Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1988-068

1988-068Kanag

Gesamter Gesetzestext

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL	
May 17, 1988
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 88- 68
The Honorable Ben E. Vidricksen
State Senator, Twenty-Fourth District
713 N. 11th Street
Salina, Kansas 67401
Re: Constitution of the United States--Fourth
Amendment--Searches and Seizures
Synopsis: Ordinance No. 88-9230 of the city of Salina
prescribes that a refusal by the owner and/or
occupant of certain property (dwellings, lodging
houses, hotels, and apartments) to submit to an
inspection "shall lead to a presumption that the
premises is not equipped with approved smoke
detectors and will result in a citation being
issued." As the ordinance does not establish a
warrant procedure under the standard set forth in
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 18
L.Ed.2d 930 (1967), it is our opinion that the
"presumption" set forth in the ordinance violates
the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, and is void. Cited herein: U.S.
Const., Fourth Amendment.
Dear Senator Vidricksen:
You request our opinion as to the constitutionality of
ordinance no. 88-9230 of the city of Salina. The ordinance
mandates smoke detectors in various residential properties,
and subsection (b) thereof provides as follows:
"Inspections. Whenever a permit [is]
issued by the Permits and Inspection
Division for any alteration, addition or
repair to a Group R, Division 1 or 3
occupancy, a code enforcement inspection
shall be conducted by the building
inspection staff to determine compliance
with this section. Group R, Division 1
occupancies and commercial structures with
sleeping rooms shall also be inspected
annually by the fire department to
determine compliance with this section.
A refusal by the owner and/or occupant to
submit to an inspection shall lead to a
presumption that the premises is not
equipped with approved smoke detectors and
will result in a citation being issued."
In considering the constitutionally of the presumption
established by the above-quoted ordinance, a review of United
States Supreme Court cases dealing with administrative
inspections is appropriate. These cases provide that under
the Fourth Amendment, warrantless searches presumptively are
unreasonable. Beginning with Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967), the court held that a
warrantless search of residential property by a municipal
inspector violated the Fourth Amendment. In Camara an
apartment dweller was charged with a misdemeanor for violating
a San Francisco building ordinance (that allowed inspectors to
enter a building and check for possible building code
violations without a warrant) by refusing to consent to an
inspection. The ordinance in question did not require a
warrant. In holding the ordinance unconstitutional, the Court
rejected the argument that the ordinance provided enough
protections for occupants without a warrant and that the
warrant process could not function effectively in the area of
municipal inspections. The Court said:
"Under the present system, when the
inspector demands entry, the occupant has
no way of knowing whether enforcement of
the municipal code involved requires
inspection of his premises, no way of
knowing the full limits of the inspectors
power to search, and no way of knowing
whether the inspector himself is acting
under proper authorization . . . the
practical effect of this system is to
leave the occupant subject to the
discretion of the official in the field.
This is precisely the discretion to invade
private property which we have
consistently circumscribed by a
requirement that a disinterested party
warrant the need to search . . . we simply
cannot say that the protections provided
by the warrant procedure are not needed in
this context; broad statutory safeguards
are no substitute for individualized
review, particularly when those safeguards
may only be invoked at the risk of a
criminal penalty." 387 U.S. at 532, 18
L.Ed.2d at 937.
This rationale was applied to commercial premises in See v.
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967), where the court
held that a non-consensual administrative inspection upon
commercial premises not open to the public must be made
pursuant to a warrant.
Applying the principles laid down in the above-cited cases, it
is apparent that the Salina ordinance does not establish a
warrant procedure that follows the standard for administrative
inspections set forth in Camara. While property owners
are not subject to criminal penalty per se , for refusing
to submit to an inspection, such fact does not insulate the
ordinance from scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment. See
Hometown Coop Apartments v. City of Hometown, 495 F.Supp.
55, 60 (1980). In our judgment, the "presumption" established
by the Salina ordinance does violence to the protections
afforded by the Fourth Amendment, and is unnecessary where a
valid warrant procedure could be established.
In summary, ordinance no. 88-9230 of the city of Salina
prescribes that a refusal by the owner and/or occupant of
certain property (hotels, apartments, dwellings and lodging
houses) to submit to an inspection "shall lead to a
presumption that the premises is not equipped with approved
smoke detectors and will result in a citation being issued."
As the ordinance does not establish a warrant procedure under
the standards set forth in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967), it is our opinion that the
"presumption" set forth in the ordinance violates the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and is void.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Terrence R. Hearshman
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JLM:TRH:jm

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