Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1983-083

1983-083Kanag

Gesamter Gesetzestext

May 2 5 , 1983
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 83- 83
Max E. Scribner
Chief of Police
14 West Central
Caldwell, Kansas 67022
Re: Automobiles and Other Vehicles -- Drivers Licenses --
Restricted Drivers Licenses; School Attendance.
Synopsis: K.S.A. 8-237 permits the holder of a restricted drivers
license between the age of 14 and 16 to operate a motor
vehicle on days while school is in session over the most
direct and accessible route between the licensee's
residence and school of enrollment for the purpose
of school attendance.
The term "school attendance" has a narrower meaning than
"school activities;" therefore, the holder of a restricted
license is not permitted by this statute to operate a motor
vehicle for transportation to mere school activities.
Cited herein: K.S.A. 8-237(a)(2), 72-133, 72-1113, 72-8302,
72-8305.
*
Dear Chief Scribner:
As the Chief of Police of Caldwell, Kansas, you have requested our opinion
as to whether an individual having a restricted drivers license may
drive to and from school activities such as football games, school
plays and other extracurricular school functions.
K.S.A. 8-237 provides in part:
"A restricted class C license issued under this subsection
shall entitle the licensee, while possessing the license,
to operate any motor vehicle in class C, as designated in
K.S.A. 8-2346. A restricted class D license shall entitle
the licensee, while possessing such license, to operate a
motorcycle. The restricted license shall entitle the
licensee to operate the appropriate vehicle at any time:
"(2) on days while school is in session, over the most
direct and accessible route between the licensee's
residence and school of enrollment for the purpose of
school attendance." (Emphasis supplied.)
In our judgment, by using the term "school attendance," the legislature
has expressed its will that driving privileges not be extended to
situations involving extracurricular activities. Turning to the
laws governing Kansas schools, we find that K.S.A. 72-133 defines
"activities" as "school activities and contests in the field of
athletics, music, forensics, dramatics and any other interschool
extracurricular activities by students enrolled in any of the grades
from seven (7) to twelve (12), inclusive." A distinction between school
attendance and school activities is recognized by K.S.A. 1982 Supp.
72-8302(a) which mandates transportation of students living outside
certain radii of the school attended, while, K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 72-8302(b)
and K.S.A. 72-8305 authorize, but not require, schools to provide
transportation for extracurricular activities.
In construing the scope of the term "school attendance" we are guided
by familiar rules of statutory construction. As noted in Johnson v.
McArthur, 226 Kan. 128 (1979)_:
"The fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which
all other rules are subordinate, is that the purpose and
intent of the legislature governs when that intent can be
ascertained from the statutes. When a statute is plain
and unambiguous the court must give effect to the intention
of the legislature as expressed, rather than determine
what the law should or should not be. Thomas County
Taxpayers Ass'n v. Finney, 223 Kan. 434, 573 P.2d 1073
(1978)." 226 Kan. at 135.
In giving effect to the intent of the legislature, courts "must consider
the language of the statute; its words are to be understood in their
plain and ordinary sense." Lakeview Gardens, Inc. v. State, ex rel,
Schneider, 221 Kan. 211, 214 (1976). Moreover, it is not the function
of the courts to expand or broaden the plain letter of a statute.
State v. One Bally Coney Island No. 21011 Gaming Table, 174 Kan. 757,
Syl. para. 2 (1953). Finally, and of particular pertinence here, we
note the following statement of the Court in Rogers v. Shanahan, 221 Kan.
221 (1977):
"When . . . the resolution of a question requires
construing a statute, the court is guided by certain
presumptions. It is presumed the legislature under-
stood the meaning of the words it used and intended
to use them; that the legislature used the words in
their ordinary and common meaning; and that the
legislature intended a different meaning when it
used different language in the same connection in
different parts of a statute. See 82 C.J.S. Statutes,
§316(b) (1953); See also, Rausch v. Hill, 164 Kan. 505,
190 P.2d 357." (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 223, 224.
Had the legislature intended to authorize restricted licensees to drive
to and from extracurricular activities, they could easily have done
so by including language to that effect. Thus, it is our opinion
that a restricted license entitles the licensee to operate a motor
vehicle to and from the licensee's school of enrollment for the
purpose of school attendance only. As such, we conclude that K.S.A.
8-237 does not authorize a licensee to drive to and from extracurricular
activities such as football games, school plays, etc. As a practical
matter we note that many school activities commence immediately after
classes are dismissed. This opinion should not be construed as pro-
hibiting restricted licensee's from driving the most direct and
accessible route between the school of enrollment and the licensee's
residence upon completion of such activities.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General
Timothy G. Madden
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JEF:TGM:may

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