Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1992-026

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL February 18, 1992
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 92- 26
Betty A. Bomar, Director
Crime Victims Compensation Board
700 S.W. Jackson, Jayhawk Tower
Suite 400
Topeka, Kansas 66603
Re: State Boards, Commissions and Authorities--Crime
Victims Compensation Board--Definitions; Victim;
Secondary Victim
Synopsis: The crime victims compensation board may properly
consider for compensation those applications
submitted by or on behalf of individuals deemed by
established board policy described herein to be
secondary victims. Cited herein: K.S.A. 1991
Supp. 74-7301; 74-7302; 74-7304; 74-7333; 1978
House Bill No. 2163.
Dear Ms. Bomar:
As executive secretary of the crime victims compensation board
(board), you request our opinion regarding whether those
individuals designated as secondary victims by board policy
may qualify for an award of compensation as a victim as
defined under K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 74-7301(m). Those
individuals deemed by Board policy to be secondary victims are
"the spouse, children under the age of 18, and the parents of
homicide victims; and the parents of children who are victims
of indecent liberties provided the parent is not the offender."

The crime victims compensation board was established by the
legislature with its adoption of 1978 House Bill No. 2163.
The bill was to "take care of those people who had no where
else to turn," Minutes, House Committee on Federal and State
Affairs, February 4, 1977, by "establish[ing] a
state-financed program of reparations to crime victims or
their dependents who suffer personal injury or death as a
result of criminal acts." Minutes, Senate Committee on
Federal and State Affairs, March 15, 1978. The board may
award compensation to claimants for economic loss suffered
from criminally injurious conduct. K.S.A. 1991 Supp.
74 - 7302. Claimants are "any of the following persons claiming
compensation under this act: A victim; a dependent of a
deceased victim; a third person other than a collateral
source; or an authorized person acting on behalf of any of
them." K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 74-7301(c). Victim is further
defined as "a person who suffers personal injury or death as a
result of: (1) Criminally injurious conduct; (2) the good
faith effort of any person to prevent criminally injurious
conduct; or (3) the good faith effort of any person to
apprehend a person suspected of engaging in criminally
injurious conduct." K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 74 - 7301(m).
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law and it is
the function of the court to interpret the statute to give it
the intended effect. U.S.D. No. 279 v. Sec'y of Kansas
Dept. of Human Resources, 247 Kan. 519, 524 (1990). The
fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the purpose
and intent of the legislature govern when that intent can be
ascertained from the statute. Id. In construing statutes,
the legislative intent is to be determined from a general
consideration of the entire act; effect must be given, if
possible, to the entire act and every part thereof. State ex
rel. Stephan v. Kansas Racing Comm'n, 246 Kan. 708, 719
(1990). In determining legislative intent, the courts are not
limited to a mere consideration of the language employed but
may properly look into historical background of the enactment,
the circumstances attending and subsequent to its passage, the
purposes to be accomplished and the effect the statute may
have under the various constructions suggested. Joe Self
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs of Sedgwick
County, 247 Kan. 625, 633 (1990). Statutes providing for
an award of compensation to crime victims are remedial in
nature; it has been held that they should be construed
liberally with a view toward the effective administration of
justice and not in such a way as to defeat or frustrate the
intention of the legislature in enacting them. 21A
Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law, § 1053 (1981).

During its consideration of 1978 House Bill No. 2163, the
legislature was made aware of the fact that 21 states had
previously adopted legislation providing for compensation to
crime victims. The programs implemented by eleven states were
closely scrutinized. Although it is clear from the
legislative history of 1978 House Bill No. 2163 that the
program proposed in the bill was based on a model bill, the
terms of the model bill are unknown. The programs scrutinized
by the legislature have varying provisions regarding those
individuals deemed to be victims. Some of the programs
specifically include designated relatives of the injured party
within the provisions regarding victims. Other programs limit
the ability of individuals to be considered for compensation
to those individuals directly injured by criminally injurious
conduct. 1978 House Bill No. 2163 did not include such a
restriction within its provisions. Taking into consideration
the purpose for implementing the act regarding the crime
victims compensation board, and that such statutes are to be
construed liberally, it is determined that those individuals
deemed by board policy to be secondary victims may receive
consideration for compensation as victims of criminally
injurious conduct.
This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the board, by
exercising its authority under K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 74-7304,
established its policy recognizing secondary victims in 1985
or 1986. Executive construction of a statute is entitled to
additional weight when it has been impliedly endorsed by the
legislature, as by reenactment in the same or substantially
same terms, or by failure of the legislature, with knowledge
of such construction, to change the law or adopt amendments.
Gorup v. Kansas Public Employees Retirement System, 3
Kan.App.2d 676, 680 (1979). The presumption of adoption
of such interpretations has added force when the reenacted
statute, in which the provision in question was not changed,
made changes in other provisions. Id. Similarly,
legislative inaction as evidence of implied endorsement is
maximized by detailed changes made to related statutes.
Id. The definitional provisions of the act have twice been
amended. See L. 1986, ch. 306, § 1; L. 1989, ch. 239, §
9. In neither instance was the definition of victim further
clarified. In its adoption of the bill of rights for victims
of crime, the legislature narrowed the definition of victim to
those persons who suffer direct or threatened physical,
emotional, or financial harm as the result of the commission
or attempted commission of a crime against such person.
K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 74-7333. Through its inaction regarding
K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 74-7301(m), the legislature in our opinion

has adopted the interpretation of victim as set forth in the
policy of the crime victims compensation board. The board may
properly consider for compensation those applications
submitted by or on behalf of individuals deemed by established
board policy described herein to be secondary victims.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Richard D. Smith
Assistant Attorney General
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