Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1987-069

1987-069Kanag

Gesamter Gesetzestext

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
April 10, 1987
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 87- 69
Curtis E. Watkins
Kingman County Attorney
105 Avenue A East
Kingman, Kansas 67068
Re: Labor--Fair Labor Standards Act--Definitions;
Employee
Synopsis: The terms "employer," "employee" and "employ" are
construed broadly under the Fair Labor Standards
Act. The United States Department of Labor's
determination that an individual is an employee of
both the City of Norwich and the Kingman County
Sheriff's Office is reasonable under the
circumstances and should be observed. Cited
herein: 29 U.S.C. §§203, 207, 213; 29 C.F.R.
§§553.9, 553.200, 791.2.
*
Dear Mr. Watkins:
As attorney for Kingman County, Kansas, you request our
opinion regarding the status of an individual who performs
part time duties for the sheriff's department. You question
whether this individual would be considered an employee of the
sheriff's department for purposes of overtime pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act. You explain that if this individual
is considered an employee, there would be five law enforcement
employees in the department and thus the department would not
be eligible for the Section 13(b)(20) exemption from the Fair
Labor Standards Act. 29 U.S.C. §213(b)(20); 29 C.F.R.
§553.200.
You give us the following facts: Kingman County pays the
City of Norwich $125.00 per month for services of the City
Marshall. The City Marshall is employed by the City of
Norwich, receiving a salary from the city. His health
insurance is paid by the City of Norwich and the city pays
into a pension fund for him. The City Marshall, while
performing duties for the sheriff's department, wears a
sheriff's office uniform, but drives a city-owned vehicle.
The City Marshall is not on the payroll of the county and no
withholding of social security or any other payments are made
from the check paid by the county to the city. The county
does, however pay the City Marshall for uniform upkeep.
In response to this set of facts, the Area Director for the
United States Department of Labor stated:
"I have examined the information provided
concerning the employment of [the City
Marshall] and how his employment effects
application of section 13(b)(2) to
employees of the Sheriff's Office. Based
on this information it is my opinion that
[he] is jointly employed by the city of
Norwich and the Kingman County
Sheriff's Office and must be included in
the employee count of the Sheriff's Office
for purposes of the section 13(b)(2)
overtime exemption. This means that in
the weeks when [he] is employed in law
enforcement activities for the County he
would be added to the four deputies
employed, which would make an employee
count of five, and prevent the application
of section 13(b)(20) to all five
employees."
Joint employment under the Fair Labor Standards Act is
discussed in 29 C.F.R. §791.2:
"(b) Where the employee performs work
which simultaneously benefits two or more
employers, or works for two or more
employers at different times during the
workweek, a joint employment relationship
generally will be considered to exist in
situations such as:
"(1) Where there is an arrangement between
the employers to share the employee's
services, as, for example, to interchange
employees; or
"(2) Where one employer is acting directly
or indirectly in the interest of the other
employer (or employers) in relation to the
employee; or. . . ." See also 29
C.F.R. §553.9.
At least one provision of 29 C.F.R. §553.9 has apparently been
revoked by §207(p)(1) of the 1985 Fair Labor Standards
Amendments, which allows a law enforcement officer to work a
special detail without creating a joint employment
relationship, even where a public agency requires the second
employer to hire its officers. 29 U.S.0 §207(p)(1) provides
as follows:
"If an individual who is employed by a
State, political subdivision of a State,
or an interstate governmental agency in
fire protection or law enforcement
activities (including activities of
security personnel in correctional
institutions) and who, solely at such
individual's option, agrees to be employed
on a special detail by a separate or
independent employer in fire protection,
law enforcement, or related activities,
the hours such individual was employed by
such separate and independent employer
shall be excluded by the public agency
employing such individual in the
calculation of the hours for which the
employee is entitled to overtime
compensation under this section if the
public agency--
"(A) requires that its employees engaged
in fire protection, law enforcement, or
security activities be hired by a separate
and independent employer to perform the
special detail,
"(B) facilitates the employment of such
employees by a separate and independent
employer, or
"(C) otherwise affects the condition of
employment of such employees by a separate
and independent employer."
Nevertheless, 29 U.S.C. §207(p) does not prevent the
possibility of dual employment, it merely protects each
employer from having to count the hours worked for the other
employer when calculating overtime. Indeed, this section, by
implication, fosters employment of law enforcement by two or
more separate employers, and indicates that cooperation
between the employers does not destroy the separateness of the
employers or preclude one from being an employer.
29 C.F.R. §553.200 provides as follows:
"(a) Section 13(b)(20) [29 U.S.C.
§213(b)(20)] of the FLSA provides a
complete overtime pay exemption for 'any
employee of a public agency who in any
workweek is employed in law enforcement
activities (including security personnel
in correction institutions), if the public
agency employs during the workweek less
than 5 employees in fire protection or law
enforcement activities, as the case may
be.'
"(b) In determining whether a public
agency qualifies for the section 13(b)(2)
exemption . . . [n]o distinction is made
between full-time and part-time employees,
or between employees on duty and employees
on leave status, and all such categories
must be counted in determining whether the
exemption applies. Individuals who are
not considered 'employees' for purposes of
the FLSA by virtue of section 3(e) of
the Act including persons who are
'volunteers' within the meaning of
§553.101, and 'elected officials and their
appointees' within the meaning of §553.11)
(sic) are not counted in determining
whether the section 13(b)(20) exemption
applies.
"(c) The section 13 (b) (20) exemption
applies on a workweek basis. It is
therefore possible that employees may be
subject to maximum hours standard in
certain workweeks, but not in others. In
those workweeks in which the section
13(b)(20) exemption does not apply, the
public agency is entitled to utilize the
section 7(k) exemption. . . ."
The definitions of "employer," "employee" and "employ" found
in 29 U.S.C. §302(d),(e) and (g) of the Act are of little help
in determining whether the individual in question is an
employee of the county.
"The FLSA defines 'employee' as 'any
individual employed by an employer'. 29
U.S.C. §203(e)(1). The term 'employ' is
defined as 'to suffer or permit to work'.
29 U.S.C. 203(g). This Court has
previously addressed these broad
definitions as requiring a judicial
interpretation of the boundaries of the
Act's applicability: In Dunlop v.
Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139, 143-45
(6th Cir. 1977):
"'The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 was
enacted by Congress to be a broadly
remedial and humanitarian statute. The
Act was designed to correct "labor
conditions detrimental to the maintenance
of the minimum standard of living
necessary for health, efficiency, and
general well-being of workers. . . ." In
interpreting [the FLSA] the courts have
construed the Act's definitions liberally
to effectuate the broad policies and
intentions of Congress. . . . "The terms
'independent contractor', 'employee', and
'employer' are not to be construed in
their common law senses when used in
federal social welfare legislation. . . .
Rather, their meaning is to be determined
in light of the purposes of the
legislation in which they were used."'
"The issue of the employment relationship
does not lend itself to a precise test,
but is to be determined on a
case-by-case basis upon the
circumstances of the whole business
activity. Rutherford Food Corp. v.
McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 67 S.Ct. 1473, 91
L.Ed. 1772 (1947)." Donovan v.
Brandel, 736 F.2d 1114, 1115 (6th
Cir. 1984).
The courts, in determining whether an individual is an
employee or an independent contractor under the Act, have
often used the test of economic dependence. See, e.g.,
Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co.., 548 F.2d 139, 145 (6th
Cir. 1977); Weisel v. Singapore Joint Venture, Inc., 602
F.2d 1185, 1189 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Silk,
331 U.S. 704, 67 S.Ct. 1463, 91 L.Ed. 1757 (1947) (for
purposes of employment taxes on employers under the Social
Security Act). Other courts have recognized that economic
dependence is merely one of several factors to consider when
looking at the relationship as a whole. See, e.g.,
Dunlop v. Dr. Pepper-Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 529 F.2d
198, 301 (6th Cir. 1976).
Control over the work is another factor to consider. Public
Building Authority of Birmingham v. Goldberg, 298 F.2d 367,
369 (5th Cir. 1962); Powell v. United States Cartridge
Co., 339 U.S. 497, 70 S.Ct. 755, 94 L.Ed. 1017 (1950). In
Bowman v. Pace, 119 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1941), the court
used a control test in determining that a night watchman was
the employee of the company who hired and paid him rather than
the company for which he performed services. In so finding,
the court relied on the following facts:
"Forsyth, being in that line of
business, on his own account contracted
with the Pace Company for a monthly
consideration to maintain said factory
watchman service at these premises, and
on his own account hired Bowman at a
weekly wage to watch there, putting him
under the direction to some extent of the
Pace Company to insure that the service
should be satisfactory. The hiring,
transferring, or discharging of Bowman was
Forsyth's affair. Bowman could and did
look to Forsyth alone for his pay. If
the employment as watchman comes under the
Act, Forsyth owes him the minimum wage,
for he is Bowman's employer. Instead of
using only one man to furnish the service
contracted for, Forsyth could have hired
other men to work in eight-hour shifts,
or done the work himself. It would be
most unjust to enforce the overtime rates,
which make up a large part of Bowman's
claim, against the Pace Company, who had
no control over this matter." 119 F.2d at
860, 861. See also Dugas v.
Nashua Mfg. Co., 62 F.Supp. 846, 851
(D.N.H. 1945). (Emphasis added.)
In Schroepfer v. A. S. Abell Co., D.C., 48 F.Supp. 88,
94 (D.Md. 1942), the court narrowed the factors to these:
"The statutory definitions of 'employer,'
'employee' and 'employ' are in very
general terms, and should be understood in
'their natural sense, and intended to
describe the conventional relations of
employer and employee'. . . . The Act
thus contemplates (a) a situation in which
the employer, expressly or impliedly,
agrees to pay a certain sum of money to
the employe [sic], and (b), has the
control and determination of the hours of
work by the employe [sic]. . . ."
(Emphasis added.)
Finally, the court in Hodgson v. Ellis Transportation
Co., 456 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1972) concluded that an
individual can be an employee for purposes of the Fair Labor
Standards Act even though he pays his own insurance, taxes and
social security, and does not receive medical coverage,
vacation benefits or paid holidays, and keeps his own time
statements and submits weekly invoices to the company. The
court held that the individual was not in business for
himself, but was an integral part of the employer's everyday
operation, thus making him an employee rather than an
independent contractor for purposes of the Fair Standards Act.
Based upon the above and the facts you have provided, it is
our opinion that the Department of Labor is justified in
regarding the City Marshall as an employee of the sheriff's
department when performing duties for that department. The
Department appears to have based its conclusion on the
following: The sheriff directs the day to day activities
performed for that office, provides the Marshall with a
sheriff's office uniform and pays for uniform maintenance.
Because of the control necessary to operate a public law
enforcement agency, and the fact that the City of Norwich is
not primarily in the business of hiring out law enforcement
officials, the Department has concluded that this cannot be
treated as an independent contractor situation for purposes of
the Fair Labor Standards Act. In that the United States
Department of Labor has enforcement powers under the Act, it
is our opinion that their decision should be observed. Thus,
the individual in question should be considered an employee of
the county sheriff's department as well as an employee of the
city.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Julene L. Miller
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JLM:jm

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