Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1986-148

1986-148Kanag

Gesamter Gesetzestext

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL October 10, 1986
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 86- 148
Keith D. Hoffman
Dickinson County Attorney
325 Broadway
Abilene, Kansas 67410
Re: Automobiles and Other Vehicles--Driving Under the
_Influence of Alcohol or Drugs; Related
Provisions--Search Warrants; Use in Municipal Courts
Synopsis: A search warrant maybe issued by a district
magistrate judge upon the sworn oral or written
statement of a city attorney. Municipal law
enforcement officers may execute such warrant, and
property seized pursuant to the warrant may be
admissible as evidence in a municipal court.
However, K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 8-1001(f) precludes
the use of a search warrant to obtain a blood
sample from a person who has refused to submit to a
blood, breath or urine test pursuant to that
statute. An ordinance authorizing such procedure
would be in conflict with the state statute
proCited hereinther testing after an informed
refusal. Citedtherein: K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 8-1001,
as amended by L. 1986, ch. 40, §2; K.S.A. 1985
Supp. 8-1005, as amended by L. 1986, ch. 41, §1;
K.S.A. 198522-2202, as67(m); K.S.A. 12-4504;
K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 22-2202, - as amended by L. 1986,
ch. 133, §1; K.S.A. 22-2502; 22-2503; 22-2507; L.
1986, ch. 40, S1.
Dear Mr. Hoffman:
As attorney for Dickinson county, you have requested our
opinion concerning the prosecution of driving under the
influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI) in municipal court.
Specifically, you inquire whether a city attorney may apply to
the district magistrate judge to obtain a search warrant for
use in a municipal court. Your question stems from a concern
that a warrant may be necessary when a person who is charged
with a DUI offense refuses to submit to a breath test,
rendering a blood sample necessary for evidence of
intoxication. It is our opinion that while a district
magistrate judge may issue a search warrant upon application
by a city attorney, such a warrant may not issue solely for
the purpose of obtaining a blood sample when a person refuses
to submit to a breath, blood or urine test pursuant to K.S.A.
1985 Supp. 8-1001, as amended by L. 1986, ch. 40, §2.
A search warrant may be obtained on the testimony of the city
attorney, may be executed by a city law enforcement officer,
and the fruits of the search pursuant to the warrant may be
admitted as evidence in a municipal court. The Kansas code
for criminal procedure places no limitation upon whose
testimony a search warrant may issue. K.S.A. 22-2502(a)
provides in relevant part:
"A search warrant shall be issued only
upon the oral or written statement of any
person under oath or affirmation. . . ."
(Emphasis added.)
We believe that this section limits the type of information
upon which a warrant may issue, not the source of the
information. A city attorney is included as "any person."
-U
K.S.A. 22-2502 further provides that a search warrant is to be
issued by a magistrate, which is defined in K.S.A. 1985 Supp.
22-2202(14), as amended, as an officer: having the power to
issue warrants, including supreme court justices, court of
appeals judges, and district court judges. The territorial
limitations of search warrants are supplied in K.S.A. 22-2503,
which states:
"[s]earch warrants issued by a district
magistrate judge may be executed only
within the judicial district in which said
judge resides or within the judicial
district to which said judge has been
assigned. . . ."
A search warrant is a command to the person to search the
place and seize the thing described therein. K.S.A. 22-2507.
The command may be directed to any specifically named law
enforcement officer, defined in K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 22-2202(13),
as amended, to include a person vested with authority to make
arrests for violations of municipal ordinances. We believe
that this is sufficient authority to charge a city law
enforcement officer with the duty to execute a search
warrant. We also believe that property seized in the
execution of the search warrant is admissible in a municipal
court, subject to restrictions which would render the same
evidence inadmissible in a district court. K.S.A. 12-4504.
Pursuant to K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 8-1001, as amended by L. 1986,
ch. 40, S2, any person who exercises the privilege of
operating a motor vehicle on the highways of the State of
Kansas is deemed to have given consent to a test of that
person's breath, blood, or urine, subject to the provisions of
that act. Actual refusal of such a test may result in the
suspension of the person's driver's license, and evidence of
the refusal may be used against the person at any trial
wherein the person is accused of driving under the influence
of alcohol or drugs. K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 8-1001(f), as
amended.
The act outlines a specific procedure for law enforcement
officers when a driver suspected of intoxication refuses to
submit to a breath, blood or urine test. The law enforcement
officer must give oral or written notice that:
"(A) There is no right to consult with an
attorney regarding whether to submit to
testing; 4
"(B) Refusal to submit to and complete any
test of breath, blood or urine hereafter
requested by a law enforcement officer
will result in six months' suspension of
the person's driver's license;
"(C) refusal to submit to testing may be
used against the person at any trial on a
charge arising out of the operation or
attempted operation of a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol or
drugs, or both;
"(D) the results of the testing may be
used against the person at any trial on a
charge arising out of the operation or
attempted operation of a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol or
drugs, or both; and
"(E) after the completion of the testing,
the person has the right to consult with
an attorney and may secure additional
testing, which, if desired, should be done
as soon as possible and is customarily
available from medical care facilities and
physicians. . . . If the person refuses
to submit to and complete a test as
requested pursuant to this section,
additional testing shall not be given
and the persons' driver's license shall be
subject to suspension. . . ." K.S.A.
8-1001(f)(1), as amended by L. 1986, ch.
40, §2. (Emphasis added.)
The legislature has, by statute, precluded the option of
obtaining a search warrant for a blood sample when a person
refuses to submit to and complete a breath, blood or urine
test as requested pursuant to this act. The dispositive legal
question becomes, therefore, whether the procedure outlined
above is uniformly applicable. In our opinion, it is.
While a city may, under the authority of K.S.A. 1985 Supp.
8-1567(m), enact an ordinance prohibiting driving under the
influence of alcohol or drugs, the legislature has indicated
an intent to preempt any municipal procedural ordinance
concerning the introduction of evidence of blood alcohol
concentration. The relevant provisions concerning such
preemption are located in K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 8-1005, as
amended by L. 1986, ch. 41, 51, with reference to L. 1986,
ch. 40 §1. When read together, the statutes provide that,
in any prosecution for a violation of a city ordinance
concerning driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs,
evidence of blood alcohol concentration may be admitted to
show evidence of alcohol influence, prima facie alcohol
influence, or drug influence. K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 8-1005(a),
as amended by L. 1986, ch. 41, §1. However, such admission
of evidence is subject to section 1 of 1986 House Bill No.
2752, published as L. 1986, ch. 40, §1. Section 1 of
chapter 40 provides that, if a law enforcement officer
believes, based on reasonable grounds, that a person has
alcohol in his possession, has committed a traffic infraction,
or has been involved in an accident, such law enforcement
officer may request a person to submit to a preliminary
screening test. The results of such preliminary screening
tests are not admissible to show actual driving under the
influence of alcohol or drugs, but may be used to establish
the validity of a request to submit to further testing
pursuant to K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 8-1001, as amended.
Further indicia of a legislative intent to preempt the field
of blood-alcohol-concentration-testing procedures appears in
K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 8-1001, as amended by L. 1986, ch. 40,
§2. Subsection (a) of the statute provides, in relevant part:
"Any person who operates or attempts to
operate a motor vehicle within this
state is deemed to have given consent,
subject to the provisions of this act,
to submit to one or more tests of the
person's blood, breath, urine or other
bodily substance to determine the presence
of alcohol or drugs." (Emphasis added.)
Subsection (b) is a substantial departure from K.S.A. 1982
Supp. 8-1001. The 1982 version required that for the act to
apply, the alleged offender be under arrest or otherwise in
custody. Thus, it was noted in State v. Prichard, 10
Kan.App.2d 293 (1985), that the provisions of K.S.A.
8-1001 could not be invoked if the suspect had not been
arrested and requested to submit to a blood or breath test.
Under the 1985 and 1986 amendments, arrest or involvement in a
motor vehicle accident is a prerequisite to the statute's
application. Subsection (b) of K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 8-1001, as
amended by L. 1986, ch. 40k §2, now states in relevant part:
"A law enforcement officer shall- request
a person to submit to a test or tests
deemed consented to under subsection (a)
if the officer has reasonable grounds to
believe the person was operating or
attempting to operate a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol or
drugs, or both, and one of the following
conditions exits: (1) the person has been
arrested or otherwise taken into custody
for any offense involving operation or
attempted operation of a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol or
drugs, or both, in violation of a state
statute or a city ordinance; or (2) the
person has been involved in a motor
vehicle accident or collision resulting in
property damage, personal injury or death.
• • • " (Emphasis added.)
This mandatory language is a departure from the previous
statute, which stated that consent to testing was deemed to
have been given, and a law enforcement may request a
chemical test of blood. The 1986 amendment specifies in part
that, if a person has been arrested or is otherwise in custody
for violation of a DUI offense in violation of a state
statute or city ordinance, or is involved in an accident, the
officer shall request submission to a test or tests.
In short, the legislature acknowledges that a city may enact
ordinances relevant to driving under the influence of drugs or
alcohol, but any person operating a motor vehicle in that
condition will be deemed to have given consent to a blood,
breath or urine test, subject to the provisions of the act.
The uniform language in subsection (a), and the mandatory
language of subsection (b) lead us to believe that a city may
not depart from the procedural aspects of K.S.A. 1985 Supp.
8-1001,as amended. This includes the prohibition of further
testing after a person has given an informed refusal to submit
to a breath, blood or urine test.
We need not, conclude at this juncture, that a city may not
enact its own ordinance involving consent. However, any such
ordinance would be invalid if in conflict with the provisions
of K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 8-1001, as amended. In City of
Junction City v. Lee, 216 Kan. 495 (1975), it was noted
that a test to determine whether conflict exists is whether
the ordinance permits that which the statute forbids. Id.
at 501. A city ordinance which would allow a taking of blood
pursuant to a search warrant after a person refuses to submit
to a blood, breath or urine test would be in conflict with
K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 8-1001, as amended.
In conclusion, it is our opinion that a search warrant may be
issued upon the sworn statement of a city attorney. Municipal
law enforcement officers may execute the warrant, and evidence
seized pursuant to the warrant may be admitted as evidence in
a municipal court. However, the use of a search warrant does -
not extend to obtaining a blood sample from a person who has
refused to submit to a blood, breath or urine test. An
ordinance authorizing such procedure would be in conflict with
state statute.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Julene L. Miller
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JLM:jm

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.