Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1985-030

1985-030Kanag

Gesamter Gesetzestext

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
March 21, 1985
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 85- 30
Jerry L. Griffith
City Attorney
165 West First Street
P.O. Box 58
Hoisington, Kansas 67544
Re: Constitution of the United States--First Amendment--
Restrictions on Political Activities of City Police
Officers
Synopsis: A city personnel policy which prohibits a police
officer from becoming a candidate for board member
of a unified school district within the city is
justified by the city's compelling interest in
maintaining the integrity of its police department,
and is constitutional as applied to prohibit the
candidacy of a police captain. Cited herein:
U.S. Const., First Amendment.
Dear Mr. Griffith:
You request our opinion as to whether a personnel policy of
the City of Hoisington is constitutional as applied to a City
Police Captain who is prohibited from becoming a candidate for
the board of a unified school district within the City of
Hoisington. The personnel policy provides as follows:
POLITICAL ACTIVITY
"The term 'political' as used herein refers
to partisan politics, or nominations and
elections to public office. The following
political activity is prohibited:
"1. No employee shall use his influence to
further the cause of any political party,
or candidate for nomination or election to
public office other than exercising his or
her rights to vote.
"2. No employee shall seek or accept nom-
ination, election, or appointment as an
officer of a political party, club or orga-
nization.
"3. No employee shall be a candidate for a
political office.
"4. No employee shall solicit money, service
or other valuable thing, or in any other way
further the cause of any political party or
candidate for nomination or election to public
office." (Emphasis added.)
Initially, it should be noted that the above-quoted personnel
policy may be facially invalid if it is "substantially overbroad"
in regulating conduct protected by the First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,
37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). In this regard, measurement of the
substantiality of a law's overbreadth requires a "rough bal-
ancing" of the number of valid applications compared to the
number of potentially invalid applications. Magill v. Lynch,
560 F.2d 22, 30 (1977). As we are not fully apprised of how
the city has interpreted and applied the above-quoted policy,
it is not possible to provide an opinion as to whether it is
"substantially overbroad." Therefore, our opinion is limited
to determining whether the policy is constitutional as applied
in a specific situation, i.e. to prohibit a city police captain
from becoming a candidate for a unified school district board.
The office of school board member is nonpartisan in nature,
and it has been held that candidacy for such a public office
is one of the rights included within the scope of the First
Amendment, although it is not a "fundamental right." Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973); United States
Civil Service Comm's v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers,
413 U.S. 548, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973); Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S.
957, 73 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982). The Supreme Court in Broadrick and
Letter Carriers, supra, did not hold that restrictions on non-
partisan political activities of public employees were uncon-
stitutional, but simply upheld restrictions on partisan political
activities. Cummings v. Godin, 377 A.2d 1071, 1078 (R.I. Sup.Ct.
1977); see also Hickman v. City of Dallas, 475 F.Supp. 137 (1979)
and Magill v. Lynch, 560 F.2d 22 (1977).
However, it has been held that the validity of restrictions on
non-partisan political activity of public employees can be tested
in the same manner as restrictions on partisan political activity.
Hickman v. City of Dallas, supra. That test is as follows:
"[R]estrictions on the partisan political
activity of public employees and officers,
where such activity contains substantial
non-speech elements, see U.S. v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672
(1968), are constitutionally permissible
if justified by a reasonable necessity, see
Bullock v. Carter, [supra], to burden those
activities to achieve a compelling public
objective." Morial v. Judiciary Commission,
565 F.2d 295, 300 (5th Cir., 1977) (enbanc)
cert. den. 435 U.S. 1013, 98 S.Ct. 1887,
56 L.Ed.2d 395. (Emphasis added.)
In Hickman, supra, the court considered a provision of the
Dallas City Charter which prohibited city employees from
campaigning for or holding elected public office within Dallas
County. Plaintiff, a Dallas patrol officer who desired to
become a candidate for the nonpartisan office of city council
member of the City of DeSoto in Dallas County, sought to have
the charter provision declared unconstitutional.
Applying the test quoted above, the court held that the City
of Dallas had a compelling interest in maintaining the loyalty,
efficiency and nonpartisanship of its employees, and that such
interest was sufficiently compelling that the city could put
restrictions on the right of its employees to become candidates
for elective office, including nonpartisan elective offices of
the City of Dallas. However, the court held that any harm to
Dallas' compelling interests resulting from plaintiff's candidacy
for DeSoto City Council was purely speculative, and stated as
follows:
"[T]he fact that the race and the position
are nonpartisan clearly reduces the potential
for interference with the compelling objectives
of Dallas and, at the same time, strengthens
the view that Hickman's right to be a candidate
should not be denied." 475 F.Supp. at 141.
Accordingly, the court ruled that the subject provision of the
Dallas City Charter was unconstitutional as applied to the
plaintiff.
It is important to note that the restrictions which were struck
down in the Hickman case related to nonpartisan activity occurring
entirely outside the city, i.e. running for nonpartisan office
in a different city. As noted above, the candidacy at issue here
relates to a school district operating within the City of Hoisington.
The importance of this distinction is demonstrated by the case of
Wachsman v. City of Dallas, 704 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1983).
In Wachsman, police officers and firefighters of the City of
Dallas challenged charter provisions which prohibited city
employees from managing a partisan political campaign, or
soliciting or receiving funds for such a campaign. While the
court stated that it would be "questionable" to apply these
restrictions to noncandidate elections (such as elections on
state constitutional amendments) and to elections and related
activity occurring entirely outside Dallas (such as solicitation
of funds for a candidate running for city office in Fort Worth),
the court upheld the restrictions as they related to other local
partisan elections. We find the following reasoning of the
court persuasive:
"[W]e conclude that while the case at
bar does not present as close a nexus
between the nonemployer elections and
the affairs of the employer governmental
entity imposing the restrictions on its
employees as does the Hatch Act, never-
theless such a nexus is not entirely lack-
ing here. We believe it unrealistic to
assume that politics within the geographical
boundaries of a city are divided into complete-
ly unrelated watertight compartments of city
and noncity politics. On the candidate and
officeholder level, it is certainly not un-
heard of for a person prominent in local
partisan politics, as a former officeholder
or otherwise, to become a city councilperson
in a nonpartisan election, or for a member
of the nonpartisan city council to there-
after become a local, state, or even federal
elective officeholder through the partisan
political process. Moreover, significant
operating relationships frequently exist
within the geographical area of a city,
between the city government, whether par-
tisan or not, and the county, state, and
federal governments. City politics, then,
whether or not 'partisan,' cannot be viewed
as wholly divorced from the politics, within
the area of the city, of the local, state,
and federal governments.
"Finally, appellants' challenge to these
portions of the Charter fails to recognize
the considerable power wielded by public
employees by virtue of their positions. Of
necessity, individual governmental employees,
as a practical matter, often have considerable
discretion in the actual administration and
enforcement of laws and the provision of
governmental services. And, the timing,
manner, and nature of the performance of such
governmental functions in actual practice may
frequently be subject to variation according
to the attitudes of the governmental employees
concerned. A Dallas private citizen might well
be hesitant to refuse a political contribution
or favor sought by a campaign manager or solicitor
in a county, legislative or congressional
campaign if the private citizen were de-
pendent on that campaign manager or solicitor
for fire or police protection or were subject
to discretionary law or regulatory enforcement
actions by that campaign manager or solicitor.
Certainly the City has a legitimate interest
in minimizing the exposure of its citizens
to such pressures from city employees. And
the Dallas private citizen is no less pressured
simply because the election campaign for which
the contribution or favor is sought by the city
employee is for an office such as sheriff of
Dallas County, or a local legislative or congres-
sional seat, rather than for a place on the
Dallas city council.
Accordingly, the City has a significant interest
in limiting the activities of its employees in
local 'partisan' campaigns. While these interests
are somewhat less extensive than those present
in city council elections, the restrictions
imposed are less onerous, and less fundamental
employee rights are involved. Therefore, we
uphold these provisions." (Emphasis added.)
704 F.2d at 171-172.
Additionally, we note that a Massachusetts court has upheld a
regulation of the police commissioner of the City of Boston
which requires police officers to take a leave of absence
upon becoming a candidate for election to any office under the
federal, state or city government. Boston Police Patrol Ass'n v.
City of Boston, 326 N.E.2d 314 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1975). The
court's opinion recites the following city interests promoted
by such a rule:
"The commissioner could reasonably infer
that permitting him [the police officer]
to remain on duty while campaigning for
elective office could create a conflict of
interest which could impede his efficient
performance of his duty and could undermine
and impair the integrity and discipline of
the law enforcement agency. For example,
he might be reluctant to interrogate fully,
to arrest, or otherwise to enforce the law
against a citizen who might have the power
to affect substantially the outcome of the
campaign."
In accordance with the above authorities, it is our opinion
that a city personnel policy which prohibits a police officer
from becoming a candidate for board member of a unified school
district within the city is justified by the city's compelling
interest in maintaining the integrity of its police department,
and is constitutional as applied to prohibit the candidacy of
a police captain.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Terrence R. Hearshman
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JSS:TRH:jm

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