Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1985-083

1985-083Kanag

Gesamter Gesetzestext

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL July 12, 1985
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 85- 83
The Honorable Joe Knopp
State Representative, 67th District
410 Humboldt
Manhattan, Kansas 66502
Re: Schools -- Miscellaneous Provisions -- Statute
Authorizing Period of Silence in Public School
Classrooms; Constitutionality
Synopsis: K.S.A. 72-5308a authorizes the teacher in charge of
each public school classroom to observe, at his or her
option, a brief period of silence at the opening of
each school day. Such a period of silence is not to
be conducted as a religious exercise, but is to be
used for silent prayer or silent reflection on
the activities of the day. In that both the statute
itself and the legislative history of this and
subsequent bills indicates a legislative purpose which
is not exclusively religious, the statute is not
invalid under the holding of the United States Supreme
Court in Wallace v. Jaffree, -- U.S. --, 105 S.Ct.
2479 (1985). Cited herein: K.S.A. 72-5308a; U.S.
Const., First Amend.
Dear Representative Knopp:
As Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, you request our
opinion concerning the effect of a recent decision of the United
States Supreme Court on a Kansas statute which permits a period
of silence at the outset of each day in the state's public
schools. Specifically, you inquire whether the decision in
Wallace v. Jaffree, -- U.S. --, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (1985),
which invalidated an Alabama statute authorizing "meditation or
voluntary prayer," also invalidates K.S.A. 72-5308a. After
examining the language of the statute and the Court's reasoning,
it is our opinion that the Kansas statute remains valid.
Enacted by the Kansas Legislature in 1969 and unamended to the
present, K.S.A. 72-5308a states as follows:
"In each public school classroom the teacher
in charge may observe a brief period of
silence with the participation of all the
pupils therein assembled at the opening of
every school day. This period shall not be
conducted as a religious exercise but shall be
an opportunity for silent prayer or for silent
reflection on the anticipated activities of
the day." (Emphasis added.)
No legislative history exists for the statute, which was
contained in an omnibus act and which was added during floor
debate in the House of Representatives (1969 House Journal 434),
nor does the statute appear to have replaced any prior
legislation on this subject. While efforts have been made
during three subsequent sessions of the legislature to amend the
statute to make its provisions mandatory and to strengthen the
emphasis on prayer, none have been adopted. (1979 Senate Bill
No. 96, 1980 House Bill No. 3162, 1981 House Bill No. 2258).
The most recent of these efforts would have replaced K.S.A.
72-5308a with the following language:
"At the commencement of the first class of
each day in all grades in all public schools
the teacher in charge of the room in which
each class is held shall announce that a
period not to exceed one minute in duration
shall be observed for meditation or prayer
and, during such period, silence shall be
maintained and no activities shall be engaged
in by the teacher or pupils in the class."
(Emphasis added.)
Such legislative history is important in light of the way in
which the Supreme Court examined the Alabama statute at issue in
Wallace v. Jaffree, supra. There, the Alabama Legislature had
initially (in 1978) enacted a statute which provided for the
observing of a one-minute period of silence "for meditation,"
during which time no activities could be engaged in. Although
the statute was mandatory in its effect ["the teacher in charge
. . . shall announce"], it was found to be valid by the lower
federal court in the Jaffree case, a finding which was not
contested upon appeal. The same can not be said of the two
subsequent efforts of the Alabama Legislature, enacted in 1981
and 1982 respectively. Optional in their provisions, they
permitted "meditation or voluntary prayer" in the case of the
1981 law and a prescribed prayer to "Almighty God . . . the
Creator and Supreme Judge of the world" in the 1982 act. After
the federal appellate court found the 1982 act unconstitutional
[Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1567, 1535-1536 (11th Cir.
1983)], the only question left for the Supreme Court concerned
the validity of the 1981 statute.
While similar on its face to K.S.A. 72-5308a, the 1981 Alabama
statute [Alabama Code §16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984)] has a very
different legislative history. The facts surrounding the
statute's passage were found by the Court's majority opinion to
be of great weight in determining whether the statute had a
valid secular purpose. Such a determination is part of a
three-pronged test which the Court has used in the past in
determining the scope of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution ["Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion"]. As the Court
noted in Jaffree:
"When the Court has been called upon to
construe the breadth of the Establishment
Clause, it has examined the criteria developed
over a period of many years. Thus, in Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971),
we wrote:
"'Every analysis in this area must begin with
consideration of the cumulative criteria
developed by the Court over many years. Three
such tests may be gleaned from our cases.
First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; ;second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion, Board of
Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243
(1968); finally, the statute must not foster
"an excessive government entanglement with
religion." Walz [v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S.
664 (1970)].'
"It is the first of these three criteria that
is most plainly implicated by this case. As
the District Court correctly recognized, no
consideration of the second or third criteria
is necessary if a statute does not have a
clearly secular purpose. For even though a
statute that is motivated in part by a
religious purpose may satisfy the first
criterion, see, e.g., Abington School Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296-303 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring), the First Amendment
requires that a statute must be invalidated if
it is entirely motivated by a purpose to
advance religion." 105 S.Ct. at 2489-90
(Emphasis added.)
In examining the background of the Alabama statute, the court in
particular noted that the bill's sponsor had clearly stated, both
at the time of consideration and later during the district court
action, that the bill was an effort to return voluntary prayer to
the schools, and that no secular purpose existed. The State of
Alabama was unable to provide any such purpose, and the Court
concluded that either the legislature intended to make a change
from the existing law which by adding voluntary prayer, or the
1981 statute was a meaningless exercise. Not surprisingly, the
Court rejected the latter explanation, and found that the statute
had only a religious purpose. As such, it characterized prayer
as a favored practice and thus represented an endorsement by the
State of Alabama of religion, and so was in violation of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 105 S.Ct. at
2492-93.
As noted earlier, the legislative history of the Kansas statute
is diametrically opposed to that of the Alabama measure at issue
in Jaffree. No statement of legislative intent to place prayer
in schools exists, and the subsequent action of the legislature
in rejecting efforts to this effect shows that K.S.A. 72-5308a
was not intended to represent a legislative statement endorsing
prayer as a favored practice. The language of the statute itself
states that the period of silence is not to be conducted as a
religious exercise, and arguably has the secular purpose of
calming school children and preparing them to concentrate on
their studies. While such a period also facilitates voluntary,
silent prayer, a statute can be found valid even if it has a
mixture of secular and religious purposes, as the Court in
Jaffree notes. 105 S.Ct. at 2490.
While it is always difficult, if not impossible, to predict what
a court will say on a matter which is not before it, especially
when First Amendment questions are involved, we believe that both
the opinion of the majority of the Supreme Court in Jaffree and the
concurring opinion of Justice O'Conner contain language which
would allow the Kansas statute to withstand a constitutional
challenge. Justice Stevens, in writing for the majority, states
that "[t]he legislative intent to return prayer to the public
school is, of course, quite different from merely protecting
every student's rights to engage in voluntary prayer during an
appropriate moment of silence during the school day." 105 S.Ct.
at 2491. Justice O'Conner, while joining in the majority opinion,
states in her concurring opinion that:
"By mandating a moment of silence, a State
does not necessarily endorse any activity that
might occur during the period. Cf. Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 272, n. 11 (1981)
('by creating a forum the [State] does not
thereby endorse or promote any of the
particular ideas aired there'). Even if a
statute specifies that a student may choose to
pray silently during a quiet moment, the State
has not thereby encouraged prayer over other
specified alternatives. Nonetheless, it is
also possible that a moment of silence
statute, either as drafted or as actually
implemented, could effectively favor the child
who prays over the child who does not. For
example, the message of endorsement would seem
inescapable if the teacher exhorts children to
use the designated time to pray. Similarly,
the face of the statute or its legislative
history may clearly establish that it seeks to
encourage or promote voluntary prayer over
other alternatives, rather than merely provide
a quiet moment that may be dedicated to prayer
by those so inclined. The crucial question is
whether the State has conveyed or attempted to
convey the message that children should use
the moment of silence: for prayer. This
question cannot be answered in the abstract,
but instead requires courts to examine the
history, language, and administration of a
particular statute to determine whether it
operates as an endorsement of religion."
(Citation omitted.) 105 S.Ct. at 2499.
In conclusion, K.S.A. 72-5308a authorizes the teacher in charge
of each public school classroom to observe, at his or her option,
a brief period of silence at the opening of each school day.
Such a period of silence is not to be conducted as a religious
exercise, but is to be used for silent prayer or silent
reflection on the activities of the day. In that both the
statute itself and the legislative history of this and subsequent
bills indicate a legislative purpose which is not exclusively
religious, the statute is not invalid under the holding of the
United States Supreme Court in Wallace v. Jaffree, -- U.S. --,
105 S.Ct. 2479 (1985).
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
JeffreyS.
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JSS:crw

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