Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1981-007

1981-007Kanag

Gesamter Gesetzestext

January 14, 1981
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 81- 7
Mr. Michael L. Bailey
Executive Director
Kansas Commmission on Civil Rights
535 Kansas Avenue, 5th Floor
Topeka, Kansas 66603
Re: Labor and Industries--Kansas Acts Against
Discrimination--Commission on Civil Rights--
Personnel Rules Limiting Private Practice of Law
Synopsis: The Kansas Commission on Civil Rights may impose
reasonable personnel rules upon its employees,
but any such rule may not unreasonably limit a
fundamental right of a public employee.
The Commission may, in circumstances justifying
the same, dismiss an attorney or hearing examiner
for violation of a reasonable and constitutional
personnel rule, relating to conflict of interest,
adopted by the Commission. Cited herein: K.S.A.
1980 Supp. 75-2949(1); K.A.R. 1980 Supp. 1-9-1 and
1-10-1(a); U.S. Const., Amend. I.
Dear Mr. Bailey:
You request our opinion as to the legality of two alternative
"policies" which the Kansas Commission on Civil Rights is con-
sidering for possible adoption. These policies, which would
restrict the private practice of law by attorneys employed by
the Commission, are included in the appendix to this opinion.
Before considering the provisions of each of the proposed policies,
it must be recognized that state agencies do not have unlimited
authority to impose conditions and requirements upon state employees.
Numerous cases have prescribed the constitutional parameters within
which a public agency must operate, and a review of those cases would
be helpful prior to considering any restrictions which the commission
might seek to impose.
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605 (1966), it
was held that:
"[T]he theory that public employment which
may be denied all together may be subjected to
any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable,
has been uniformly rejected."
It was also noted that public employment may not be conditioned
upon the surrender of constitutional rights which could not be
abridged by direct government action. Id. at 605.
In Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1967), the
United States Supreme Court considered the First Amendment rights
of a teacher who was dismissed for criticizing the board of education
in a letter that was published in a newspaper. The Court stated
that the problem, in such a case, is
"[t]o arrive at a balance between the interests
of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest
of the state, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees." Id. at 568.
In Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), another case involving
the exercise of First Amendment rights by a teacher, it was held
that, regardless of the public employee's contractual or other claim
to a job, the government may not withdraw the benefit of public
employment on a basis that infringes constitutionally protected
interests. Id. at 597. The Court also stated that a college may
not refuse to renew a teaching contract as a reprisal for the
exercise of constitutionally protected rights. Id. at 598.
In Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), it was held that the
First Amendment prohibits the dismissal of a public employee
solely because of his private political beliefs, unless such
political beliefs would interfere with the discharge of his
public duties."- Id. at 583.
In Voichahoske v. City of Grand Island, 231 N.W.2d 124 (Neb.
1975), a city personnel rule which stated that it was prejudicial
to the public interest for more than one person in a household
to be on the city payroll was considered. It was held that if
a personnel rule establishes a system of classification of employees
which affects the exercise of a fundamental right (i.e., the right
to marry), the rule can only be sustained if it promotes a compelling
governmental interest. The case was remanded to the trial court
to determine the issue of fact as to whether there was such
a compelling governmental interest for the subject personnel rule.
The "compelling governmental interest" test set forth in the
Voichahoske case, supra, was rejected in Town of Milton v.
Civil Service Commission, 312 N.E.2d 188 (Mass., 1974). The
case involved a requirement that applicants seeking employment
to a city police force, and who had resided in such city or town
for one year prior to filing application for examination, be placed
ahead of other applicants on the list of eligible applicants if
other things were equal. The Court noted numerous cases, involving
the dismissal of public employees, which established that the
government may properly discharge an employee for actions which
bear a reasonable relation to the job even if those actions involve
the exercise of a constitutional right. Id. at 192-193. According
to the Court, the same cases also established that, in considering
the legality of a dismissal, the test is whether the activity at
issue might reasonably be thought to interfere with the duties
of the office, and the government is not required to satisfy the
compelling state interest test for dismissal. Id. at 193. It
was also noted that a state "may not discharge an employee for
the sole reason that he has chosen to exercise a constitutional
right unless the action also demonstrates an independent job-
related reason for dismissal." Id. at 192. In the case at bar,
the Court upheld the subject rule giving priority, for purposes of
appointment to a city of police force, to residents of the subject
city, and stated that the improvement in the effectiveness of
the police force might justify such a rule even under the compelling
state interest test. Id. at 194.
There are numerous cases which consider the validity of restrictions,
imposed upon public employees, with regard to outside employment.
Many of these cases are summarized in the annotation at 94 A.L.R.3d
1230. Some of the older cases seem to indicate that an absolute
prohibition against outside employment is permissible even where
such employment will not interfere with or affect performance of
public duties. See MacLellan v. Michigan Dept. of Correction,
129 N.W.2d 861 (Mich., 1964). However, one of the more recent
cases holds that an absolute prohibition, in the absence of a
reasonable need dictated by the public interest, violates the Due
Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. Crowley Firemen v.
City of Crowley, 280 So.2d 897 (La., 1973). Another case indicates
that a prohibition against "substantial outside interests" by
teachers, during the school year, is reasonably related to the
state's interest in maintaining well-run schools, and does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution. Gosney v. Sonora Independent School Dist., 430
F.Supp. 53 (1977). Finally, as the above-cited annotation
indicates, certain restrictions against outside employment by
policemen and firemen have been upheld due to the public interest
in maintaining police and fire departments which are "fit and ready."
Having summarized the above cited public employment cases,
we now consider the subject of imposing restrictions, relative
to the private practice of law, upon attorneys employed by the
Kansas Commission on Civil Rights. It has been noted in several
cases that the opportunity to earn a living or to engage in a
common occupation is a fundamental right. Town of Milton v.
Civil Service Commission, supra at 192; Armstrong v. Howell,
371 F.Supp. 48, 54 (Nebraska, 1974); Crowley Firemen v. City of
Crowley, supra at 902. Although, in our judgment, the Kansas
Commission on Civil Rights may impose reasonable personnel rules
upon its employees, any such rule may not unreasonably limit,
in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection provisions
of the Federal Constitution, a fundamental personal right of a
public employee. We must, in accordance with this principle,
examine the reasonableness of a rule which would restrict the
private practice of law by attorneys employed by the Kansas
Commission on Civil Rights.
In our judgment, there would be substantial justification for
a personnel rule which would prohibit commission attorneys from
prosecuting or defending, except as a part of the attorney's
employment by the Commission, civil rights cases. Such a rule
would serve to prevent conflict of interest situations which might
arise in the course of representing clients in such cases. All
authorities are in agreement that the elimination and prevention
of conflict of interest is a proper state purpose. Dunphy v.
Sheehan, 549 P.2d 332, 334 (Nev., 1976). Such a rule would also
prevent the possibility that complaints generated by the operation
of a public agency might be used as a "springboard" to establishing
a private law practice. We have no doubt that such a limited
restriction, relative to the practice of law by commission attorneys,
would be reasonable and in the public interest.
However, policy no. 1 (see attached appendix), which is under
consideration by the Commission, is not such a limited restriction.
Among other things, it is stated that the policy will not permit:
"1. Partnership or other beneficial interest
in any corporation, organization or
association engaged in the practice of law.
"2. Maintenance of any office in any way
identifed as an office for the general or
limited practice of law.
"3. Any telephone or local directory listings
as an attorney.
"4. Any advertisements or public notices tending
to convey the impression that the individual
is in the private practice of law."
In our opinion, the restrictions imposed by this policy are overly
broad and unreasonably infringe upon the fundamental right of
Commission attorneys to engage in their profession. We see no
justification for totally prohibiting the practice of law by
Commission attorneys, where such practice occurs outside the
normal business hours of the Commission and does not interfere with
the civil service (whether classified or unclassified) duties of
the attorney. Such a broad restriction may not, in our opinion,
be constitutionally imposed against attorneys employed by the	Commission.
With regard to the second policy being considered by the Commission
(see appendix attached), we perceive no constitutional or statutory
problem inherent therein. The first paragraph, which requires full-
time employees to expend a full forty hours per week in the per-
formance of their assigned duties, is supported by K.A.R. 1980
Supp. 1-9-1. The second paragraph, which proscribes any full or
part-time employment which creates a conflict of interest or
appearance of a conflict of interest with the employee's duties
as an employee of the Commission, is, as has been stated, a proper
state purpose. Dunphy v. Sheehan, supra. It should be noted,
however, that there are often questions and disagreements as to
what is, or is not, a conflict of interest. Therefore, we would
recommend that the rule be modified so as to be more specific as
to the conduct which is proscribed.
Finally, it is our opinion that a Commission attorney (or hearing
examiner) in the classified civil service may, in circumstances
justifying the same, be dismissed for violation of a reasonable
and constitutional personnel rule, relating to conflict of interest,
adopted by the Commission. K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 75-2949(1) provides,
in part, that:
"An appointing authority may dismiss any
permanent classified employee when the appointing
authority considers that the good of the service
will be served thereby . . . ."
K.A.R. 1980 Supp. 1-10-1(a) provides, in part, that a appointing
authority may dismiss a permanent employee "for other good cause"
when the appointing authority considers that the good of the
service will be served thereby. In our judgment, these provisions
are sufficient to allow the Commission to propose the dismissal
of an attorney (or hearing examiner) in the classified service
upon the grounds of a violation of a personnel rule established
and published by the Commission. Of course, any such action would
be subject to the dismissal procedures of the Civil Service laws
and regulations, including a review by the civil service board
as to the reasonableness of the dismissal.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Terrence R. Hearshman
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:TRH:jm
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