrals to therapy services that focused on intensive outpatient or in-
patient substance abuse treatment. Mother refused to go to in-patient treatment.
Mother was also referred to services that focused on mental health. The Cabinet
worker said Mother would claim to be interested in services but would not follow
through. Mother was also evicted during this time period, and she had not
regained stable housing at the time of the hearing. Mother was not consistent with
communication with the Cabinet and other service providers. Visitation with the
Children was also not consistent during this time frame.

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It was not until March or early April 2025 (after the TPR petition had
been filed) that Mother did any type of substance abuse treatment, and she
completed a short-term treatment program. Yet she still refused to enter an in-
patient treatment, despite it being recommended to her at the completion of her
short-term treatment. It is not clearly erroneous to conclude that Mother was
unable to provide substantial parental care and protection when she was abusing
substances and was essentially homeless. The time period of May 2024 to April
2025 clearly exceeds the six-month requirement. Even if we consider that Mother
may have gone into treatment in March, the time period is still obviously met, as
there was testimony that no progress occurred until the TPR petition was filed.
It was conceded by the Cabinet worker that Mother made progress on
her case plan since the TPR petition was filed in March 2025. The Cabinet worker
testified she believed Mother had been clean and sober since she completed the
short-term treatment. She had also completed her parenting classes, and Mother
was enrolled in therapy. It was also undisputed by the Cabinet worker, as well as
the Children’s foster parents, that Mother had been consistent with her visits with
the Children since at least April. Mother argues this progress was such that the
family court’s finding that there was “no reasonable expectation of improvement”
was erroneous. We must disagree.

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Despite Mother’s progress in the months leading up to the termination
hearing, she still did not have housing which could accommodate the Children.
She had not completed long-term treatment, which was strongly recommended
after her short-term treatment. She also had not completed her parenting
assessment, although she did have an appointment to do so in the near future.
There was also testimony that she struggled to care for all four Children at one
time during visitation.
The family court stated at the conclusion of the termination hearing
that it had been trying to “warn her for months” that this would be where they
would end up if she did not make progress on her case plan. The family court
believed Mother only decided to take the matter seriously once the TPR petition
was filed. We find the facts herein analogous to those in T.R.W. v. Cabinet for
Health & Family Services, 599 S.W.3d 455 (Ky. App. 2019), in which this Court
stated:
“Just because the child . . . [is] committed to the
Cabinet does not mean that the parent has no further
responsibilities to the child. The Cabinet developed a
case plan, and continually offered services. Nevertheless,
[M]other neglected her duties and failed to complete the
goals set by the Cabinet.” Cabinet for Health & Family
Servs. on behalf of C.R. v. C.B., 556 S.W.3d 568, 573
(Ky. 2018) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
While it is certainly good news that Mother may now be
sober, at the time of the trial, she had still not completed
her protective parenting class. Also, she had almost 3

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years to get her life in order and complete her case plan
but was unable.
Id. at 463.
We are satisfied from our review of the record that clear and
convincing evidence supports the family court’s findings that grounds exist to find
termination under KRS 625.090(2)(e).
We will also briefly comment on subsection (g) of the statute, in
which it is stated “that there is no reasonable expectation of significant
improvement in the parent’s conduct in the immediately foreseeable future”
(emphasis added). The fact that Mother did not have housing appropriate for the
Children supports the finding that Mother is “incapable of providing essential . . .
shelter.” While Mother stated she has been in contact with the housing authority
and is on a waiting list, there was no indication how long it would be until Mother
is able to obtain housing for herself and four children. Because the court is only
required to find the existence of one of the grounds under KRS 625.090(2) to grant
termination, Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health and Family Services v. T.N.H.,
302 S.W.3d 658, 663 (Ky. 2010), we need not analyze the remaining grounds
found by the family court to be applicable to this case.
The final prong of the tripartite test is the “best interest of the child”

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standard. In determining the best interest of the Children and the existence of a
ground for termination, the family court must consider the factors in KRS
625.090(3), which are:
(a) Mental illness as defined by KRS 202A.011(9), or an
intellectual disability as defined by KRS 202B.010(9)
of the parent as certified by a qualified mental health
professional, . . . [which] renders the parent
consistently unable to care for the immediate and
ongoing physical or psychological needs of the child
for extended periods of time;
(b) Acts of abuse or neglect as defined in KRS
600.020(1) toward any child in the family;
(c) If the child has been placed with the cabinet, whether
the cabinet has, prior to the filing of the petition
1. Made reasonable efforts as defined in KRS
620.020 to reunite the child with the parents
unless one or more of the circumstances
enumerated in KRS 610.127 for not requiring
reasonable efforts have been substantiated in a
written finding by the District Court; or
2. Provided a parent with a disability as defined in
KRS 199.011 with targeted adaptive and
supportive services based on an individual
assessment of the parent, or has received a
written acknowledgement from the parent
knowingly and affirmatively rejecting the
offered services;
(d) The efforts and adjustments the parent has made in his
or her circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make
it in the child’s best interest to return the child to his
or her home within a reasonable period of time,
considering the age of the child;

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(e) The physical, emotional, and mental health of the
child and the prospects for the improvement of the
child’s welfare if termination is ordered; and
(f) The payment or the failure to pay a reasonable portion
of substitute physical care and maintenance if
financially able to do so.
Mother argues it was erroneous for the family court to find it was in
the Children’s best interests to terminate her parental rights. She points to
testimony from the foster mother of the three oldest Children, who stated when
visits began, the Children were emotional and upset after the visits. But once the
visits became more regular and the Children were able to rely on that consistency
of visits, those feelings improved. She also points to testimony that Mother has a
strong bond with the oldest three Children.
At this juncture, the analysis of best interests of the Children is
different for the oldest three Children and the youngest Child. The youngest Child
was removed at birth, and there was testimony that she does not recognize Mother
as her mother. This Child’s foster mother testified that she refers to her and her
husband as “mama” and “dada.” She also testified that recently, the Child has
been more attached to her after visits with Mother. Foster mother stated that after
the Child’s most recent visit with Mother, the Child held onto her for
approximately fifteen minutes before she would allow foster mother to put the
Child into her car seat. Foster mother stated that Mother has brought toys for the

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Child to some of the visits but has not provided any diapers or clothing. All
evidence shows that the Child is flourishing in her foster home, and the foster
parents are the only parents she has ever known. The Child is healthy and
developing appropriately. The foster home is an adoptive home, and the family
wishes to adopt the Child.
The family court found it was in the Child’s best interest to terminate
Mother’s parental rights, and this Court determines there was substantial evidence
to support that finding.
As for the older three Children, the analysis is not as simple. These
Children, particularly the older two, are aware of their Mother’s circumstances.
Their foster mother testified that all three Children have a close and loving bond
with both their Mother and foster mother. They also have a very close bond with
each other. They refer to Mother as “Mommy,” and they have a special nickname
for her as well. She confirmed that Mother is consistent with her visits with the
Children and that she brings toys, clothes, meals, and candy to the visits for the
Children (although some of this may have been provided through the financial
support of Mother’s aunt who raised her).
Foster mother also testified as to how the Children have improved
since they came to live with her. She stated that when they first arrived, the
youngest Child was very clingy and stayed attached to the oldest Child, but she is

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now much more independent and loves to explore. Foster mother also stated that
she could tell the oldest Child was used to taking care of her younger siblings. She
also stated that the oldest Child “can worry,” but she is in therapy to help with that.
The second Child has several diagnoses, including autism, ADHD,
and fetal alcohol syndrome. Foster mother testified about the therapies he is
receiving and how he is progressing. Foster mother has fostered children for over
twenty years. She stated that stability is in every child’s best interest. She further
stated that the Children know their Mother “absolutely loves them,” but “at the end
of the day, for we as adults, we know that the children need to have that security
and that safety and the permanency of you know, life in general.”5
The family court stated in its order that it considered all the factors of
KRS 625.090(3) and found it was in the best interest of the Children to terminate
parental rights of Mother and the Children’s respective fathers. Its findings were
mostly identical6 in all four Children’s orders:
This Court has considered each factor in KRS 625.090(3)
and finds that it is in the best interest of [Child] that the
parental rights of [Mother] and [Father] be terminated.
The mother has been offered assistance and services from
the Cabinet since November 2022 and although she has
made some minimal progress since the Petition in this
case was filed, it is not sufficient to make it in the child’s
5 Hearing of November 4, 2025, Video Record (VR) at 11:52:21.
6 A date was different in the youngest Child’s order, based on her not being born when the first
two petitions were filed.

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best interest to return to her care. The mother has
provided minimal toys and gifts to the child but not
adequate to meet the ongoing needs of the child. The
father has not presented evidence of any efforts or
adjustments in his conduct or circumstances to make it in
the child’s best interest to be placed in his custody and
has failed to provide any form of support for the child
since at least June 21, 2024. The child is improving and
doing well in foster care and there is no reason to believe
that that progress will not continue if termination is
granted.
The Cabinet has offered reasonable services to help
reunify the family since May 9, 2024 and it is not likely
that additional services would bring about lasting
parental adjustment enabling a return of the child to
either parent.[7]
The evidence was clear that Mother had a close and loving bond with
the three Children; it is also clear that the Children are doing exceptionally well in
their foster placement. There was evidence presented to support either finding that
termination was or was not in the Children’s best interests. In these situations,
the family court is in the best position to evaluate the
testimony and to weigh the evidence, [and] an appellate
court should not substitute its own opinion for that of the
family court. If the findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence and if the correct law is applied, a
family court’s ultimate decision . . . will not be disturbed,
absent an abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion
implies that the family court’s decision is unreasonable
or unfair.
Thus, in reviewing the decision of the family court,
the test is not whether the appellate court would have
7 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, December 1, 2025.

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decided it differently, but whether the findings of the
family court are clearly erroneous, whether it applied the
correct law, or whether it abused its discretion.
Varney v. Bingham, 513 S.W.3d 349, 352 (Ky. App. 2017).
We cannot determine, based on the record before us, that the family
court’s finding that termination was in the Children’s best interests was clearly
erroneous or that it abused its discretion in ordering termination of Mother’s
parental rights.
Mother makes one final argument, that KRS 625.090(2)(a) is
unconstitutional. First, this argument is unpreserved, which Mother admits.
Further, Mother failed to notify the Attorney General as required by KRS 418.075.
“We have made plain that strict compliance with the notification provisions of
KRS 418.075 is mandatory.” Benet v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 528, 532 (Ky.
2008). Additionally, we have affirmed the termination based on other factors of
KRS 625.090(2) found by the family court. It is therefore unnecessary to comment
on this issue further.
CONCLUSION
The family court’s factual findings were supported by substantial
evidence and were not clearly erroneous. We determine the family court did not
abuse its discretion in ordering the termination of Mother’s parental rights to the

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Children. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the orders of the Henderson
Family Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Scott A. Lu
Henderson, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
COMMONWEALTH OF
KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR
HEALTH AND FAMILY
SERVICES:
Kevin Martz
Covington, Kentucky

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