Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-050

1982-050Kanag

Gesamter Gesetzestext

February 25, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82-50
The Honorable LeRoy F. Fry
Kansas State Representative
State Capitol, Room 272-W
Topeka, Kansas
Re: Public Health--Solid and Hazardous Waste--
Condemnation of Property For Storing Radioactive
Waste
Synopsis: The provisions of K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 65-3449(b)
cannot be construed as an implied delegation of
the power of eminent domain to any state board or
agency.
If the Kansas Legislature were to enact legislation
authorizing condemnation proceedings to acquire
real property for use as a radioactive waste storage
facility, and declaring condemnation of property for
such use to be a "public use," the condemnation of
property under such an enactment would probably be
upheld by the courts of this state. However, any
specific "taking" of property, thereunder, would be
open to judicial review for the purpose of considering
public use, fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion.
Cited herein: K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 65-3445 and 65-3449.
*
Dear Representative Fry:
You request our opinion as to whether the state of Kansas has
the authority, under the general power of eminent domain, to
take property for use as a high-level or low-level radioactive
waste storage facility. Although our research has failed to
reveal any Kansas case, or cases from other jurisdictions, where
this specific question has been addressed, we will respond to
your inquiry by providing a general review of the law of eminent
domain.
In Weast v. Budd, 186 Kan. 249 (1960), the Kansas Supreme Court
defined the power of eminent domain as follows:
"[E]minent domain is the right to take private
property for public use without the owner's
consent upon payment of just compensation. The
right is an inherent power of the sovereignty
and comes into being with the establishment
of government and continues as long as the
government endures, but its exercise may be
limited by the constitution. Except as so
limited, it may be exercised for any public
purpose designated by the legislature and in
the manner it prescribes." (Citations omitted.)
186 Kan. at 252.
In Soden v. State Highway Commission, 192 Kan. 241 (1963), the
Court enunciated the following principles regarding the exercise
of the power of eminent domain:
"It rests with the legislature to determine
the power of eminent domain, when the power
may be exercised and the character, method
and extent of such exercise. The power of
eminent domain can only be exercised by
virtue of a legislative enactment. However,
once the legislature has delegated to a
public authority the power to determine the
necessity of exercising the power, the decision
of the grantee as to the necessity can only
be reviewed by the courts for the purpose of
considering public use, fraud, bad faith, or
abuse of discretion. A court cannot sit in
judgment on the motives actuating a public
authority in pursuing a course authorized by
the legislature." [Citations omitted.] (Emphasis
added.) 192 Kan. at 244.
As is apparent from the underscored portion of the above quotation,
one of the questions which would arise if the Kansas Legislature
were to authorize the condemnation of property for use as a
high-level or low-level radioactive waste facility is whether
such a condemnation would be for a "public use." In this regard,
the Kansas Supreme Court has stated that, although such a question'
is a "judicial question for the determination of the court . . . ,
a legislative declaration with respect to that question is
entitled to a prima facie acceptance of its correctness." State,
ex rel., v. City of Topeka, 176 Kan. 240 (1954), Syllabus No. 6.
Therefore, if the Kansas Legislature declared that the condemnation
of property for use as a radioactive waste facility would be for
a public use, such a declaration would be entitled to a "prima
facie acceptance of its correctness."
Also in regard to the public use requirement, it should be noted
the state of Oregon has authorized its "Environmental Quality
Commission" to institute condemnation proceedings to acquire
real property for the disposal of hazardous wastes (see Oregon
Rev. Stat. §459.595), and that the state of Maryland has authorized
its "Department of Health and Mental Hygiene" to condemn any land
or facility used for disposal of hazardous substances, provided
the condemnation "is necessary to provide for proper perpetual
care and monitoring of the facility" [see Md. Natural Res. Code
Ann. §8-1413.2(n) (Michie Supp. 1981)]. Our research has failed
to reveal any reported case wherein a "taking" under either of
these two statutes has been challenged on the basis of the public
use requirement.
"Public land siting" of hazardous waste sites, and the exercise
of the power of eminent domain in acquiring sites, was discussed
in a recent law review article. 1 Although the author's position
represents only one person's opinion, which may or may not be
supported by other authorities, the following excerpt from the
article is relevant to the question which has been posed:
"Closely related to state identification of
hazardous waste sites is the idea of siting
on state-owned land. Public land siting can
also entail state operation of the facility,
operation by a private licensee, or the avail-
ability of both options. Eminent domain has
also been recommended for the quick and assured
capture of sites for private facilities and is
usually presupposed an integral part of the
public land siting option. The justifications
1Wolfe, Public Opposition to Hazardous Waste" Sites: The
Self-Defeating Approach to National Hazardous Waste Control
Under Subtitle C of The Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976, 8 Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review
463 (1980).
for public siting seem to be that it allows
the prompt acquisition and development of sites
when needed, provides a stronger state role in
site care during and after operations, and,
through the intermediary of state government,
moves citizens closer to decisions about the
proper management of hazardous waste sites.
"The rationales for public siting dissolve when
public siting is scrutinized either as it has
actually been practiced or alongside other reg-
ulatory measures which attain the same ends.
The ultimate in public land siting is the govern-
ment owned and operated waste facility, yet this
facility is just as prone to hazardous waste
pollution catastrophe as any private facility
sited on private or public land. A case in point
is the hazardous waste disaster at the federally
owned Rocky Mountain Arsenal near Denver.
Discharges of industrial and military wastes at the
arsenal have contaminated thirty square miles
of underground water and EPA believes that merely
to study the problem could cost up to $78 million;
the actual clean-up costs would be several times
larger. From the perspective of Subtitle C control,
public land siting provides neither greater nor
lesser citizen power in the management of hazardous
waste sites than does private land siting. No
distinction between hazardous wastes facilities
on public land and those on private land is made
by Subtitle C or its draft regulations either
in the type of control or in the extent of public
involvement in the regulation of the facilities.
The only advantage possibly gained by public
siting or eminent domain for hazardous waste
facilities is a greater ease in securing sites.
Public ownership of hazardous waste sites, in
itself, gives no assurance of greater security
against harm nor of diminished public opposition.
"EPA has not adopted a formal policy supporting
or promoting the use of public land (federal,
state or local) for the siting of hazardous waste
facilities in any manner. Conspicuous in its
absence is any provision in Subtitle C which
even faintly refers to state or federal ownership
of hazardous waste sites or facilities. The
Subtitle C which Congress fashioned is firmly
anchored to the long-held assumption that
the private sector is competent to manage
waste sites and the proper role of govern-
ment is as a regulator not an owner or
operator of waste sites. Whether private
waste facility operators are in fact competent
is another matter, but there is no reason
to believe state government can do a better
job of running hazardous waste sites."
(Emphasis added.) [Footnotes omitted.]
Although there appears to be some doubt as to the wisdom of
public siting of hazardous waste facilities, such questions must
be resolved by the legislature, not the courts. As we previously
noted above, our research has failed to reveal any Kansas
case, or cases from other jurisdictions, which have considered
whether the taking of property for a hazardous waste disposal
site is for a "public purpose." Additionally, the Kansas Supreme
Court has stated that "it has been impossible for courts to define
comprehensively the concept of a public use and to formulate
a universal test, due, no doubt, to the diversity of local
conditions and circumstances in an inevitably changing world."
Ottawa Hunting Ass'n v. State, 178 Kan. 460, 464 (1955). Although
the question has apparently not been addressed in any reported
case, it is our opinion that if the Kansas Legislature were to
enact legislation authorizing condemnation proceedings to acquire
real property for use as a radioactive waste storage facility,
and declaring condemnation of property for such use to be a
"public use," the condemnation of property under such an
enactment would probably be upheld by the courts of this state.
Of course, any specific "taking" of property, thereunder, would
be open to judicial review for the purpose of considering public
use, fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion. See Soden v.
State Highway Commission, supra.
Finally, it should be recognized that there is no statutory
enactment which, at the present time, authorizes condemnation
of real property for use in storing radioactive wastes. Although
state law (K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 65-3449 and 65-3445) requires that
the state of Kansas acquire the physical site of any commercial
radioactive waste disposal or storage facility, or that such
lands be owned by the federal government, such a requirement
is not a delegation of the power of eminent domain to the Hazardous
Waste Facility Board or the Kansas Department of Health and Environment.
The power of eminent domain is not lightly inferred, but must
be articulated in any statutory grant by clear and unmistakable
language. See Kansas Attorney General Opinion No. 76-348 (copy
enclosed) and authorities cited therein. In our judgment, the
provisions of K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 65-3449(b) cannot be construed
as an implied delegation of the power of eminent domain to any
state board or agency.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Terrence R. Hearshman
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:TRH:jm

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