Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1988-171

1988-171Kanag

Gesamter Gesetzestext

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL December 28, 1988
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 88- 171
The Honorable Herbert W. Walton
District Judge, Division No. 1
Johnson County Courthouse
Olathe, Kansas 66061
Re: Counties and County Officers -- County
Commissioners -- Powers and Duties; Budget for
Operation of Sheriff's Office
Counties and County Officers -- Sheriff --
Preservation of Peace; Courthouse Security
Synopsis: K.S.A. 19-812 and 19-813 do not by their terms
mandate the continual presence of a county sheriff
at the courts of record in the county. However,
the county sheriff possesses the discretionary
authority to determine if and when such security is
necessary. The board of county commissioners is
vested with general authority and responsibility
over county expenditures, but may not prevent a
county official from carrying out statutorily
imposed duties. Competing county budgetary
constraints must therefore be reasonably balanced
with the need to fund the performance of
discretionary official duties. Cited herein:
Kan. Const., Art. 9, §2; K.S.A. 19-212;
19-801a; 19-812; 19-813.
Dear Judge Walton:
You request our opinion as to whether a county sheriff is
required to provide security for the courts and if the board
of county commissioners has an affirmative duty to provide
funding for that security. You note that there is often a
great need for such security because of the number of people
exposed to potential harm from uncontrolled persons involved
in tense and difficult court actions.
Kan. Const., Art. 9, § 2, gives the legislature the
authority to provide for "such county and township officers as
may be necessary." K.S.A. 19-801a et seq. are a product
of that constitutional authority. These statutes establish
the office of county sheriff. K.S.A. 19-813 sets forth the
general duties of the county sheriff:
"It shall be the duty of the sheriff and
undersheriffs and deputies to keep and
preserve the peace in their respective
counties, and to quiet and suppress all
affrays, riots and unlawful assemblies and
insurrections, for which purpose, and for
the service of process in civil or
criminal cases, and in apprehending or
securing any person for felony or breach
of the peace, they, and every coroner, may
call to their aid such person or persons
of their county as they may deem
necessary."
In addition to K.S.A. 19-813, there are numerous statutes
which define and set forth specific official duties required
of a county sheriff. Libby v. Schmidt, 179 Kan. 683,
687 (1956). (See e.g. K.S.A. 28-109, 60-2602, 66-1,131,
74-3302, 75-5220 and 79-320.) K.S.A. 19-812 states:
"The sheriff, in person or by his
undersheriff or deputy, shall serve and
execute, according to law, all process,
writs, precepts and orders issued or made
by lawful authority and to him directed,
and shall attend upon the several courts
of record held in his county, and shall
receive such fees for his services as are
allowed by law." (Emphasis added).
Thus, the issue becomes whether language in K.S.A. 19-812
creates an affirmative duty requiring all county sheriffs to
at all times be present or provide security at county
courthouses. That statute requires a sheriff to "attend upon
the several courts of record held in his county." Attend is
generally defined as "[t]o look after or to take charge
of . . . to go or stay with as a companion . . . to visit
professionally . . . to be present at." Websters Seventh
New Collegiate Dictionary 57 (1969). The two Kansas cases
citing K.S.A. 19-812 do not mandate that a county sheriff has
an affirmative duty to be at all times present in the
courthouse. See State v. Lamb, 209 Kan. 453, 468
(1972); Robson v. Dickinson County, 8 Kan. App. 374
(1898). Citing a statute substantively identical to K.S.A.
19-812, the Robson court held that a reasonable and fair
interpretation is that the sheriff shall, when required or
when necessary, attend upon the several courts of records.
The court in Skinner v. Cowley County, 63 Kan. 557
(1901), stated that the law does not require the sheriff to be
continuously in the probate judge's office, nor to follow him
about on the watch for issuance of writs. Id, at 562.
Cases from other jurisdictions discuss the duty of the sheriff
to attend the court, but do not recognize an absolute
affirmative statutory or common law duty requiring a sheriff
to be at all times present at the courthouse. Rather, while
it may be part of a sheriff's duty as chief law enforcement
officer of the county to assist the courts in enforcing the
law, it is generally sufficient that the sheriff or his
deputies be available to the court. "That a court be ready
and able to summon witnesses or parties, requires sooner or
later the sanction of force entrusted to the coordinate
executive arm of government, i.e., the sheriff of his county.
See, Hobart v. Hobart, 45 Iowa, 501; State ex rel. Steers
v. Crim. Court of Lake County, 232 Ind. 443, 112 N.E. 2d
445, 113 N.E. 2d 44." Tidwell v. State, 130 So.2d 206, 208
(Ala. 1961). See also, Near v. Commonwealth, 116 S.E.
2d 85 (Va. 1960) (permitting a sheriff and deputy, who were
later called as witnesses, to remain in the courtroom when the
other witnesses were excluded was not an abuse of the court's
discretion because it is part of the sheriff's duty to wait
upon the court); Adams v. Tackett, 365 S.W. 2d 125 (Ark.
1963) (while a sheriff can be forced to attend a session of
the county court, if the judge so orders, the sheriff cannot
prevent a session from being legally held merely by staying
away.); Taylor v. Wilson County, 216 S.W. 2d 717 (Tenn.
1949) (while the Tennessee Code requires the sheriff to wait
on the court, he cannot be required to do so without being
paid the statutorily established compensation. See Tenn.
Code Ann. § 16-15-601, ". . . the sheriff shall designate a
court officer to wait on the court at all times said court is
in session."). Thus, based upon the specific statutory
language in each state, courts allow, but do not mandate, the
continual presence of an officer in the courthouse.
Custody of the courthouse is a duty which, at common law,
rests on the sheriff as an incident to his general duties. 80
C.J.S., Sheriffs and Constables, § 46 (1953); See also
70 Am. Jur. 2d Sheriffs, Police, and Constables, 5 46
(1987). However, care and custody of the courthouse does not
automatically dictate that the sheriff must provide full-time
security at the courthouse. Whether such full-time security
is necessary appears to be one of the many discretionary
decisions properly made by a sheriff. See Brooks v.
Marquess, 157 Kan. 244, 248 (1943); Hopkins v. State,
237 Kan. 608, 610 (1985). While K.S.A. 19-813 allows a
sheriff to be present at all public gatherings in order to
preserve the peace, his presence at certain public gatherings
is not mandated.
K.S.A. 19-812 requires the sheriff to attend upon the court.
K.S.A. 19-813 mandates that he keep and preserve the peace.
It is our opinion that these duties do not absolutely mandate
that a sheriff at all times be present at the courthouse.
Therefore, while the county sheriff may provide security for
the courts of record in his county, it is our opinion that the
necessity for such security and the exercise of such authority
is a discretionary decision, properly addressed by the sheriff
of each county. A county sheriff may reasonably determine
that such security is necessary. Such a determination raises
the second issue you ask us to address; the extent to which a
board of county commissioners must provide funding to an
elected officer for the performance of that officer's duties.
Previously issued Attorney General opinions discussing the
budgetary control of the board of county commissioners over
other elected offices include 87-37, 87-14, 84-53, 84-30,
82-100 and 80-69. As noted in opinions no. 84-53 and 80-69,
the general authority and responsibility over county
expenditures is vested in the board of county commissioners.
See K.S.A. 19-212. An exception to the general rule exists
when the expenditure or obligation is necessary in order for a
county official to carry out statutorily imposed duties.
Thus, a board may not use its budgetary powers to preclude the
performance of duties imposed by law upon other elected
officials.
As discussed herein, while a county sheriff may
discretionarily conclude that there is a necessity for
security at a courthouse, Kansas statutes do not absolutely
mandate the full-time presence of a county sheriff or officer
at the courthouse. It therefore becomes necessary to
reconcile potential conflicts between the general budgeting
authority enjoyed by the board of county commissioners and the
discretionary authority of a county sheriff who reasonably
believes it is necessary to provide full-time or increased
security at a courthouse. This reconciliation process
requires the exercise of good judgment and conscience in a
manner that appears to be just and proper under the
circumstances. There is no hard and fast rule as to the
course of conduct that must be taken in such a discretionary
situation. If, in the reasonable judgement of a county
sheriff, public safety and order dictate the presence of an
officer at court, competing county budgetary constraints
dictate that a board of county commissioners must decide
whether it is economically feasible to provide additional
funding for additional security or personnel.
Maricopa County v. Dann, 758 P. 2d 1298 (Az. 1988),
discusses county policies in filling court personnel
positions. The Arizona Supreme Court held that the judge of
the superior court was required to follow county procedures
necessary to employ court personnel and stated that an orderly
fiscal policy is a governmental necessity. Judicial
proceedings do not require the presence of a sheriff or
officer at court, however desirable that presence may
sometimes be for security reasons. If a sheriff
discretionarily concludes that such security is necessary in
order to preserve the peace, he must work within the
established county budgetary processes and restraints.
However, a board of county commissioners cannot completely
control the proper exercise of such discretionary authority,
but must balance economic realities with pubic safety
interests. Whether discretionary decisions thus made by a
board of county commissioners or a county sheriff are
reasonable, is a fact question to be determined on a case by
case basis.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Theresa Marcel Nuckolls
Assistant Attorney General
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