Termination: A J v. Indiana Department of Child Services

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-965 | October 16, 2026 Page 1 of 20
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any
action in reliance upon this memorandum decision until it is certified.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not
binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value
or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
I N T H E
Court of Appeals of Indiana
In re the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of:
G.L.J. (Minor Child),
and
A.J. (Mother),
Appellant-Respondent
v.
Indiana Department of Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner
October 16, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-JT-965
Appeal from the Allen Superior Court
The Honorable Nancy L. Gettinger, Senior Judge

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Trial Court Cause No.
02D08-2510-JT-224
Memorandum Decision by Judge Bradford
Judges Bailey and Altice concur.
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] On June 21, 2023, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”)
petitioned to have G.L.J. (“Child”) adjudicated a child in need of services
(“CHINS”). On September 28, 2023, A.J. (“Mother”) stipulated that Child was
a CHINS, after which she and K.L. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) were
ordered to complete certain services.1 Mother did not comply with the case
plan and failed to make meaningful progress towards reunification with Child.
On October 9, 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother’s parental rights to
Child. Following an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court issued an order
terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child. Mother contends that the
evidence is insufficient to sustain the juvenile court’s order terminating her
parental rights. We affirm.
1 While Father’s parental rights to Child were also terminated, he does not participate in this appeal.

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Facts and Procedural History
[2] Child was born to Parents on October 3, 2022. “On June 3, 2023, Mother was
arrested and charged with Operating a Vehicle while Intoxicated (OWI) while
[Child] was in the vehicle with her.” Ex. Vol. I p. 61. At the time of her arrest,
Mother “had a blood alcohol content of .153%.” Ex. Vol. I p. 61. Mother had
a significant criminal history and substantiated DCS history involving other
children.
[3] On or about June 4, 2023, DCS discovered that Mother and Child had been
“‘couch-surfing’ at various homes.” Ex. Vol. I p. 61. Mother initially denied
the allegation that she had been driving while intoxicated, claimed that “the law
enforcement officer was lying,” and refused to cooperate with DCS. Ex. Vol. I
p. 61. DCS was unable to locate Mother and Child until June 20, 2023, when
Mother met a DCS representative “at the Pontiac Library” with Child, at which
time “she was arrested on scene due to her outstanding warrants.” Ex. Vol. I p.
62. Child was then removed from Mother’s care.
[4] On June 21, 2023, DCS petitioned to have Child adjudicated a CHINS. DCS
alleged that without support and services, Mother was “unable and/or
unwilling to ensure that [Child’s] needs” were being met and to provide Child
with “a safe and stable home free from substance abuse and neglect.” Ex. Vol.
I p. 62. DCS further alleged that Mother and Child were in need of services
that were unlikely to be accepted without coercive intervention.

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[5] Mother stipulated that Child was a CHINS on September 28, 2023. The
juvenile court accepted the stipulation and adjudicated Child a CHINS. After a
dispositional hearing, the juvenile court ordered Mother, inter alia, to refrain
from all criminal activity, to maintain safe and stable housing, complete a drug-
and-alcohol assessment and counseling and follow all recommendations,
participate in individual counseling, refrain from use of alcohol and illegal
drugs and other substance abuse, submit to random drug and alcohol screens,
and attend and appropriately participate in all scheduled visits with Child.
[6] Throughout the CHINS proceedings, Mother was abrasive, rude, and
threatening to DCS caseworkers. Mother called DCS’s offices “incessantly”
and would “berate[,] scream[, and] yell” at the DCS family case manager
(“FCM”). Tr. Vol. II p. 37. Mother frequently complained that Child had been
placed in “relative/kinship care” with Foster Mother and demanded that Child
be removed, but “could give no valid reason as to why [Child] should be
removed” from the placement. Tr. Vol. II p. 38.
[7] Mother refused to provide DCS with her address and, only in August of 2025,
after the CHINS case had been pending for more than two years and after
Mother had been arrested again, did Mother tell FCM Elise Mandeville where
she had been living. FCM Mandeville later explained that she could not say
whether Mother’s housing had been “safe or suitable” because, when she had
attempted to conduct home visits, Mother “would make threats to [her] and
[she] didn’t feel safe going to visit the home[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 84. Although
Mother once told FCM Mandeville that she had “a full-time job[,]” Mother

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refused to tell FCM Mandeville “where it was[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 89. FCM
Mandeville was never “able to confirm anything about” Mother’s finances
during the CHINS case. Tr. Vol. II p. 89.
[8] Mother completed a diagnostic assessment with Park Center, which made
several treatment recommendations, including a psychiatric evaluation,
medication management, outpatient individual therapy, substance-abuse
treatment, and home-based services. Mother was also recommended to
participate in an “adult daily living skills group[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 91. Mother
refused substance-abuse treatment, claiming that “she didn’t have an alcohol
problem[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 91.
[9] DCS made referrals for the recommended services through Park Center, but
Mother largely did not participate. When FCM Mandeville inquired as to why
Mother was not participating, Mother indicated that “she didn’t want to talk
about services.” Tr. Vol. II p. 92. The only service in which Mother
participated was the home-based case work provided through Park Center.
However, she was unable to complete that service due to her frequent
incarceration. Mother also failed to complete the drug-and-alcohol and
parenting assessments, despite DCS making referrals for the assessments at
Park Center. Mother only submitted to “some” drug screens. Tr. Vol. II p. 93.
She “missed [fifty-nine] calls” and twenty drug screens. Tr. Vol. II p. 95. Of
the tests for which Mother did appear, the results were “[a]bnormal” for six
tests. Ex. Vol. I pp. 192, 195–96, 199.

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[10] Mother was referred to Iris for supervised visitation with Child but did not
immediately set up services. Mother had her first supervised visit on March 18,
2025. Although Iris scheduled Mother for one six-hour visit with Child per
week between early March and the end of May, she attended only three visits.
Mother was unengaged during visits, for which she later blamed her frustration
with the visit supervisor assigned to her. Iris eventually closed the referral due
to Mother’s lack of participation.
[11] Mother was then referred for visitation through Lifeline Youth and Family
Services. Mother only attended three visits, and the referral was eventually
closed due to Mother’s poor attendance. Mother subsequently informed FCM
Mandeville that she had a “skills coach or home-based worker from Park
Center” who would be willing to supervise visitation but, when FCM
Mandeville contacted Park Center, she was informed that it did not offer
supervised visitation. Tr. Vol. II p. 86. FCM Mandeville attempted to place
Mother at multiple agencies for visitation services, none of whom “had
availability[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 86. Eventually, Dockside “took over visitation”
but eventually “closed out[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 86. FCM Mandeville “did a
referral to Phoenix but then [Mother] was incarcerated.” Tr. Vol. II p. 86. In
June of 2025, Mother informed DCS Permanency Supervisor Jill Harges that
DCS “wouldn’t want [Child] to be visiting with her because she was mentally
unstable.” Tr. Vol. II p. 39.
[12] Also in June of 2025, Mother called and “cussed [Supervisor Harges] out” and
threatened to harm her, while “complaining that she wasn’t getting visits[.]”

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Tr. Vol. II p. 36. Mother demanded that visits “be supervised by a third party
however she … refused to provide a name for that third party.” Tr. Vol. II p.
37. Eventually, Mother informed FCM Mandeville that she wanted an uncle to
supervise a visit, but FCM Mandeville was unable to conduct a background
check before the next scheduled visit, which was supposed to occur the
following day. Mother later told FCM Mandeville that she had a cousin who
could supervise visits, but that cousin did not respond to FCM Mandeville’s
request that he complete a background check. Mother’s visitation with Child
never progressed from supervised to unsupervised, and she had not seen child
for about a month prior to her arrest in August of 2025.
[13] In October of 2025, Mother’s parole was revoked and she was remanded to the
Department of Correction after she was charged with invasion of privacy.
While incarcerated, Mother participated in “Recovery While Incarcerated[,]”
parenting classes, and “Alcoholics Anonymous[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 127.
[14] On October 7, 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother’s parental rights to
Child. The juvenile court conducted an evidentiary hearing on March 9, 2026.
During the evidentiary hearing, FMC Mandeville testified and recommended
that Mother’s parental rights be terminated and that Child be adopted by Foster
Mother. FCM Mandeville stated that she believed termination to be in Child’s
best interests because Child is “bonded to his placement[,]” “thinks that he has
a brother and sister in that placement[,]” and “thinks [Foster Mother] is his
mom.” Tr. Vol. II p. 105. FCM Mandeville explained that Child has resided in
Foster Mother’s home for “most of his life.” Tr. Vol. II p. 105.

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[15] Guardian ad Litem (“GAL”) Thomas Allen also recommended the termination
of Mother’s parental rights to Child. While GAL Allen acknowledged that
Mother had completed some services while incarcerated, he testified that he
had not seen any evidence demonstrating that she had benefitted from them.
GAL Allen testified that he did not believe that Mother had resolved her
problems with alcohol abuse or that she could provide Child with permanency
as a sober caregiver.
[16] On March 13, 2026, the juvenile court issued an order terminating Mother’s
parental rights to Child. In its order, the juvenile court found that Child had
been removed from Mother’s care for at least fifteen of the most recent twenty-
two months, Mother had been uncooperative with services and belligerent to
work with, Mother had failed to successfully complete the court-ordered
services aimed at remedying the reasons for Child’s removal from her care and
reunification, termination of Mother’s parental rights is in Child’s best interests,
and DCS has a satisfactory plan for Child’s care, i.e., adoption by Child’s
current placement.
Discussion and Decision
[17] “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the
traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Bester
v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Although
parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the
termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their

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parental responsibilities. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001),
trans. denied. Parental rights, therefore, are not absolute and must be
subordinated to the best interests of the child. Id. Termination of parental
rights is proper where the child’s emotional and physical development is
threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the child is irreversibly
harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently
impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.
[18] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, we will not reweigh the
evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Term. of
Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only
consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court’s decision and reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes
findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights,
our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the
evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the
legal conclusions. Id.
[19] In deference to the juvenile court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we
set aside the juvenile court’s findings and judgment terminating a parent-child
relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. “A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.”
Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the
juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact, or the conclusions do not
support the judgment. Id.

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[20] In order to terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child, DCS must prove that
there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child and that
termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child’s best interests. Ind.
Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)–(3).2 Of relevance to this case, Indiana Code section 31-
35-2-4(c)(1) further provides that DCS must also prove one or more of the
following:
(2) That:
(A) the child has been removed from the parent and
has been under the supervision of a local office or
probation department for at least fifteen (15) months
of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning
with the date the child is removed from the home as a
result of the child being alleged to be a child in need
of services or a delinquent child; and
(B) despite the department’s reasonable efforts to
preserve and reunify the child’s family under [Indiana
Code section] 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been
unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in
the child being placed in care outside the parent’s
home.
(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement
outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of
2 Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 was amended effective March 11, 2024, and again effective July 1, 2025.
DCS filed its petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to Child on October 9, 2025. Although Mother
cites a prior version of the statute in her appellate brief, we apply the version of the statute in effect at the time
DCS petitioned to terminate her parental rights.

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the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being,
safety, physical health, or life of the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d). Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the termination of her parental rights, arguing that DCS failed to prove
one of the alleged factors set forth in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) and that
termination of the parental relationship was in Child’s best interests.
I. The Evidence is Sufficient to Satisfy Indiana Code
section 31-35-2-4(c)(1).
[21] In this case, DCS alleged that termination of Mother’s parental rights was
warranted under subsections (d)(2), (d)(3), and (d)(4). Indiana Code section 31-
35-2-4(c)(1) explicitly provides that DCS must prove “one (1) or more of the
circumstances described in subsection (d)[.]” (Emphasis added). Thus, DCS
was only required to prove one of the circumstances listed in subsection (d) in
support of its petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to Child. See
generally In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (addressing the
prior version of the statute and explaining that because Indiana Code section
31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) had used the word “or” and had therefore been written in the
disjunctive, the juvenile court had only been required to find that one prong of
subsection (B) had been proven by clear and convincing evidence), trans. denied.
[22] As it relates to subsection (d), the juvenile court found that it was established by
clear and convincing evidence that

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i. [Child] has been removed from Mother and under the
supervision of the local [DCS] office for a least fifteen (15)
months the most recent twenty-two (22) months. See Order on
Initial Hearing and Detention dated June 22, 2023 in Cause
Number 02D08-2306-JC-000186.
ii. [Mother] has been uncooperative with services and belligerent
to work with, and therefore, she has not completed services
ordered and provided.
iii. By her own admission, [Mother] believes she has some
mental health issues.
iv. And, for all of these reasons, [C]hild has been out of the
home for a significant length of time … at least fifteen (15)
months the most recent twenty-two (22) months.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 4. Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s
determination that, at the time of the evidentiary hearing, Child had been
removed from her care, and under DCS supervision, for at least fifteen of the
most recent twenty-two months so we accept this fact as true. See Madlem v.
Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992) (providing that unchallenged findings
must be accepted as correct). Mother merely asserts that DCS failed to prove
that it had made reasonable efforts toward reunification. We disagree.
[23] The Indiana Supreme Court has held that when seeking to terminate a parent’s
parental rights, DCS is not required “to plead and prove that services have been
offered to the parent to assist in fulfilling parental obligations[.]” S.E.S. v. Grant
Cnty. Dept. of Welfare, 594 N.E.2d 447, 448 (Ind. 1992).

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Likewise, we have stated on several occasions that, although the
DCS is generally required to make reasonable efforts to preserve
and reunify families during the CHINS proceedings, that
requirement under our CHINS statutes is not a requisite element
of our parental rights termination statute, and a failure to provide
services does not serve as a basis on which to directly attack a
termination order as contrary to law.
In re J.W., Jr., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (internal brackets,
citations, and quotation omitted), trans. denied; see also In re T.W., 135 N.E.3d
607, 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“[I]t has been established that DCS is not
required to provide parents with services prior to seeking termination of the
parent-child relationship.”), trans. denied. “In determining the extent to which
reasonable efforts to reunify or preserve a family are appropriate under this
chapter, the child’s health, welfare, and safety are of paramount concern.” Ind.
Code § 31-34-21-5.5(a). “What constitutes ‘reasonable efforts’ will vary by case,
and as noted above, it does not necessarily always mean that services must be
provided to the parents.” In re T.W., 135 N.E.3d at 615.
[24] Mother claims that DCS failed to provide her with “any services pertaining to
alcohol addiction while she was out of incarceration” despite the “precipitating
cause of the underlying CHINS case” being her “2023 OWI.” Appellant’s Br.
p. 18. In its dispositional order, the juvenile court ordered Mother to complete
a drug-and-alcohol assessment and follow all recommendations; enroll in drug-
and-alcohol counseling, attend all sessions, and successfully complete the
counseling program; refrain from use of alcohol, illegal drugs, and other
substance abuse; and submit to random urinalysis testing, drug screens, and/or

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oral swabs. FCM Mandeville testified that Mother refused to complete the
ordered substance-abuse treatment and claimed that “she didn’t have an alcohol
problem[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 91. In addition, despite DCS making referrals for a
drug-and-alcohol assessment and drug-and-alcohol counseling through Park
Center, Mother failed to complete either. Mother also missed twenty
drug/alcohol screens. Contrary to Mother’s claim, the record reveals that DCS
did, in fact, offer her services relating to her alcohol abuse, but that she either
refused or failed to engage in and complete the services.
[25] Mother also claims that DCS had made a “bouncing referral” for her visitation
with Child, which Mother asserts “is not the architecture of a reasonable-efforts
plan[,]” and her incarceration interrupted her participation in services as DCS’s
referrals were inaccessible to her while she was incarcerated. Appellant’s Br. p.
19. With regard to the agency overseeing her visitation with Child allegedly
“bouncing” around, the record reveals that Mother was initially referred for
visitation through Iris but that the referral was “closed because of
noncompliance [after Mother] missed too many visits.” Tr. Vol. II p. 86.
Visitation was then referred through Lifeline, but that Lifeline closed out the
referral due to Mother’s participation being “so sporadic[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 86.
FCM Mandeville had attempted to refer visitation through Park Center only to
learn “that Park Center doesn’t do visitation[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 86. FCM
Mandeville had then referred visitation through Dockside and, after Dockside
closed out services, through Phoenix, by which time Mother was once again
incarcerated. The record reveals that the so-called “bouncing” nature of

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Mother’s visitation services with Child was entirely due to Mother’s
inconsistent participation, not any act by DCS.
[26] Additionally, Mother demonstrated an unwillingness to participate in services
during periods when she was not incarcerated. While her incarceration may
have interrupted some services, Mother had demonstrated a pattern of
inconsistent participation with services prior to said incarceration. When FCM
Mandeville attempted to discern why Mother was not participating in services,
Mother responded that “she didn’t want to talk about services.” Tr. Vol. II p.
92. Based on the evidence before the juvenile court, we cannot say that DCS
failed to make reasonable efforts towards reunification.3 Mother’s claim to the
contrary effectively amounts to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which
we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.
II. The Evidence is Sufficient to Satisfy Indiana Code
section 31-35-2-4(c)(3)
[27] We are mindful that in considering whether termination of parental rights is in
the best interests of the child, the juvenile court is required to look beyond the
factors identified by DCS and look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v.
Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In
3 While the juvenile court did not make specific findings regarding subsection (3) or (4), FCM Mandeville
opined that given Mother’s lack of participation in services and lack of progress towards reunification, there
was a “pretty good” probability that the conditions that resulted in Child’s removal from Mother’s care
would not be remedied and that continuation of the parent-child relationship would pose a threat to Child.
Tr. Vol. II p. 105.

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doing so, the juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to
those of the children involved. Id. “A parent’s historical inability to provide a
suitable environment along with the parent’s current inability to do the same
supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of
the children.” Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 373
(Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.
The [juvenile] court need not wait until the child is irreversibly
harmed such that her physical, mental, and social development is
permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child
relationship. Additionally, a child’s need for permanency is an
important consideration in determining the best interests of a
child, and the testimony of the service providers may support a
finding that termination is in the child’s best interests.
In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations
omitted).
[28] We have previously concluded that the testimony of a case worker and child’s
advocate can support a best-interests finding. See Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 374
(providing that the testimony of the case worker, GAL, or a court appointed
special advocate regarding the children’s best interests supports a finding that
termination is in the children’s best interests). In this case, both FCM
Mandeville and GAL Allen opined that termination of Mother’s parental rights
was in Child’s best interests.
[29] FCM Mandeville stated that Mother had not demonstrated an ability to benefit
from services as she had failed to participate in services when not incarcerated,

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continued to test positive for substances, and “continued to be incarcerated and
arrested for different crimes.” Tr. Vol. II p. 104. FCM Mandeville testified that
Child is “bonded to his placement … [w]here he’s been most of his life” and his
placement is willing to adopt him. Tr. Vol. II p. 105.
[30] GAL Allen testified that DCS had been unable to verify that Mother has a safe
and stable home because, when not incarcerated, Mother has refused to “let
DCS review the home and make sure it’s appropriate so it’s kind of a negative
inference of we can’t see the house I can’t assume that it’s appropriate[.]” Tr.
Vol. II p. 134. In addition, over the course of thirty-three months, Mother had
often “been incarcerated for different offenses.” Tr. Vol. II p. 134. GAL Allen
testified that he had seen “no evidence that she’s benefitted from services[,]”
noting that it was “on [Mother] because if you get incarcerated you can’t do the
services but even when she was out she didn’t follow through with the Parent
Participation Plan that would have substantially helped her[.]” Tr. Vol. II pp.
134–35. GAL Allen additionally noted Mother’s failure to participate in
alcohol-related services when not incarcerated but noted that while he did
appreciate that she did services while she was in prison I think
that’s helpful and I appreciate that she has done AA and I think
that’s helpful but I am a Doubting Thomas and until somebody is
out and has free will and can’t be incarcerated or just going out
and having a drink you know it’s not going to be a violation of
probation … we don’t know if she’s going to stay sober or not
and her testimony as to my questions was—was very troubling
and she seems to not recognize that if you’re an alcoholic you’re
and alcoholic forever and you’re probably going to involved in

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some sort of services whether it be AA or some other program to
give you support during that process[.]
Tr. Vol. II p. 135. GAL Allen also found troubling that over the course of
thirty-three months, Mother had visited with Child for only “approximately 16
hours[,]” leaving GAL Allen concerned that Mother does not have a
relationship with Child “anymore[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 135.
[31] Finally, GAL Allen opined that Child requires permanency. “[A] child’s need
for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests
of a child[.]” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 224. GAL Allen indicated that he
cannot simply “assume [Mother] can be sober[,]” noting that she would have to
demonstrate “that she is sober” and an appropriate caregiver before Child could
be returned to her care. Tr. Vol. II p. 135. GAL Allen opined that “we’re
probably looking at somewhere around [forty] months before she could ever
think about having that child back in her home” and that given that Child
is very young child and the only family he know is the one he has
now and as such I—I think it’s—it’s his right to have
permanency and he doesn’t have a relationship with—with mom
and I can’t see one being developed as thoroughly as the
relationship she [sic] has now with current placement over the
next six months[.]
Tr. Vol. II pp. 135–36 (first set of brackets in original, second set added).
[32] In addition to FCM Mandeville’s and GAL Allen’s testimony, the evidence
establishes that Mother has been incarcerated for most of Child’s life and has

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had minimal contact with Child. In addition, Mother has failed to demonstrate
a willingness to receive alcohol-related treatment when not incarcerated. DCS
has been unable to confirm that Mother has safe and stable housing. FCM
Mandeville testified that she did “not know that [Mother’s] housing is safe or
suitable[,]” noting that she “would try to schedule with [Mother] to go see it
and then she would make threats to me and I didn’t feel safe going to visit the
home usually.” Tr. Vol. II p. 84. Mother has also established a pattern of being
rude and belligerent with case workers and unwilling to participate in services.
The record establishes that despite being offered numerous services aimed at
reunification, Mother has not made meaningful progress towards such.
[33] In light of Child’s need for permanency, the opinions of FCM Mandeville and
GAL Allen, and the evidence that Mother has failed to make meaningful
progress towards reunification, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to
sustain the juvenile court’s determination that the termination of Mother’s
parental rights was in Child’s best interests. Once again, Mother’s claim to the
contrary is nothing more than a request that we reweigh the evidence, which
again, we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.
[34] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Jon J. Olinger
Fort Wayne, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-965 | October 16, 2026 Page 20 of 20
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
Evan Matthew Comer
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana