State v. Paulson

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 50657

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: February 13, 2026
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
)
ADAM BRADLEY PAULSON, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Derrick J. O’Neill, District Judge.

Order for child support, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Andrea W. Reynolds, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Elizabeth H. Estess, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

GRATTON, Judge
Adam Bradley Paulson appeals from the district court’s order for child support. Paulson
was convicted of vehicular manslaughter in the death of Madeline Duskey. Paulson argues the
district court abused its discretion in ordering Paulson to pay child support for Duskey’s two minor
children by failing to consider her lost income or the condition and needs of her children. We
affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Paulson struck and killed Duskey as Duskey was crossing the street. Paulson’s blood
alcohol level was measured at .238. The State charged Paulson with vehicular manslaughter, Idaho
Code § 18-4006(3)(b), and he was convicted following a jury trial. The Idaho Supreme Court
vacated Paulson’s conviction and the case was remanded to the district court. State v. Paulson,

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169 Idaho 672, 501 P.3d 873 (2022). Upon retrial, Paulson was again convicted of vehicular
manslaughter.
The district court ordered restitution to various individuals and entities and entered a civil
judgment pursuant to I.C. § 19-5307, ordering Paulson to pay a fine in the amount of $5,000 for
the benefit of Duskey’s minor children. The district court also ordered Paulson to pay child support
for Duskey’s children pursuant to I.C. § 18-4007(3)(d). The district court determined Paulson’s
annual earnings potential upon release from incarceration would be $28,440, and based on that
imputed income, ordered Paulson to pay $322 per month for the benefit of the two minor children
until the oldest child reaches the age of eighteen, and then $161 per month until the second child
reaches the age of eighteen. Paulson appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court’s restitution order is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Torrez,
156 Idaho 118, 119, 320 P.3d 1277, 1278 (Ct. App. 2014); State v. Bybee, 115 Idaho 541, 543,
768 P.2d 804, 806 (Ct. App. 1989). When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on
appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the trial court:
(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such
discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before
it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429
P.3d 149, 158 (2018).
This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of statutes. State v.
Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App. 2003).
III.
ANALYSIS
Paulson argues the district court abused its discretion in requiring him to pay child support
based on his projected future income without considering Duskey’s lost income or the condition
and needs of her minor children which, Paulson argues, are relevant factors for consideration.
Idaho Code § 18-4007, titled “Punishment for Manslaughter,” states in pertinent part:
In addition to the foregoing, any person convicted of a violation of section
18-4006(3), Idaho Code, that resulted in the death of the parent or parents of minor
children may be ordered by the court to pay support for each such minor child until
the child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years. In setting the amount of support,
the court shall consider all relevant factors. The nonpayment of such support shall
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be subject to enforcement and collection by the surviving parent or guardian of the
child in the same manner that other child support orders are enforced as provided
by law. In no event shall the child support judgment or order imposed by the court
under this section be paid or indemnified by the proceeds of any liability insurance
policy.
I.C. § 18-4007(3)(d). By its plain language, the statute does not set forth a list of relevant factors
but instead directs the court to “consider all relevant factors.” Citing this language, the district
court noted that the statute “seems to eschew a formulaic approach based strictly on the incomes
of any individual.” As such, the district court considered the $5,000 civil penalty Paulson was
ordered to pay to the minor children under I.C. § 19-5307; the civil action on behalf of the children,
including the resulting minor’s compromise for each child; Paulson’s income history; and
Paulson’s prospective income.
Paulson argues the factors set out in the child support guidelines, I.C. § 32-706(1), should
have been considered by the district court, including Duskey’s earnings and the condition and
needs of the children. Paulson acknowledges that I.C. § 18-4007 originally stated that support
shall be established in accordance with the child support guidelines then in effect. 1994 Idaho
Sess. Laws, ch. 413, § 1. The statute was amended in 2009 to delete any reference to the child
support guidelines. See 2009 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 166, § 2, p. 496. The amendment was
recommended by the Idaho Supreme Court because the child support guidelines “are intended to
apportion the support obligations for a child between the child’s parents” and “do not provide a
method for determining the support obligation of a third party.” SOP RS18289, S.B. No. 1004,
2009 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 166. Nonetheless, Paulson argues that the child support guidelines
provide a list of relevant factors for determining child support in this context, including a parent’s
earnings. The State argues the district court did not err by failing to consider Duskey’s earnings
since the requirement in I.C. § 18-4007 that the court do so was removed from the statute at the
behest of the Idaho Supreme Court.
Paulson argued in the district court that Duskey’s earnings should be considered instead of
Paulson’s earnings. The district court stated it was not considering Duskey’s lost income as “[n]o
evidence was presented to the Court as to the income level of Madeline Duskey at the time of her
death.” The State points out that Paulson had every opportunity to introduce Duskey’s earnings
into evidence but failed to do so. Paulson responds, “the fact that Mr. Paulson did not provide
such evidence does not mean that it was not a relevant factor for the court to consider.” However,
even if a deceased parent’s earnings are a relevant factor for I.C. § 18-4007 purposes, if Paulson
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believed that evidence to be relevant then Paulson should have presented it. The district court
cannot abuse its discretion by failing to consider a factor for which no evidence was presented.
Paulson also argues the district court erred in failing to take into consideration the condition
and needs of the children. Presumably, this assertion is based on I.C. § 32-706(1)(d), which states
that “the physical and emotional condition and needs of the child and his or her educational needs”
shall be considered when calculating child support. Paulson contends that this factor is relevant
because, while the amendment to I.C. § 18-4007 deleted reference to the factors in I.C. § 32-
706(1), the statement of purpose for the amending legislation stated an intent to “provide that the
support obligation shall be determined on the basis of all relevant factors, including the financial
resources and the condition and needs of the child.” SOP RS18289, S.B. No. 1004, 2009 Idaho
Sess. Laws, ch. 166. However, “The asserted purpose for enacting the legislation cannot modify
its plain meaning.” Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 892-93, 265 P.3d
502, 505-06 (2011). The statute does not state that the conditions and needs of the children are
relevant factors. Moreover, nothing in the statement of purpose in I.C. § 18-4007 equates its
language to that in I.C. § 32-706(1)(d).
Even if the condition and needs of the children are a relevant factor, Paulson makes no
claim that he argued the district court should consider this factor. Generally, issues not raised
below may not be considered for the first time on appeal. State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824
P.2d 123, 126 (1992). Paulson acknowledges that based on the evidence in the record, “we know
nothing about . . . the physical, emotional, and educational needs of the children.” Paulson
provided no argument or evidence that showed the physical and emotional condition and needs of
the children were relevant to an award of child support in this context. The district court can only
consider factors supported by the evidence presented.
To the extent Paulson argues the district court should have considered the financial
condition of the children, it did. In the district court, Paulson claimed child support should not be
awarded “given that the minor children have been provided for through a settlement with Mr.
Paulson’s insurance company,” and because the minor children’s father “petitioned the Court to
grant [that] settlement as well as release Mr. Paulson from any further liability regarding the minor
children.” The district court rejected these arguments and found it was required to impose an order
for child support in addition to any civil recovery, and “in no event” could such order be “paid or
indemnified by the proceeds of any liability insurance policy.” The district court considered the

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civil penalty, and the civil action brought on behalf of the children, including the resulting minor’s
compromise for each child. The district court then awarded child support for the children based
on Paulson’s earnings potential. The district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering child
support.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Paulson has not shown the district court abused its discretion in ordering child support.
Therefore, the district court’s order for child support is affirmed.
Judge HUSKEY CONCURS.
Judge LORELLO, SPECIALLY CONCURRING
Based on the plain language of I.C. § 18-4007(3)(d), I concur in the Court’s opinion. I
write separately to observe that the broad statutory authorization to “consider all relevant factors”
as it relates to awarding child support as a component of punishment for voluntary manslaughter
for victims with minor children does little to aid trial judges tasked with calculating a child support
award pursuant to I.C. § 18-4007(3)(d). It does even less to facilitate meaningful appellate review.
While I understand the stated reasons for amending I.C. § 18-4007 to eliminate reference to the
child support guidelines in the family law context, the absence of any standards presents its own
challenges—challenges courts at both the trial and appellate level will undoubtedly be required to
confront in future cases based on the current state of the law.

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