Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1983-003

1983-003Kanag

Gesamter Gesetzestext

January 14, 1983
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 83- 3
William D. Rustin
County Counselor
Sedgwick County Courthouse
Suite 315
Wichita, Kansas 67203-3790
Re: Insurance--Fireman's Relief Fund--Penalties for
Non-Payment; Ability of Fire District to Pay Counsel
Synopsis: K.S.A. 40-1703 requires each insurance company providing
fire protection coverage to pay an annual tax to the
commissioner of insurance of 2% of the premiums collected
for such coverage, with the taxes then paid over to
the firemen's relief association of the city, town-
ship, county or fire district from which the premiums
were collected. In the event of a failure by an
insurance company to pay the required amount, K.S.A.
40-1705 allows these governmental entities to recover
a civil penalty of $300 for each violation, with the
penalty going to the use and benefit of the firemen's
relief association. As the employment and compensation
of legal counsel is necessarily implied by the statute
authorizing suit, a fire district may use a portion of
the penalties so recovered to pay its attorney, although
the tax money itself may not be so spent. Cited herein:
K.S.A. 40-1702, 40-1703, 40-1705, 40-1706, 40-1707.
Dear Mr. Rustin:
As Sedgwick County Counselor, you request our opinion on a
question concerning Fire District No. 1, of which the Sedgwick
County Commission is the governing board. Specifically, you
inquire whether the fire district may use a portion of any civil
penalty collected under K.S.A. 40-1705 to pay attorney's fees
due and owing to their counsel for his efforts on the district's
behalf. As no express language exists in the statutes which
either allows or prohibits this, any conclusion reached must be
based on principles of statutory interpretation.
The statutes in question are contained within the Firemen's Relief
Fund Act, K.S.A. 40-1701 et seq. This act is intended to provide
for the establishment and funding of firemen's relief associations
within the fire departments of Kansas counties, cities and town-
ships, as well as specially-created fire districts like District
No. 1 in Sedgwick County. The associations provide a variety
of services and benefits for injured or disabled firemen, as well
as for the families of those who die as a result of service-related
causes (K.S.A. 40-1707). Funding is provided by a tax upon insur-
ance companies who issue fire and lightning insurance policies
for the area served by the individual fire department. This tax,
set at 2% of the premiums collected for such coverage, is paid
to the commissioner of insurance (K.S.A. 40-1703), and then
distributed to the local associations. K.S.A. 40-1706.
The statute which prompted your request, K.S.A. 40-1705, concerns
the failure of an insurance company to pay the tax or perform
other acts required by the statutes. Therein, it is stated:
"Every such insurance company who shall
neglect to keep such books of account as
aforesaid, or shall fail or neglect to
report or pay over any of the money due
on premiums received as provided in this
article at the times and in the manner
specified in this article, or shall be
found upon examination to have made a false
return of business done by them, shall
for each offense forfeit three hundred
dollars ($300) for the use and benefit of
such firemen's relief association of such
city, township, county or fire district,
to be recovered in a civil action in the
name of the city, township, county or fire
district." (Emphasis added.)
You inquire whether the fire district may, on the authority of
this section, enter into contingent fee arrangements with its
attorney whereby he or she would be compensated from the $300
civil penalty. This would occur when the attorney was successful
in prosecuting an insurance company which either failed to pay
the requisite tax or paid funds due the district to another
entity.
Admittedly, the express wording of the statute itself does not
envisage such a situation. However, in our opinion this silence
is by no means dispositive of the question. In addition to
powers specifically given them by statute, governmental units
possess those limited, implied powers which are necessary to
effectively exercise the former. See, e.g., Tilton v. Riley
County, 194 Kan. 250 (1965), State ex rel. v. City of Topeka,
176 Kan. 240 (1954). Cases which have found certain powers to
be necessary, and therefore incidental to other powers spe-
cifically authorized, have generally done so only where the
purpose of the statute could not be fulfilled without such power.
State, ex rel. v. Davis, 114 Kan. 270 (1923), Edwards County
Commissioners v. Simmons, 159 Kan. 41 (1944). In the latter case,
the authority of the county commissioners to contract for attorneys'
services to intervene in a receivership action was challenged.
The court stated:
"The statute provides that a board of county
commissioners may direct that suit be brought
against the delinquent utility corporation,
that a receiver may be appointed, that such
proceedings may be taken as are necessary to
collect the delinquent taxes, and that the
board may intervene in any suit brought by
other parties (79-2101a). It would be a
wholly unreasonable contruction to hold that
the board might do all of that but might not
employ attorneys for the purpose. The statute
plainly contemplates that the board may employ
such reasonable means as are necessary to ef-
fect the statutory purpose. How else would
the board have intervened in the receivership
action in Reno county except by the employment
of attorneys?" Id. at 52, 53.
Accordingly, in that K.S.A. 40-1705 authorizes a district to initiate
a lawsuit when an insurance company fails to perform certain acts,
the power to employ and pay an attorney must of necessity be inferred.
Further, the method of payment (i.e. hourly or on a contingent basis)
is a matter within the discretion of the district.
It is additionally our opinion that a fire district may use all
or a portion of the civil penalty received under K.S.A. 40-1705 to
pay its counsel. Unlike the money received from the 2% tax,
the use of which is strictly delineated by K.S.A. 40-1706 and
40-1707, the civil penalty recovered under the former statute
can be spent "for the use and benefit" of the relief association
of the district. In that the initiation of a lawsuit to require
deposit of the necessary funds is clearly of benefit to the
relief fund, the ability to use the civil penalties recovered
thereunder for attorneys' fees would, by facilitating such suits,
also benefit the district's relief association.
In conclusion, K.S.A. 40-1703 requires each insurance company
providing fire protection coverage to pay an annual tax to the
commissioner of insurance of 2% of the premiums collected for
such coverage, with the taxes then paid over to the firemen's
relief association of the city, township, county or fire district
from which the premiums were collected. In the event of a
failure by an insurance company to pay the required amount,
K.S.A. 40-1705 allows these governmental entities to recover a
civil penalty of $300 for each violation, with the penalty
going to the use and benefit of the firemen's relief association.
As the employment and compensation of legal counsel is necessarily
implied by the statute authorizing suit, a fire district may
use a portion of the penalties so recovered to pay its attorney,
although the tax money itself may not be so spent.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
JeffreyS.Southard
Assistant Attorney General
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