Termination: R W v. Indiana Department of Child Services, et al.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-986 | October 21, 2026 	Page 1 of 11
Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take
any action in reliance upon this memorandum decision until it is certified.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not
binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value
or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
I N 	T H E
Court of Appeals of Indiana
In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child
Relationship of: J.L. (Minor Child), and R.W. (Father),
Appellant-Respondent
v.
Indiana Department of Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner
And
Kids’ Voice of Indiana, Inc.,
Appellee-Guardian ad Litem
October 21, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-JT-986
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court
The Honorable Philip C. Sheward, Judge

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Trial Court Cause No.
49D24-2509-JT-9771
Memorandum Decision by Judge Brown
Judges Kenworthy and Scheele concur.
Brown, Judge.
[1] 	R.W. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental rights to his minor
child, J.L. (“Child”). We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] 	Child was born to Father and Je.L. (“Mother” and, together with Father,
“Parents”)1 in August 2024. Child was born exposed to illegal drugs, including
amphetamine, opiates, and fentanyl, and Mother “left the hospital and
abandoned [Child].” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 86. Father “initially
denied paternity and did not make himself available to parent [Child],” so Child
was removed from both Mother’s and Father’s care upon discharge from the
hospital and placed in foster care. Id.
[3] 	On August 22, 2024, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a
petition alleging Child was a child in need of services (“CHINS”). Mother did
not appear for any CHINS proceedings but “[a]djudication and [d]ispositional
1 Mother’s parental rights were also terminated, but she does not participate in this appeal.

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order[s] were entered for Mother” on December 1, 2024. Exhibits Volume I at
19. Father “was very adamant” that Mother had made the decision to have
Child, that “he was not a part of that,” and he “would not do anything.”
Transcript Volume II at 23. Father “fought very hard to determine that [Child]
was his biological child,” and DCS established Father’s paternity in January
2025. Id. Thereafter, Father admitted Child was a CHINS and waived
factfinding, and a dispositional hearing was held on January 31, 2025. The
court entered a dispositional order requiring Father to participate in home-
based casework, home-based therapy, random drug screens, psychological
evaluation, and supervised visitation. DCS placed referrals for services, but
Father failed to participate. DCS Family Case Manager Jeffrey Theil (“FCM
Theil”) met with Father multiple times during his incarceration, but Father
seemed to have “no interest” in participating “in any meetings or anything”
regarding Child. Id. at 24. A visitation coordinator attempted to contact
Father, but those communications went unanswered. FCM Theil was also
working with Father regarding a CHINS proceeding involving one of Child’s
older siblings. FCM Theil observed that, although Father “was somewhat
involved in [the sibling’s CHINS] case,” he “was disinterested” when it came to
Child. Id.
[4] 	On March 24, 2025, Father was charged in cause number 49D29-2503-F3-9643
(“Cause No. 9643”) with robbery as a level 3 felony and intimidation as a level
6 felony. The court held a permanency hearing on August 22, 2025. Father
appeared in person and by counsel. DCS reported that Father was still

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incarcerated in the Marion County Adult Detention Center and that his jury
trial “on multiple felony charges” was set for September 11, 2025. Exhibits
Volume I at 23. Both DCS and the Guardian ad Litem requested the
permanency plan for Child be changed from reunification to adoption. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the court determined that it was in Child’s best
interests for the permanency plan to be changed to adoption.
[5] 	On September 24, 2025, DCS filed a verified petition for the termination of
Parents’ parental rights. The court appointed counsel for both Mother and
Father and set an initial hearing for October 21, 2025. Neither Parent appeared
for the initial hearing, but counsel appeared on their behalf. The hearing was
continued to November 4, 2025. On that date, the court held a hearing.
Mother failed to appear, but counsel appeared on her behalf. Father appeared
in person and by counsel. Father indicated he received a copy of the petition to
terminate his parental rights and was prepared for the evidentiary hearing
scheduled for March 5, 2026.
[6] 	The court held a remote evidentiary hearing on March 5, 2026. Mother failed
to appear. Father appeared with counsel. DCS presented the testimony of
FCM Theil and Guardian ad Litem Brittany Lismon (“GAL Lismon”). Father
testified on his own behalf.
[7] 	FCM Theil testified that, at the time of Child’s birth, Father was incarcerated
and unavailable to parent Child. He stated that Father was ordered to
participate in reunification services, referrals were put in place for those

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services, but Father failed to successfully complete any services. FCM Theil
opined that termination of Father’s parental rights was in Child’s best interests.
He emphasized that Father had “not remedied any of the reasons for removal
of [Child],” and he remained incarcerated at the time of the termination
hearing. Transcript Volume II at 17. FCM Theil noted that, from the opening
of this case at Child’s birth, Father had not seen Child and, despite “the
opportunity to do the in-person visitations at that time,” he failed to
“communicate with the visitation provider to get visits set up with [Child].” Id.
at 22-23.
[8] 	GAL Lismon testified that she did not believe that Child could be returned
safely to either Mother or Father’s care. She stated that Child is “not bonded”
with either parent as neither had “been engaged in any services throughout the
life of his case.” Id. at 31. She opined that termination of Father’s parental
rights and adoption was in Child’s best interests. Id. She emphasized that
Child is “extremely bonded” with his current pre-adoptive placement. Id. at 32.
[9] 	Father testified that he formed a bond with Child the “couple times” he saw
him in the hospital after his birth. Id. at 33. Father admitted that FCM Theil
visited him while he was incarcerated. He denied anyone ever tried to contact
him to set up visitation with Child. Father became frustrated during his
testimony and “unilaterally and of his own accord decided to disconnect his call
from the adult detention center after being nonresponsive to counsel’s question
and after ignoring the attempted admonition by the court.” Id. at 38.

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[10] 	On March 17, 2026, the court entered its findings of fact, conclusions thereon,
and order terminating Parents’ parental rights. Specifically, the court found
that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child’s
removal or continued placement outside Parents’ care will not be remedied;
continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child’s well-
being; termination of Parents’ parental rights is in Child’s best interests; and
there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child, that being
adoption by his current foster care placement.
Discussion
[11] 	Father challenges the termination of his parental rights. Regarding petitions
seeking the termination of parental rights, Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 provides in
pertinent part that DCS must allege as follows:
(c) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege:
(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances
described in subsection (d);
(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment
of the child; and
(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in
the child’s best interests.
(d) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege the existence
of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:
* * * * *
(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the
conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the

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reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will
not be remedied.
[12] 	If the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in Ind. Code § 31-
35-2-4 are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind.
Code § 31-35-2-8(a). A finding in a proceeding to terminate parental rights
must be based upon clear and convincing evidence. Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2.
We do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses but
consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind.
2014). We confine our review to two steps: whether the evidence clearly and
convincingly supports the findings, and then whether the findings clearly and
convincingly support the judgment. Id. We give due regard to the trial court’s
opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. Id. “Because a
case that seems close on a ‘dry record’ may have been much more clear-cut in
person, we must be careful not to substitute our judgment for the trial court
when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.” Id. at 640. To the extent
Father does not challenge the court’s findings of fact, the unchallenged facts
stand as proven. See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)
(failure to challenge findings by the trial court resulted in waiver of the
argument that the findings were clearly erroneous), trans. denied.
[13] 	We first address Father’s challenge to the trial court’s conclusion that there is a
reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child’s removal or the

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reasons for placement outside his care will not be remedied.2 In determining
whether the conditions that resulted in Child’s removal will not be remedied,
we engage in a two-step analysis. See E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642-643. First, we
identify the conditions that led to removal, and second, we determine whether
there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id.
at 643. In the second step, the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness as of the
time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of
changed conditions, balancing a parent’s recent improvements against habitual
patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of
future neglect or deprivation. Id. We entrust that delicate balance to the trial
court, which has discretion to weigh a parent’s prior history more heavily than
efforts made only shortly before termination. Id. Requiring trial courts to give
due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that a
parent’s past behavior is the best predictor of future behavior. Id. The statute
does not simply focus on the initial basis for a child’s removal for purposes of
determining whether a parent’s rights should be terminated, but also those bases
resulting in the continued placement outside the home. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d
385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). A court may consider evidence of a parent’s
prior criminal history, drug abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support,
2 To the extent Father challenges the trial court’s conclusions regarding additional subsections of Ind. Code §
31-35-2-4(d), we need not address those arguments as the involuntary termination statute is written in the
disjunctive and requires proof of only one of the circumstances listed.

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lack of adequate housing and employment, and the services offered by DCS and
the parent’s response to those services. Id.
[14] 	The record reveals that Child was removed from Father’s care due to his
criminal activity and resulting incarceration. Throughout the eighteen-month
pendency of the CHINS case, Father failed to engage in or successfully
complete ordered services despite DCS’s referrals and attempts to facilitate such
services. Father exhibited “no interest” in reunification with Child. Transcript
Volume II at 24. Father remained incarcerated as of the date of the termination
fact-finding hearing with a pending trial date on “multiple felony charges.”
Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 86.3 Father’s parental rights to Child’s
older sibling were terminated shortly before the current fact-finding hearing
based upon the same behavior by Father. In light of the evidence set forth
above and in the record, we cannot say the trial court clearly erred in finding
that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child’s
removal or the reasons for placement outside Father’s care will not be
remedied.
[15] 	Father also challenges the trial court’s conclusion that termination of his
parental rights is in Child’s best interests. In determining the best interests of
children, the trial court is required to look to the totality of the evidence.
3 According to DCS, “Father signed a plea agreement on March 11, 2026” pursuant to which he “agreed to
plead guilty to Level 5 felony robbery resulting in bodily injury in exchange for dismissal of the original
charges against him.” Appellee’s Brief at 16 n.2 (citing Docket for Cause No. 9643). Father “was sentenced
to three years in the Indiana Department of Correction.” Id.

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McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App.
2003). The court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the
children. Id. The court need not wait until children are irreversibly harmed
before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. The recommendation of a
case manager and child advocate, in addition to evidence that the conditions
resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and
convincing evidence that termination is in the children’s best interests. In re
P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), reh’g denied, trans. denied; A.D.S.
v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158-1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013),
trans. denied.
[16] 	FCM Theil opined that termination of Father’s parental rights and adoption by
Child’s current foster placement was in Child’s best interests. He noted that
Father had not remedied any of the issues that led to Child’s removal from his
care. Similarly, GAL Lismon opined that termination of Father’s parental
rights and adoption by Child’s current foster placement was in Child’s best
interests. She noted that Child is “not bonded” with Father as he had not “been
engaged in any services throughout the life of his case.” Transcript Volume II
at 31. In light of the recommendation of the case manager and the child
advocate to terminate parental rights, as well as the evidence in the record
regarding Father’s failure to remedy the conditions resulting in removal, we
cannot say the trial court clearly erred in finding that termination of Father’s
parental rights is in Child’s best interests.

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[17] 	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s termination of Father’s
parental rights to Child.
[18] 	Affirmed.
Kenworthy, J., and Scheele, J., concur.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Talisha Griffin
Marion County Public Defender Agency
Appellate Division
Indianapolis, Indiana
Daniel G. Foote
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Evan Matthew Comer
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana