Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1981-046

1981-046Kanag

Gesamter Gesetzestext

February 17, 1981
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 81- 46
William B. Elliott
Attorney at Law
105 East Cherry
Hill City, Kansas 67642
Re: Cities of the Third Class--Election, Appointment and
Removal of Officers--Filling of Vacancies
Synopsis: Where a person is appointed to fill a vacancy in the
office of councilman of a city of the third class
pursuant to K.S.A. 15-201, and by that statute is to
serve "until the next election for that office," such
person is to serve the unexpired portion of that council-
man position's two-year term of office. Even though
there may be held an election of other councilmen prior
to the expiration of such term of office, K.S.A. 15-201
does not require or authorize the election of a successor
to fill the unexpired term of such office.
Where a person has mistakenly filed his statement of
candidacy for such unexpired term of office, such
declaration is to be disregarded, and such person cannot
be considered a candidate for some other office. Cited
herein: K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 13-1806, K.S.A. 15-201.
*
Dear Mr. Elliott:
You have requested our opinion as to whether it will be necessary, at
the time of the forthcoming city election, to have an election to fill
the balance of an unexpired term of office for one of the positions on
the City Council of Hill City, Kansas.
Before discussing the factual setting giving rise to your inquiry, it
is appropriate to note that the questions you have posed concern the
application of K.S.A. 15-201, as it has been modified by Charter Ordinance
No. 5 of the City of Hill City. The portions of K.S.A. 15-201 pertinent
here are as follows:
"Every two (2) years an election shall be held
for a mayor, and five (5) councilmen. The mayor
and councilmen shall hold their offices for two
(2) years and until their successors are elected
and qualified.
"In case of a vacancy in the council occurring
by reason of resignation, death, or removal
from office or from the city, the mayor, by and
with the advice and consent of the remaining councilmen,
shall appoint some suitable elector to fill the
vacancy until the next election for that office."
(Emphasis added.)
While the foregoing statutory provisions are applicable to cities
of the third class having the mayor-council form of government, the
City of Hill City on June 19, 1972, enacted its Charter Ordinance
No. 5, which exempted the city from the first paragraph of this
statute (quoted above) and provided substitute and additional provisions
in lieu thereof. Section 2 of that Charter Ordinance provided that, at
the city general election in 1973, the mayor and two councilmen would be
elected for terms of two years and three councilmen would be elected
for terms of one year. Section 3 of that ordinance then provides:
"Section 3. That thereafter on the first Tuesday in
April of each even-numbered year, three councilmen
shall be elected for a term of two years and on the
first Tuesday in April of each odd-numbered year,
a Mayor and two Councilmen shall be elected for a term
of two years."
Thus, even though the charter ordinance has not changed the require-
ment of 15=201 that the mayor and councilmen are elected for two-year
terms, it has eliminated the statute's requirement that all six city
officers be elected at the same time, and has staggered their election,
so that there is an annual city election in Hill City to elect three of
these officers. It also is apparent that the portion of the second
paragraph of 15-201 quoted above remains applicable to Hill City.
In light of these provisions, you advise that in the latter part of
1980 a vacancy occurred in one of the councilmen positions for which
there had been an election in April of that year, arid in accordance
with the above-quoted provisions of 15-201 which remain applicable to
Hill City, a successor was appointed to fill the vacancy. However, you
further relate that, just prior to the deadline for filing statements
of candidacy for city offices to be elected at the forthcoming city
election, an individual filed his statement of candidacy for the "unexpired
term of office" of that particular councilman position, and you have
inquired whether an election for such unexpired term of office is required
to be held.
In our judgment, such election is neither required nor authorized
by K.S.A. 15-201 and cannot be held. Of pertinence to our conclusion
is the emphasized language of the above-quoted provisions of 15-201.
It requires, in effect, that a person appointed to fill a vacancy in
the office of councilman shall serve until the next election for
that office. In this case, pursuant to the requirements of Hill City's
Charter Ordinance No. 5, the next election for that position on the
city council will be on the first Tuesday in April of 1982, and by virtue
of the plain and unambiguous language of 15-201, the successor appointed
in 1980 to fill a vacancy in that position is to serve until the 1982
city election. We believe our conclusion is consonant with the following
statement of the Kansas Supreme Court in City of Kiowa v. Central
Telephone & Utilities Corporation, 213 Kan. 169 (1973):
"A primary rule for the construction of a statute
is to find the legislative intent from its language,
and where the language used is plain and unambiguous
and also appropriate to the obvious purpose the court
should follow the intent as expressed by the words used
and is not warranted in looking beyond them in search
of some other legislative purpose or extending the meaning
beyond the plain terms of the Act. (Alter v. Johnson,
127 Kan. 443, 273 Pac. 474; Hand v. Board of Education,
198 Kan. 460, 426 P.2d 124; City of Overland Park v.
Nikias, 209 Kan. 643, 498 P.2d 56; Hunter v. Haun, 210
Kan. 11, 499 P.2d 1087.)" 213 Kan. at 176.
Of similar import is the Court's pronouncement in Lakeview Gardens,
Inc. v. State, ex rel. Schneider, 221 Kan. 211 (1976):
"[T]his court must ascertain and give effect to the intent
of the legislature. In so doing we must consider the
language of the statute; its words are to be understood
in their plain and ordinary sense. (Hunter v. Haun,
210 Kan. 11, 13, 499 P.2d 1087; Roda v. Williams, 195
Kan. 507, 511, 407 P.2d 471.) When a statute is plain
and unambiguous this court must give effect to the
intention of the legislature as expressed rather than determine
what the law should or should not be. (Amoco Production
Co. v. Armold, Director of Taxation, 213 Kan. 636, 647, 518
P.2d 453; Jolly v. Kansas Public Employees Retirement
System, 214 Kan. 200, 204, 519 P.2d 1391.)" 221 Kan.
at 214.
In addition to what is plainly stated by this statute, we believe
it significant what the statute does not say. It does not provide
that a person appointed to fill a vacancy serves until the next election
of councilmen or until the next city general election. Such requirements
are familiar to city election statutes (see, e.g., K.S.A. 1980 Supp.
13-1806 which provides that a successor selected to fill a vacancy
serves "until the next city general election"), but no such requirement
is imposed in 15-201. Instead, it plainly requires that the appointed
councilman will serve until the next election for that office.
We also note that the same result would obtain in a third class city
which has not adopted a charter ordinance providing for annual city
elections. There, of course, K.S.A. 15-201 would govern, and there
would not be a city election in even-numbered years, as there was in
the situation you have posed, due to the charter ordinance provisions.
However, in a comparable situation governed solely by the provisions
of 15-201, if a vacancy occurs at the same point in a councilman's term
of office as did the vacancy under consideration here, the successor
appointed to fill the vacancy would serve "until the next election for
that office, " which would be the next city general election. In that
situation the successor's term of office would be identical in length
to the term of office that will be served by the councilman appointed
in Hill City to fill the vacancy which occurred in 1980. Thus, the
statute's provisions for filling vacancies will apply with equal force
in either situation, which is further evidence that our conclusion
accurately reflects the legislature's intent.
Anticipating the foregoing conclusion, you also have asked whether
the individual who filed for the unexpired term of office should be
regarded as having filed his statement of candidacy for one of the
two council positions for which there will be an election in 1981.
In our judgment, he should not. That individual filed his statement
of candidacy for a particular office. We recognize that he mistakenly
did so, since there will be no election for that office in 1981. None-
theless, he was quite specific in his declaration, and we find no basis
for imputing to him an intent to be a candidate for some other office.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
W. Robert Alderson
First Deputy Attorney General
RTS:WRA:phf

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