Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1985-039

1985-039Kanag

Gesamter Gesetzestext

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL April 25, 1985
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 85- 39
Daniel A. Young
Douglas County Counselor
7 West 11th Street
Lawrence, Kansas 66044
Re: Counties and County Officers -- Planning and Zoning --
Regulations Inapplicable to Agricultural Purposes;
Home Rule Authority
Synopsis: The enactment of L. 1984, ch. 96, pertaining to zoning
and planning in urban counties does not render
non-uniform the statutes pertaining to zoning in all
other Kansas counties. Counties may not exempt from
or enact substitute provisions for state statutes
which are uniformly applicable to all counties. In
that K.S.A. 19-2921 is part of an enactment which is
uniformly applicable to all counties, it is not
subject to county home rule authority pursuant to
K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 19-101a. Cited herein: K.S.A.
1984 Supp. 19-101a; K.S.A. 19-2654; 19-2908;
19-2916b; K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 19-2920; K.S.A.
19-2921; K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 19-2960; Kan. Const.,
Art. 2, §17; Art. 12, §5.
*
Dear Mr. Young:
As Douglas County Counselor, and on behalf of the Douglas County
Commissioners, you have requested an opinion on the question of
whether Douglas County may use county home rule authority to
exempt itself from and enact substitute provisions for K.S.A.
19-2921.
K.S.A. 19-2921 is one of the statutes pertaining to county
planning and zoning and provides in relevant part:
"Regulations adopted under authority of this
act shall not apply to the existing use of any
buildings or land . . . Provided, That no
determination nor rule nor regulation shall be
held to apply to the use of land for
agricultural purposes, nor for the erection or
maintenance of buildings thereon for such
purposes so long as such land and buildings
erected thereon are used for agricultural
purposes and not otherwise." (Emphasis added.)
The only recent Kansas case construing this statute has given it
a rather strict interpretation. In Blauvelt v. Board of
Leavenworth County Comm'rs, 227 Kan. 110 (1980), the court
considered an argument that a house, situated on farm property,
in which a farmer resided served only a residential and not an
agricultural purpose. In rejecting this contention, the court
said:
"The pertinent provisions of the statute have
been in effect since 1939. (L. 1939, ch.
164, S8). The obvious purpose of the proviso
in K.S.A. 19-2921 was to favor agricultural
uses and farmers. Since this state's economy
is based largely on the family farm it would
appear the intent of the legislature was to
spare the farmer from more governmental
regulation and not to discourage the
development of this state's farm industry. It
would be ludicrous to say that the legislature
intended to exempt a farmer conducting a hog
feeding operation from county zoning
regulations but at the same time require the
same farmer to build his house upon a
subdivided lot fronting on a public road."
Id. at 113
The court concluded that in a situation where land in questin was
clearly used for agricultural purposes the home of the farmer
was within the scope of "agricultural purposes" as set forth in
K.S.A. 19-2921.
Thus, it is clear that the legislature intends K.S.A. 19-2921 to
protect property used for agricultural purposes from any county
planning or zoning regulations and restrictions. [See also
K.S.A. 19-2908, which places the same limitations on township
zoning.]
In 1984 the Kansas legislature enacted K.S.A. 1984 Supp.
19-2956 through 19-2966. This act pertains to planning and
zoning in counties designated as urban areas pursuant to K.S.A.
19-2654. The later statute provides that the only county in the
state which is designated an urban area is Johnson County.
Pursuant to the Kansas Constitution, Article 2, Section 17, the
legislature may designate certain counties or areas in counties
as urban in character and enact special laws regarding such areas
or counties.
K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 19-2960 is an example of a special law
regarding urban counties. In subsection (c), the statute
provides that zoning regulations in urban counties shall not be
held to apply to the use of land for agricultural purposes, nor
to the erection or maintenance of buildings thereon for
agricultural purposes. The subsection further provides:
"No zoning regulations shall apply to the use
of land for agricultural purposes nor for the
erection or maintenance of agricultural
buildings as long as such agricultural
buildings are used for agricultural purposes
and no other. Dwellings, garages and other
similar accessory buildings shall not be
considered as agricultural buildings. All
buildings, including agricultural buildings,
may be regulated as to setback requirements
from public roads so as to protect the future
use and improvement of such roads."
(Emphasis added.)
This statute thus cancels the effect of the Blauvelt v. Board of
Lyon County Comm'rs decision in Johnson County. Moreover, the
statute permits regulation of all agricultural buildings as to
setback requirements from public roads.
You ask whether this statute renders the zoning statutes
non-uniform in application to Douglas County and thereby subject
to county home rule authority. In our opinion, it does not have
that effect. A county's home rule authority is purely statutory.
K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 19-101a provides in relevant part:
"(a) The board of county commissioners may
transact all county business and perform all
powers of local legislation and administration
it deems appropriate, subject only to the
following limitations, restrictions or
prohibitions: (1) Counties shall be subject
to all acts of the legislature which apply
uniformly to all counties."
Although home rule powers granted to counties are to be
liberally construed "for the purpose of giving to the counties
the largest measure of self-government" (K.S.A. 19-101c),
counties are clearly prohibited from passing any local
legislation contrary to or in conflict with any act of the state
legislature which is of uniform application throughout the state.
The statutes which authorize county-wide zoning, of which K.S.A.
19-2921 is a part, appear to be uniformly applicable to all
counties in Kansas. Those statutes are not rendered non-uniform
by the enactment of K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 19-2960. The later
statute is part of a 1984 enactment (L. 1984, ch. 96) which is
only applicable to Johnson county. That enactment is separate
and distinct from the enactment which includes K.S.A. 19-2921
This conclusion finds support in the city home rule case
of City of Junction City v. Griffin, 227 Kan. 332 (1980), where
the court held that a "legislative enactment," within the meaning
of constitutional provisions granting home rule powers to cities
(Kan. Const., Art. 12, §5), meant a single bill enacted into law
that is, a single legislative act. There is no Kansas case law
to the contrary regarding county home rule. In fact, the Kansas
Supreme Court has relied on city home rule cases in one of the
few.decisions interpreting county home rule. Missouri Pacific
Railroad v. Board of Greeley County Comm'rs, 231 Kan. 225, 226
(1982).
Counties are prohibited from exempting from acts of the
legislature which are uniformly applicable to all counties.
Applying the reasoning of the Junction City opinion, it is clear
that K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 19-2960 is part of an act of the
legislature which is separate from K.S.A. 19-2921. In our
opinion, the 1984 enactment of planning and zoning statutes which
are only applicable in urban counties does not render the other
county-wide zoning statutes non-uniform in their application to
all other counties. Thus, pursuant to K.S.A. 1984 Supp.
19-101a(a)(1), a county may not utilize home rule authority to
exempt itself from and enact substitute provisions for K.S.A.
19-2921. The legislature's permission to regulate certain
agricultural uses only extends to counties which are designated
as urban in character.
We note parenthetically that an argument may be made that K.S.A.
19-2916b renders the county-wide zoning statutes non-uniform and
thus subject to county home rule. That statute makes it possible
for counties between 150,000 and 200,000 population to carry out
a zoning master plan by issuing general obligation bonds. Enacted
in 1953 (ch. 168, §1), in our opinion the statute in question
did not amend or affect the uniformity of the other county zoning
statutes. Similarly, the 1981 amendment of K.S.A. 1984 Supp.
19-2920 to include a paragraph applicable only in Franklin County
(L. 1981, ch. 123), did not amend the entire enactment of which
K.S.A. 19-2921 is a part. Thus, L. 1981, ch. 123 is a
separate enactment which is non-uniform in its application.
K.S.A. 19-2921, however, remains part of a uniformly applicable
act.
Accordingly,we conclude that K.S.A. 19-2921 is not subject to
county home rule authority and therefore may not be exempted from
nor replaced with substitute local regulations. As construed by
the Kansas Supreme Court, the effect of K.S.A. 19-2921 is clear,
i.e. no county zoning rules, regulations or determinations may
be applied the use of land for agricultural purposes nor to the
erection or maintenance of buildings on agricultural land if such
buildings are used for agricultural purposes.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Mary F. Carson
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JSS:MFC:crw

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