State v. Grove

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 52308

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: April 3, 2026
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
TESSA RYANNE GROVE, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, Canyon
County. Hon. Brent L. Whiting, District Judge.

Order granting motion to correct judgment of conviction and sentences, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jason C. Pintler, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Allison C. Jaros, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge
Tessa Ryanne Grove appeals from the order granting the State’s motion to correct her
judgment of conviction and sentences. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The State charged Grove with ten counts of attempted murder, two counts of aggravated
assault on law enforcement personnel, trafficking in methamphetamine, destruction of evidence,
possession of a controlled substance, obstructing an officer, possession of drug paraphernalia, and
using a firearm during the commission of a crime. The State also alleged Grove is a persistent
narcotics violator. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Grove pled guilty to four counts of aggravated
assault on law enforcement personnel, I.C. § 18-915(1)(b), and one count of trafficking in

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methamphetamine, I.C. § 37-2732B(A)(3). Grove also admitted to being a persistent narcotics
violator, I.C. § 37-2739. In exchange for Grove’s guilty pleas, the State dismissed the remaining
charges and two other cases pending against Grove. The district court held a sentencing hearing
where it orally sentenced Grove to concurrent, unified terms of ten years, with minimum periods
of confinement of eight years, for each of the four counts of aggravated assault. The district court
also orally sentenced Grove to a consecutive unified term of fifteen years, with a minimum period
of confinement of four years, for trafficking in methamphetamine. As a result, the district court
explained Grove’s total aggregate sentence would be twenty-five years, with a minimum period of
confinement of twelve years.
Thereafter, the district court entered a written judgment of conviction. The judgment,
however, did not accurately reflect the district court’s oral pronouncement of Grove’s sentences
and, instead, indicated her sentences for all five convictions would run concurrently. The State
subsequently filed an I.C.R. 36 motion to correct Grove’s judgment of conviction. The following
day, the district court granted the State’s motion and issued an amended judgment of conviction
reflecting the district court’s oral pronouncement of Grove’s sentences. Grove objected, arguing
the district court improperly granted the State’s motion without giving her an opportunity to
respond and that the district court lacked jurisdiction to correct the judgment under I.C.R. 36.
Thereafter, the State filed an amended motion to correct the judgment, citing additional case law
and arguing I.C.R. 35(a) was the proper mechanism for correcting the written judgment. After a
hearing, the district court found that it had properly amended the judgment to reflect its oral
pronouncement of Grove’s sentences. As a result, the district court granted the State’s motion and
issued an order of findings confirming the “proper sentence” was “declared at the sentencing
hearing.” Grove appeals.
II.
ANALYSIS
“Mindful that the [district] court’s action was consistent with the applicable law,” Grove
asserts the district court abused its discretion in granting the State’s motion to correct the judgment
of conviction. The State responds that Idaho law “required the district court to correct the
judgment of conviction to match the oral pronouncement of” Grove’s sentences. We hold that

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Grove has failed to show the district court erred in correcting her judgment to accurately reflect
the oral pronouncement of her sentences.
When there is a difference between the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written
judgment, the oral pronouncement of a sentence controls. State v. Shackelford, 174 Idaho 31, 33
551 P.3d 31, 33 (2024); State v. Timbana, 145 Idaho 779, 782, 186 P.3d 635, 638 (2008). In Idaho,
the only legally cognizable sentence in a criminal case is the actual oral pronouncement in the
presence of the defendant. Shackelford, 174 Idaho at 33, 551 P.3d at 33; State v. Wallace, 116
Idaho 930, 932, 782 P.2d 53, 55 (Ct. App. 1989). The legal sentence consists of the words
pronounced in open court by the judge, not the words appearing in the written order of
commitment. Shackelford, 174 Idaho at 33, 551 P.3d at 33.
On appeal, Grove contends the district court “abused its discretion by correcting her
judgment of conviction to reflect” the oral pronouncement of her sentences because “the original
written judgment sentencing her to a total of fifteen years, with eight years [determinate], is
sufficient to meet the goals of sentencing.” Grove’s argument is unpersuasive and inconsistent
with the applicable law.
The district court orally sentenced Grove to consecutive terms of imprisonment.
Specifically, the district court orally sentenced Grove to concurrent terms of ten years, with
minimum periods of confinement of eight years, for each of the four counts of aggravated assault.
The district court also orally sentenced Grove to a consecutive term of fifteen years, with a
minimum period of confinement of four years, for trafficking in methamphetamine. Toward the
conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the district court explained that the “total sentence” would
be “twelve years [determinate] plus thirteen years indeterminate for a total of twenty-five years.”
Grove does not argue the district court’s oral pronouncement was ambiguous, nor that it was
illegal. That Grove believes the goals of sentencing would be met by a lesser sentence does not
show the district court erred in correcting her judgment of conviction. Moreover, it is the district
court’s oral pronouncement of a sentence that controls when any disparity exists between it and
the written judgment of conviction. See Timbana, 145 Idaho at 782, 186 P.3d at 638. As a result,
Grove has failed to show the district court erred in amending her judgment of conviction to reflect
what the district court pronounced at her sentencing hearing.

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III.
CONCLUSION
Grove has failed to show the district court erred in correcting her judgment of conviction
to reflect the oral pronouncement of her sentences. As a result, the district court’s order granting
the State’s motion to correct Grove’s judgment of conviction and sentences is affirmed.
Chief Judge TRIBE and Judge Pro Tem MELANSON, CONCUR.

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