Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-144

1982-144Kanag

Gesamter Gesetzestext

June 30, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION CIO. 82- 144
James L. Wisler
Linn County Attorney
Judicial Building
Mound City, Kansas 66056
Re: Counties and County Officers -- Conflict of
Interests -- Prohibited Contracts
Synopsis: K.S.A. 75-4304 prohibits a county commissioner
from contracting, in his official capacity, with
a business in which the commissioner has a sub-
stantial interest. The prohibition is not elim-
inated if the other county commissioners approve
the subject contracts.
K.S.A. 75-4304 does not preclude participation by
the county commissioner in county commission deci-
sions to accept or reject bids for county work
from contractors to whom the county commissioner
sells automobile batteries, so long as the commis-
sioner has no substantial interest in any contrac-
tor bidding for county work. Cited herein: K.S.A.
75-4301, K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75-4302, K.S.A. 75-4304,
K.A.R. 19-51-2(c).
Dear Mr. Wisler:
You have informed this office that a Linn County commissioner
is engaged in the sale of automobile batteries as his primary
business, and the commissioner's disclosure of substantial
interests, filed pursuant to K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75-4302, indi-
cates that he has a substantial interest in an automobile
battery business that contracts with Linn County, as well as
various contractors that bid on county contracts. However,
the battery purchases by Linn County are not made subsequent
to competitive bidding.
The questions raised in your opinion request may be stated
as follows:
1. Does the Commissioner have a conflict of interests
vis a vis the sale of automobile batteries to Linn
County?
2. May the commissioner's automobile battery business
contract with Linn County if such contracts are approved
by the other two Linn County commissioners?
3. Does the commissioner have a conflict of interests
vis a vis his sale of automobile batteries to contrac-
tors who bid on county projects?
4. May the commissioner vote on bids made by contrac-
tors to whom he sells batteries, or should he abstain
from such votes?
Prior to addressing these questions, an overview of conflict
of interests law will be helpful. K.S.A. 75-4304 states:
"(a) No public officer or employee shall in
his or her capacity as such officer or em-
ployee, make or participate in the making of
a contract with any person or business by
which he or she is employed or in whose busi-
ness he or she has a substantial interest,
and no such person or business shall enter
into any contract where any public officer or
employee, acting in such capacity, is a signa-
tory to or a participant in the making of such
contract and is employed by or has a substan-
tial interest in such person or business. A
public officer or employee does not make or
participate in the making of a contract if he
or she abstains from any action in regard to
the contract.
"This section shall not apply to the following:
"(1) Contracts let after competitive bidding
has been advertised for by published notice;
and
"(2) Contracts for property or services for
which the price or rate is fixed by law.
"(b) Any public officer or employee who is
convicted of violating this section shall for-
feit his or her office or employment."
K.S.A. 75-4304 was analyzed in Attorney General Opinion No.
74-269 and it was determined that the act is intended to pro-
hibit self-dealing, i.e., it precludes a public officer or
employee, acting in that capacity, from making or participat-
ing in the making of a contract with a business in which he
or she has a substantial interest. The opinion also states
that
"a public officer or employee may not be a
party to a contract in connection with which
he enjoys a dual role, i.e., acting or par-
ticipating therein in both his public and
private capacities."
K.S.A. 75-4304 is the codification of the common-law rule
which precludes the making of contracts between counties and
members of a governing board having an interest in such con-
tract or agreement. Southern v. Beeler, 195 S.W.2d 857 (Tenn.
1946), Bosworth v. Hagerty, 99 N.W.2d 334 (S.D. 1959), Miller
v. County of Lake, 404 N.E.2d 222 (Ill. 1980), State, ex rel.,
v. Schroeder, 199 Kan. 403 (1967), Sedgwick County v. State,
66 Kan. 634 (1903). It has been held that even an indirect
interest, such as owning stock in a company benefitting from
a county contract, is sufficient to disqualify the county
official from acting on the contract. Clark v. Utah Constr.
Co., 8 P.2d 454 (Idaho, 1932), Claxton v. Johnson County, 20
S.E.2d 606 (Ga., 1942), Githens v. Butler County, 164 S.W.2d
650 (Mo. 1942), Paisley & Co. v. Cole & Miller, 1 Tenn. App.
714 (1926), Adams v. Bd. of Trustees of Employees Retirement
Sys. of Baltimore, 137 A.2d 151 (Md., 1957).
This issue has been the subject of several previous attorney
general opinions. In a letter opinion to the Hugoton city
attorney dated November 2, 1971 (VII Op. Att'y Gen. 912), it
was determined that the conflict of interests statute precluded
certain city councilmen from contracting with the city of
Hugoton to provide data processing equipment. General author-
ities support this conclusion. In C. Antieau, County Law
(1982), for example, the author states that a county official
"occupies a fiduciary relationship to the
county. Such officers and employees are ob-
ligated to discharge their responsibilities
with integrity and fidelity. They may not
prostitute their official position for their
private benefit. County officers and employ-
ees are accountable to the county for every
violation of good faith in dealings with and
for the county." Id. at §34.08, p. 96.
The members comprising the governing body of a county have
also been characterized as trustees with a fiduciary respon-
sibility to their constituents. Butler County v. Campbell,
182 S.W.2d 589, 591-592 (Mo., 1944).
Considering the foregoing legal authorities we shall address
each question posed by your opinion request.
1. Does the commissioner have a conflict of interests
vis a vis the sale of automobile batteries to Linn County?
The commissioner's disclosure of substantial interests indi-
cates that he is the owner of a battery company which sells
automobile batteries to Linn County. Thus, we are of the
opinion that the commissioner would be acting contrary to
the provisions of K.S.A. 75-4304 if he voted for or partici-
pated in the making of a contract between the county and his
battery company. Since there is no indication that any com-
petitive bidding takes place prior to the purchase of the
automobile batteries, or that the prices of the batteries
are fixed by law, the statutory exceptions at paragraphs (1)
and (2) of K.S.A. 75-4304(a) are not applicable.
2. May the commissioner's automobile battery business
contract with Linn County if such contracts are approved
by the other two Linn County commissioners?
The prohibitions of K.S.A. 74-4304 extend to businesses af-
fected with a proscribed interest that attempt to contract
with the county when the interested government officer (here,
the county commissioner) participates in the making of the
contract. However, the prohibitions of K.S.A. 75-4304 are
not triggered unless the interested government officer
"participates" in the making of such contracts. In Attorney
General Opinion No. 73-164 a contract between Riley County
and a company owned by one of the county commissioners was
questioned vis a vis K.S.A. 75-4301 et seq. The opinion dis-
cussed the prohibition against participation by a public
officer in making a contract as follows:
"This is a broad prohibition and it seems to
us that merely abstaining from signing a con-
tract is not sufficient; a public officer or
employee must not participate in any way in
the making of such a contract. Thus it would
be improper for the public official or employee
to participate in any deliberations of the
governing body regarding the terms of [sic]
conditions of such. It would be prudent for
him to exclude himself from any meeting or
that part thereof wherein such contracts are
being considered." (Emphasis original.)
We note that the 1974 amendment to K.S.A. 75-4304 added the
following language:
"A public officer or employee does not make
or participate in the making of a contract if
he or she abstains from any action in regard
to the contract."
This amendment was subsequent to the issuance of Attorney
General Opinion No. 73-164, supra, and it is our considered
opinion that the amendment codified the restrictive language
of the above-cited attorney general opinion. Further, this
is consistent with the interpretation of K.S.A. 75-4304 by
the Governmental Ethics Commission (now Public Disclosure
Commission) in their Opinion No. 75-75.
Accordingly, if the commissioner "participates" in the making
of contracts with a business affected with a proscribed in-
terest, the concurring votes of the other two commissioners
would be ineffective to remove the statutory prohibition. To
avoid the proscription of K.S.A. 75-4304, the commissioner
in question must abstain from "any action" regarding the
contract.
3. Does the commissioner have a conflict of interest
vis a vis his sale of automobile batteries to contrac-
tors who bid on county projects.
The prohibitions of K.S.A. 75-4304 are applicable when a
county commissioner has a substantial interest in a business
that seeks to contract with the county. Substantial interest
is defined at K.S.A. 75-4301 as follows:
"The ownership by an individual or his or her
spouse, either individually or collectively
of a legal or equitable interest exceeding five
thousand dollars ($5,000) or five percent (5%)
of any business, whichever is less, and also
including the receipt by an individual or his
or her spouse directly or indirectly of any
salary, gratuity, other compensation or remun
eration or a contract for or promise or expec-
tation of any such salary, gratuity, other com-
pensation or remuneration having a dollar val-
ue of one thousand dollars ($1,000) or more in
the current or immediately preceding or succeed-
ing calendar year from any business or combina-
tion of businesses, and also including the hold-
ing of the position of officer or director of
any business, irrespective of the amount of com-
pensation or remuneration received by the per-
son holding any such position. If a person's
salary, compensation or other remuneration is
a portion or percentage of a fee paid to a
business or combination of businesses, a per-
son shall have a substantial interest in any
client who pays a fee to such business or com-
bination of business from which fee such per-
son receives one thousand dollars ($1,000) or
more in the current or immediately preceding
calendar year."
A similar issue was addressed in a letter opinion issued
May 5, 1972, to the St. Francis city attorney. VII Op. Att'y
Gen. 1019. There, the city had been awarded a federally
financed housing project. The city was responsible for con-
ducting preliminary studies and was to advertise for bids
from developers for the construction project. Upon completion
of construction and approval by the city council, title to
the housing project property was to be conveyed to the city.
One city councilman owned a tract of real property under con-
sideration as a site for the housing project. The issue was
whether a conflict of interests existed should the councilman
sell the land to the developer and subsequently participate
in the deliberations to accept or reject the project for the
city. The opinion found no conflict of interests because
"the property owned by the councilman in ques-
tion would be sold not to the city but to the
developer, as we understand. If the project
is accepted by the city, the property, as part
of the completed project, is transferred only
at that time from the developer to the city.
The councilman's participation in the decision
to accept or reject the project raises no ques-
tion, in our opinion, under the general con-
flict of interest law, nor does his sale of
the land to the developer itself." Id.
The prohibitions of K.S.A. 75-4304 were not applicable in the
St. Francis case because the city councilman was not attempt-
ing to arrange a contract between the city and a business in
which he had a substantial interest. Further, the St. Francis
city councilman's subsequent participation in the city's deci-
sion to accept or reject the housing project would have no
financial effect on his prior sale of the land in question,
i.e., the councilman did not stand to gain anything by his
subsequent official participation in decisions regarding the
subject real property.
This is in contrast to the situation where the county commis-
sioner participates in contract deliberations regarding
businesses to which his company has sold batteries in the
past and with which there is an expectation of a continued
commercial relationship. Commercial relationships that gen-
erate at least one thousand dollars worth of compensation in
a calendar year may create a substantial interest pursuant
to K.S.A. 75-4301. We also note that a substantial interest
in a business may result from the indirect receipt or anti-
cipated receipt of compensation or remuneration.
From the information you have provided us, we are unable to
discern whether the commissioner has a substantial interest
in any business other than those listed on his disclosure of
substantial interests. However, if the commissioner has any
question whether the relationship between his battery company
and any other business creates a substantial interest in such
other business, we suggest that he advise the Public Disclo-
sure Commission of the particular details involved and request
an advisory opinion from the Commission as to his appropriate
course of action.
4. May a commissioner vote on bids made by contrac-
tors to whom he sells batteries, or should he abstain
from such votes?
The response to this question is suggested by the answer
immediately preceding. K.S.A. 75-4304 prohibits participa-
tion in contract deliberations and votes only when a commis-
sioner has a substantial interest in the business attempting
to secure a county contract. Therefore, a commissioner may
vote on bids made by contractors to whom his company sells
batteries, so long as he has no substantial interest in any
of the businesses attempting to secure county contracts.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Robert Vinson Eye
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:RVE:hle

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.