Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-183

1982-183Kanag

Gesamter Gesetzestext

August 19, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82-183
The Honorable Ed C. Rolfs
State Representative, Sixty-Fifth District
424 North Madison
Junction City, Kansas 66441
Re: Automobiles and Other Vehicles -- Serious Traffic
Offenses -- Driving While Under Influence of
Alcohol; Performance of Public or Community Service
Work by Convicted Violators
Synopsis: As amended by L. 1982, ch. 144, 55, K.S.A. 1981
Supp. 8-1567 provides that a person convicted of
a violation of the offense of operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol may
be required to perform public or community service
work as an alternative to incarceration or payment
of a fine. In assigning the work to be performed,
a judge or court services division would be exer-
cising judicial and discretionary functions, re-
spectively, and would be exempt from liability
under the Tort Claims Act, K.S.A. 1981 Supp.
75-6101 et seq. However, as noted by Attorney
General Opinion Nos. 81-98 and 82-157, the recipi-
ent organization (including local governments and
non-profit corporations) may be liable for injuries
and damages inflicted or suffered by persons act-
ing within the scope of their designated community
service duties. Cited herein: K.S.A. 1981 Supp.
8-1567 (as amended by L. 1982, ch. 144, 55), K.S.A.
21-4610, K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75-6102, 75-6104.
Dear Representative Rolfs:
As State Representative for the 65th District, which includes
Junction City and Geary County, you request our opinion on
several questions regarding recent amendments to K.S.A. 1981
Supp. 8-1567 and related statutes concerning the offense of
operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.
Specifically, you inquire as to the effect of provisions which
allow a person who has been accused or convicted of a viola-
tion to perform community service work in lieu of serving
time in jail or paying a fine. Your questions concern the
discretion of a judge in assigning a person to perform such
tasks, and the potential liability of a city should a parti-
cipant in the program be injured, cause injury to another or
damage private property.
As amended, subsection (c) of K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1567 pro-
vides:
"Upon a first conviction of a violation of
this section, a person shall be sentenced to
not less than 48 hours' imprisonment or 100
hours of public service nor more than 6 months'
imprisonment and fined not less than $200 nor
more than $500, or by both such fine and im-
prisonment."
The provision for the performance of public service is a new
feature of the subsection, which previously allowed the impo-
sition of jail time, a fine or both. While a court's discre-
tion has been removed as to whether to impose a fine or a sen-
tence (see Attorney General Opinion No. 82-175), the subsec-
tion's language does provide an alternative to incarceration
in the form of "public service."
Subsection (g) of the statute as amended provides a further
alternative which concerns payment of any fine, to-wit:
"In lieu of payment of a fine imposed pursu-
ant to this section, the court may order that
the person perform community service specified
by the court. The person shall receive a cre-
dit on the fine imposed in an amount equal to
$5 for each full hour spent by the person in
the specified community service. The commun-
ity service ordered by the court shall be re-
quired to be performed not later than one year
after the fine is imposed or by an earlier
date specified by the court. If by the re-
quired date the person performs an insuffici-
ent amount of community service to reduce to
zero the portion of the fine required to be
paid by the person, the remaining balance of
the fine shall become due on that date."
While the phrase used herein is "community service," we would
assume (in the absence of any legislative intent to the con-
trary) that such activity is synonymous with the "public ser-
vice" mentioned at subsection (c).
Specific details concerning the performance of such service
are not set forth by the amended statute, i.e. what entities
are eligible for inclusion in a program made up of violators
performing community service work, how such persons are
assigned and what degree of liability, if any, exists on
the part of the courts or the recipient organizations. How-
ever, other statutes give guidance as to the tasks the par-
ticipants could be assigned and the potential liability which
could be incurred. For example, the Kansas Criminal Code
section on conditions of probation and suspended sentence,
K.S.A. 21-4610, provided that a court, as one of the condi-
tions it prescribes, may require a violator to:
"Perform community or public service work for
local governmental agencies, private corpora-
tions organized not for profit, or charitable
or social service organizations performing ser-
vices for the community." K.S.A. 21-4610(k).
While a sentence to perform community service work under K.S.A.
1981 Supp. 8-1567 is not precisely the same as a condition of
probation or a suspended sentence, it is closely akin, and in
our opinion the same type of discretion is vested in the court
as in the above-quoted statute. See also 14 W.L.J. 57, 65
(1975).
As to the questions which arise concerning the liability which
various entities associated with this assignment process could
incur, we note that similar questions were addressed by two
prior opinions of this office, Nos. 81-98 and 82-157. The
former addressed the liability of a court in setting, and a
probation officer in administering, conditions of probation
and suspended sentences. As to a court, the opinion looked
to K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75-6104(b) and concluded:
"[I]t is our opinion that when the district court
exercises its discretion by assigning a proba-
tioner to fa] program as a condition of pro-
bation, it is clearly performing a judicial
function and is, therefore, immune from tort
liability in the event the probationer is in-
jured or commits a tort while performing work
under the program." (p. 4)
Concerning a probation officer who would oversee the perform-
ance of the probation or suspended sentence conditions, the
opinion stated:
"[I]t is our opinion the probation officer,
in assigning a probationer to a particular
recipient organization is performing a discre-
tionary function or duty which necessarily
flows from the district court's exercise of
its judicial function in setting terms and
conditions of probation. This being the case,
K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 75-6104(d) exempts such pro-
bation officer from liability resulting from
the exercise of such discretionary function
or duty." (p. 5)
We believe the same results would be true for a court services
employee who would seek to place and then monitor those per-
forming community service work under K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 3-1567,
as amended.
A different result was reached in the case of the ultimate
recipient of the person's efforts. In Attorney General Opinion
No. 81-98, the master-servant doctrine was applied in finding
that a non-profit corporation or private organization which
oversaw the work of the participant could, under the correct
circumstances, be liable for the latter's actions. This would
of course depend on a determination of negligence on the part
of the worker, which finding could then be applied to the
organization only if the actions were within the scope of
the worker's assigned duties. Here, as there, it is the
recipient organization which directly controls the physical
activities of the worker, as well as issuing the necessary
equipment and determining if the work has been properly done.
Accordingly, our conclusion reached therein may be applied
here.
A more recent opinion, No. 82-157, spoke to the potential
liability of a city in such circumstances. The result reached
(i.e. potential liability) was the same, although the statutory
scheme of the Tort Claims Act replaced the common-law applied
in the earlier opinion. However, in that the definition of
"employee" contained in the Act [at K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75-6102(d)]
includes a "servant" who worked with or without compensation,
the master-servant concept, including the right to control,
was found to apply to a city as well as to a non-profit chari-
table corporation or organization. Again, it should be em-
phasized that it is this right to control upon which the po-
tential for liability is predicated. Should the city merely
act as a conduit for assigning the violator to such an organ-
ization, the discretionary exemption contained in the Tort
Claims Act (and cited above with regard to probation officers),
would in our opinion shield a city from such potential liability.
In conclusion, as amended by L. 1982, ch. 144, §5, K.S.A.
1981 Supp. 8-1567 provides that a person convicted of a vio-
lation of the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol may be required to perform public or
community service work as an alternative to incarceration or
payment of a fine. In assigning the work to be performed, a
judge or court services division would be exercising judicial -
and discretionary functions, respectively, and would be exempt
from liability under the Tort Claims Act, K.S.A. 1981 Supp.
75-6101 et seq. However, as noted by Attorney General Opinion
Nos. 81-98 and 82-157, the recipient organization (including
local governments and non-profit corporations) may be liable
for injuries and damages inflicted or suffered by persons
acting within the scope of their designated community service
duties.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Jeffrey; S. Southard
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:JSS:hle

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