State of Idaho v. RICKY EDWARD McCLAIN

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket Nos. 52801/52802

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: May 28, 2026
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
RICKY EDWARD McCLAIN, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Cassia
County. Hon. Blaine Cannon, District Judge.

Orders revoking probation and directing execution of sentences, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Stacey M. Donohue, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kacey L. Jones, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

Before HUSKEY, Judge; LORELLO, Judge;
and MELANSON, Judge Pro Tem
________________________________________________

PER CURIAM
In these consolidated appeals, Ricky Edward McClain entered an Alford1 plea to possession
of a controlled substance, Idaho Code § 37-2732(c)(1) (Docket No. 52801). In exchange for his
guilty plea, an additional charge was dismissed. One week later, McClain again pled guilty to
possession of a controlled substance, I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1) (Docket No. 52802). In exchange for
his guilty plea, an additional charge was dismissed. In a joint hearing, the district court imposed
a unified term of four years with two years determinate in Docket No. 52801, a consecutive
sentence of two years determinate in Docket No. 52802, and retained jurisdiction in both cases.
Following the term of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended the sentences and placed

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See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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McClain on probation. Subsequently, McClain admitted to violating the terms of the probation,
and the district court consequently revoked probation and ordered execution of the original
sentences, returned McClain to probation, and ordered him to complete drug court. A few months
later, McClain admitted to again violating his probation. The district court revoked McClain’s
probation and executed the underlying sentences with credit for time served. McClain appeals,
contending that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation and that the sentences
are excessive.
It is within the trial court’s discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and conditions
of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324,
325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261
(Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In
determining whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation is achieving
the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. State v. Upton, 127 Idaho
274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; Hass,
114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation has been established,
order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the court is authorized under
I.C.R. 35 to reduce the sentence. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; State v. Marks, 116
Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). The court may also order a period of retained
jurisdiction. I.C. § 19-2601(4). A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only
upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at
327. In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the conduct
underlying the trial court’s decision to revoke probation. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621,
288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012). Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record
before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are properly made part
of the record on appeal. Id.
Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and
the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well established and
need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-
15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984);
State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the
length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722,

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726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Our role is limited to determining whether reasonable minds could
reach the same conclusion as the district court. State v. Biggs, 168 Idaho 112, 116, 480 P.3d 150,
154 (Ct. App. 2020).
When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation,
we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment.
State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 29, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our review upon
the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original
sentencing and the revocation of probation. Id. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the
record before the trial court that are properly made part of the record on appeal. Morgan, 153
Idaho at 621, 288 P.3d at 838.
Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the records in these cases, we
cannot say that the district court abused its discretion either in revoking probation or in ordering
execution of McClain’s sentences without modification. Therefore, the orders revoking probation
and directing execution of McClain’s previously suspended sentences are affirmed.

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