Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1984-008

1984-008Kanag

Gesamter Gesetzestext

February 3, 1984
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 84 - 8
Marvin A. Harder, Secretary
Department of Administration
Room 263-E, State Capitol
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: Kansas Constitution--Legislative--Laws Enacted
Only by Bill; All Bills Passed Presented to the
Governor
Statutes--Rules and Regulations--Modification,
Rejection or Revocation of Same By Concurrent
Resolution
Synopsis: The provisions of subsections (c) and (d) of K.S.A.
1983 Supp. 77-426, which allow the legislature to
reject, modify or revoke an administrative rule
and regulation by means of the adoption of a con-
current resolution, are unconstitutional. Such
action by the legislature is an unlawful usurpation
of the governor's constitutional power to administer
and enforce the laws. Such action violates the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
In addition, the legislative oversight mechanism
prescribed in subsections (c) and (d) of K.S.A. 1983
Supp. 77-426 is unconstitutional for the reason that
it attempts to authorize the legislature to make law,
without following the mandatory procedures of the
Kansas Constitution. The Kansas constitution
requires that any law be enacted only by bill
[not by resolution or concurrent resolution]; that
every bill contain the constitutionally-specified
enacting clause; and that all bills passed by the
legislature be presented to the governor for approval
or disapproval. The procedure set forth in subsections
(c) and (d) of K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 77-426 does not
meet these constitutional requirements and is
unconstitutional. Cited herein: K.S.A. 1983 Supp.
77-426; Kan. Const., Art. 2, §§14, 20.
* *
Dear Secretary Harder:
Your predecessor, Secretary Hurley, recently sought our opinion
concerning the constitutionality of subsections (c) and (d) of
K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 77-426. More specifically, he noted that
these subsections purport to allow the legislature to modify,
reject or revoke administrative rules and regulations by means
of the adoption of a concurrent resolution, without presentment
of any such resolution to the Governor. The question posed is
whether this procedure is constitutionally permissible.
This inquiry, we understand, was prompted by a number of recent
state and federal court decisions in which it has been concluded
that provisions such as those in subsections (c) and (d) of K.S.A.
1983 Supp. 77-426 violate the doctrine of separation of powers
and constitutional procedures for the enactment of law, and, thus,
are unconstitutional. See Consumer Union of U.S., Inc. v. F.T.C.,
691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd U.S. , 103 S.Ct.
3556, 77 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1983); Consumer Energy, Etc. v. F.E.R.C.,
673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd U.S. , 103 S.Ct.
3556, 77 L.Ed.2d 1402 (1983); General Assembly of New Jersey v.
Bryne, 448 A.2d 438 (N.J. 1982); and State ex rel. Barker v.
Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622 (W.Va. 1981). Also, the Kansas Supreme
Court, in the recent case of State v. Kearns, 229 Kan. 207 (1981)J
made it clear that the legislature may enact a law only by the
enactment of a bill. The Court specifically overruled its prior
decision in State ex rel. v. Knapp, 102 Kan. 701 (1918), in which
the Court held a joint resolution, adopted by the legislature
and signed by the governor, substantially complied with the
constitution and, thus, was a constitutionally-valid law. Thus,
these recent decisions prompt this inquiry.
In State ex rel. v. Bennett, 219 Kan. 285 (1976), the Kansas
Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether powers
conferred upon the State Finance Council by state law constituted
a violation of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
In resolving the issue, the Court said:
"[T]he Constitution of Kansas contains no
express provision requiring the separation
of powers, but all decisions of this court
have taken for granted the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers between the
three departments of the state government--
legislative, executive and judicial. The
separation of powers doctrine was designed
to avoid a dangerous concentration of power
and to allow the respective powers to be
assigned to the department most fitted to
exercise them." Id. at 287.
The Court, in Bennett, continued that the problem in any case
involving an alleged violation of the separation of powers doctrine
is:
. . . to determine whether or not a usurpa-
tion of powers has taken place. That term
has not heretofore been clearly defined. It
has been suggested that to have a usurpation
one department of the government must be
subject directly or indirectly to the coer-
cive influence of the other. (State, ex rel. v.
Fadely, supra, at page 696; Leek v. Theis,
supra, at page 807.) It seems to us that to
have a usurpation of powers there must be a
significant interference by one department
with the operations of another department.
In determining whether or not an unconstitu-
tional usurpation of powers exists, there are
a number of factors properly to be considered.
First is the essential nature of the power
being exercised. Is the power exclusively
executive or legislative or is it a blend of
the two? A second factor is the degree of r
-control by the legislative department in the
exercise of the power. Is there a coercive
influence or a mere cooperative venture?
A third consideration of importance is the
nature of the objective sought to be attained
by the legislature. Is the intent of the
legislature to cooperate with the executive
by furnishing some special expertise of one
or more of its members or is the objective
of the legislature obviously one of establish-
ing its superiority over the executive depart-
ment in an area essentially executive in nature?
A fourth consideration could be the practical
result of the blending of powers as shown by
actual experience over a period of time where
such evidence is available. We do not wish to
imply that these are the only factors which
should be considered but it seems to us that
they have special significance in determining
whether a usurpation of powers has been
demonstrated." 219 Kan. at 290-291.
After stating the foregoing principles, the Supreme Court sum-
marized the various powers conferred upon the State Finance
Council. Among other things, the powers included the authority
to approve, modify and approve, or reject proposed rules and
regulations submitted by the secretary of administration. The
Court noted:
"The state finance council exercises control
and authority over the state department of
administration as a whole. The council must
approve any and all rules and regulations
with respect to the manner of performance of
any power or duty of the department and the
execution of any business of the department
and its relations to and business with other
state agencies. (K.S.A. 1975 Supp. 75-3706.)
The finance council may hear and determine
appeals by any state agency from final decisions
or final actions of the secretary of administration
or the director of computer services. (K.S.A.
1975 Supp. 75-3711[a][1].) All regulations
promulgated by the director of the division
of accounts and reports pertaining to old-age
and survivors insurance for public employees
are made subject to approval of the state
finance council (75-3749). The finance
council must approve all rules and regulations
adopted by the director of architectural services
pertaining to uniform standards for mobile homes
and recreational vehicles. (K.S.A. 1975 Supp.
75-1220[e].)" (Emphasis by the Court.) 219 Kan.
at 294.
The Court then noted the above-indicated powers of the Council
were challenged by the attorney general as a usurpation of executive
powers by the legislature. The Court then stated:
"It is obviously a difficult task to clas-
sify these powers as executive or legislative
and to determine which powers may constitutionally
be exercised by the state finance council and
which may not. We have concluded that the
statutory power and duties granted to the
state finance council to supervise the oper-
ations of the department of administration
and its various divisions are purely an exer-
cise of executive power. In particular we
hold the followin duties or sowers to be
essentially executive or administrative in
nature:
"(2) Certain powers under the civil service
act, such as the adoption of rules and reg-
ulations for carrying out the act . . • ;
"(7) Approval of rules and regulations govern-
ing operations of the department of administration
and each of its divisions;
"(9) Approval of rules and regulations to carry
out the uniform standard code for mobile homes
and recreational vehicles;
"All of these powers concern the day-to-day
operations of the department of administration
and its various divisions. The vesting of such
powers in the state finance council in our judg-
ment clearly grants to a legislatively oriented
body control over the operation of an executive
agency and constitutes a usurpation of executive
power by the legislative department. All of the
powers and functions set forth above are controlled
by a majority vote of the nine-member finance
council, only one of whom, the governor, is a
member of the executive department. It is true
that only the governor, as chairman, has the
authority to call meetings of the finance council
and that the governor has the power to set the
agenda for any meeting. The trouble is that the
governor has no real choice except to call a
meeting of the state finance council since the
department of administration cannot really
function unless its rules and regulations are
approved and made effective and unless intra-
departmental disputes can be finally determined.
The legislature has by these statutes placed the
state finance council, a body controlled by
legislators, at the apex of the administrative
structure of the state department of admin-
istration in a position where it exerts, both
directly and indirectly, a coercive influence
on that executive department. We, therefore,
hold that all of the executive powers specifically
set forth above may not constitutionally be
performed by the state finance council with
its present membership." (Emphasis added.)
219 Kan. at 297-298.
Bennett is the only case of which we are aware in which our
Supreme Court has specifically held that the adoption of rules
and regulations is "purely an exercise of executive power," and,
as a consequence, struck legislative enactments which conferred
these executive powers on a legislative body. State ex rel. v.
Bennett, supra, at 297. However, this determination is not
surprising when it is realized the Court has held repeatedly
that the power to adopt rules and regulations is administrative
in nature, not legislative. Moreover, the power to adopt rules
and regulations is not the power to "legislate" in the true
sense, and, thus, under the guise of a rule and regulation,
legislation may not be enacted. See State ex rel. v. Columbia
Pictures Corporation, 197 Kan. 448, 454 (1966). See also
Wesley Medical Center v. Clark, 234 Kan. 13,17-19 (1983);
Woods v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 231 Kan. 763, 771 (1982); Cray v.
Kennedy, 230 Kan. 663, 675-677 (1982); Rhodes v. Harder, 211
Kan. 820, 830 (1973); and Willcott v. Murph , 204 Kan. 640, 648
(1970). As careful as the Court has been to guard the legislative
power to legislate from usurpation by the executive branch, it
logically follows that the Court likewise would cautiously guard
the executive power to execute and administer the laws from
usurpation by the legislative branch. We must conclude that,
if the separation of powers doctrine precludes the executive
branch from "making the law," it follows that the doctrine also
precludes the legislative branch from "executing the law."
In Leek v. Theis, 217 Kan. 784 (1975), the Court was confronted
with an alleged usurpation of executive power by the legislature.
In disposing of the allegation, the Court said: "There is no
quarrel that our constitution creates three distinct and separate
departments. In this respect, our state constitution is the
same as our federal constitution." (Emphasis added.) Id. at
806.
Recently, the federal courts have determined that one- or two-house
"legislative vetoes" of administrative rules and regulations
increases Congress' constitutional powers by allowing Congress,
in effect, "to expand its role from one of oversight, with
an eye to legislative revision, to one of shared administration."
Consumer Energy, Etc. v. F.E.R.C., supra, 673 F.2d at 474.
In regard to this, the courts have concluded: "This overall
increase in congressional power contravenes the fundamental
purpose of the separation of powers doctrine." Id. at 474.
The determinations of other state courts and the federal courts,
and the determination of our own Supreme Court in State ex rel. v.
Bennett, supra, convince us that the legislative oversight
mechanism prescribed in subsections' (c) and (d) of K.S.A. 1983
Supp. 77-426 contravenes the constitutional doctrine of separation
of powers, and, thus, is unconstitutional. The legislative power
is the power to make, amend, or repeal laws; the executive power
is the power to enforce and administer the laws; and the judicial
power is the power to interpret and apply the laws in actual
controversies. See, e.g., Van Sickle v. Shanahan, 212 Kan. 426,
440 (1973). The oversight mechanism in these subsections of the
law constitutes an unlawful intrusion by the legislature into
the executive's power to enforce and administer the laws.
Subsections (c) and (d) of K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 77-426 are invalid
for an additional reason. These subsections purport to allow
the legislature to enact law without complying with the require-
ments prescribed in Article 2 of the Kansas Constitution.
Specifically, Article 2, Section 20, provides: "The enacting
clause of all bills shall be 'Be it enacted by the Legislature
of the State of Kansas:'. No law shall be enacted except by bill."
Also, Article 2, Section 14(a) of the constitution provides:
"Within ten days after passage, every bill
shall be signed by the presiding officers
and presented to the governor. If the
governor approves a bill, he shall sign it.
If the governor does not approve a bill,
the governor shall veto it by returning the
bill, with a veto message of the objections,
to the house of origin of the bill. When-
ever a veto message is so received, the
message shall be entered in the journal
and in not more than thirty calendar days
(excluding the day received), the house of
origin shall reconsider the bill. If two-
thirds of the members then elected (or ap-
pointed) and qualified shall vote to pass
the bill, it shall be sent, with the veto
message, to the other house, which shall
in not more than thirty calendar days
(excluding the day received) also reconsider
the bill, and if approved by two-thirds of
the members then elected (or appointed) and
qualified, it shall become a law, notwith-
standing the governor's veto.
"If any bill shall not be returned within ten
calendar days (excluding the day presented)
after it shall have been presented to the
governor, it shall become a law in like man-
ner as if it had been signed by the governor."
In Harris v. Shanahan, 192 Kan. 183 (1963), the Supreme Court
held:
"Pursuant to Article 2, Section 14 of the
Constitution of Kansas, the legislature
and the governor exercise co-ordinate
functions in enacting laws, and the gover-
nor is an essential part of the legislation.
Until a bill has the final consideration of
the three law-making powers, that is, the
house, the senate, and the governor, it is
not a law . . . ." Id. at Syl. $1. See
also, State ex rel. v. Robb, 163 Kan. 502,
515-518 (1947).
Also, in the recent case of State v. Kearns, 229 Kan. 207 (1981),
the Court held the requirement of Article 2, Section 20, that
each bill have the constitutionally-specified enacting clause,
prevented a bill from becoming law which contained the phrase:
"Be it resolved by the Legislature of the State of Kansas,"
instead of the constitutionally-specified enacting clause.
This case makes it clear that no law can be enacted except
by bill, and that any bill must have the constitutionally-
specified enacting clause.
Thus, if the legislature, in rejecting, modifying or revoking
an administrative rule and regulation, in fact, is making a law,
the action of the legislature must comply with the requirements
of Article 2, 5§14 and 20.
The question of whether the legislature, in effect, is making
a law when it rejects an administrative rule and regulation
was answered affirmatively in Consumer Energy, Etc. v. F.E.R.C.,
supra. The Court said: "[T]here is no question that the effect
of a congressional veto is to alter the scope of the agency's
discretion [as originally granted to the agency by federal
statutes.]" 673 F.2d at 469. Thus, through its power to
legislate, Congress, in effect, is amending the law pursuant
to which the power to adopt rules and regulations was conferred
upon the executive agency.
Moreover, in State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 (Alaska
(1980), the Supreme Court of Alaska, relying on decisions from
the states of Illinois, California, and New York, held that,
whenever the legislature takes action that is to have "a binding
effect on those outside the legislature," it is making a law, and
"may do so only by following the enactment procedure set forth
in the State Constitution." State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, supra,
at Syl. ¶6 and page 773. At issue in that case was the validity
of a concurrent resolution passed by the Alaska legislature which
purported to reject an administrative rule and regulation. The
court found the action of the legislature was an unconstitutional
attempt to make law because the concurrent resolution did not
comply with the constitutional requirement that laws be enacted
by bill.
We are persuaded by the above-referenced decisions that our state
legislature, when it rejects, modifies or revokes an administrative
rule and regulation, is making law. However, the legislature may
make a valid law only by following the enactment procedures set
forth in Article 2 of the Kansas Constitution. In subsections
(c) and (d) of K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 77-426, the legislature has
attempted to dispense with these procedures. Such cannot be
done, however, and these subsections of law are unconstitutional.
Thus, in summary, it is our opinion that the provisions of
subsections (c) and (d) of K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 77-426, which
allow the legislature to reject, modify or revoke an administrative
rule and regulation by means of the adoption of a concurrent
resolution, are unconstitutional. Such action by the legislature
is an unlawful usurpation of the governor's constitutional power
to administer and enforce the laws. Such action violates the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
In addition, the legislative oversight mechanism prescribed in
subsections (c) and (d) of K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 77-426 is unconsti-
tutional for the reason that it attempts to authorize the legis-
lature to make law, without following the mandatory procedures
of the Kansas Constitution. The Kansas constitution requires
that any law be enacted only by bill [not by resolution or
concurrent resolution]; that every bill contain the consti-
tutionally-specified enacting clause; and that all bills passed
by the legislature be presented to the governor for approval
or disapproval. The procedure set-forth in subsections (c)
and (d) of K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 77-426 does not meet these
constitutional requirements and is unconstitutional.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Rodney J. Bieker
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:RJB:jm

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.