Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1985-024

1985-024Kanag

Gesamter Gesetzestext

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
February 26, 1985
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 85- 24
David E. Retter
Concordia City Attorney
P.O. Box 676
Concordia, Kansas 66901
Re: Elections -- City Elections -- Filing Deadlines for
Candidates; Filling Vacancy
Cities, Second Class -- The Board of Commissioners --
Vacancy in the Office of Commissioner
Synopsis: In a city of the second class with the commission
manager form of government which is governed by K.S.A.
14-1305, a person appointed to fill a vacancy in the
office of commissioner holds office only until the
"next city election," at which time someone shall be
elected to fill the unexpired term if any portion of
the term remains. Under Kansas case law, "next city
election" is the next ensuing election at which city
officers are elected. This conclusion is not altered
even though a vacancy occurs after the filing
deadline for a candidates seeking city office. The
unexpired term should appear on the ballot of the next
ensuing city election regardless of the fact no one
was able to file as a candidate for the office
according to the regular procedures governing the
conduct of city elections. Cited herein: K.S.A.
12-1006; 12-1017; 12-1020; 14-1305; K.S.A. 1984 Supp.
25-2101; K.S.A. 25-2102; 25-2103; K.S.A. 1984 Supp.
25-2108a; 25-2110; K.S.A. 25-2118; R. S. 19-203
(1923).
Dear Mr. Retter:
As attorney for the City of Concordia, you have requested an
opinion on the application of K.S.A. 14-1305 to a situation
which has arisen in Concordia. You inform us that Concordia is a
city of the second class with the commission-manager form of city
government. The city has enacted a charter ordinance which
provides for staggered three-year terms for each of three city
commissioners.
Commissioner Armand Racette was elected to a three-year term
which began on April 18, 1984 and will expire in April, 1987.
Commissioner Racette submitted his resignation from the city
commission on February 11, 1985. As noted above, Concordia has a
commission-manager form of government. The statutes providing
for the city manager plan state that vacancies in the governing
board shall be filled in "the manner already provided by law."
K.S.A. 12-1006. K.S.A. 12-1017 provides that when the city
manager plan is adopted, the general laws relating to the
commission form of government in cities of the same class shall
govern, except insofar as the city manager statutes are
inconsistent with the general statutes. See also K.S.A.
12-1020.
The general statutes pertaining to commission government in
cities of the second class are found at K.S.A. 14-1101 through
14-2004. K.S.A. 14-1305 addresses vacancies in the office of
commissioners and provides in relevant part:
"In case of any vacancy from any cause in the
office of mayor or any commissioner, the
remaining members of the said board of
commissioners shall within ten (10) days after
the occurrence of said vacancy elect some
suitable person to fill said vacancy until the
next city election, at which time a successor
shall be elected to fill the unexpired term,
provided there is any portion of said term
unexpired, . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
You ask when the vacancy created by Commissioner Racette's
resignation must be filled by an election and particularly,
whether this office must be placed on the ballot at the next
ensuing city election, scheduled for April 2, 1985. A potential
problem is created by the fact Commissioner Racette's resignation
occurred well after the statutorily prescribed filing deadline
for candidates for city office. K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 25-2110
provides that the filing deadline for all city elections shall be
12:00 o'clock noon of the first Tuesday preceding by 10 weeks the
first Tuesday in April. This year that deadline was January 22,
1985. Similarly, K.S.A. 25-2118 requires the city clerk to
certify to the county election officer a list of all city offices
to be voted upon at the next city election "not later than
January 1 of every year that such city has a city election." In
addition, the number of candidates who file for a particular
office determines whether it is necessary to conduct a primary
election on the Tuesday 5 weeks before the first Tuesday in
April. K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 25-2108a.
Under the prescribed regular procedures for city elections, it is
not possible to place Commission Racette's unexpired term on the
ballot at the April 2, 1985 election. K.S.A. 14-1305 clearly
provides, however, that a person appointed to fill a vacancy in
the office of city commissioner shall hold the office only until
"the next city election." K.S.A. 25-2103 defines "city election"
as "the election of such city officers as are provided by law to
be elected." K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 25-2101 further defines "general
election" as:
. . the election held on the Tuesday
succeeding the first Monday in November of
even numbered years, the elections held for
officers on the first Tuesday in April, and in
the case of special elections of any officers
to fill vacancies, the election at which any
such officer is finally elected."
Thus, the term "general election" includes the regular election
of city officers in April. It is not clear what the phrase
"special elections . . . to fill vacancies" has reference to;
however, in this context it has no meaning because K.S.A.
14-1305 does not provide for a "special election" to fill a
vacancy in the office of commissioner. A literal interpretation
of the phrase "next city election" requires the conclusion that
Commissioner Racette's unexpired term should appear on the ballot
at the next election of city officers on April 2, 1985.
An argument can be made that such a literal interpretation of the
language is not warranted, in view of the legislative history of
the statutes in question and in terms of the practical problems
which are raised by a literal reading of the statute. K.S.A.
14-1305 was last amended by L. 1968, ch. 274, §40. That
enactment concerned city elections and contained a number of new
sections prescribing the conduct of city elections which now
appear in the statute book at article 21 of chapter 25. This
enactment included the deadline for filing as a candidate for
city office.
Thus, it is clear that the manner of filling a vacancy pursuant
to K.S.A. 14-1305 was considered by the legislature at the same
time the procedures for the conduct of city elections were
prescribed. It is possible to conclude, therefore, that the
sections should be construed in pari materia and reconciled to
reflect the intent of the legislature. This would lead to the
conclusion that the reference to the "next city election" in
K.S.A. 14-1305 means the next city election at which the vacancy
may be filled according to the prescribed procedures for
conducting such elections, and not necessarily the next ensuing
city election.
While this conclusion has a great deal of practical appeal, our
research into Kansas law has revealed a large body of law which
clearly supports the opposite conclusion. This latter
construction is consistent with the oft-cited rule announced in
the case of Rice v. Stevens, 25 Kan. 302 (1881): "The theory
of our law is, that officers shall be elected whenever it can be
conveniently done; and that appointments to office will be
tolerated only in exceptional cases." Id. at 307. K.S.A.
14-1305 clearly limits the term of a person appointed to fill a
vacancy to the next "city election," that is, the next occasion
when city officers are elected. In the case of Wendorff v.
Dill, 83 Kan. 782 (1911), the Supreme Court interpreted the
phrase "next regular election" to further the policy of filling
offices by election rather than appointment, and concluded that a
judge appointed to fill a vacancy held office only until a
successor could be chosen at a general election, whether or not
that particular office would normally be filled at that time.
Although this policy alone would not be enough to override the
practical problems raised by a literal interpretation of K.S.A.
14-1305, there is a Kansas case, decided upon remarkably similar
facts, which compels such a conclusion. In Hamilton v. Raub,
131 Kan. 392 (1930), the Supreme Court interpreted R. S.
19-203, which provided that in case of a vacancy in the office of
a county commissioner:
. . . the remaining commissioner or
commissioners and the county clerk shall
appoint some one resident in the district to
fill the office until the next general
election, when a commissioner shall be elected
to fill the unexpired term." R. S. 19-203
(1923). (Emphasis added.)
Facts presented in the Hamilton v. Raub case showed that a
Shawnee county commissioner, one J. A. Cole, was elected at the
general election in 1928 and commenced his four year term in
January, 1929. Mr. Cole died on August 14, 1930. Thereafter,
the remaining county commissioners and the county clerk, pursuant
to R. S. 19-302, appointed a Mr. Noller to fill the vacancy
occasioned by the death of Commissioner Cole. The primary
election in that year was held on August 5, 1930, nine days
before Cole's death. Obviously, no vacancy existed at the time
of the primary and therefore no name appeared on the primary
ballot as a candidate for Commissioner Cole's seat. After his
death, the Republican county committee met and nominated one
W. G. Tandy to fill the vacancy of a candidate on the Republican
ticket for the office of county commissioner in Cole's district.
The county clerk, acting on the advice of the Attorney General,
refused to place Mr. Tandy's name on the ballot. Tandy filed a
mandamus action seeking to compel the county clerk to print his
name on the ballot for the general election held in November.
On the question of when the election should be held to fill the
unexpired term of Commissioner Cole, the court heard arguments
favoring the general election to be held in November of 1930 and
arguments favoring the general election of 1932. The court
described the arguments as follows:
"Considering the first of these questions, it
is argued on behalf of plaintiffs that the
appointment of Noller by the other members of
the board of county commissioners and the
county clerk was to fill the office only until
the next general election, at which time a
commissioner should be elected (R. S.
19-203). Defendant contends the primary
election law (R. S. 25-201 et seq.), in its
provision with respect to the nomination of
candidates to be voted upon at the general
election, has the effect of making the primary
election held on the first Tuesday in August a
part of the general election, and hence that
the term 'next general election' used in R. S.
19-203 necessarily means the next election
held in November after the August primary
election held after the vacancy in the office
of county commissioner, and that since the
primary election of 1930 was held August 5 and
the vacancy in the office occurred thereafter,
on August 14, 1930, by the death of the
incumbent, there can be no election to fill
the unexpired term until the November
election, 1932. On this point the judgement
of the court accords with the view of the
plaintiffs."
The court rejected the argument that "general election" should be
read to include the primary election process of nominating
candidates to be voted on at the general election. Relying on
the definition of "general election" found in the Kansas
constitution and in numerous previous cases, the court concluded
that the next general election could only be the next ensuing
election held on the Tuesday following the first Monday in
November.
"To hold to the contention of defendants we
would have to give to the term 'general
election' a meaning different from that which
had been used in the constitution, statutes
and judicial opinions of this state throughout
the seventy years since the state was
organized, and say that in some indirect way
the primary election law amended R. S.
19-203 so as to postpone, in a case such as we
have before us, for two years the election of
a county commissioner and to permit the
appointee to hold under his appointment two
years longer than is contemplated by the plain
language of the statute. This we are
unwilling to do. The result is that the next
general election, as that term is used in
R. S. 19-203, after the death of J. A. Cole,
August 14, 1930, is the election to be held on
the Tuesday after the first Monday in
November, 1930, at which time the statute
requires that 'a commissioner shall be elected'
to fill his unexpired term of office." 131
Kan. at 397.
Thus, despite the fact that the time for complying with the
regular nomination process had passed when the vacancy in office
occurred, the court concluded that a commissioner would be
elected to fill the unexpired term of office at the next ensuing
general election.
The matter was further complicated by the court's second
conclusion that in a case where no one was nominated at the
primary election whose name could appear on the ballot at the
general election for the unexpired term of the deceased
commissioner, the county central committee had no power or
authority to nominate a candidate for that position and have his
name appear on the general election ballot. This conclusion was
based on the case of Koehler v. Beggs, 121 Kan. 897 (1926)
which held:
"The provision of the primary election law,
that vacancies occurring after the holding of
a primary may be filled by the proper party
committee, applies only to vacancies in
nominations made at the primary." Id. Syl.
The court then concluded:
"The result is that the writ prayed for must
be denied. But since there is a county
commissioner from the second commissioner
district to be elected at the general election
to be held November 4, 1930, to fill the
unexpired term of J. A. Cole, deceased,
defendant should prepare the ballot so there
is a place thereon for the electors to cast
their ballots, such as the following:
FOR COUNTY COMMISSIONER, SECOND DISTRICT.
(Vote for one.)
It is so ordered." 131 Kan. at 399-400.
Although we find this result to be somewhat awkward, the
similarities between the Hamilton case and the matter you
present are too great to permit any other conclusion. The
Hamilton case considered precisely the kind of arguments which
may be presented in favor of interpreting "next city election" to
mean the next election at which the usual procedures for
nominating candidates for offices may be followed. The court
rejected such arguments in favor of a literal interpretation of
the phrase "next election," despite the fact that it was
impossible to place the name of any candidates for the office on—
the general election ballot. We can find no basis for
distinguishing the situation presented by your request. The
statutory language in both instances provides for the same
result.
Thus, under the terms of K.S.A. 14-1305, an individual appointed
to fill a vacancy in the office of commissioner holds office only
until the "next city election" at which time someone shall be
elected to fill the unexpired term. This conclusion is not
altered even though the vacancy occurs after the filing deadline
for candidates for city office and after the city clerk's
deadline for certifying to the county clerk the city offices to
be elected. Therefore, the commission seat of former
Commissioner Racette must be placed on the city election ballot,
although no names can be printed on the ballot as candidates for
the position. Presumably, some individual will be elected as a
write-in candidate for the position, and under Kansas law this
result is to be favored over an appointee serving in office
longer than the plain language of K.S.A. 14-1305 permits.
In anticipation of further questions which may be raised by this
conclusion, we have enclosed copies of Attorney General Opinions
No. 81-16 and 80-126. Opinion No. 81-16 noted that a person
elected to succeed an appointee in filling a vacancy takes office
immediately upon receiving his or her certificate of election and
may commence upon the duties of such office after subscribing to
the appropriate oath or affirmation as required by law. Opinion
No. 80-126 concerns the right of an incumbent to hold over
beyond his or her prescribed term of office until his or her
successor is elected or appointed and has qualified.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Mary F. Carson
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JSS:MFC:crw
Enclosures

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.