State v. Tonye Daye Awantaye

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 40799

STATE OF IDAHO, ) 2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 574
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) Filed: June 19, 2014
)
v. ) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
)
TONYE DAYE AWANTAYE, ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
Defendant-Appellant. ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Michael E. Wetherell, District Judge.

Order revoking probation and requiring execution of unified five-year sentence
with three-year determinate term for felony operating a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol and/or drugs, affirmed.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Shawn F. Wilkerson, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

Before GUTIERREZ, Chief Judge; LANSING, Judge;
and MELANSON, Judge

PER CURIAM
Tonye Daye Awantaye was convicted of felony operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, Idaho Code §§ 18-8004, 18-8005(5). The district court
sentenced Awantaye to a unified term of five years, with a minimum period of confinement of
three years, suspended the sentence, and placed Awantaye on probation. Subsequently,
Awantaye admitted to violating several terms of the probation. The district court revoked
probation and retained jurisdiction. Upon completion of the retained jurisdiction period,
Awantaye’s sentence was suspended and the district court returned him to probation. Following
a report of probation violations, the district court revoked Awantaye’s probation and ordered a

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second period of retained jurisdiction. Awantaye completed the second period of retained
jurisdiction, and the district court again suspended his sentence and placed him on probation.
Awantaye violated the terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation and
ordered execution of the original sentence. Awantaye appeals, contending that the district court
abused its discretion in revoking probation without sua sponte reducing his sentence. Awantaye
also asserts that the Idaho Supreme Court deprived him of due process, equal protection, and
effective assistance of counsel when it denied his motion to augment the record.
Awantaye asks this Court to hold that the Idaho Supreme Court deprived him of due
process, equal protection, and effective assistance of counsel when it denied his motion to
augment the record. We do not, however, have the authority to review and, in effect, reverse an
Idaho Supreme Court decision on a motion made prior to assignment of the case to this Court on
the ground that the Supreme Court decision was contrary to the state or federal constitutions or
other law. See State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 620, 288 P.3d 835, 837 (Ct. App. 2012). Such
an undertaking would be tantamount to the Court of Appeals entertaining an appeal from an
Idaho Supreme Court decision and is plainly beyond the purview of this Court. Id. If a motion
is renewed by the movant and new information or a new or expanded basis for the motion is
presented to this Court that was not presented to the Supreme Court, we deem it within the
authority of this Court to evaluate and rule on the renewed motion in the exercise of our
responsibility to address all aspects of an appeal from the time of assignment to this Court. Id.
Such may occur if the appellant’s or respondent’s briefs have refined, clarified, or expanded
issues on appeal in such a way as to demonstrate the need for additional records or transcripts, or
where new evidence is presented to support a renewed motion. Id.
Awantaye has not filed with this Court a renewed motion to augment the record or
presented to this Court in his briefing any significant new facts or a new justification for
augmentation beyond that already advanced in his motion to the Supreme Court. In essence,
Awantaye asks us to determine that the Idaho Supreme Court violated constitutional law by
denying his motion.
We adhere to our conclusion in Morgan that reviewing the denial of a motion to augment
the record by the Supreme Court is beyond the scope of our authority. If a party files a renewed
motion after the case assignment to this Court and presents new information or justification for
the motion, we have the authority to rule on the motion. Awantaye had an opportunity to present

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his constitutional arguments to the Supreme Court and that Court denied his motion. He has no
right to appeal that denial to the Idaho Court of Appeals, and we have no authority to consider
such an appeal. Therefore, we will not address Awantaye’s attempt to distinguish his case from
Morgan, based on his appeal from the sentence, because it still falls within the challenge to the
Idaho Supreme Court’s denial of the motion to augment.
It is within the trial court’s discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and
conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122
Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772
P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App.
1988). In determining whether to revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation
is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society. State v.
Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834
P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation
has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the
court is authorized under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to reduce the sentence. Beckett, 122 Idaho at
325, 834 P.2d at 327; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989).
The court may also order a period of retained jurisdiction. State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158,
162, 244 P.3d 1244, 1248 (2010). A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal
only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834
P.2d at 327. In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the
conduct underlying the trial court’s decision to revoke probation. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho
618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012). Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are properly
made part of the record on appeal. Id.
Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the
factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well established and
need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-
15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App.
1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing
the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho
722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).

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When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of
probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original
judgment. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 29, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our
review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring
between the original sentencing and the revocation of the probation. Id. Thus, this Court will
consider the elements of the record before the trial court that are properly made part of the record
on appeal and are relevant to the defendant’s contention that the trial court should have reduced
the sentence sua sponte upon revocation of probation. Morgan, 153 Idaho at 621, 288 P.3d at
838.
Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot
say that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation. Assuming that the issue is
properly before this Court, we also conclude that the district court did not err in ordering
execution of Awantaye’s original sentence without modification. Therefore, the order revoking
probation and directing execution of Awantaye’s previously suspended sentence is affirmed.

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