IDHW v. John Doe

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 50785

In the Interest of: Jane Doe I, A Child
)
Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age.
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF )
HEALTH AND WELFARE, ) Filed: October 3, 2023
)
Petitioner-Respondent, ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
)
v. ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
JOHN DOE (2023-20), ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Andrew Ellis, Magistrate.

Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed.

Boise Law Group; Jefferson H. West, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Peter A. Mommer, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

GRATTON, Judge
John Doe (2023-20) appeals from the magistrate court’s judgment terminating his parental
rights to Jane Doe (Child). We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 2, 2021, following her birth, Child was placed in foster care after testing
positive for methamphetamine. A petition for hearing under the Child Protective Act (CPA) was
filed on December 3, 2021, listing Child’s mother and no legal father. A shelter care hearing was
held on December 3, 2021, and the magistrate court awarded temporary legal custody to the Idaho

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Department of Health and Welfare (Department). On January 26, 2022, after a disposition hearing,
the magistrate court awarded legal custody to the Department.
On August 4, 2022, the State filed an amended petition, identifying a different person than
John Doe (Doe) as the father. The person previously listed on the birth certificate was the husband
to the mother (Mother) of Child at the time of conception and birth. On September 7, 2022, the
State filed its second amended petition identifying Doe, a resident of Arizona, as the legal father
based on a decree of paternity.
On November 15, 2022, the magistrate court entered the Child Protective Act Adjudicatory
Decree and Order Approving Case Plan as Amended to include Doe. The November 15, 2022,
case plan removed tasks 1B, 1C, and 1D from Doe’s case plan. Task 1B required Doe to maintain
a safe and clean home environment. Task 1C required Doe to complete a parenting class and
demonstrate the skills acquired. Task 1D required Doe to complete a mental health evaluation, a
substance abuse evaluation, or both, and treatment, if recommended. The only remaining task on
Doe’s case plan was Task 1A, which required Doe to complete an Interstate Compact home study.
On December 8, 2022, an amended petition for termination of parent-child relationship
was filed. On March 14, 2023, a trial on the amended petition was held. The magistrate court
entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a decree terminating Doe’s parental rights on
May 3, 2023. The court dismissed Counts I and II against Doe. Count I alleged that Doe had not
complied with the court-ordered case plan. Count II alleged that Doe abandoned Child. The
magistrate court concluded that the State had proven Count IV which alleged, among other things,
that Doe did not have the skills and/or ability to safely parent Child. The magistrate court identified
Doe’s history as a sex offender as a concern of heightened risk, but concluded that status alone
was insufficient to terminate Doe’s parental rights. The magistrate court found that Doe
“demonstrates deficits in his parenting” during the in-person visits. The magistrate court further
found that Doe had not shown that he was interested in and committed to being Child’s parent, as
Doe was not committed to the work of day-to-day parenting and viewed Child as a possession.
The judgment as to the father was entered May 3, 2023, terminating Doe’s parental rights
to Child. Doe timely appeals.

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II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the
decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243,
245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable inferences
in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated.
Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has also said that the substantial evidence test requires a greater
quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court’s finding must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence than in cases where a mere preponderance is required. State v. Doe, 143
Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood
to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. Roe
v. Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006). Further, the magistrate court’s decision
must be supported by objectively supportable grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600.
III.
ANALYSIS
Doe alleges the magistrate court’s judgment terminating his parental rights to Child should
be reversed because: (1) the Department failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite Child with
Doe; (2) Doe was not allowed to explore the bias of the social worker; (3) the record does not
support a finding that Doe neglected Child; and (4) the record does not support a finding that
termination of Doe’s parental rights is in the best interests of Child.
A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her
child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341,
343 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the
Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that, wherever possible, family
life should be strengthened and preserved. I.C. § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of due
process must be met when terminating the parent-child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383,
386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006). Due process requires that the grounds for terminating a parent-
child relationship be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Because a fundamental liberty
interest is at stake, the United States Supreme Court has determined that a court may terminate a

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parent-child relationship only if that decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); see also I.C. § 16-2009; In re Doe, 146 Idaho 759,
761-62, 203 P.3d 689, 691-92 (2009); Doe, 143 Idaho at 386, 146 P.3d at 652.
Idaho Code § 16-2005 permits a party to petition the court for termination of the parent-
child relationship when it is in the child’s best interests and any one of the following five factors
exist: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between the child
and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities for a
prolonged period that will be injurious to the health, morals, or well-being of the child; or (e) the
parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time. Each statutory
ground is an independent basis for termination. Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 1117.
A. Reasonable Efforts
Doe argues that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite Child with Doe
by failing to implement a case plan for Doe until after the permanency goal was changed from
reunification to termination and adoption.1 Doe points to delays in obtaining DNA results which
truncated the time from establishment of paternity to the termination trial.
The CPA contemplates that the Department will make reasonable efforts at reunification
during the pendency of CPA proceedings. In re Doe, 156 Idaho 682, 688 n.3, 330 P.3d 1040, 1046
n.3 (2014). “However, whether the Department has made reasonable efforts at reunification is not
part of the magistrate court’s analysis when terminating parental rights on the grounds of neglect.”
Id.; see I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b)(i)-(ii). The Department’s efforts at reunification should be addressed
during the CPA proceedings by motion or argument to the court under I.C. § 16-1622(2)(g)(iii).
In re Doe, 156 Idaho at 688 n.3, 330 P.3d at 1046 n.3. To the extent Doe argues the Department
failed to make reasonable efforts at reunification, such argument is irrelevant to this Court’s
determination of whether the magistrate court erred in terminating Doe’s parental rights.
Therefore, the sufficiency of the Department’s efforts at reunification are not properly before this
Court on appeal.

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We note that, while Doe cites to the record in his statement of the case, there are no citations
to the record in the argument section of his brief. Citations to the record are not required in the
statement of the case, I.A.R. 35(a)(3), but are required in the argument section of the brief, I.A.R.
35(a)(6). This Court will not search the record on appeal for error, nor is it the Court’s obligation to
reference the statement of the case to find support for assertions in the argument section. See Idaho
Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 103, 113, 244 P.3d 247, 257 (Ct. App. 2010).

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B. Witness Bias
Doe contends that the magistrate court erred in sustaining the State’s objections to Doe’s
questioning of the social worker. Specifically, the magistrate court ruled that Doe’s attempts
during cross-examination of the social worker to establish the social worker’s bias in favor of the
foster family was irrelevant. Evidence that is relevant to a material issue is generally
admissible. State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, 670-71, 462 P.3d 1125, 1134-35 (2020). Evidence is
relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence. I.R.E. 401; Garcia, 166 Idaho at 670, 462 P.3d at 1134. Whether a fact is of
consequence or material is determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented by the
parties. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 671, 227 P.3d 918, 925 (2010). The Supreme Court has
held “that the scope or extent of cross-examination tending to show interest or bias rests largely in
the sound discretion of the trial court.” Hall v. Bannock County, 81 Idaho 256, 261, 340 P.2d 855,
857 (1959).
The magistrate court found the questions aimed at establishing the social worker’s bias
towards the foster family were irrelevant to whether Doe neglected Child. The magistrate court
found that Doe’s counsel’s line of questioning of the social worker was seeking to elicit her
personal desires regarding Child’s placement and stated that “this court has no authority over foster
placement, has no authority over adoptive placement. It’s not relevant to any decision I’m going
to make in this case.” Questions regarding favoritism as to Child’s eventual placement were not
relevant to the issue of termination. The magistrate court was within its discretion in precluding
Doe’s questions of the social worker regarding placement bias.
C. Neglect
The magistrate court found a statutory basis for terminating Doe’s parental rights to Child
based on neglect. The magistrate court found that Doe lacks the skills and/or ability to safely
parent Child. On appeal, Doe argues the magistrate court erred in finding he neglected Child.
Specifically, Doe argues that the magistrate court’s order to remove tasks from the case plan was
to the detriment of Doe because the magistrate court then relied upon Doe’s alleged failures in
regard to those tasks as evidence of his neglect.
Idaho Code § 16-2002(3)(a) defines “neglect” as any conduct included in I.C. § 16-1602(31).
Section 16-1602(31)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a child is neglected when the child is without

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proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control necessary for his or
her well-being because of the conduct or omission of his or her parents, guardian, or other custodian
or their neglect or refusal to provide them. Neglect also exists where the parent has failed to comply
with the court’s orders or the case plan in a child protective act case and the Department has had
temporary or legal custody of the child for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months and
reunification has not been accomplished by the last day of the fifteenth month in which the child has
been in the temporary or legal custody of the Department. I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b).
The Department sought termination of Doe’s parental rights based on an allegation of
neglect for failing to provide proper parental care and control, or subsistence, education, medical
or other care or control necessary for the children’s well-being. See I.C. § 16-1602(31)(a). In
particular, the State alleged that Doe: (1) failed to demonstrate an understanding of Child’s needs;
(2) failed to show an interest in Child’s life after the paternity test was completed; and (3) lacked
the insight and ability to raise Child.
Neglect is not found on the basis of what a parent is able to do, but rather based on what
is necessary for a child’s well-being. Doe v. Doe I, 162 Idaho 653, 659, 402 P.3d 1106, 1112
(2017). The magistrate court found, by “an abundance of clear and convincing evidence,” that
Doe neglected Child, including: Doe’s lack of commitment to being a parent, little to no
understanding of Child’s developmental stages, and Doe’s inability to “function in the
community.”
The magistrate court found that Doe’s actions and statements reflected a lack of
commitment to raising Child. For instance, when the Department tried to assist with helping Doe
understand what Child needed during visits, Doe responded with “defensiveness and anger.”
Further, the magistrate court stated that “the court has grave concerns how Doe will react when
faced with adversity” and the challenges of raising a toddler. During one of the three in-person
visits with Child, Doe deferred to his mother for parenting duties. As to Doe’s understanding of
Child’s developmental stages, the magistrate court noted that “Doe expected a fourteen (14) month
[old child] only to reciprocate expressions of affections over a video call and became angry when
she didn’t.”
Lastly, the magistrate court expressed grave concern over Doe’s mental stability. Doe is a
registered sex offender and was imprisoned for five years from a conviction in 2002. Doe testified
that he received full SSI disability and that his five years in prison “institutionalized him such that

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he cannot function in the community.” The magistrate court saw no physical limitations which
would qualify Doe for SSI benefits and understandably concluded that Doe’s actions and testimony
that he is unable to function in the community was due to mental health issues. The magistrate
court expressed “significant concern” about Doe’s basic ability to solo parent a vulnerable child.
Doe argues that the magistrate court’s basis for neglect is erroneous because the November
2022 order removed two tasks from the case plan that would have provided the court with the
necessary information to address its concerns. Specifically, Doe argues that it was error to remove
the parenting class and mental health and substance abuse evaluation and treatment tasks from the
case plan and then use those insufficiencies as justification to terminate his parental rights.
While a case plan may provide, as Doe claims, a “road map” as to what steps a parent needs
to accomplish in order to regain custody of a child, it does not delimit the bases for finding neglect
under I.C. § 16-2002(31)(a). Regardless of any tasks in a case plan, Doe would still need to
demonstrate the skills, abilities, and wherewithal to parent Child. The magistrate court dismissed
the count in the petition for termination which was based on the case plan. As outlined above, the
magistrate court instead found clear and convincing evidence that Doe was not able to provide
proper parental care and control, or subsistence, education, medical or other care or control
necessary for Child’s well-being. I.C. § 16-2002(31)(a). The magistrate court’s findings are
supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record.
D. Best Interests of Child
Doe argues that termination of his parental rights is not in Child’s best interests. The State
contends that substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s finding that
termination is in Child’s best interests.
Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court must next
determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parent-child relationship.
In re Aragon, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818 P.2d 310, 315 (1991). When determining whether
termination is in the child’s best interests, the trial court may consider the parent’s history with
substance abuse, the stability and permanency of the home, the unemployment of the parent, the
financial contribution of the parent to the child’s care after the child is placed in protective custody,
the improvement of the child while in foster care, the parent’s efforts to improve his or her
situation, and the parent’s continuing problems with the law. In re Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 198, 358
P.3d 77, 83 (2015); In re Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 111, 320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014). A finding that it

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is in the best interests of the child to terminate parental rights must still be made upon objective
grounds. In re Doe, 152 Idaho 953, 956-57, 277 P.3d 400, 403-04 (Ct. App. 2012).
The magistrate court determined that termination is in the best interests of Child based on
numerous findings. The magistrate court found that Doe did not show interest or commitment to
being Child’s parent. Doe was first told it was possible that he was Child’s father when Mother
gave birth and Child was in the Department’s custody. Doe requested a paternity test after he was
contacted by the Department and told that he may be Child’s father. Several months passed
between ordering the test and Doe’s completion of the test. The magistrate court found that Doe
did not seek involvement in the child protection case. These actions (or inactions) demonstrated
to the magistrate court that Doe was not interested in participating in Child’s life until he first
requested a visit at the advice of his attorney, nearly three months after DNA established his
paternity.
Further, the magistrate court found that Doe has not demonstrated the ability to meet
Child’s basic needs. Doe has not taken any action to familiarize himself with Child’s medical or
service providers. The magistrate court concluded that “the unspecified basis for [Doe’s] full
disability further calls into question his capacity to provide a safe, stable home for a sixteen (16)
month old child.”
Moreover, the magistrate court noted that the foster family is the only family that Child has
known since the day after her birth when she was taken into the Department’s custody. The
magistrate court found that Child is “thriving in [the foster family’s] home and she is deeply
attached to her foster siblings.” The magistrate court appropriately concluded, based on clear and
convincing evidence, that Child’s best interests are not to remove Child from the “only family”
Child has known to be with a “complete stranger” that has only spent “fifteen hours” with her.
These factors are objective grounds that provide substantial and competent evidence that
termination is in the best interests of Child.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Doe’s challenge to the Department’s efforts at reunification is not properly on appeal to
this Court, but should have been raised in the child protection case. Substantial and competent
evidence supports the magistrate court’s finding that Doe neglected the child and that it is in the
best interests of Child to terminate Doe’s parental rights, and Doe failed to establish any error in

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the magistrate court’s evidentiary rulings. Therefore, the judgment terminating Doe’s parental
rights is affirmed.
Chief Judge LORELLO and Judge HUSKEY CONCUR.

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