Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1988-082

1988-082Kanag

Gesamter Gesetzestext

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL June 16, 1988
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 88- 82
The Honorable Jessie M. Branson
State Representative, Forty-fourth District
800 Broadview Drive
Lawrence, KS 66044-2423
Re: Hotels, Lodging Houses and Restaurants -- Liens of
Hotels and Lodging House Keepers--Applicability of
Defrauding an Innkeeper Statute to Tenants
Synopsis: K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 36-206 and 36-207, add
"dwelling unit" to penal statutes of defrauding an
innkeeper or owner. K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 36-206 and
36-207, as applied to tenants, do not violate
Section 16 of the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution of the State of Kansas nor do they
violate the due process provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Cited herein: K.S.A. 1987 Supp.,
26-206; 36-207; Kan. Const., Bill of Rights,
§16; U.S. Const., Fourteenth Amendment.
*
Dear Representative Branson:
You request our opinion concerning the 1987 amendments to
K.S.A. 36-206 and 36-207. See L. 1987, ch. 148.
Specifically you ask:
1. Does the new act violate Section 16 of the Bill
of Rights of the Kansas Constitution which
prohibits a person from being imprisoned for debt
except in case of fraud?
2. Does the new act violate the due process or
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Unites States Constitution?
Before turning to the issue of the constitutionality of these
Statutes, as amended, we first restate the basic principals
applicable when our courts consider constitutionality of
statutes.
"'This court adheres to the proposition
that the constitutionality of a statute is
presumed, that all doubts must be resolved
in favor of its validity, and before the
statute may be stricken down, it must
clearly appear the statute violates the
constitution. Moreover, it is the court's
duty to uphold the statute under attack,
if possible, rather than defeat it, and if
there is any reasonable way to construe
the statute as constitutionally valid,
that should be done.'" (Quoting State v.
Huffman, 228 Kan. 186, Syl. § 1,
612 P.2d 630 [1980]). Federal Land Bank
of Wichita v. Bott, 240 Kan. 624,
628, 629.
K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 36-207 provides:
"The following shall be prima facie
evidence of the intent to defraud an owner
or innkeeper as provided in K.S.A. 36-206
and amendments thereto:
(1) Obtaining lodging, food or other
accommodations by false pretense or by
false or fictitious show or pretense of
any baggage or other property;
(2) paying for such food, lodging or
other accommodation by a check or other
negotiable paper on which payment had been
refused;
(3) leaving the inn, restaurant, hotel,
boardinghouse, apartment house, dwelling
unit or rooming house without paying or
offering to pay for such food, lodging, or
other accommodation;
(4) surreptitiously removing or
attempting to remove baggage or other
property; or
(5) registering under a fictitious name."
Section 16 of the Kansas Constitution, Bill of Rights states:
"No person shall be imprisoned for debt, except in cases of
fraud." The plain language of K.S.A. 26-206 as amended
clearly applies only to cases of fraud and thus is not
violative of §16.
We must now consider whether the prima facie provisions of
K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 36-207, violate the due process provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution:
"The general rule universally applied
throughout the United States is that a
statutory presumption will be upheld as
constitutional if, in accordance with the
experience of mankind, there is a natural
and rational evidentiary relation between
the fact proved and the one presumed; if
the defendant has more convenient access
to evidence relating to the fact to be
presumed; and if, by requiring defendant
to go forward with evidence to rebut the
presumption, he is not thereby being
subjected to unfairness or hardship.
(Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Evidence,
13th Ed., Vol. 1, §94) (emphasis
added)." State v. Haremza, 213 Kan.
201, 204 (1973).
To establish guilt, the intent to defraud must exist when the
accommodation is obtained. In other words, there must be
fraudulent intent at the inception of the event, to establish
guilt. In State v. Harris, 6 Kan. App. 2d 721 (1981),
the Court of Appeals considered whether Harris' surreptitious
removal of luggage and personal property from a motel room
without paying his bill was sufficient evidence to prove that
he intended to defraud the owner. The appellate court, in
reversing the trial court decision based on the facts, said:
"We are of the opinion the state has
suffered a failure of proof. It is not a
crime to fail to pay a motel bill. Our
Kansas Constitution prohibits any person
being imprisoned for debt except in cases
of fraud. Bill of Rights §16. It is the
fraud of the accused that constitutes the
crime, not the failure to pay a debt, even
if the accused unjustly and willfully
refused to pay his or her obligations."
6 Kan. App. 2d at 723 (Emphasis
added).
"There is no evidence the defendant did
anything that could be construed as
furnishing the intent to defraud an
innkeeper prior to his being locked out of
the motel room. The state relies on an
incident that occurred after the lockout
(removal of luggage and personal property
from the room) to trigger the presumption
afforded by K.S.A. 36-207 that Harris
intended to defraud when he checked into
the motel a month earlier. . . . We are,
however, unwilling to say that a jury
should have been permitted to imply from
the record before us that Harris obtained
the accommodations by means of a trick or
deception, or false representation,
statement or pretense with the intent to
defraud the owners or keeper of the motel
when he obtained the accommodations. To
hold otherwise would allow a jury to
speculate and return a guilty verdict,
thus enabling a debtor to be imprisoned
for nothing more than the inability to pay
a just debt on demand." 6 Kan. App.
2d at 723, 724 (emphasis added).
The message is clearly stated by the court that to establish
guilt, the intent to defraud must exist when the accommodation
is obtained. Regarding the prima facie provisions in K.S.A.
1987 Supp. 36-207, no criminal action can be maintained on
the provisions alone. The facts must rationally relate back
to fraudulent intent at the time of obtaining. Ordinarily a
guest of a hotel or restaurant can reasonably be expected to
know, at the time of obtaining, his or her ability to pay.
The tenant of a dwelling unit, however, may encounter changing
conditions over time which common sense tells us might result
in inability to pay. The facts of each case should be
carefully analyzed. If there is no intent to defraud at the
time the dwelling unit is obtained, there can be no criminal
liability.
We now consider whether passage of these statutes violate the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. Two standards have generally been
used to determine whether state legislation violates the
federal equal protection clause. Ferguson v. Garman,
643 F. Supp. 335, 338 (D. Kan. 1986) provides:
"The Equal Protection Clause generally
provides that all persons similarly
situated should be treated alike.
Edwards v. Valdez, 789 F.2d 1477, 1482
(10th Cir. 1986) (citing Pyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S.Ct. 2382,
2394, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982).
Traditionally, two standards have been
used to determine whether state
legislation runs afoul of that clause.
The first, and by far the most commonly
applied, is the rational basis test.
Under this test, the court seek[s] only
the assurance that the classification at
issue bears some fair relationship to a
legitimate public purpose. Pyler, 457
U.S. at 216, 102 S.Ct. at 2394.
"The second standard, labeled strict
scrutiny, is applied when the challenged
classification involves a suspect class or
impinges upon a fundamental rights.:
Because tenants are not a suspect class and no fundamental
right is implicated, the rational basis test is applied.
These two statutes, as amended, do bear a fair relationship to
a legitimate public purpose. The purpose of the amendments is
to discourage defrauding of landlords by tenants. In our
opinion the statutes, as amended, do not violate the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.
In conclusion, K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 36-206 and 36-207 as
amended, do not violate Section 16 of the Constitution of the
State of Kansas nor do they violate the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution.
Very truly yours,
Robert T. Stephan
Attorney General of Kansas
Brenda L. Braden
Deputy Attorney General
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