Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1985-114

1985-114Kanag

Gesamter Gesetzestext

September 5, 1985
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 85- 114
Kenneth P. Hackler
Legal Counsel
Washburn University of Topeka
Topeka, Kansas 66621
Re: Cities; First Class -- Municipal Universities --
Buildings; Construction of Chapel
Synopsis: The construction by Washburn University of a
multi-purpose building which would include a
non-denominational, non-sectarian chapel funded
by both public and private funds, and the
subsequent maintenance of such a building with
public funds, would not violate the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. Cited herein: 10
U.S.C. §4354(b), 93547 U.S. Const., First Amend.
*
Dear Mr. Hackler:
On behalf of Washburn University's Board of Regents, you
seek our opinion on the legality of the university's proposed
construction and maintenance of a chapel on its grounds.
You advise that the funds to be used for construction of the
chapel consist of both public funds and private funds. The
public moneys in Washburn University's building construction
fund include funds originally generated by the Shawnee County
mill levy. The private funds would be contributed by a
private corporation, Washburn College, which would also have
input on the design and construction of the chapel. The
multi-purpose building, to be named the Bradbury Thompson
Chapel, would include classrooms, a performance and recital
hall, and a chapel.
Our review of Kansas statutes has disclosed no statutory
barrier to the proposed construction of a chapel.
Accordingly, the primary issue raised by the facts you have
related to us is whether the construction and maintenance of
such a chapel would violate the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion.") In considering whether the
erection or maintenance of religious structures on public
property violates the First Amendment, courts have applied
principles applicable in freedom of religion cases generally
and standards developed in cases construing the Establishment
Clause. 16A Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law §482, p. 298
(1979).
In determining whether a particular state action is an
improper "law respecting an establishment of religion," the
United States Supreme Court has applied a three-part test:
"First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion, Board of
Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243
(1968); finally, the statute must not
foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion. Walz [v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674
(1970)]." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 612-613, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d
745, (1971).
The United States Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that
state action alleged to violate the Establishment Clause
should be measured against the Lemon criteria. See e.g.
Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, U.S. , 105
S.Ct. 3216, L.Ed.2d (1985); Gilfillan v. City of
Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924 (C.A. Pa. 1980), cert. den.,
451 U.S. 987 (City's expenditure of $204,569.00 in connection
with Pope John Paul's two day visit to the city violated each
prong of the Establishment Clause test).
Our research has disclosed several reported cases which have
examined and upheld the legality of constructing a
non-sectarian, non-denominational chapel on public
property. See e.g., State v. Williamson, 347 P.2d 204
(Okla. 1959) (construction of memorial chapel on grounds of
state-owned orphan's home constitutional where funded by a
private funds and used for assembly purposes including
non-sectarian, non-denominational religious worship);
Fenske v. Coddington, 57 So.2d 452 (1952) (construction
of chapel at state industrial school legal); Reichwald v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 101 N.E. 266 (Ill. 1913)
(construction of chapel on county poor farm constitutional.)
However, the analysis used in those cases is of little help to
the instant question in that all pre-date the Lemon case
and therefore do not apply the three-part test currently
used. Further, all three involved the use of strictly private
funds.
Numerous post-Lemon cases may be found in which state
actions impacting on elementary and secondary schools have
been challenged under the Establishment Clause. See e.g.
Wallace v. Jaffree, U.S. , 105 S.Ct. 2479, 86
L.Ed.2d 29 (1985) (Alabama statute authorizing "meditation or
voluntary prayer" unconstitutional); Aguilar v. Felton,
U.S. 105 S.Ct. 3232, L.Ed.2d (1985) (Title I
program administered by New York City in parochial schools
required excessive government entanglement in religion and
violated Establishment Clause); School District of Grand
Rapids v. Ball, supra, ("Shared Time" and "Community
Education" programs have the primary or principal effect of
advancing religion and therefore violate Establishment
Clause); Committee for Public Education v. Nyguist, 413
U.S. 756, 93 S.Ct. 2955, 37 L.Ed.2d 948 (1973) (certain types
of state aid to sectarian schools, students, and students'
parents had primary effect of advancing religion and violated
Establishment Clause). Although these and numerous other
cases are helpful in demonstrating applications of the Lemon
criteria, their usefulness is diminished by factual
distinctions and contextual differences' (i.e. no examination
of religious structure in college and university context).
In applying the Lemon criteria to the fact situation you
pose, we first examine whether the construction of the chapel
would have a primary secular purpose. The United States
Supreme Court has recognized that a government action may have
both a religious and secular purpose. See e.g. 637 F.2d
at 929. If the primary purpose of the government's action is
secular and the religious purpose merely incidental, the
government's action will be upheld under this element of the
three-part test. For example, statutory grant programs
directed toward providing students with a greater opportunity
for a college education have no difficulty satisfying the
constitutional criteria of secular legislative purpose, even
if students receiving such grants attend religious
institutions. See e.q. Americans United for Separation
of Church and State v. Bubb, 379 F.Supp. 872, 888 (D. Kan.
1974) and cases cited therein.
Here, if the primary intent of the university in constructing
the multi-purpose building in question is to provide
additional space for classrooms and student activities of a
non-religious nature, to serve as a memorial to Bradbury
Thompson, and to provide a more intimate setting for such
ceremonies as initiations or weddings, and not to advance the
cause of religion, the primary purpose would likely be viewed
as secular.
The second prong of the Establishment Clause analysis requires
a determination whether the principal or primary effect of the
government action advances religion. An indirect and
incidental effect beneficial to religion has never been
thought a sufficient defect to warrant the invalidation of
state action. See Committee for Public Education v.
Nyquist, supra. The United States Supreme Court has long
recognized that university students are young adults, are less
impressionable than younger students, and should be able to
appreciate that the government's policy is one of neutrality
toward religion. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,
686, 91 S.Ct. 2091, 29 L.Ed.2d 790 (1970). Students at the
college level are more critical than students at elementary or
secondary schools and are therefore less susceptible to
religious indoctrination. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State v. Bubb, 379 F.Supp. 872, 891 (D. Kan.
1974).
Because of the inherent differences between the college level
and the elementary and secondary level 'Of education, courts
have found state aid to church-related colleges valid even
though similar aid to parochial schools may violate the
Establishment Clause. See e.q. 379 F.Supp. at 891; (Kansas
statute providing tuition grants to qualified students
enrolled at private colleges and universities within state was
not necessarily violative of First Amendment even though all
eligible colleges were church related); Tilton v.
Richardson, supra (one-time federal grant to
church-related colleges which required no on going
supervision was not violative of First Amendment); Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 93 S.Ct. 2868, 37 L.Ed.2d 923 (1973)
(state construction grant to be used for secular education
purposes at higher educational institutions including a
church-controlled college was not violative of First
Amendment); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426
U.S. 736, 96 S.Ct. 2337, 49 L.Ed.2d 179 (1976) (state aid to
religious colleges to be used for "any non-sectarian
purpose" was not violative of First Amendment); Americans
United for Separation of Church and State v. State, 648 P.2d
1072 (Colo. 1982) (Colorado statute providing grants to
qualified students at private religious institutions of higher
education was not violative of First Amendment).
Considering the adult status of Washburn students and the
inclusion of the proposed chapel in a multi-purpose
building, we view it unlikely that the direct or primary
effect of the construction would advance or promote religion.
The final criterion is whether the construction or maintenance
of the chapel would foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion. It is well established that
allowing religious worship and religious discussions on public
property does not of itself demonstrate excessive government
entanglement with religion. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981) (state
university's policy of equal access to campus facilities for
all organizations including those of a religious nature does
not violate Establishment Clause); O'Hair v. Andrews, 613
F.2d 931, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Here, where the chapel would
be located in a pervasively secular environment, and where the
university could by policy ensure the absence of
denominational or sectarian teaching therein, the traditional
entanglement issue does not arise.
While it is always difficult to predict what a court will say
on a matter which is not before it, especially when First
Amendment questions are involved, we believe that the proposed
construction and maintenance of a chapel on Washburn
University's property would withstand a constitutional
challenge.
We also take note that the maintenance of a chapel on the
grounds of federal institutions of higher education is a
common practice. See 10 U.S.C. §4354(b) (authorizing the
erection of a building for religious worship at the West Point
Military Reservation); 10 U.S.C. 59354 (authorizing the
erection of a building for religious worship at the U.S. Air
Force Academy); O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931, 937
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (U.S. Naval Academy can provide a chapel for
voluntary worship regardless of the accessibility of nearby
city churches). Similarly, several of the state universities
in Kansas maintain chapels on their property with public
funds. No constitutional challenge to the maintenance of such
chapels has been made, or in our judgment, would be successful
if made.
In our opinion, Washburn University's construction of a
multi-purpose building which would include a
non-denominational, non-sectarian chapel financed by both
public and private funds, and the subsequent maintenance of
such a building with public funds, would not violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Kathryn Gardner
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JSS:KG:crw

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