Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1988-037

1988-037Kanag

Gesamter Gesetzestext

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
March 11, 1988
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 88- 37
The Honorable Bill Graves
Secretary of State
State Capitol, 2nd Floor
Topeka, Kansas 66612-1594
Re: Cities and Municipalities -- Interlocal
Cooperation; General -- Interlocal Agreements by
Public Agencies; Filing
Synopsis: K.S.A. 12-2905 requires filing of all agreements
entered into pursuant to the interlocal
cooperation act. However, failure to file such an
agreement does not render the contract void or
unenforceable when the agreement substantially
complies with all other requirements contained in
the act and has been subsequently acted upon or
partially performed by the parties to the
agreement. Cited herein: Kan. Const., Art.
12, § 5; K.S.A. 12-101 Fourth; 12-2901; K.S.A.
1987 Supp. 12-2904; K.S.A. 12-2905; K.S.A. 1987
Supp. 12-2908; K.S.A. 12-3001; 19-101 Fourth;K.S.A.1987Supp.19-101a;K.S.A.19-212
Eleventh; 22-2101; K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 58-3406;
K.S.A. 75-4317; 84-3-101.
*
Dear Secretary Graves:
As Secretary of State you request our opinion as to the status
of an interlocal agreement entered into pursuant to K.S.A.
12-2901 et seq. when such agreement has not been filed
with the local register of deeds or the secretary of state as
required by K.S.A. 12-2905.
K.S.A. 12-2905 states:
"Prior to its entry into force, an
agreement made pursuant to this act shall
be filed with the register of deeds of the
county where such political subdivision or
agency of the state government is located
and with the secretary of state."
This statute does not clearly address the impact of failure to
file, and thus does not in and of itself render an otherwise
legal contract void for failure to file.
Whether a contract exists often relies on a determination of
the parties capacity and intent to contract, which are
questions of fact. Augusta Bank & Trust v. Broomfield,
231 Kan. 52 (1982). K.S.A. 12-2901 et seq. supplies
governmental entities with a statutory means and thereby
capacity to contract. This capacity may also be inherent or
otherwise authorized. See generally Kan. Const., Art.
12, § 5; K.S.A. 19-212 Eleventh; 19-101 Fourth; 12-101
Fourth; McQuillans Intergovernemntal Relations, §
3A.06 (1987). The mere existence of a document and any
subsequent action on the contract evidence an intent to
contract. If, however, filing procedures under K.S.A. 12-2905
mandate an express legislative condition precedent, failure to
file may completely void the contract.
A condition precedent is something that must happen or be
performed before rights can accrue to enforce the main
contract. If a condition precedent is not performed, the
contract cannot be enforced even though the contract is
executed. Wallerius v. Hue, 194 Kan. 408 (1965);
Morton Bldgs., Inc. v. Department of Human Resources, 10
Kan. App. 2d 197 (1985). It is not clear from the
language of the statute whether the legislature intended to
create such a condition precedent pursuant to K.S.A. 12-2905.
Thus, some statutory construction is necessary to determine
legislative intent.
While K.S.A. 12-2905 states that these agreements "shall" be
filed prior to entry into force, this language may be
directory rather than mandatory, and thus not an absolute
requirement. If statutory filing procedures are viewed as
merely directory, the theory of substantial compliance may be
applicable. McQuillins, Intergovernmental Relations, §
3A.10 (1987).
"Shall" is not a hard and fast identifying mark which can
foretell the mandatory or directory character of a statute.
City of Kansas City v. Board of County Comm'rs of
Wyandotte County, 213 Kan. 777, 783 (1974). The word
"shall" in a statute is frequently read to mean "may" where
the context requires. Paul v. City of Manhattan, 212 Kan.
381 (1973). Questions as to whether language in a statute is
mandatory or directory is largely determined on a case by case
basis and an important consideration is whether the
requirement is essential to preserve the rights of parties.
Griffen v. Rogers, 232 Kan. 168 (1982); Unified School
District No. 252 v. South Lyon County Teachers Association,
11 Kan. App. 2d 295 (1986). Provisions in a statute
intended to secure order, system and dispatch, and by
disregard of which parties cannot be injuriously affected, are
not regarded as mandatory unless accompanied by negative words
indicating that the acts shall not be done in any other manner
than that designated. Manhattan v. Ridgeway Bldg. Co.,
Inc., 215 Kan. 606 (1974). See also City of
Hutchinson, Reno County v. Ryan, 154 Kan. 751 (1942).
The filing of documents serves many purposes, depending upon
the circumstances and the document to be filed. The word
"file" contemplates the deposit of a writing with the proper
official. City of Overland Park v. Nikias, 209 Kan. 643
(1972). It means to "layaway and arrange in order,
pleadings, motions, instruments, and other papers for
preservation and reference. . . ." Blacks Law Dictionary 566
(5th Ed. 1979). Filing provides notification,
authentication or ease of access to public documents.
Notice to the public of a proposed interlocal agreement or
contract is provided by means other than filing. Public
hearing and publication laws give notice of the proposed
governmental action before, during and after execution of the
agreement. See, e.g., K.S.A. 75-4317 et seq.; K.S.A.
1987 Supp. 19-101a(b); K.S.A. 12-3001 et seq.
The legislature is presumed to be aware of existing laws
concerning the subject matter of a statute. State v.
Coley, 236 Kan. 672 (1985). It can therefore be presumed
that, being aware of all the notification involved in adopting
these agreements, the legislature did not require filing
pursuant to K.S.A. 12-2905 merely to give notice. Rather than
provide duplicate notice, the filing may instead be intended
to document the authenticity or existence of the filed
agreements or to provide public access to them. In certain
circumstances recording or filing documentation of an official -
action may be considered as a mere clerical or ministerial
duty that is not essential. Boardman v. Davis, 3 N.W. 2d
608, 611 (Iowa 1942).
Though it can be safely said that the legislature does not
intend any statutory provision to be totally disregarded, in
determining the consequences of failure to comply with a
statute the ultimate object which the legislature sought to
serve should be considered. City of Kansas City v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 213 Kan 777, 783 (1974). The purpose of
the filing requirements contained in K.S.A. 12-2905 appears to
be administrative in nature because failure to file does not
seriously injure the rights of the parties nor does it deprive
the public of notice due to previous notification.
It is therefore our opinion that K.S.A. 12-2905 requires
filing of agreements entered into pursuant to that act.
However, failure to file such an agreement does not render the
contract void or unenforceable, when that agreement
substantially complies with all other requirements and has
been subsequently acted upon or partially performed by the
parties to the agreement.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT -T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Theresa Marcel Nuckolls
Assistant Attorney General
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