Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1981-098

1981-098Kanag

Gesamter Gesetzestext

April 21, 1981
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 81-98
The Honorable Carl B. Anderson, Jr.
Associate District Court Judge
Ninth Judicial District
County Courthouse
McPherson, Kansas 67460
Re: State Departments; Public Officers, Employees -- Tort
Claims Act -- Liability of State and Courts for Acts of
Probationers
Crimes and Punishments -- Code; Sentencing -- Community
Or Public Service Work as Condition of Probation
Synopsis: Under the specific work restitution program devised for
McPherson County, liability would not attach to the district
court or judge in the event the probationer is injured or
commits a tort while performing work within the scope of
the program. Similarly, liability would not attach to
the probation officer to the extent that his or her duties
involve the exercise of a discretionary function. However,
as this work restitution program is devised, the partici-
pating non-profit organizations located in McPherson County
may be ultimately responsible for injuries suffered by
probationers and torts committed by such probationers
against third parties while acting within the scope of
their designated work duties. Cited herein: K.S.A. 1980
Supp. 20-345, 20-346a, K.S.A. 21-4601, K.S.A. 1980 Supp.
21-4603, 21-4610, 75-4101, K.S.A. 75-4114, K.S.A. 1980
Supp. 75-6101, 75-6104 and 75-6115.
Dear Judge Anderson:
In reply to your inquiries concerning the possible liability of the
State or of the District Court of McPherson County in the institution
of a work restitution program, there are various factors to consider. In
essence, the program which has been devised would require all convicted
persons (15 years of age or older) who are placed on probation for the
conviction of a crime or the adjudication of miscreancy or delinquency
to perform public service work in the county for a period of time which
would vary according to the terms of the probation. The program is
administered by a probation officer, whose responsiblities include:
(1) drawing a list of private, non-profit organizations that are willing
to participate in the program; (2) scheduling the probationers for their
respective work schedules; (3) checking to ensure all work is satisfactorily
completed; and (4) ultimately reporting back to the sentencing judge
whether the individual has fulfilled such condition of probation.
Based upon this set of facts, you have asked the following questions:
"1. What liability would the Courts (State of Kansas)
have if an individual was injured while performing
the work which was required as a term of probation?
"2. What liability would the Courts (State of Kansas)
have if the person who is required to work as a term
of probation causes damages to his employer or a
third party while performing such work?
"3. Under any circumstances do you see the Courts
(State of Kansas) having any liability under the
above-described program?
"4. If the Courts (State of Kansas) could be held
liable under any circumstances in carrying out the
above-described program, does the District Court
of McPherson County have authority to purchase a
liability insurance policy covering such risks?
"5. If the District Court of McPherson County does
not have the authority to purchase a liability
insurance policy covering such risks, where would
such authority rest?"
In view of the fact the district court judge, the probation officer
and the participating organizations all play a substantial role in
this program, it is necessary to determine whether liability extends
to the State of Kansas and its agents under the Kansas Tort Claims
Act (K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 75-6101 et seq.).
In answer to questions 1 and 2 above, relative to the participation and
potential liability of the district court judge, if the extent of the
judge's involvement is limited to determining sentences and conditions
of probation, these decisions would constitute acts as part of the
state's "judicial function" and, as a result, would qualify as an
exception to tort liability under the Tort Claims Act. As provided
in K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 75-6104:
"A governmental entity or an employee acting within
the scope of his or her employment shall not be.
liable for damages resulting from: . . .
"(b) judicial function . . . ."
In State v. Miller, 214 Kan. 538 (1974), the Kansas Supreme Court had
occasion to speak to the question of what acts constitute a "judicial
function." In a discussion comparing the power to grant probations and
to annul convictions, the Court stated:
"Like the granting of probation the annulment of a
conviction is part of the sentencing process. The
sentencing judgment is a judicial function and the
granting or denial of probation under 21-4603 is a part
of the sentencing process vested in the trial court.
( State v. Owens & Carlisle, 210 Kan. 628, 504 P.2d
249.) Likewise the granting or denial of an application
for annulment of a conviction is a judicial function.
Such power contemplates a judicial inquiry and the
exercise of judicial discretion in the same way that
a court exercises its discretion in the granting of
probation, in setting conditions of probation, and
in deciding whether or not probation should be revoked."
214 Kan. at 545. (Emphasis added.)
The Kansas Legislature has granted the power to a district court judge
to exercise discretion in determining the conditions of probation
and suspended sentences through K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 21-4610(3).. Pertinent
to the situation at hand, K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 21-4610(3)(m) states:
"(3) The court may include among the conditions of
probation or suspension of sentence the following
and any other conditions that it deems proper:
The defendant shall
"(m) Perform community or public service work for
local governmental agencies, private corporations
organized not for profit, or charitable or social
service organizations performing services for the
community . . . ."
In our judgment, the program proposed by McPherson County fully complies
with the scheme of prescribing conditions of probation envisioned by the
legislature and, from an organizational standpoint, does "appear practicable
and not detrimental to the needs of public safety and the welfare of
the offender." K.S.A. 21-4601. As a result, it is our opinion that
when the district court exercises its discretion by assigning a probationer
to this program as a condition of probation, it is clearly performing
a judicial function and is, therefore, immune from tort liability in
the event the probationer is injured or commits a tort while performing
work under the program.
Relative to the potential liability of the probation officer, an analysis
of the probation officer's position in the work restitution program will
indicate whether there is such potential.
Probation officers are provided for in K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 20-345:
"Within staffing limits prescribed by the supreme
court and appropriations therefor, the administrative
judge of each judicial district, with the approval
of a majority of the other district judges and
associate district judges of such judicial district,
shall appoint such bailiffs, court reporters,
secretaries, parole and probation officers and
other clerical and non-judicial personnel as are
necessary to perform the judicial and administrative
functions of the district court."
This statute subsequently provides that the employees enumerated above
shall perform duties and functions either prescribed by law or assigned
by the administrative judge, subject to guidelines or rules of the Supreme
Court. Probation officers are further discussed in K.S.A. 1980 Supp.
20-346a(b):
"(b) On and after July 1, 1979, all probation officers
supervising adults and juveniles placed on probation by
the district courts of this state and all parole officers
supervising misdemeanants placed on parole by the district
courts of this state shall be appointed by the district
courts as provided by law. The supreme court shall
prescribe the qualifications required of persons appointed
as parole or probation officers of the district courts.
The compensation of parole or probation officers of the
district courts shall be paid by the state either in
accordance with a compensation plan adopted by the
supreme court or as may be otherwise specifically
provided by law."
It is clear float these statutory provisions that the probation officer
is an employee of the state and that his assigned duties may properly
include the responsibility for the administration of the work restitution
program. In carrying out this responsibility, it is our opinion the
probation officer, in assigning a probationer to a particular recipient
organization is performing a discretionary function or duty which
necessarily flows from the district court's exercise of its judicial
function in setting terms and conditions of probation. This being the
case, K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 75-6104(d) exempts such probation officer from
liability resulting from the exercise of such discretionary function or
duty. Moreover, notwithstanding such conclusion, we find it difficult,
if not impossible, to envision a situation wherein the probation officer's
actions in merely placing a probationer with a recipient organization
could be construed as the proximate cause of any injury sustained or
caused by the probationer while working in the program. However, we
emphasize that the foregoing conclusion has relevance only to the
probation officer's discretionary functions and duties. To the extent
that a probation officer is assigned duties and responsibilities which
are not discretionary in nature, the negligent performance thereof,
or the breach of any duty in connection therewith, may subject the
probation officer to liability. Of course, the determination of whether
a probation officer's act or omission is in connection with a discretionary
function or duty is a question of fact, to be determined on a case by
case basis.
In light of the foregoing, therefore, it would appear the ultimate
responsibility for injuries sustained or caused by probationers
while assigned to this program may well be borne by the recipient
organizations, since a master-servant relationship will exist between
the probationers and the organizations enjoying the free labor being
furnished them. The general rule of whether a master-servant relation-
ship exists was described in Atwell v. Maxwell Bridge Co., 196 Kan.
219, 224 (1966):
"[A] master is a principal who employs another to perform
service in his affairs and who controls or has the
right to control the physical conduct of the other in the
performance of the service. A servant is a person employed
by a master to perform service in his affairs whose physical
conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or
is subject to the right to control by the master. ( Evans v.
Board of Education of Hays, 178 Kan. 275, 278, 284 P.2d 1068.)
It is not the exercise of direction, supervision or control
over a workman which determines whether he is a servant or
an independent contractor, but the right to exercise such
direction, supervision or control. ( Bowler v. Elmdale
Developing Co., 185 Kan. 785, 787, 347 P.2d 391; Schroeder v.
American Nat'l Bank, 154 Kan. 721, 121 P.2d 186; Davis v. Julian,
152 Kan. 749, 756, 107 P.2d 745.) The necessity of the control
element was also recognized in Henderson v. Sutton's Food City,
191 Kan. 145, 379 P.2d 300."
See, also, Chasteen v. Childers, 218 Kan. 519, 530 (1976).
It should be noted from the discussion above that the right to control
test is the most important aspect of the existence of a master-servant
relationship, and whether the servant receives compensation is generally
not a decisive point, in that consideration is not necessary to create
the relationship of master and servant. In Re Read's Petition, 224
F.Supp. 241 (S.D. Fla. 1963); Bollman v. Kark Rendering Plant, 418 S.W.2d
39 (Mo. 1967); Lunt v. Fidelity & Casualty CO. of New York, 28 A.2d 736
(Maine, 1942); Lowry v. Kneeland, 117 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. 1962).
When the probationers are assigned by the probation officer to work for a
particular organization, it is that organization which will directly control
the physical movements of the workers, issue them any necessary tools or
equipment, decide if the work has been satisfactorily completed and
then report to the probation officer with the results.
Associated with the responsibility of directing the probationers' work
being done on, about, or within their place of business, is the liability for
accidents or torts committed by the probationers while acting in the
scope of their assigned duties. As stated in Hall v. Atchison, Topeka
and Santa Fe Railway Company, 349 F.Supp. 326 (U.S.D.C. Kansas 1972),
which was an action by a truck passenger against the truck owner and railroad
for injuries sustained in a collision with the defendant's train:
"The doctrine of respondeat superior is predicated upon
the master-servant relationship. The vicarious liability
of the master is not based upon the knowledge or lack of
knowledge of a third party concerning that relationship
but upon the relationship itself." 349 F.Supp. at 329.
It should be noted the organizations will be responsible for the acts
of the probationers only to the extent of their assigned work duties.
As stated in Hollinger v. Stormont Hospital and Training School for
Nurses, 2 Kan.App.2d 302, 311-12 (1978):
"An employee is acting within the scope of his authority when
he is performing services for which he has been employed or
when he is doing anything which is reasonably incidental to
his employment. The test is not necessarily whether the
conduct was expressly authorized or forbidden by the employer,
but whether such conduct should have been fairly foreseen
from the nature of the employment and the duties relating to
it. The liability of an employer for the acts of his employee
depends not upon whether the injurious act of the employee
was willful and intentional or was unintentional, but upon
whether the employee, when he did the wrong, was acting in
the prosecution of the employer's business and within the
scope of his authority or had stepped aside from that business
and had done an individual wrong. The now generally recognized
rule is that the employer is liable for the reckless, willful,
intentional, wanton, or malicious acts of his employee as
well as for his heedless and careless acts if they are
committed while the employee is acting in the execution of
his authority and within the course of his employment, or
with a view to the furtherance of his employer's business,
and not for a purpose personal to the employee. Williams v.
Community Drive-in Theater, Inc., supra. See also, Beggerly v.
Walker, 194 Kan. 61, 397 P.2d 395 (1964). . . If an assault
by an employee is motivated entirely by personal reasons
such as malice or spite or by a desire to accomplish some
unlawful purpose, and does not have for its purpose the
furtherance of the employer's business, it will be considered
personal to the employee and not such as will make the employer
answerable. Williams v. Community Drive-in Theater, Inc.,
supra."
Thus, if a probationer causes damages to a third party while acting
within the scope of his work assignment, liability may result for the
participating organization.
In the event the probationer suffers an injury while performing his
work duties prescribed under this program, there are certain factors
to consider in determining liability for such injuries. This subject
was discussed in Murphy v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 447 F.Supp.
557 (D.C. Kan. 1977), wherein the court ordered a new trial to redetermine
the award of damages granted by the trial court to an employee of Owens-
Corning for his permanent disability which allegedly had resulted from
hazardous working conditions:
"Under Kansas law, there is no question but that an employer
has a duty not to expose his employees to perils and dangers
against which the employer may. guard by the exercise of
reasonable care, and that a part. of this duty is to furnish
a reasonably safe place in which to work. E.g., Taylor v.
Hostetler, 186 Kan. 788, 352 P.2d 1042 (1960); Fishburn v.
International Harvester Co., 157 Kan. 43, 138 P.2d 471
(1943). It is equally clear, however, that a master is not
an insurer against all injuries which his servants may
suffer in the discharge of their duties. E.g., Uhlrig v.
Shortt, 194 Kan. 68, 397 P.2d 321 (1964); Blackmore v. Auer,
187 Kan. 434, 357 P.2d 765 (1960). The Kansas Supreme Court
has reiterated time and time again the legal axiom that an
employer's duty to furnish safe working conditions is not
absolute and that an employee's recovery for breach thereof
is dependent upon proof of negligence. In Allen v. Shell
Petroleum Corp., 146 Kan. 67, 68 P.2d 651 (1937), the Kansas
Supreme Court formulated the test of employer negligence
as follows:
"'The master is not required to furnish the best, the
safest, or the newest appliances or methods of operation,
nor to adopt extraordinary or unusual safeguards against
risks and dangers. The limit of his duty here is to exercise
ordinary care to supply reasonably safe places, appliances,
and methods. The test of his discharge of this duty is the
exercise of ordinary care to supply such places, appliances,
and methods as persons of ordinary intelligence and prudence
commonly furnish in like circumstances.'
"Further, because under fundamental principles of tort
law the risk of injury defines the duty to be obeyed,
Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E.
99, 59 A.L.R. 1253 (1928), the Kansas Supreme Court has held
that ' "the master is not compelled to foresee and guard against
an accident which reasonable and prudent men would not expect
to happen, and where an injury to a servant could not reasonably
have been anticipated, a failure to take precautionary
measures is not negligence on the part of the master for
which he is liable to the servant." ' Dodd v. Wilson & Co.,
Inc., 149 Kan. 605, 88 P.2d 1116 (1939). An employer is
therefore not liable for failing to anticipate idiosyncratic
injury to a particular employee, arising from the employee's
peculiar physical condition of which the employer had and
could have no notice. Allen, supra. An employer's duty
does not extend to the prevention of or warning against
remote, improbable, and exceptional occurrences; it is
limited to such perils as reasonably are to be anticipated."
447 F.Supp. 561, 562.
Resultantly, all the circumstances of each injury accident will have to
be considered before deciding where the responsibility lies for injuries
suffered by the probationer.
In answer to your third question, we cannot realistically offer
a complete reply because: (1) the program is still in the planning
stages; and (2) even if we were given the circumstances of a particular
incident, we could but speculate what cause of action a creative attorney
may plead, or a receptive jury may accept.
In answer to your fourth and fifth questions, relative to the purchase
of liability insurance for the district court of McPherson County,
the Committee on Surety Bonds and Insurance (K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 75-4101
et seq.) has the authority to decide which governmental entities of state
government may purchase liability insurance. Related specifically to
this subject, K.S.A. 75-4114 provides:
"The committee, in addition to the coverages
specified in K.S.A. 75-4109, may, within the
limitations of appropriations made by the
legislature therefor, purchase such liability
insurance as they deem necessary for the
protection of the state and its officers,
employees and agents against any liability for
injuries or damages resulting from any tortious
conduct of such officers, employees or agents
arising from the course of their employment
or from any liability for injuries or damages
resulting from conduct or decisions of such
officers, employees or agents in carrying out
the official duties of their offices pursuant
to existing law, rule or regulation or court
order."
Since the enactment of the Kansas Tort Claims Act, it has been the
general practice of the Committee that: (1) the State acts as a self-insurer
for liability claims against the state, its officers and employees
( e.g., judges); (2) the committee authorizes the purchase of liability
insurance from private insurance companies only for: (a) organizations
specifically exempted from the Tort Claims Act ( e.g., medical malpractice
for "health care providers"; see K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 75-6115); and
(b) organizations it determines have an extraordinary need for an
exclusive liability insurance policy C e.g., state funded attorneys for
indigent defendants). As a result, district courts are indemnified by
the State and cannot purchase liability insurance without the prior
approval of the State Committee on Surety Bonds and Insurance.
In summary, under the specific work restitution program devised for
McPherson County, liability would not attach to the district court or
judge in the event the probationer is injured or commits a tort while
performing work within the scope of the program. Similarly, liability
would not attach to the probation officer to the extent that his or her
duties involve the exercise of a discretionary function. It is further
our opinion that, as this work restitution program is devised, the
participating non-profit organizations located in McPherson County
may be ultimately responsible for injuries suffered by probationers
and torts committed by such probationers against third parties while
acting within the scope of their designated work duties.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Christopher Y. Meek
Assistant Attorney General
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