JESSE STANDLEY V. NICHOLAS ROSE ET. AL. — NOT TO BE PUBLISHED - OPINION AFFIRMING

RENDERED: OCTOBER 9, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2025-CA-1302-MR JESSE STANDLEY APPELLANT v. APPEAL FROM POWELL CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE LISA HAYDEN WHISMAN, JUDGE ACTION NO. 24-CI-00116 NICHOLAS ROSE AND CHRISTINA A. ROSE APPELLEES OPINION AFFIRMING ** ** ** ** ** BEFORE: ACREE, EASTON, AND KAREM, JUDGES. KAREM, JUDGE: Jesse Standley (“Standley”) appeals from the Powell Circuit Court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Nicholas and Christina Rose in Standley’s claim against the Roses under Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 258.235. Finding no error, we affirm.

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-2- FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Standley was walking along a public roadway directly adjacent to the Roses’ property in Stanton, Kentucky. The Roses’ dogs ran towards the perimeter of the Roses’ underground electrical fence and barked and/or growled at Standley.1 The record reflects that the dogs remained within the confines of the electrically- fenced area and the Roses’ property at all times. Standley alleges that he was terrified by the barking and the dogs’ approach. He darted into the roadway, where he was struck by an oncoming vehicle. The dogs never made physical contact with Standley and never bit him. Standley filed a complaint against the Roses alleging their strict liability for his injuries under KRS 258.235. The Roses filed a motion for summary judgment on September 5, 2025, which the circuit court granted. This appeal followed. We will discuss further facts as they become relevant. 1 Standley maintains that both of the dogs owned by the Roses, a French Bulldog and an Australian Shepherd, were involved in the incident. Conversely, the Roses recalled that only the Australian Shepherd was outside that day. However, the number of dogs is irrelevant to the legal analysis sub judice, and we will proceed with the analysis as if both dogs were outside.

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-3- ANALYSIS 1. Standard of Review “The proper standard of review on appeal when a trial judge has granted a motion for summary judgment is whether the record, when examined in its entirety, shows there is ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Hammons v. Hammons, 327 S.W.3d 444, 448 (Ky. 2010) (quoting Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 56.03). Indeed, “[a] motion for summary judgment presents only questions of law[.]” Patton v. Bickford, 529 S.W.3d 717, 723 (Ky. 2016). Therefore, “[o]ur review is de novo, and we afford no deference to the trial court’s decision.” Id. Importantly, “[t]he record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991) (citations omitted). 2. Discussion KRS 258.235 was promulgated to provide for, among other things: authority to kill or seize a dog; return of a dog by the court; and, liability for damage caused by a dog. Specifically, KRS 258.235(4) dictates that “[a]ny owner whose dog is found to have caused damage to a person, livestock, or other property shall be responsible for that damage.” Therefore, to be held liable under this

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-4- statute, a person must first be an owner of a dog. The parties do not dispute that the Roses were the owners of the dogs in this case. Next, the owner’s dog must have caused the damage at issue. Damage is not defined in the statutes, but KRS 446.080(4) provides that “[a]ll words and phrases shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of language, but technical words and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed according to such meaning.” The definition of “damage” is functionally the same in both legal and common usage. See Damage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 471 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “damage” as “[o]f, relating to, or involving monetary compensation for loss or injury to a person or property”). Thus, for this appeal’s purposes, we will assume that Standley’s injuries constituted “damage” within the statutory definition. In this case, the Roses convincingly contend that the general meaning of KRS 258.235 is that the legislature only intended the applicable damage to stem from dog bites or attacks. Indeed, the statute is often denoted the “dog bite statute.” See Benningfield ex rel. Benningfield v. Zinsmeister, 367 S.W.3d 561, 568 (Ky. 2012), as modified (Jun. 25, 2012). This meaning is consistent with other subsections of the statute that clearly address dogs who physically attack individuals. The Kentucky Supreme Court explained in Zinsmeister that KRS

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-5- 258.235 was “clearly part of a [legislative] scheme to displace or abrogate the common law rule on dog-bite liability . . . presumably to create incentives for various actors to take steps to reduce the chances of dog bites.” Id. at 566 (emphasis added). More recently, our Supreme Court referred to KRS 258.235(4) as governing “dog bite law” and being “the progeny of years of evolution in the law of dog attacks.” Maupin v. Tankersley, 540 S.W.3d 357, 359-60 (Ky. 2018). A dog barking or growling is plainly neither a bite nor an attack. Thus, we agree with the circuit court that Standley’s injuries caused by being frightened by a dog barking or growling is not the type of “damage” that the legislature intended to address in KRS 258.235(4). See also Hanna v. Shea, 717 S.W.3d 568, 569 (Ky. App. 2025) (no liability under the statute when a “startled” dog got up at the same time as plaintiff and tripped her, resulting in injury). Consequently, we cannot extend liability to the Roses under this case’s facts. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reason, we affirm the Powell Circuit Court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the Roses. ALL CONCUR.

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-6- BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Tanner H. Shultz Lexington, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Brandon T. Lally Elizabethtown, Kentucky

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