Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-154

1982-154Kanag

Gesamter Gesetzestext

July 12, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82-154
Mr. Rod Ludwig
Mitchell County Attorney
Box 179
Beloit, Kansas 67420
Re: Taxation--Aggregate Tax Levy Limitation--
Exemption of County from Said Limitation
Synopsis: The Board of County Commissioners of Mitchell
County possessed the authority to exempt the county
from the provisions of K.S.A. 79-5001 to 79-5016,
inclusive, to the extent of the costs to be incurred
by the county in the operation of the sheriff's
department in fiscal year 1983 and each year there-
after, and to prescribe that, for the purpose of
determining the county's compliance with the
limitation prescribed in K.S.A. 79-5003, those costs
are not to be included in determining the aggregate
amount of taxes levied by the county in said years.
Attorney General Opinion Nos. 81-168 and 77-272
affirmed herein. Cited herein: K.S.A. 19-101a
(as amended by L. 1982, ch. 115, §1), 79-5002,
79-5003, 79-5004, 79-5006, 79-5007, 79-5008,
79-5009, 79-5011, 79-5016.
*
Dear Mr. Ludwig:
You ask us to review a charter resolution adopted by the Board
of County Commissioners of Mitchell County whereby said Board
exempted the county from the provisions of K.S.A. 79-5001 to
79-5016, inclusive, commonly known as the "Tax Lid Law," to the
extent of the costs incurred by the county in the operation of
the sheriff's department. You ask whether the county has the
authority to exempt these costs from the calculation of the
county's aggregate tax levy limitation, and whether the charter
resolution is sufficient to accomplish the intended result of
allowing the county to impose an aggregate amount of ad valorem
taxes in excess of the aggregate amount of such taxes it would
have been authorized to levy under the "tax lid."
The matter of a city or county exempting itself, by charter
ordinance or charter resolution, from the aggregate tax levy
limitation prescribed in K.S.A. 79-5001 et seq. has been the
subject of several opinions issued by this office. In addition,
in recent months, the Municipal Accounting Section of the Division
of Accounts and Reports of the Department of Administration has
made a number of inquiries concerning this subject. Thus, we
shall address this matter in some detail.
The Mitchell County Charter Resolution submitted by you contains
only four sections. The third and fourth sections relate to
publication of the charter resolution and the time at which the
same is to become effective. These sections are in compliance
with the requirements of K.S.A. 19-101b, and are not pertinent
to your inquiry.
The remainder of the Charter Resolution prescribes as follows:
"C H A R T E R R E S O L U T I O N
"A CHARTER RESOLUTION exempting the Board of County
Commissioners of Mitchell County from the provisions
of K.S.A. 79-5001 through 79-5016, and any amend-
ments thereto, relating to Aggregate Tax Levy
Limitations to remove the total costs incurred by
the County in the operation of the Sheriff's Department.
"BE IT RESOLVED by the Board of County Commissioners
of Mitchell County, Kansas:
"Section 1. That Mitchell County, Kansas, under
authority of K.S.A. 19-101a et seq., and any amend-
ments thereto (County Home Rule), hereby elects to
exempt itself from and make inapplicable to it, K.S.A.
79-5001 through 79-5016, and any amendments thereto,
to the extent of the total cost incurred by the
County in the operation of the Sheriff's Department.
K.S.A. 79-5001 through 79-5016, and any amendments
thereto, are applicable to Mitchell County, Kansas,
but are not uniformly applicable to all Counties.
"Section 2. That the Governing Body of Mitchell
County, Kansas, is hereby authorized and empowered
to levy taxes in each year on each dollar of assessed
tangible valuation of said County for County purposes
in an amount necessary to meet the requirements of
its adopted budget and that portion of such levy
to be used for operation of the Sheriff's Department
shall be outside of the Aggregate Tax Levy Limitation."
In order to analyze the intent and effect of the above-quoted
provisions, we believe it is necessary to understand the purpose
of the Tax Lid Law and its application to Mitchell County, prior
to the adoption of these provisions.
The intent and purpose of K.S.A. 79-5001 to K.S.A. 79-5016,
inclusive, is stated by the legislature in K.S.A. 79-5004. This
statute, in part, states:
"It is the intent of K.S.A. 75-5001 to 79-5016,
inclusive, to prescribe a limitation upon the
aggregate amount which may be levied with certain
exceptions upon tangible property by each .
[city or county] of the state and not to pre-
scribe a limitation upon the amount produced by
each of the several levies imposed by such taxing
subdivisions for its [sic] various tax supported
funds." (Emphasis added.)
In the same statute, the legislature commands:
"It shall be the duty of the governing body of
each . . . [city or county] to adjust legally
authorized levies for separate funds or functions
of the . . . [city or county] within the aggregate
limitation imposed under the provisions of this
act."
From these provisions, we think it is absolutely clear that
the purpose of the Tax Lid Law is to fix a maximum dollar amount
which may be raised by each city or county in the state, through
the imposition of property taxes upon tangible property.
The maximum dollar amount a city or county can raise through
property tax impositions under the provisions of the Tax Lid Law
is determined by the amount of "taxes levied for the base year"
by the city or county. Under the Tax Lid Law, "base year" means
"either the year 1969 or 1970," whichever is designated the base
year by the city or county. K.S.A. 79-5002(a). The phrase "taxes
levied - for the base year" means "taxes, other than special assess-
ments and . . . levies specified in K.S.A. 79-5011, which were
levied in the year next preceding the base year and which became
due on November 1 of such preceding year for the use of and expendi-
ture by [the] taxing subdivision during the base year." K.S.A.
79-5002(b).
The limitation prescribed under the Tax Lid Law is stated in
K.S.A. 79-5003, thusly:
"Except as otherwise hereinafter provided,
no . . . [city or county] shall certify to
the county clerk of the county any tax levies
upon tangible property, excluding taxes levied
as special assessments and excluding levies
specified in K.S.A. 79-5011, and amendments
thereto, which in the aggregate will produce
an amount in excess of the amount which was
levied by . . . [the city or county] for the
base year."
This statute further provides:
"All tax levies now-or hereafter authorized by
law to be made by . . . [cities and counties],
except levies specifically excluded under the
provisions of K.S.A. 79-5011, shall be subject
to the aggregate limitation prescribed here-
under unless the provisions of the act autho-
rizing the levy specifically states that such
levy is exempt from the limitation imposed under
the provisions of K.S.A. 79-5001 to 79-5016, inclusive."
Thus, except for certain adjustments provided in various other
sections of the Tax Lid Law and except for levies that are
specifically exempted from the provisions of K.S.A. 79-5001 to
79-5016, inclusive, no city or county can certify to the county
clerk in any year an amount of property taxes in excess of the
amount of property taxes levied by the city or county for the
base year. For example, if a city designated 1970 as its base
year, and the city, in 1969 levied, in the aggregate, $100,000 in
property taxes which were subject to the limitation prescribed
under the Tax Lid Law, and which were to be expended by the city
in 1970, then the city could not, in any year, certify to the
county clerk more than $100,000 in property taxes, which are subject
to the limitation prescribed under the Tax Lid Law, except for
adjustments made to that amount under K.S.A. 79-5006, 79-5007,
79-5008 and 79-5009.
Thus, prior to the adoption of the Mitchell County Charter Resolution
about which you inquire, said county had designated a base year,
the amount of taxes levied for the base year of the county had
been determined, and the procedure for calculating the maximum
amount of taxes that could be levied by the county for any year
was fixed by the provisions of K.S.A. 79-5001 et seq.
Whether the base year designated by Mitchell County was 1969
or 1970, the amount of taxes levied for the base year of the
county included a certain sum of money to pay the costs to be
incurred by the county in the operation of the Mitchell County
Sheriff's Department. These costs were part of the ordinary,
usual, and reoccurring expenses of the county and, thus, were
included in Mitchell County's general fund tax levy for the base
year. Therefore, said costs were included in determining the
aggregate tax levy limitation of Mitchell County, under the
provisions of K.S.A. 79-5001 to 79-5016, inclusive, and these
costs would have continued to have been included in determining
the county's total amount of taxes levied for each fiscal year,
had the county not adopted the charter resolution now under review,
since said costs necessarily are part of the county general fund.
With these facts in mind, we think the result sought by the
Mitchell County Board of Commissioners through the adoption of
this charter resolution is crystal clear. The result was to be
that, in determining the total amount of property taxes levied
by the county for expenditure in 1983 and each year thereafter,
the sum of money to be expended by the county for operation of
its sheriff's department was not to be considered. In our
judgment, the provisions of the charter resolution adequately
express this intent and are sufficient to accomplish the intended
result.
The interpretation of this charter resolution, like the inter-
pretation of any local ordinance or resolution, must be made
in accordance with the rules of construction that apply in
regard to a state statute [see Phillips v. Vieux, 210 Kan.
612, 617 (1972) and Desser v. City of Wichita, 96 Kan. 820, 821
(1915)], and "[t]he fundamental rule of statutory construction
to which all other rules are subordinate, is that the purpose
and intent of the legislature governs when that intent can be
ascertained from the statute." In re Adoption of Trent, 229 Kan.
224, Syl. 111 (1981). In addition, in determining legislative
intent, the court may properly look to the purpose to be ac-
complished, and the necessity and effect of the statute. See
State ex rel. Stephan v. Lane, 228 Kan. 379, Syl. 1f11 (1980) and
the case cited therein at 390. Moreover, there is a presump-
tion the legislature did not intend to do a useless and sense-
less thing through the enactment of a statute. See Herd v.
Chambers, 158 Kan. 614 (1944).
In this case, the legislature body, i.e., the Board of County
Commissioners of Mitchell County, has enacted that the county be
exempt from K.S.A. 79-5001 to 79-5016 "to the extent of the total
costs incurred by the County in the operation of the Sheriff's
Department." Mitchell County Charter Resolution, Section 1.
We believe the intent of the governing body was that the amount
of taxes levied by the county for 1983 and each year thereafter,
for the purpose of operating the county sheriff's department,
although necessarily included as part of the county's general
fund tax levy, was not to be included in determining the aggregate
amount of taxes levied by the county in any such year. Thus, the
amount of money to be used for this purpose, like the amount of
money to be used for any purpose specified in K.S.A. 79-5011, is
not to be included in determining the aggregate amount of property
taxes levied by Mitchell County, for the purpose of determining
the county's compliance with the limitation prescribed in K.S.A.
79-5003.
The question remains, however, whether the Board of County
Commissioners possessed the authority to adopt the provisions
of this charter resolution.
Under the provisions of K.S.A. 19-101a (as amended by L. 1982,
ch. 115, §1), counties are "empowered to transact all county
business and perform such powers of local legislation and admin-
istration as they deem appropriate," subject to numerous limita-
tions, restrictions and prohibitions prescribed in this statute.
The only limitation in K.S.A. 19-101a, as amended that might
prohibit Mitchell County from adopting the provisions of the
charter resolution here under review is the first limitation
prescribed in the statute. It states: "[C]ounties shall be
subject to all acts of the legislature which apply uniformly to
all counties." K.S.A. 19-101a, First.
On August 17, 1977, this office issued Attorney General Opinion
No. 77-272, in which it was concluded that the act in which the
various sections now found at K.S.A. 79-5001 to 79-5017, inclusive,
were enacted, was an act of the legislature which did not apply
uniformly to all counties. Thus, the limitation prescribed in
K.S.A. 19-101a, First, did not prohibit a county from exempting
itself from the provisions of those statutes.
In Attorney General Opinion No. 81-168, we concurred with the
conclusion stated in the prior opinion. We again do so and
conclude that a county, through the exercise of its county home
rule powers, may exempt itself from the provisions of K.S.A.
79-5001 to 79-5016, inclusive, or any part thereof. Conse-
gently, we are of the opinion the Board of County Commissioners
of Mitchell County possessed the authority to exempt the county
from the provisions of K.S.A. 79-5001 to 79-5016, inclusive,
to the extent of the costs to be incurred by the county in the
operation of the sheriff's department in fiscal year 1983 and
each year thereafter, and to prescribe that, for the purpose
of determining the county's compliance with the limitation
prescribed in K.S.A. 79-5003, those costs, are not to be included
in determining the aggregate amount of taxes levied by the county
for any such year.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Assistant Attorney General
Rodney J. Bieker
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:RJB:jm

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.