People v. Dambrell

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2026 IL App (5th) 240148-U
NO. 5-24-0148
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Saline County.
)
v. ) No. 19-CF-623
)
ZACHARIA C. DAMBRELL, ) Honorable
) Jayson M. Clark,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HACKETT delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Vaughan and McHaney concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to the maximum
sentence after revoking his probation for burglary when he committed two felonies
during probation.
¶ 2 Following a hearing, defendant, Zacharia C. Dambrell, was found guilty of violating his
probation for burglary, a Class 2 felony. 720 ILCS 5/19-1 (West 2018). Thereafter, the trial court
sentenced him to the maximum sentence of seven years in the Illinois Department of Corrections
(IDOC) to be served at 50% and one year of mandatory supervised release. On appeal, defendant
does not challenge his conviction but rather attacks his sentence as excessive. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm the order of the circuit court of Saline County.
NOTICE
This order was filed under
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed
under Rule 23(e)(1).
NOTICE
Decision filed 10/13/26. The
text of this decision may be
changed or corrected prior to
the filing of a Petition for
Rehearing or the disposition of
the same.

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¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On December 26, 2019, defendant was charged with one count of burglary (id.) and one
count of criminal trespass (id. § 21-3). The charges stemmed from a December 23, 2019, incident
where Brianna Bishop (Brianna) requested the Eldorado Police Department to drive past one of
her buildings on Beulah Street in Eldorado. The police found two individuals leaving the premises,
defendant and Tony Dambrell (Tony). Defendant informed Officer Dustin Gulley that he had been
staying at the building, and Tony was helping him remove his belongings. Office Gulley observed
copper pipe sticking out of a backpack in the trailer attached to defendant’s bicycle. Officer Gulley
asked about the pipe, and defendant admitted that the bag belonged to him and that he had taken
plumbing from the residence. Upon searching the bag, Officer Tom Martin found a hypodermic
needle. After being advised per Miranda,1 defendant stated that the hypodermic needle was his.
Defendant claimed that Dylan Bishop had given him permission to stay at the residence. Officer
Gulley attempted to contact Brianna but spoke to Brianna’s boyfriend, Brandon Beal, instead. Beal
informed Officer Gulley that Dylan had no authority over the property and that Brianna said “no
one” was supposed to be on the property. The police arrested defendant. Officer Martin contacted
Brianna, who informed the police that she wished to press charges.
¶ 5 On April 8, 2020, defendant entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to burglary in
exchange for the State recommending a sentence of 30 months’ probation and dismissing the
charge of criminal trespass and an unrelated pending criminal case. The trial court found that the
plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily and accepted the plea agreement, sentencing defendant
to 30 months of probation.
1See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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¶ 6 On September 2, 2020, the State filed a petition to revoke probation, alleging that defendant
had not reported his latest address to the Saline County Probation Office. A warrant was issued for
defendant’s arrest, bond was posted, and first appearance was set for September 28. Due to a
COVID-19 outbreak at the state’s attorney’s office, the hearing was reset for November 2. When
defendant failed to appear, a bond forfeiture hearing was set for December 7. Defendant appeared
at the December 7 hearing, and a status hearing for the violation of probation was set for January
7, 2021. Defendant failed to appear on January 7 but contacted the trial court and explained that
he was at work. By agreement, the status hearing was reset for March 18. On March 18, the status
hearing was reset for May 20 by agreement. On May 19, defense counsel informed the court that
defendant was in rehab, and the status hearing was reset to June 3. On June 3, the violation of
probation hearing was set for September 2. Defendant failed to appear and a warrant for his arrest
was issued on September 3. On October 8, 2021, defendant appeared before the trial court and
explained that he missed the September 2 hearing as he was incarcerated in the Jackson County
jail. Defendant posted bond and a pretrial hearing date was set for October 21, 2021. Defendant
failed to appear, and the hearing was continued to January 13, 2022. Due to another COVID-19
quarantine, the January 13 hearing was rescheduled to January 27. Defendant again failed to
appear, and a warrant for his arrest was issued on February 1.
¶ 7 On June 2, 2022, the State submitted an amended petition to revoke probation, adding six
additional allegations of defendant violating probation. The State alleged that defendant violated
his probation on August 24, 2021, by committing the offense of retail theft, a Class 3 felony, in
Jackson County. The petition noted that defendant pled guilty to the offense on March 9, 2022.
The State also alleged that defendant had been charged with committing aggravated domestic
battery, a Class 2 felony; aggravated battery, a Class 3 felony; and domestic battery, a Class A

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misdemeanor, respectively on or about May 20, 2022, in Jackson County. The State further alleged
that defendant failed to make payments toward his court balance as required by his probation and
failed to verify completion of his substance abuse evaluation or recommended treatment. A copy
of the guilty plea for the retail theft and a copy of the battery charges were attached to the amended
petition as exhibits.
¶ 8 On September 14, 2022, the warrant of arrest was served. The pretrial hearing was set for
October 13. At the hearing, defendant claimed he missed the January 27, 2022, hearing because
he had been admitted to the mental institution at Touchette Hospital in Centreville. The hearing
was reset to November 3. On November 3, a plea hearing was set for November 16.
¶ 9 At the plea hearing, the State informed the trial court that an agreement had been reached.
Defendant stated that he understood the terms of the agreement but informed the court that his new
medication made his brain “foggy.” The trial court did not accept the plea and rescheduled the
hearing for a later date. On January 4, 2023, the rescheduled hearing took place. The State informed
the trial court that defendant had agreed to admit that he had committed aggravated battery in
Jackson County on May 20, 2022, violating his probation in the current case. The trial court
admonished defendant that, should he admit to the violation, he would be resentenced on the
charge of burglary, a Class 2 felony with a sentencing range of three to seven years in prison.
Defendant admitted to the violation. The court found the admission was entered knowingly and
voluntarily and scheduled the sentencing hearing for February 15, 2023.
¶ 10 At the sentencing hearing, defendant alleged that he had sent letters to the trial court
requesting the withdrawal of his revocation admission. The State and defense counsel agreed to
continue the matter so a proper motion could be filed. Counsel filed the motion to vacate the
admission on May 1, 2023, arguing that defendant did not have a sufficient understanding of the

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consequences of the agreement. The hearing on the motion was held on May 2, 2023, and the trial
court allowed defendant to withdraw his admission.
¶ 11 A new hearing for the probation violation was held on June 1, 2023. Lisa Rice, supervisor
of the probation department of Saline County, testified that she was aware that defendant was
charged with the offenses of retail theft and aggravated battery in Jackson County while on
probation. The State offered a record of defendant’s convictions as evidence. The trial court found
that defendant violated his probation on April 8, 2020, by failing to update his address with the
Saline County probation office and by committing aggravated battery, and revoked defendant’s
probation.
¶ 12 On July 14, 2023, the trial court held defendant’s final sentencing hearing in this matter.
The State offered that defendant has a significant criminal history, having three prior convictions
in Mississippi: felony armed robbery in 2001, felony grand larceny in 2008, and misdemeanor
improper credit card use in 2017. For the 2001 conviction, defendant was sentenced to six years
in the Mississippi Department of Corrections, followed by three years of probation. Defendant
failed probation in 2006, which the State argued showed a history of failing to comply with the
terms of probation. The State also argued that, prior to the instant case, defendant was convicted
of misdemeanor retail theft in 2016 in Williamson County. The State indicated that, while on
probation for this matter, defendant had been convicted of two additional Class 3 felonies, retail
theft and aggravated battery. Based on defendant’s criminal history and the fact that he continued
to commit felonies while on felony probation, the State recommended that defendant’s probation
be revoked and that he be sentenced to six years in prison subject to six months of mandatory
supervised release, along with paying fees, fines, and court costs.

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¶ 13 Defense counsel argued defendant should receive further probation in order to obtain
mental health treatment. Defense counsel argued that defendant’s presentence investigation report
(PSI) showed that defendant had a long history of mental illness and that he struggled with
substance abuse. Defense counsel further argued that proper treatment and medication would set
defendant on the right path and that defendant would not receive the treatment he needs from
IDOC. Defense counsel requested that defendant be sentenced to 30 months’ probation and be
ordered to obtain mental health treatment. In response, the State noted that defendant had been
successfully discharged from a treatment program on May 18, 2021, but “continued to commit
more times [sic] after being successfully discharged from substance abuse treatment.”
¶ 14 After hearing argument, the trial court stated that it considered the PSI and all addenda and
supplements, took judicial notice of the record and court file, considered the financial impact of
incarceration based upon the financial impact statement, considered the arguments and statements
regarding the factors in aggravation and mitigation, and considered sentencing alternatives argued
by the parties. The trial court also stated that it considered the factors in aggravation as set forth in
section 5-5-3.2 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2 (West 2022)) and
in mitigation as set forth in section 5-5-3.1 of the Code (id. § 5-5-3.1).
¶ 15 The trial court then gave its view of the PSI, stating that there were notable issues in the
report in regard to whether defendant would be “likely to comply with a continued period of
probation,” and that defendant failed to come to court multiple times in the instant case. The trial
court considered that the case involved breaking into an unoccupied residence and stealing copper
pipe from the residence. The trial court stated that deterrence for crimes of that nature was
“particularly compelling” in this case as Saline County had an ongoing problem of people breaking
into abandoned homes and buildings and stealing copper to sell, usually for drugs. The trial court

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stated that it did not know if the copper was stolen for drug money in this matter, but nevertheless,
the court believed that people “breaking into abandoned buildings and stealing things from inside”
was a problem.
¶ 16 The trial court also considered that defendant committed two felony offenses while on
probation. Defendant’s criminal record also indicated that he committed grand larceny shortly after
release from the Mississippi Department of Corrections for the armed robbery conviction. The trial
court additionally noted that defendant had a history of missing court dates and had ex parte
judgments entered against him.
¶ 17 The trial court acknowledged that the PSI showed defendant had a history of substance
abuse and that substance abuse was implicated in the crime by defendant’s own admission in the
PSI. The trial court noted that defendant had a serious problem with methamphetamine but
completed treatment in 2021 or 2022. The trial court further noted that, while defendant had a
lengthy mental health history, in-patient treatments tended to be brief.
¶ 18 The trial court determined that continuing probation would “deprecate the serious [sic] of
the offense and be inconsistent with the ends of justice.” The trial court then revoked defendant’s
probation and sentenced him to seven years in the IDOC to be served at 50%, with credit for time
served, with an additional one year of mandatory supervised release. The court further
recommended defendant for controlled substances and/or alcohol abuse treatment in the IDOC.
This appeal followed.
¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 20 On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to
the maximum seven years of imprisonment after his probation revocation. He contends that the
trial court improperly considered his conduct while on probation and facts that were not in

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evidence. Defendant claims that the trial court further abused its discretion by failing to consider
mitigating factors and his rehabilitative potential. In making these arguments, the defendant
acknowledges that he has forfeited review of his claims because he failed to contemporaneously
object and raise the claims in his posttrial motion (see People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186
(1988)). However, he argues that we should review the issue under the first prong of the plain-
error doctrine.
¶ 21 The plain-error rule is a narrow and limited exception to the general rule of forfeiture.
People v. Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d 584, 593 (2008). Under the plain-error doctrine, a reviewing court
will review an unpreserved error when a clear and obvious error occurs and (1) the evidence is so
closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against defendant or
(2) the alleged error is so serious that it affected the fairness of defendant’s trial and challenged
the integrity of the judicial process. People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 564-65 (2007). The first
step in the plain-error analysis under either prong is determining whether an error occurred. Id. at
565.
¶ 22 The Illinois Constitution provides sentences are to be “determined both according to the
seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.”
Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. “This constitutional mandate calls for balancing the retributive and
rehabilitative purposes of punishment, and the process requires careful consideration of all factors
in aggravation and mitigation.” People v. Daly, 2014 IL App (4th) 140624, ¶ 26. Trial courts have
broad discretionary powers in imposing sentences because, having observed the proceedings, trial
courts are in the best position to “weigh such factors as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor,
general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age.” People v. Stacey, 193 Ill.
2d 203, 209 (2000).

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¶ 23 Therefore, where, as here, a sentence imposed by the trial court is within the statutory limits
for the offense, we will generally not disturb the sentence absent an abuse of discretion by the
court. People v. McGee, 2020 IL App (2d) 180998, ¶ 8. A sentence will be deemed excessive and
the result of an abuse of discretion where it is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the
law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 210. Although
a reviewing court has the power to reduce or alter a sentence, this power should be exercised
cautiously and sparingly. People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010). The appellate court
presumes that the trial court considered only appropriate factors in sentencing, unless the record
affirmatively shows otherwise. People v. Quintana, 332 Ill. App. 3d 96, 109 (2002) (citing People
v. Lurks, 241 Ill. App. 3d 819, 827 (1993)).
¶ 24 The Unified Code of Corrections sets out certain statutory factors in aggravation and
mitigation that a trial court must consider when imposing a sentence of imprisonment. 730 ILCS
5/5-5-3.1, 5-5-3.2 (West 2022). In fashioning the appropriate sentence, the court must carefully
consider all of the factors in aggravation and mitigation, and other factors, such as defendant’s age,
demeanor, habits, mentality, credibility, criminal history, general moral character, social
environment, and education as well as the nature and circumstances of the crime and of defendant’s
conduct in the commission of the crime. People v. Calhoun, 404 Ill. App. 3d 362, 385 (2010). This
determination must be based on the particular circumstances of the case. People v. Brown, 2015
IL App (1st) 130048, ¶ 41 (citing People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53 (1999)). When resentencing a
defendant after probation is revoked, the trial court can impose any sentence that was appropriate
for the original offense. 730 ILCS 5/5-6-4(e) (West 2022).

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¶ 25 A. Aggravating Factors
¶ 26 Defendant first claims that the trial court erred and abused its discretion during sentencing
by punishing him for factors outside of the underlying offense. Specifically, he argues that the trial
court improperly considered the convictions that led to the probation revocation and community
issues without basis in fact or law. The State argues that no error occurred as the trial court may
consider a defendant’s actions on probation and deterrence as factors in sentencing.
¶ 27 We begin with the presumption that the trial court considered only appropriate factors in
sentencing, unless the record affirmatively shows otherwise. Quintana, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 109. To
that end, we consider the record of the sentencing hearing as a whole, rather than focusing on “a
few words or statements” from the court. People v. Brown, 2019 IL App (5th) 160329, ¶ 18. When
sentencing a defendant after a probation revocation, the trial court may consider defendant’s
conduct on probation in assessing his “history and character.” People v. Willett, 44 Ill. App. 3d
545, 551 (1976). A trial court may also consider a defendant’s conduct while on probation “ ‘in
assessing the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation.’ ” People v. Pina, 2019 IL App (4th) 170614,
¶ 30 (quoting People v. Palmer, 352 Ill. App. 3d 891, 895 (2004)). Additionally, the trial court
may “ ‘give reasonable consideration to the need for deterrence as a factor in the imposition of a
sentence.’ ” People v. Cunningham, 2018 IL App (4th) 150395, ¶ 27 (quoting People v. Cameron,
189 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1010 (1989)).
¶ 28 In support of defendant’s argument that the trial court improperly considered factors
beyond the underlying burglary charge, defendant relies on People v. Gansz, 2024 IL App (4th)
230243-U. In Gansz, the defendant entered into a plea agreement for a conditional discharge. Id.
¶¶ 6-7. The defendant then violated terms of the discharge by being charged with several new
offenses. Id. At the resentencing hearing, the trial court stated that the “level of criminality that

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has taken place” while the defendant was on conditional discharge was the “most disturbing” and
“most aggravating” factor and justified a longer sentence. Id. ¶ 38. The appellate court found the
trial court erred by using defendant’s postplea actions as the primary factor during sentencing,
holding that the trial court failed to properly consider the defendant’s PSI, prior criminal history,
and whether the underlying crime was violent. Id.
¶ 29 Unlike in Gansz, the record here does not support a conclusion that trial court improperly
considered defendant’s convictions while on probation as the primary factor in sentencing. The
trial court made no comment about the nature of the convictions nor as to any weight given to the
convictions. The trial court was given many factors to consider in evaluating whether the defendant
was likely to comply with terms of any potential probation sentence. Among the factors were
defendant’s convictions, defendant’s ex parte dispositions, his failures to appear in the instant case,
and the nature of his criminal history, which included a violation of probation. We find no
indication that any factor was improperly relied upon by the court. As the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by improperly considering defendant’s convictions while on probation, we find no
error.
¶ 30 We also find no error in the trial court’s consideration of deterrence as a factor in
sentencing. Defendant here argues that the trial court’s comment that it found deterrence to be
“particularly compelling” in this matter shows that the trial court relied on the improper factor of
societal harm. See People v. Corn, 358 Ill. App. 3d 825, 827 (2005). However, we do not look at
single sentences but the record as a whole to determine if an improper factor was considered.
Brown, 2019 IL App (5th) 160329, ¶ 18. In context, therefore, it is clear that the statement relates
to the need for deterrence as a sentencing factor, a statutory factor that the court may reasonably
consider in aggravation. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(7) (West 2022); Cunningham, 2018 IL App (4th)

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150395, ¶ 27. Therefore, we find that the court did not improperly consider societal harm in
sentencing defendant and no error occurred.
¶ 31 B. Factors in Mitigation
¶ 32 Defendant next claims that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider
defendant’s rehabilitative potential as a mitigating factor during sentencing. Defendant argues that
the trial court disregarded his history of mental illness and substance abuse, along with his
willingness to submit to treatment, and that sentencing him to the maximum term shows that the
trial court did not give those mitigating factors proper weight in its consideration. The State argues
that the trial court explicitly considered both defendant’s mental health struggles and his substance
abuse during sentencing and that defendant’s sentence was given with the goal of rehabilitation as
evidenced by the trial court requiring defendant to receive substance abuse treatment from the
IDOC.
¶ 33 While rehabilitative potential is a factor in sentencing, a sentencing judge is not required
to give it greater weight than other factors, including the seriousness of the crime. People v.
Kendrick, 2023 IL App (3d) 200127, ¶ 50. Further, “it is presumed that the trial court considered
all mitigating factors, including rehabilitative potential, and the burden is upon the defendant to
show the contrary.” People v. Connery, 296 Ill. App. 3d 384, 391 (1998).
¶ 34 The defendant alleges that this matter is similar to People v. Heider, 231 Ill. 2d 1 (2008),
and People v. Brown, 2015 IL App (1st) 130048. In Heider, a defendant with a severe intellectual
disability was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment for sexual relations with a 12-year-old when
he was 19 years old. 231 Ill. 2d 1. During sentencing, the trial court stated that the defendant’s
intellectual disability made him unable “to control himself” and “that should terrify the public.”
Id. at 11. As such, the trial court sentenced the defendant to the maximum sentence of 10 years in

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prison, beyond the State’s recommended statutory minimum of 6 years. Id. On appeal, the Illinois
Supreme Court determined that the defendant’s prior history, which included only traffic
violations, showed no indication that the defendant was dangerous in any way. Id. at 23. The
supreme court then held that the sentence was excessive as the trial court improperly considered
the defendant’s disability as an aggravating factor. Id. at 24.
¶ 35 In Brown, the defendant was sentenced to 50 years in prison for attempted first degree
murder when he was 16 years old. 2015 IL App (1st) 130048, ¶ 39. While firing at the victim, the
defendant’s gun allegedly jammed before the defendant fixed it and fired an additional two shots.
Id. ¶ 44. During sentencing, the trial court noted that there were many mitigating factors in the
defendant’s favor but stressed that “but for that gun jamming, [the trial] would have been even
more serious.” Id. ¶ 22. On appeal, the court held that the sentence was excessive as the trial court
had “considered uncertain speculative evidence” as an aggravating factor. Id. ¶ 44. The court
further held that the sentence was excessive as it “does not satisfy the constitutional objective of
restoring defendant to useful citizenship.” Id. ¶ 45. The court named the defendant’s youth, family
support, the fact that he was in high school, and single adjudication of delinquency for residential
burglary on his record as factors that indicated the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation. Id.
¶ 36 Like Heider, defendant received the maximum sentence despite alleging mental illness as
a mitigating factor in sentencing. However, this case is distinguished from both Heider and Brown
in multiple ways. The defendant in this matter was not a teenager when he committed the
underlying offense nor was it his first criminal conviction, both key factors indicating the
defendants’ rehabilitative potential in those cases. Indeed, the trial court in this matter declined to
resentence defendant to probation as he had both an extensive criminal history and had violated
his probation. Furthermore, the record shows that defendant’s mental health issues were not

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improperly treated as an aggravating factor, as they were in Heider. There is also no evidence that
the trial court considered uncertain speculative evidence, as in Brown. Moreover, while defendant
was sentenced to the maximum term of seven years imprisonment, the trial court ordered it would
be served at 50%, and defendant has the opportunity to serve less time in the IDOC.
¶ 37 The defendant here essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence and factors and to arrive at
a different sentencing determination. It is clear from the trial court’s comments that it weighed and
considered both the mitigating and aggravating factors, and we will not substitute our judgment
for that of the trial court. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing the defendant within the applicable sentencing range, and thus, there was no error.
¶ 38 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 39 For the reasons stated, we affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences.
¶ 40 Affirmed.

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