State v. Boyer

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 49991

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: September 26, 2023
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
GREGORY ADAM BOYER, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Nancy A. Baskin, District Judge.

Order denying motion to suppress and judgment of conviction, affirmed.

Bond, Black & Nightingale; J.W. Bond, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

GRATTON, Judge
Gregory Adam Boyer appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of
methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. Boyer argues the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during an unlawful seizure, thus violating his
constitutional rights provided by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. The order denying Boyer’s motion to suppress and his
judgment of conviction are affirmed.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Officer Gibson responded to a call from dispatch including information from a report made
by an REI loss prevention officer who observed a subject in dark clothing near the cargo bay doors
and thought the individual was suspicious and may be associated with previous burglaries. When
Officer Gibson arrived on scene, he saw a truck parked between a Chevron station and REI. The
Chevron and REI were closed, and this was the only vehicle in the parking lot. The truck appeared

1
to have just started or was already running when Officer Gibson arrived. As Officer Gibson
conducted the investigation, the truck left the parking lot. Officer Gibson made a radio advisement
to other officers to execute a stop on the truck.
Officer Lister saw the truck exit the parking lot without coming to a complete stop, drove
behind the truck, and activated his overhead emergency lights. The truck kept driving for one and
a half blocks after Officer Lister initiated the attempt to pull the truck over. Once the truck stopped,
and as Officer Lister approached, he saw Boyer make furtive movements throughout the truck.
Boyer was also slow in following Officer Lister’s verbal commands. Boyer would not comply
with Officer Lister’s commands to keep his hands still and on the steering wheel. Officer Lister
opened the truck’s door and removed Boyer. After Boyer was secured in handcuffs, Officer Lister
saw a glass pipe in plain view inside the truck; the pipe appeared to be a pipe used to ingest illegal
narcotics. A canine unit responded to the location, conducted a sniff, and alerted. Officer Lister
then searched the truck and located multiple cap syringes, a wig, multiple knives, a loaded pistol,
and a clear plastic bag containing a crystal-like substance that tested presumptively positive for
amphetamine.
Boyer sought suppression of evidence from the stop, arguing that the stop was executed in
violation of his constitutional rights and was not based upon reasonable suspicion. After a hearing,
the district court ruled the stop of Boyer’s truck was legal because (1) officers had reasonable
suspicion to believe Boyer was engaged in criminal activity at REI; and, alternatively (2) Boyer
violated Idaho Code § 49-651 by failing to come to a complete stop before turning onto the street
from the parking lot.
Thereafter, a jury convicted Boyer of possession of methamphetamine, I.C. § 37-
2732(1)(A), and possession of drug paraphernalia, I.C. § 37-2734A.1 Boyer appeals from his
judgment of conviction, asserting the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion
to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by
substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts

1
Boyer initially entered a guilty plea, then the court granted his motion to withdraw his plea.
The case proceeded to a jury trial where Boyer was found guilty.
2
as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d
659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
III.
ANALYSIS
Boyer contends the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence
discovered during a search of his truck because the search was the product of an unlawful
detention. Specifically, Boyer argues the officers unreasonably relied on the report from an REI
loss prevention officer that there was a burglary because the loss prevention officer could not
sufficiently describe the individual, the only criminal activity described by the loss prevention
officer was that the individual he observed on video surveillance was a darkly clothed figure who
may be a serial burglar responsible for several REI store robberies across the country, and the rest
of the loss prevention officer’s statements made clear he did not have any ability to identify the
man on the video. Boyer asserts that, because officers could not rely on the information provided
by the loss prevention officer, they did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop.
Further, Boyer contends that Officer Lister’s testimony that he observed Boyer commit a traffic
infraction before initiating the stop was not credible because Boyer testified he stopped before
entering the roadway and Officer Lister did not include any traffic violations in his report.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho
State Constitution protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” and applies to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho
804, 810, 203 P.3d 1203, 1209 (2009).2 The determination of whether an investigative detention
is reasonable requires a dual inquiry--whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception and
whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in

2
Although Boyer contends that both constitutions were violated, he provides no cogent
reason why Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution should be applied differently than the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution in this case. Therefore, the Court will rely on judicial
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in its analysis of Boyer’s claims. See State v. Schaffer,
133 Idaho 126, 130, 982 P.2d 961, 965 (Ct. App. 1999).
3
the first place. State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926, 931 (Ct. App. 2004); State v.
Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 361, 17 P.3d 301, 305 (Ct. App. 2000). A limited investigative
detention is permissible if it is based upon an officer’s reasonable articulable suspicion that the
detained person is, has been, or was about to be engaged in criminal activity. Bishop, 146 Idaho
at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210. An officer’s reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable
facts and the rational inference that can be drawn from those facts. Id.; see also State v. Sheldon,
139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). The quantity and quality of necessary
information to establish reasonable suspicion is greater than a mere hunch or “inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion” but less than what is necessary to establish probable cause. Alabama
v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989));
Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210. Whether the officer possessed enough necessary
information to establish reasonable suspicion is evaluated on the totality of the circumstances at or
before the time of the stop. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210.
A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the truck’s occupants and implicates the
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); Atkinson, 128 Idaho at 561, 916 P.2d at 1286. Under the Fourth
Amendment, an officer may stop a truck to investigate possible criminal behavior if there is a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the truck is being driven contrary to traffic laws. United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645,
648 (Ct. App. 1998). The reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of
the circumstances at the time of the stop. State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 483, 988 P.2d 700, 709
(Ct. App. 1999). The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause but more
than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer. Id. An officer may draw reasonable
inferences from the facts in his or her possession, and those inferences may be drawn from the
officer’s experience and law enforcement training. State v. Montague, 114 Idaho 319, 321, 756
P.2d 1083, 1085 (Ct. App. 1988).
The district court determined that Officer Lister had reasonable and articulable suspicion
Boyer was driving contrary to traffic laws when he exited the parking lot without coming to a
complete stop before entering the roadway.3 Boyer asserts the district court erred in accepting

3
Idaho Code § 49-651 states:
4
Officer Lister’s testimony that he witnessed Boyer failing to stop before entering the roadway.
Boyer argues that Officer Lister was not credible because Officer Lister did not tell dispatch that
he observed any traffic violation; did not tell Boyer after stopping him that he was stopped because
of a traffic violation; did not tell other officers that he witnessed Boyer commit a traffic infraction;
did not note the observation of a traffic violation in his police report; and first described having
observed a traffic violation at the preliminary hearing. Boyer also points to his own testimony that
he came to a complete stop.
The district court found Officer Lister’s testimony was credible and “that [Boyer’s]
testimony is not as credible as the officers.” The district court found that Officer Lister’s testimony
was corroborated by the circumstances. First, the district court accepted as reasonable and credible
Officer Lister’s explanation for why he did not include the traffic violation in his report and that
his primary basis for pulling Boyer over was reasonable suspicion for involvement in the burglary.
Second, Officer Lister consistently testified to observing the traffic stop, beginning with
questioning from Boyer’s counsel at the preliminary hearing. Third, Officer Lister’s testimony
about his observation of the way in which Boyer’s truck left the parking lot was consistent with
Officer Gibson’s testimony. While Officer Gibson did not recall if he saw Officer Lister following
Boyer out of the parking lot, Officer Lister had informed dispatch he “had eyes” on the truck and
Officer Gibson had turned his attention back to investigating the burglary. Fourth, Officer Lister
was familiar with I.C. § 49-651. Finally, the district court found that it was less likely Boyer came
to a complete stop because he was apparently in a hurry due to the fact that he was in a state of
partial undress. Based upon the district court’s factual findings and its express finding that Officer
Lister was credible, the district court held that Officer Lister had reasonable suspicion to conduct
a Terry4 stop due to an observed traffic violation.
We agree. Although Officer Lister did not cite Boyer for the traffic violation or reference
it in his report, those were not prerequisites to the validity of that basis for the seizure. Officer

The driver of a vehicle emerging from an alley, building, private road or
driveway within a business or residential district shall stop the vehicle immediately
prior to driving onto a sidewalk or onto the sidewalk area extending across the alley,
building entrance, or driveway, or in the event there is no sidewalk area, shall stop
at the point nearest the highway to be entered where the driver has a view of
approaching traffic.
4
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
5
Lister disclosed this basis for a seizure in response to Boyer’s cross-examination at the preliminary
hearing, and he specifically testified to the violation in relation to the motion to suppress. The
district court did not err in finding that Officer Lister was credible and had reasonable suspicion
to conduct the traffic stop based on Boyer committing a traffic violation. This Court will not
substitute its own credibility determinations for those of the finder of fact. State v. Adamcik, 152
Idaho 445, 460, 272 P.3d 417, 432 (2012).
Regardless of whether Officer Lister observed a traffic violation, the district court correctly
concluded that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Boyer as a possible suspect of the
burglary based on the loss prevention officer’s information and the totality of the circumstances.
A report received from an individual regarding suspected criminal activity may establish
reasonable suspicion when it would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that a stop
was appropriate. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210. A report received from a known
citizen is generally sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion because the citizen’s reputation can
be assessed and may be subjected to criminal liability if the provided information is untruthful. Id.
at 812, 203 P.3d at 1211. A report from a known citizen is presumed reliable. Id. Even though
reports provided by known citizens are presumed reliable, the report’s content and the citizen’s
basis of knowledge are examined under the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the
report gives rise to reasonable suspicion. Id. Factors indicative of reliability include, among other
things, whether the reporting party: (1) reveals his or her identity; (2) reveals the basis of his or
her knowledge; (3) the location of the reporting party is known; (4) the information was based on
personal knowledge of events as they occurred; (5) the information was subject to immediate
confirmation or corroboration by police; (6) the reporting party has previously provided reliable
information; (7) the provided information is predictive; and (8) the reporting party could be held
criminally liable if the information provided is false. State v. Huntley, 170 Idaho 521, 527, 513
P.3d 1141, 1147 (2022).
The district court denied Boyer’s motion to suppress after first making factual findings
regarding the content of the loss prevention officer’s (the citizen) report. Even though there was
limited information provided, several factors here show the report was reliable. The information
provided by the loss prevention officer included: (1) the loss prevention officer’s identity, phone
number, and location--loss prevention for REI in California; (2) the basis of their knowledge--a
first-hand observation of a burglary from watching the REI store from live surveillance cameras;

6
(3) the information was subject to immediate confirmation by police who arrived at the scene
within minutes of the call; (4) the information was “predictive” in that a person seen at the REI
could foreseeably have been just outside the store upon the police officers’ arrival and officers
were aware of a history of burglaries at REIs throughout the northwest; and (5) the loss prevention
officer could have been criminally charged if he made a false report to the police.
While the loss prevention officer’s report standing alone was particularized to Boyer, the
totality of the circumstances upon the officers’ arrival at the scene establishes reasonable
suspicion. The district court concluded Officer Gibson’s suspicion was reasonable based on the
information contained in the report and the circumstances existing at the time the officer arrived
on scene. It was dark outside and after midnight; REI and Chevron were closed; REI had been
burglarized three months earlier with entry made through a back door by use of a yellow crowbar;
there was a bulletin regarding serial burglaries at REI facilities across the Northwest and Boise
previously known to the officer; and the officer responded quickly to the scene. Additionally,
when the officer arrived at the parking lot there was only one vehicle present (Boyer’s truck) in
the parking lot near the cargo bay door of the REI with its engine running. The officer did not see
other individuals or vehicles near the area. The truck was then observed by Officer Gibson and
Officer Lister pulling out of its parking space, then it “went around, pulled forward and went
around the landscaping and then came back going eastward to then go south to turn right on
Emerald.” The district court correctly concluded that the totality of the circumstances gave the
officers reasonable suspicion to detain Boyer to investigate his possible involvement in a suspected
break-in at REI. Boyer has failed to show the district court erred in denying Boyer’s motion to
suppress.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The officers possessed specific, articulable facts providing reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity, either because of the traffic violation or the suspected burglary, to justify Boyer’s
detention to confirm or dispel that suspicion. Thus, the traffic stop was not unlawful. The district
court did not err in denying Boyer’s motion to suppress, and the judgment of conviction is
affirmed.
Chief Judge LORELLO and Judge HUSKEY CONCUR.

7