Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1989-137

1989-137Kanag

Gesamter Gesetzestext

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL November 20, 1989
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 89- 137
Nola Foulston
Sedgwick County District Attorney
Sedgwick County Courthouse
535 N. Main
Wichita, Kansas 67203
Re: Minors--Kansas Juvenile Offenders Code--New Trial
Synopsis: District courts appear to have the authority to
entertain a motion for new trail in a juvenile
proceeding if the motion is timely filed and if
double jeopardy problems would not arise. A
juvenile does not, however, have a statutory or
constitutional right to a new trial. Cited
herein: K.S.A. 38-801 et seq., repealed L.
1982, ch. 182; 38-1601; 38-1632; 38-1653; 38-1665;
38-1681; 38-1683; 60-259; 60-2103; K.S.A. 44-556,
as amended by L. 1979, ch. 158, § 1.
Dear Ms. Foulston:
You request our opinion regarding the following:
"Does a juvenile offender have a statutory
right to a new trial following
adjudication and/or disposition? If so,
does that right exist by a provision in
the juvenile offender's code or provisions
in the code of civil procedure generally?
If not, is a juvenile offender entitled to
a new trial by virtue of any other
considerations; i.e. constitutional
rights, inherent power of the court to
review its own rulings, etc?"
Although the court may rehear a preadjudicatory detention
matter upon request of the alleged juvenile offender's parent
who was not given notice of the hearing, K.S.A. 38-1632(e),
and may modify certain orders of disposition, K.S.A. 38-1665,
the Kansas juvenile offenders code contains no specific
provision authorizing a new trial on the adjudication.
(K.S.A. 38-1683, however, does provide for a trail de novo in
the district court on appeal from an order entered by a
district magistrate judge.) The question therefore becomes
whether K.S.A. 60-259 of the code of civil procedure applies
in juvenile proceedings.
This exact question has as yet not been resolved by the Kansas
appellate courts. In re Trotter, 3 Kan.App.2d 566
(1979) involved a question on the court's jurisdiction to
grant a new trial on the basis that the trial court had failed
to record proceedings in a trial de novo of a matter under the
old juvenile code (K.S.A. 38-801 et seq., repealed, L.
1982, ch. 182). The issue whether K.S.A. 60-259 (the
provision for new trial) was legally available to the
requesting party was not discussed, but rather whether the
grounds for new trail listed in K.S.A. 60-259(a) included a
court's failure to record its proceedings. The court held
that it did. 3 Kan.App.2d at 567.
In In re Waterman, 212 Kan. 826 (1973), the Kansas Supreme
Court held that "[t]he juvenile court act is a comprehensive
inclusive act covering the entire field of juvenile
delinquency, miscreancy, dependency and neglect, and it
provides its own specific procedures. It is full and complete
within itself." 212 Kan. at 830. The court therefore
concluded that since the old juvenile code did not provide for
an appeal by the state, appeal by the state was not available
in a juvenile proceeding. Id. More recently, however, the
Supreme Court has held that a district court could proceed
under K.S.A. 60-235, authorizing medical and psychiatric
evaluations, in a juvenile proceeding even though the old
juvenile code did not specifically provide for such
evaluations:
"The parents argue on appeal that K.S.A.
60-235(a) was not applicable to the
proceedings. They base this contention on
the fact the proceedings herein were under
Chapter 38 (Juvenile Code) and argue that
an order pursuant to K.S.A. 60-235(a) was
improper. This case arose prior to court
unification and the statute in effect at
the time relative to the scope of Chapter
60 (Code of Civil Procedure) was set forth
in K.S.A. 60-201 (Corrick) as follows:
"'This article governs the procedure in
the district courts of Kansas and original
proceedings in the supreme court in all
suits of a civil nature whether cognizable
as cases at law or in equity with the
exceptions stated in section 60-265.
"K.S.A. 38-813, in the form in effect at
the time, provided:
"'All witnesses shall be sworn on oath or
affirmation, and the rules of the code of
civil procedure relating to witnesses,
including the right of cross-examination,
shall apply to proceedings in the juvenile
court. Only witnesses who have been
subpoenaed shall be allowed witness fees
and mileage. No witness shall be entitled
to be paid such fee or mileage before his
actual appearance in court.'
"This court has used K.S.A. 38-813 as a
basis to apply the hearsay rules (K.S.A.
60-460) to juvenile court proceedings.
In re Harris, 218 Kan. 625, 544 P.2d
1403 (1976); In re Johnson, 214 Kan.
780, 522 P.2d 330 (1974).
"The Juvenile Code is to be liberally
construed for the protection of dependent
and neglected children. This concept is
well stated in Lennen v. State, 193
Kan. 685, 689-90, 396 P.2d 290 (1964),
as follows:
"'[W]e must ever bear in mind the purpose
which underlies the Juvenile Code and the
beneficent objectives which the code seeks
to attain. These objectives are well
expressed in 38-801, supra, which
provides:
"'"This act shall be liberally construed,
to the end that each child coming within
its provisions shall receive such care
custody, guidance, control and discipline,
preferably in his own home, as will best
serve the child's welfare and the best
interests of the state. In no case shall
any order, judgment or decree of the
juvenile court, in any proceedings under
the provisions of this act, be deemed or
held to import a criminal act on the part
of any child; but all proceedings, orders,
judgments and decrees shall be deemed to
have been taken and done in the exercise
of the parental power of the state. This
section shall not apply to proceedings
under section 30 [38-830] of this act."
"'The statute is but a legislative
expression of the concern which the people
of this state have always had for the
welfare of children. This court early
gave voice to the public feeling in this
regard. Speaking for the court in the
case of In re Bullen, 28 Kan. 781,
Justice Brewer posed the paramount
question:
Din . . . What will be best for the welfare
of the child? . . ." (p. 786.)
"'Like a vivid, vital strand, this concept
of what is best for the child runs through
the tapestry woven from our many decisions
dealing with child custody, care and
placement.'
"We do not hesitate to, hold that when the
mental condition of the parent is a basic
issue of dependent and neglected child
proceedings, the district court may
proceed under K.S.A. 60-235. Under the
circumstances herein the district court
did not err in ordering the psychiatric
evaluation of the father." In re
Kerns, 225 Kan. 746, 750, 751 (1979).
These cases were all decided under the prior juvenile code
rather than the current juvenile offender or child in need of
care codes, but they provide guidance as to how the court
might rule on the question before us.
Further guidance may be drawn from the court's decision in
Dieter v. Lawrence Paper Co., 237 Kan. 139 (1985). In a
prior case, Hensley v. Carl Graham Glass, 226 Kan. 256
(1979), the court interpreted a provision of the workers'
compensation act, K.S.A. 1978 Supp. 44-556(c), as amended by
L. 1979, ch. 158, § 1, to conform the time for appeal in
workers' compensation cases to that in other civil actions
under K.S.A. 60-258 and K.S.A. 60-2103. In Dieter, the
court took this holding one step further finding that the time
to appeal in workers' compensation cases under the 1979
amendment to K.S.A. 44-556 is tolled by post-judgment motions
as provided in K.S.A. 60-2103. The statute in question
provided as follows:
"(c) Any party to the proceedings may
appeal from any findings or order of the
district court to the appellate courts on
questions of law. The compensation
payable under the decision of the district
court shall not be stayed pending such
appeal. Such appeal shall be taken and
perfected by the filing of a written
notice of appeal with the clerk of the
district court within thirty (30) days
after the filing of the entry of judgment
as provided in K.S.A. 60-258 and
amendments thereto. Any appeal
heretofore taken and pending on the
effective date of this act which was filed
within twenty (20) days from the date of
journal entry of judgment shall be deemed
timely and the appellate court in which
the appeal is pending shall have
jurisdiction to determine such appeal.
Appeals pursuant to this subsection shall
be prosecuted in like manner as other
appeals in civil cases, and shall take
precedence over other cases except cases
of a like character." L. 1979, ch. 158,
1 (emphasis added).
The court reasoned:
"The Kansas appellate courts have not
heretofore addressed the specific question
whether the filing of a postjudgment
motion tolls the time for filing an appeal
since 44-556(c) was amended in 1979.
Prior to the 1979 amendment, a number of
Kansas cases held that, since there was no
provision in the Workmen's Compensation
Act for filing motions for a new trial or
other postjudgment motions, the
statutory time for appeal was not extended
by filing a post-trial motion. Dunn v.
Kuhlman Diecasting Co.., 203 Kan.
670; Gray v. Herclues Powder Co., 160
Kan. 767, 165 P.2d 447 (1946);
Ferguson v. Palmolive-Peet Co., 129
Kan. 516. The opinion in Henisey v.
Carl Graham Glass, 226 Kan. 256, did
not specifically cover the question
whether a postjudgment motion tolls the
time for filing a notice of appeal to an
appellate court in a workers' compensation
case.
" We have concluded that the 1979
amendment to 44-556(c) had the effect of
making the procedural provisions of the
Kansas Code of Civil Procedure pertaining
to entry of judgment, postjudgment
motions, and appeals applicable to
workers' compensation appeals pending in
the district court to the same extent as
they are applied in other types of civil
cases. In reaching this conclusion, we
note that K.S.A. 60-201 addresses the
scope of the Kansas Code of Civil
Procedure and provides as follows:
"'60-201. Scope. This article governs
the procedure in the district courts of
Kansas, other than actions commenced
pursuant to chapter 61 of the Kansas
Statutes Annotated, and any amendments
thereto, and governs the procedure in all
original proceedings in the supreme court
in all suits of a civil nature whether
cognizable as cases at law or in equity,
except as provided in K.S.A. 60-265.'
"Furthermore, the Kansas Code of Civil
Procedure is to be liberally construed.
K.S.A. 60-102. In liberally construing
the Code of Civil Procedure, it should
be held to apply to workers' compensation
reviews in the district court in order to
give a district court authority to correct
its own errors prior to appellate
review. In Hensley, 226 Kan. 256,
it is stated that the purpose of the 1979
amendment to 44-556(c) was to conform the
time for appeal in workers' compensation
cases to those in other civil actions
under K.S.A. 60-258 and K.S.A.
60-2103.
"K.S.A. 60-2103 states that when an appeal
is permitted by law from a district court
to an appellate court, the time within
which an appeal may be taken shall be
thirty days from the entry of the judgment
as provided in K.S.A. 60-258, except that
the running of the time for appeal is
terminated by a timely posthearing
motion and that the full time for appeal
commences to run and is to be computed
upon the entry of an order granting or
denying a motion for judgment under K.S.A.
60-250(b) or granting or denying a motion
under K.S.A. 60-252(b) to amend or make
additional findings of fact, or granting
or denying a motion under K.S.A. 60-259 to
alter or amend the judgment, or denying a
motion for a new trial under K.S.A.
60-259." Dieter, 237 Kan. at 143, 144
(emphasis added).
Like the workers' compensation statute considered in Dieter,
the juvenile offenders code contains a provision which adopts
the appellate procedure of the Kansas code of civil
procedure. K.S.A. 38-1683. (The code also incorporates the
rules of evidence of the code of civil procedure. K.S.A.
38-1653.) K.S.A. 60-2103 specifically references K.S.A.
60-259 in tolling the time in which an appeal must be taken.
[Note: parties in a juvenile offender proceeding must take
care to file an appeal within the limits of K.S.A.
38-1681(b). See State v. Hemminger, 207 Kan. 172, 176
(1971) (even where particular provision of civil procedure
code is made applicable to criminal cases, "in a criminal
proceeding a provision of the code of civil procedure may not
prevail in the face of a contrary or inconsistent provision of
the criminal code nor may it replace a specific provision in
the criminal code.")] Thus, arguably, the juvenile offenders
code has adopted K.S.A. 60-259 by reference, thus allowing the
district court in such proceedings to entertain motions for
new trial. We believe this is consistent with the court's
previous holdings which favor giving the trial court an
opportunity to correct its own errors. See Merando v.
A.T. & S.F. Rly. Co., 232 Kan. 404, 413 (1983); Loose v.
Burbacher, 219 Kan. 727, 729 (1976); Dieter, supra at
143. It is also consistent with the fundamental policy of the
juvenile offenders code to "best serve the juvenile's
rehabilitation and the protection of society." K.S.A.
38-1601. See also State, ex rel., v. Owens, 197 Kan.
212, 223 (1966); State v. Muhammad, 237 Kan. 850, 854
(1985); In re C.A.D., 11 Kan.App.2d 13, 19 (1985). It
is therefore our opinion that the court in a juvenile
proceeding is authorized to entertain a motion for new hearing
pursuant to K.S.A. 60-259.
However, K.S.A. 38-1683 merely adopts the. procedures on
appeal used for other civil actions, it does not specifically
adopt any substantive rights found therein. Thus, we do not
believe courts in juvenile proceedings are bound by the
provisions of K.S.A. 60-259(a) Sixth. Further, we caution
the courts in granting a new hearing on motion of the
prosecution after jeopardy is attached in that this may
violate K.S.A. 38-1682 and case law which holds the double
jeopardy clause applicable to juvenile proceedings. See
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346
(1975). See K.S.A. 22-3501. We also caution parties
requesting new hearings that, should a court disagree with our
opinion that motions for new trial may be entertained in
juvenile proceedings, filing of a motion for a new trial will
not toll the time for appeal. See Dieter, supra at 143,
and cases cited therein. If the time for appeal is not tolled
and the appeal is not taken within ten days of the entry of
the order of disposition, the appellate court will not have
jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Finally, we believe the best
way to proceed is to file the K.S.A. 60-259 motion after
adjudication but before disposition, if possible, and request
the court to stay its dispositional order until it rules on
the motion since the time to appeal does not begin to run
until entry of the order of disposition. K.S.A. 38-1681(b).
In conclusion, district courts appear to have the authority to
entertain a motion for new trail in a juvenile proceeding if
the motion is timely filed and if double jeopardy problems
would not arise. A juvenile does not, however, have a
statutory or constitutional right to a new trial.
Very truly yours
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Julene L. Miller
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JLM:jm

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