Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-152

1982-152Kanag

Gesamter Gesetzestext

July 9, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82-152
Robert H. Royer, Jr.
101 1/2 N.W. Third
P. 0. Box 413
Abilene, Kansas 67410
Re: Automobiles and Other Vehicles -- Serious Traffic
Offenses -- Driving While Under Influence of Alcohol;
Effect of State Law on City Ordinances
Criminal Procedure -- Procedure After Arrest --
Prohibition of Plea-Bargaining
Synopsis: As amended by 1982 Senate Bill No. 699, K.S.A. 1981
Supp. 8-1567 provides [at subsection (n)] that a
city may enact an ordinance which prohibits or
makes unlawful the same acts as are dealt with by
the statute, provided that the ordinance's minimum
penalties are the same as the statutes for any
given violation, and the ordinance's maximum penalty
does not exceed that of the statute. Apart from
these limits, K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1567 as amended
does not preempt a city from taking action in this
area. As amended by 1982 Senate Bill No. 699,
K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1567(c), (d) and (e) prohi-
bit a prosecuting attorney from entering into
any plea-bargaining agreement by which a defen-
dant enters a guilty or no contest plea to a
lesser offense than that originally charged.
While no sanctions against such conduct exist
under the statute, provisions of the general
ouster law could be applied against prosecuting
attorneys who violate the prohibition against
plea-bargaining. Cited herein: K.S.A. 1981 Supp.
8-1567, as amended by 1982 Senate Bill No. 699,
K.S.A. 22-2907, 22-2908.
As municipal judge for the cities of Solomon and Hope, Kansas,
you request our opinion as to two questions concerning the
recent revisions to K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1567. That statute,
which concerns the offense of operating a vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol, was extensively amended by 1982
Senate Bill No. 699. You inquire regarding the effect of
these changes upon city ordinances which presently speak to
the same offense, and the scope of the bill's prohibitions
against "plea bargaining" agreements.
Prior to the effective date of 1982 Senate Bill No. 699
(July 1, 1982), K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1567(c) established the
following penalties for violation of the statute:
"Every person who is convicted of a violation
of this section shall be punished by imprison-
ment of not more than one (1) year, or by a
fine of not less than one hundred dollars
($100) nor more than five hundred dollars
($500), or by both such fine and imprisonment.
On a second or subsequent conviction he or she
shall be punished by imprisonment for not less
than ninety (90) days nor more than one (1)
year, and, in the discretion of the court, a
fine of not more than five hundred dollars
($500)."
In that the terms of the statute do not make reference to any
city ordinance on the subject, many cities have adopted the
statute by reference, using the model set out in the Standard
Traffic Ordinance for Kansas Cities published by the League
of Kansas Municipalities. The most recent version, published
in 1979, reproduces the above-quoted portion of subsection
(c) verbatim (at Article 6, Section 30), with one exception.
That change, which reduces the maximum sentence from one year
to six months, avoids any conflict with court decisions which
require a jury trial when a sentence greater than six months
may be imposed. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct.
1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66,
90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970).
As amended, K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1567 contains a new subsection
(n), which states:
"Nothing contained in this section shall be
construed as preventing any city from enacting
ordinances declaring acts prohibited or made
unlawful by this act as unlawful or prohibited
in such city and prescribing penalties for vio-
lation thereof, but the minimum penalty in any
such ordinance shall not be less than nor ex-
ceed the minimum penalty prescribed by this
act for the same violation, nor shall the maxi-
mum penalty in any such ordinance exceed the
maximum penalty prescribed for the same viola-
tion."
This new language evinces a clear legislative intent that a
city is still free to enact its own ordinance making it a
violation to operate a vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol. As a result, the field has not been totally pre-
empted. City of Garden City v. Miller, 181 Kan. 360 (1957).
However, the legislature has also made it clear that the
ordinance of any city must contain minimum penalties equal
to those of the statute, insuring that the purpose of the new,
tougher drunk driving laws is not diluted by city ordinances
which impose substantially weaker penalties.
Additionally, it is our opinion that, as the statute is of
uniform application across the state, a city may not enforce
an ordinance whose provisions conflict with those of the
statute. Such a conflict has been defined as occurring where
the ordinance prohibits what the statute permits or allows
what the statute does not permit. City of Junction City v.
Lee, 216 Kan. 495 (1975). In that the present model ordinance
in the Standard Traffic Ordinance contains minimum penalties
which do not equal those of subsections (c), (d) and (e) of
the statute, a conflict arises which can only be resolved in
favor of the statute. See, e.g., Missouri Pacific Railroad v.
Board of Greeley County Comm'rs, 231 Kan. 225 (1982). Therefore,
upon the effective date of 1982 Senate Bill No. 699, the penalty
provisions of any city ordinance which do not meet the standard
of subsection (n) are invalid. We note that this situation may
be distinguished from that in City of Junction City v. Lee, supra,
where no such express, over-riding language existed in the statute
that was alleged to be in conflict with the city ordinance.
Your second inquiry concerns the effect of language contained
in the amendments to subsections (c), (d) and (e) of the
statute. In each case, the following prohibition appears:
"No plea bargaining agreement shall be entered
into nor shall any judge approve a plea bar-
gaining agreement entered into for the purpose
of permitting a person charged with a viola-
tion of this section, or any ordinance of a
city in this state which prohibits the acts
prohibited by this section, to avoid the man-
datory penalties established by this subsec-
tion or the ordinance."
In that the term "plea bargaining agreement" is never defined
in the bill, you wish to know the particular conduct which is
proscribed, as well as the extent of a court's power to enforce
the prohibition. We note you raise no concerns regarding the
constitutionality of the prohibition.
While the term "plea-bargaining" is not defined by the provisions
of the amended statute, the concept is a well-established one,
both in this state and nationally. In the decision of State v.
Byrd, 203 Kan. 45 (1969), the court gave its official sanction
to the actions of prosecuting attorneys in entering into
discussions and agreements with an accused concerning the
latter's plea. While the court in Byrd did not discuss the
various contexts in which plea-bargaining may occur, the term
is used generally to describe any discussion or agreement in
which a defendant enters a guilty or nolo contendere plea
to a lesser offense than that originally charged. See e.g.
9 W.L.J. 430 (1969). The Byrd decision does set forth guide-
lines for the use of this tool, both at the discussion (203
Kan. at 51) and the agreement (203 Kan. at 51-52) stages.
Further standards are set out in Standards Relating to the
Administration of Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function,
Part IV (1971).
Under the provisions of K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1567 (c), (d)
and (e) as amended, prosecuting attorneys cannot enter into
such agreements, nor can a judge approve them. While the
decision to prosecute a specific violation is left to the
prosecuting attorney [State v. Greenlee, 228 Kan. 712 (1980)],
he or she cannot negotiate with a defendant for the entering
of a specified plea in return for a reduction in the charge
to a lesser offense such as reckless driving. While the bill
provides no sanctions against such agreements, as they must
be further approved by the court, it is unlikely that a
prosecuting attorney could in fact achieve a reduction in
the charge pursuant to an agreement with a defendant. In
extreme cases, however, the general remedy of ouster would
be available, as it is for any situation involving willful
misconduct of a public official. K.S.A. 60-1205 et seq.
In conclusion, as amended by 1982 Senate Bill No. 699, K.S.A.
1981 Supp. 8-1567 provides fat subsection (1)] that a city
may enact an ordinance which prohibits or makes unlawful the
same acts as are dealt with by the statute, provided that the
ordinance's minimum penalties are the same as the statute's
for any given violation, and the ordinance's maximum penalty
does not exceed that of the statute. Apart from these limits,
K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1567 as amended does not preempt a city
from taking action in this area. As amended by 1982 Senate
Bill No. 699, K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1567(d), (d) and (e) prohi-
bit a prosecuting attorney from entering into any plea-
bargaining agreement by which a defendant enters a guilty
or no contest plea to a lesser offense than that originally
charged. While no sanctions against such conduct exist under
the statute, provisions of the general ouster law could be
applied against prosecuting attorneys who violate the prohibi-
tion against plea-bargaining.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
'Jeffrey S. Southard
Assistant Attorney General
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